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1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
This book deals with the protection of socio-economic interests by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR; Court). The European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR; Convention)1 does not contain norms guaranteeing economic
and social rights, yet from the practice of the ECtHR it must be concluded that
this Court nevertheless, and increasingly, deals with cases concerning these
rights. It regularly judges on whether a given pension reduction was justified,2
whether the authorities’ efforts to provide adequate housing were sufficient,3
or whether a state should have done more to prevent health damage resulting
from environmental pollution.4 Dealing with socio-economic issues is a diffi-
cult and sensitive endeavour, and it highlights the complexity of the task of
the ECtHR as the final arbiter of fundamental rights conflicts on the basis of
the Convention.5 It illuminates the difficulties inherent in striking the right
balance between providing effective, individual rights protection and deferring
to the national authorities whose (democratic) decisions – especially in a field
like social policy – often need to be respected. In the light of this, the ECtHR
can hardly be blamed for not providing a very principled socio-economic case
law characterised by transparent and consistent reasoning. Nevertheless, given
the Court’s important but vulnerable position and the fact that the working
of the Convention system is dependent on the acceptance and implementation
of its judgments by the Member States, the question of how it can enhance
its reasoning in socio-economic cases is worth serious attention.6
The main aim of this research is to explore the possible use and added
value of the notion of ‘core rights’ for the ECtHR in dealing with socio-economic
1 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
2 E.g., Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04,
19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05.
3 E.g., Winterstein a. O. v. France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07.
4 E.g., Dubetska a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 10 February 2011, appl. no. 30499/03.
5 In fact, protecting socio-economic rights is a difficult endeavour for courts in general. See,
e.g., King 2012, pp. 8-9, who holds that ‘the best argument’ against social rights adjudication,
is the claim that it is a ‘risky enterprise’.
6 The socio-economic practice of the Court and the (potential) shortcomings thereof, i.e., the
topic and problem that are central to this research, will be further explored in, infra, Ch. 2.
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complaints. The notion of core rights, briefly stated, entails that a distinction
can be made between more and less important, or ‘fundamental’ aspects falling
within the (potential) reach of a fundamental right or fundamental rights
norm.7 Why exactly it is worthwhile to investigate the concept of core rights
in relation to the ECtHR’s socio-economic rights protection will be elaborated
in Section 1.2. Before doing so, it is important to provide some broader context
to the issue that is central to this research, by introducing the ECtHR and its
relation to certain features of and developments in judicial fundamental rights
protection.
The European Court of Human Rights is a supranational court tasked with
the interpretation and application of the rights enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights, a treaty signed under the auspices of the
Council of Europe (CoE) in 1950 and designed ‘to take the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declara-
tion’.8 Being the first of its kind, the ECtHR, together with the former European
Commission of Human Rights (EComHR; Commission), has developed the idea
of fundamental rights protection at a level beyond the state, including the
power to render binding judgments on the basis of individual complaints.9
As natural as this may seem today, in the 1950s supranational judicial enforce-
ment of fundamental rights was a novel phenomenon, and it is to a great part
because of the success of the ECtHR that since then the importance of inter-
national and supranational rights adjudication in our modern, multi-level legal
orders has generally increased.
What is this success story about? Starting with ten CoE Member States,
presently there are forty-seven European states that have signed and ratified
the Convention and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Especially after the fall of the Berlin wall, in the beginning of the 1990s, the
number of States Parties increased significantly and many Eastern European
states entered the Convention. Although this has not been without problems
as regards the quantitative increase of complaints as well as the qualitative
standard the Convention could set throughout the continent,10 the Court has
managed to maintain and even consolidate its important role as a safety net
for individuals confronted with interferences with their fundamental rights
by the state. By now, the Court has created an immense and rich body of case
law, which has provided content to the rights norms laid down in the Con-
7 It does not concern a possible hierarchy amongst rights (norms). See, further, infra, S. 1.3.
8 Preamble to the ECHR.
9 Art. 46 ECHR.
10 On the specific issues related to Convention protection in the former communist states,
see, e.g., Greer 2007, p. 105ff.; Sadurski 2012, Ch. 1.
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vention and in the several protocols that have been added thereto,11 but also
has influenced the understanding and the protection of fundamental rights
in national legal orders.12 The ECtHR’s decisions and judgments are broadly
accepted in the Member States and widely discussed by legal academics
around the world.
The ECtHR is not only known for its successful, pioneering role as a supra-
national fundamental rights adjudicator. In legal debate, the Court and its
practice have come to be mentioned as exemplary of several European and
global legal (doctrinal) trends related to fundamental rights protection. These
trends and developments illuminate what are perceived as some of the hall-
marks of the ECtHR’s practice, which provide an important background to the
topics central to this research.
First, there is the Court’s emphasis on proportionality review and balancing
in cases concerning interferences with fundamental rights. Where Aleinikoff
speaks of an ‘age of balancing’,13 and Möller of the emerged ‘global model
of constitutional rights’,14 both underline the current predominance of a
‘proportionality paradigm’ in dealing with clashes between individual and
collective freedom. The proportionality test, which has been developed to an
important extent by the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht), and has carefully been expounded by scholars such as Alexy15
(and more recently by Barak16), consists of multiple sub-tests. These concern
the questions whether an interference with fundamental rights served a legit-
imate aim, whether it was ‘suitable’, ‘necessary’, and finally proportional stricto
sensu.17 Of these different tests, especially the latter is seen as illustrative of
what proportionality is about. This strict proportionality test boils down to
‘weighing’ and ‘balancing’ the rights of the individual against the general
interest and/or the rights of others. It finds much expression in the Court’s
approach, in the sense that the reasoning of the ECtHR discloses a clear prefer-
ence for proportionality review and especially balancing. Partly this can be
11 For the text of the Convention, as well as the several protocols thereto, see www.conven
tions.coe.int. The two most recent protocols (Protocol No. 15 and Protocol No. 16) have
not yet entered into force.




15 Alexy 1985 (Alexy 2002).
16 Barak 2012. Also Möller’s ‘global model of constitutional rights’ can be understood as a
moral theory of rights focusing in particular on proportionality (Möller 2012). See also Klatt
and Meister 2012.
17 In different jurisdictions, the different aspects of the tests may differ slightly. See, for a
further explanation of the proportionality test, infra, Ch. 3, S. 3.4.2.
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explained by the wording of the various provisions of the Convention.18 On
the basis of this wording, the Court’s review of interferences with Convention
rights is usually guided by the question whether a fair balance has been struck
between the individual and the general interests at stake.19 For generating
an answer to this question, the Court takes account of the various considera-
tions relevant on both sides of the scale, to then reach a conclusion on whether
or not the Convention has been breached.20
Secondly, the ECtHR’s case law can be seen as prototypical of another
important doctrinal development in the field of fundamental rights, namely
the recognition of positive obligations. Just like proportionality review, positive
obligations are also argued to be part of the ‘global model of constitutional
rights’,21 and the link between the two indeed seems obvious: besides in the
context of measures taken by the state the question of whether something was
proportional or not can just as well apply to situations in which a state
allegedly failed to take action in breach of a fundamental right.22 In its case
law, the ECtHR has expressly created a doctrine of positive obligations, by
explaining that the rights enshrined in the Convention also give rise to positive
duties on the part of the state.23 Accordingly, if states want to comply with
the rights enumerated in the ECHR, they cannot simply remain passive but
instead have to take deliberate action and ‘interfere’ with the situations of
individuals. When the Court started to develop its doctrine of positive obliga-
tions, which it did already in the 1960s, some may have considered this re-
markable since the ECHR rights are negatively phrased and do not on their
face demand active engagement by the state.24 However, partly also due to
18 Cf. Arts. 8-11 ECHR. In the second paragraphs of these articles a limitation clause can be
found, which requires a limitation to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This requirement
is translated by the Court into a proportionality/balancing test. See also Art. 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the ECHR.
19 E.g., Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, ECtHR (GC) 19 June 2006, appl. no. 35014/97, para. 167
(concerning the question whether a fair balance had been struck between the property rights
of homeowners and the general interest that was served by housing legislation that set
particularly low levels of rent).
20 See, for an extensive study of the Court’s review of proportionality stricto sensu, Den
Houdijker 2012. For references to the Strasbourg practice in relation to the current pre-
dominance of the proportionality paradigm, see also Barak 2012, pp. 183-184; Möller 2012,
pp. 13-14, and Ch. 7.
21 Möller 2012, especially pp. 5-10 (with multiple references to the ECtHR).
22 That is, at least the question whether there has been a ‘fair balance’ (proportionality stricto
sensu) can also be applied to positive claims. Arguably, this is less or not the case for the
other elements of a proportionality test (ibid., pp. 179-180).
23 E.g., Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, para. 31. See, for an even
earlier example, Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on het use of languages in education
in Belgium, ECtHR 23 July 1968, appl. no. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63
and 2126/64, para. 9. See, on this doctrine generally, Mowbray 2004; Xenos 2012.
24 Indeed, the provisions taken up in the Convention generally start with the words ‘No one
shall …’ or ‘Everyone has the right to …’, which mirrors a negative duty of the state to
refrain from interfering with the different rights. Cf. Merrils 1993, pp. 102-103.
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the example set by the ECtHR, the concept of positive obligations has become
generally accepted in modern legal debate and practice worldwide.25
Finally, an interesting trend in constitutional law and fundamental rights
protection in particular, is the increased prominence of socio-economic fundamental
rights.26 Although this may seem less obvious, also in relation to this develop-
ment the practice of the Strasbourg Court is not seldom considered meaningful.
Ever since economic and social rights were laid down in international docu-
ments, they have been considered to be of a second rank status.27 The
dominant philosophical account of fundamental rights today still holds that
fundamental rights foremost prescribe areas of freedom related to the civil
and political sphere.28 Yet whereas the debate has long been about whether
socio-economic rights are actually ‘rights’ properly speaking, it gradually has
shifted towards a more constructive approach. This shift is visible in particular
in national constitutional developments, where it can be seen that especially
younger and non-Western constitutions include a reference to economic and
social guarantees, sometimes merely as directive principles,29 but frequently
also as self-standing individual rights that can serve as the basis for an indi-
vidual constitutional complaint.30 Also at the international level, however,
socio-economic rights catalogues have been supplemented by additional
protocols and (collective) complaints mechanisms allowing for states to be
held accountable for shortcomings in the provision of socio-economic rights
in a more forthright manner.31 In line with these developments, the ECtHR’s
case-law has supported and even strengthened the emerging perception that
there is or should not be a clear distinction between ‘“permissible” civil and
25 As a well-known exception, the United States can be mentioned. In the case of Deshaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989), 489 U.S. 189, 169, the US Supreme
Court held with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[i]ts purpose was to protect
the people from the state, not to ensure that the state protected them from each other. The
Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to
the democratic political process’.
26 See, for a recent overview of this trend, Wesson 2014. Also Möller 2012, p. 5, speaks of
the ‘growing acceptance of socio-economic rights’.
27 Fredman 2008, pp. 1-2.
28 Cf. Möller 2012, p. 2, who holds that the different elements of the ‘dominant narrative’ of
the philosophy of fundamental rights have meanwhile been given up. See also Fredman
2008, p. 2.
29 Cf. Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Constitution of India.
30 A famous example is the Constitution of South Africa that lists a number of justiciable
economic and social rights. See, infra, Ch. 6.
31 See the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter (Council of Europe, 5 May 1988,
ETS 128 (entry into force 5 September 1992)), creating a collective complaints mechanism,
as well as the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 5 March 2009, A/RES/63/117, entered into force
5 May 2013), which creates a possibility for individual communications. Also the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/01)),
under the header of ‘Solidarity’, contains a number of socio-economic rights.
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political rights review and “impermissible” social rights review’.32 As will
become abundantly clear throughout this book, the ECtHR has for some decades
now shown that it is not possible to strictly distinguish between civil and
political and economic and social protection in ensuring the rights laid down
in the Convention.33 The Convention norms are of a classic, civil and political
kind, but the Court has explained these norms in an extensive fashion, thereby
also expounding their socio-economic dimension.34 It has become (increasing-
ly) engaged in cases concerning topics like housing, health care, and social
security, thereby underlining that there is no fatal tension between socio-
economic rights and judicial review of individual cases in this field. Even in
a supranational judicial context, in which this is arguably even more problem-
atic than at the national, constitutional level,35 the practice of the ECtHR has
shown that it is possible for a court to decide on socio-economic measures.36
Altogether, the role the ECtHR plays in regard to the different developments
in fundamental rights protection emphasises its prominent position and ‘fore-
runner’ character. The ECtHR not only sets an unprecedented example of
supranational rights adjudication as such; also when it comes to more concrete
doctrinal and other developments, its practice can be perceived of as ‘avant-
garde’. It often breaks ground, if not by creating new trends then at least by
confirming ongoing changes in the perception of fundamental rights and the
way these should be dealt with. This notwithstanding, it must not be forgotten
that the Court is constantly moving on thin ice. It always needs to be mindful
of its supranational position and take stock of the prevailing ideas on funda-
mental rights protection of the States Parties to the Convention. More precisely,
it cannot do without the States Parties’ support and should be careful not to
overstep the boundaries of its competences. In this regard the question arises
whether the success story of the Court this introduction started out with, may
in some way also be endangered by the various (doctrinal) developments
mentioned. The Court’s task does not seem unlimited and especially when
32 O’Cinneide 2014, p. 300. Speaking of the longstanding perceived distinctions between civil
and political rights, and economic and social rights, Saul et al. 2014, p. 1, note that ‘[t]he
burgeoning scholarship in recent decades has exhaustively demonstrated how these sup-
posed fault lines are both too simplistic and overly deterministic’.
33 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 26.
34 In the words of Möller 2012, p. 9: ‘The ECtHR, while regularly stressing that the ECHR
“does not, as such, guarantee socio-economic rights”, has accepted some socio-economic
entitlements mainly through the use of its doctrine of positive obligations … as flowing
from several Convention articles … ’.
35 An interesting example of the possibility of socio-economic rights protection at the national
level is the German Bundesverfassungsgericht’s recognition of an individual right to a sub-
sistence minimum (BVerfGE 125, 175, 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 February 2010 (Hartz IV)). This right
is based on the guarantee of human dignity (Art. 1(1) of the German Grundgesetz) in
conjunction with the ‘social state principle’ (Art. 20(1) GG). See, infra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.
36 For an extensive overview, see Koch 2009.
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adding the different trends it appears that there is a risk that the Court obtains
a greater role than it can legitimately claim. The recognition of positive obliga-
tions in combination with that of Convention requirements related to economic
and social rights can lead to all-encompassing rights review in the sense that
the Court’s jurisdiction – and thereby its involvement in national (social) policy
and democratic decisions – can become almost limitless. Moreover, the question
may arise whether proportionality review and especially balancing exercises
are the appropriate means for a (supranational) judicial body to decide on
all kinds of issues while trying to stay away from political decisions on the
distribution of rights and goods throughout society. At least in theory, it can
be argued, the various developments of which the ECtHR’s practice is con-
sidered a powerful example together may have the result that the ECtHR
becomes the final ‘decision-maker’ in virtually all conflicts concerning indi-
vidual interests. Especially in a Europe characterised by diversity this does
not seem desirable.
In addition, there is a practical downside to the success of the Convention
system in relation to the developments mentioned. A first problem the Court
has been confronted with is the ‘docket crisis’ of the past years. The immense
and growing number of applications that reach the Strasbourg Court has
influenced its work almost to the point of collapse.37 Serious institutional
measures had to be taken to subdue the immediate danger stemming from
the case-overload,38 and even though the danger of actual collapse seems
to have decreased by now, the question remains whether the issue has been
tackled in a lasting manner. The problem the Court has been and is still facing
cannot be seen apart from its expansive interpretation of the Convention rights
including the socio-economic aspects thereof. That is, its case law might give
the impression that it is possible to phrase almost every thinkable interest in
terms of the ECHR, thereby qualifying for Convention protection.39
A second, related issue is the criticism that is voiced concerning the practice
of the ECtHR by both academics and lawyers, but even more prominently by
politicians who in some Member States even suggest leaving the Convention.40
37 For statistical information on the number of applications, judgments, by state, etc., see
www.echr.coe.int (under ‘Statistics’).
38 Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, for example, has amended the Convention so that it now
creates the possibility for single judges to reject manifestly inadmissible applications –
committees of three judges may now declare an application inadmissible and decide on
the merits of a case where the matter at hand is determined by well-established case law
of the Court (see Arts. 27-28 ECHR).
39 Cf. Gerards 2012, on the ‘prism of fundamental rights’ and the fact that on the basis of
‘human opportunism’, in combination with the Court’s analogical reasoning, new aspects
of rights may constantly be recognised (pp. 179-180).
40 Especially the Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the Swiss People’s Party have
been critical as regards their respective countries’ membership. Further criticism has been
visible in for example the Netherlands and Belgium. See, generally, Gerards 2014a, pp.
86-88.
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Although this criticism is not specifically related to the positive, socio-economic
protection the Court has offered,41 it does explicitly concern the too far-reach-
ing impact of the Convention and the allegedly activist role of the Court in
this regard.42 It is considered problematic that the ECtHR assumes the final
say on a broad variety of topics that not always seem to concern what were
originally thought to be the fundamental rights protected by the Convention.
Also the way in which, i.e., by means of a balancing of interests and hence
in a very ad hoc manner, the Court reaches its conclusions does not seem
convincing to some critical observers, which adds to the doubts as to the broad
influence of the Convention.43
Thus, the Court’s engagement in the socio-economic sphere, combined with
the increasing role of positive obligations and the idea that the Court – or
(supranational) courts in general – is not very well placed for dealing with
‘polycentric’44 issues of this kind, may constitute a risk for the successful
functioning of the Convention system. Even without having regard to the
actual criticism, moreover, there is the fundamental issue of how a supra-
national court like the ECtHR should approach cases concerning economic and
social rights that cannot literally be found in the Convention. It is in this
context that it is worth asking whether and what improvements can be made
to the Court’s practice.
41 See, however, for criticism of the Court’s protection in the field of social security, Bossuyt
2007 (cf. also Bossuyt 2012).
42 Cf. the critical speech of Lord Hoffmann concerning the ECtHR of 2009, in which he stated
that ‘[the Court] has been unable to resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and
to impose uniform rules on Member States … laying down a federal law of Europe’ (Lord
Hoffmann 2009, para. 27). Moreover, he holds that ‘[t]he proposition that the Convention
is a “living instrument” is the banner under which the Strasbourg court has assumed power
to legislate what they consider to be required by “European public order”’ (para. 36).
43 Cf. Von Bersntorff 2011; Von Bernstorff 2014 (who aims at suggesting more ‘categorical’
alternatives to the balancing-dominated practice (also) of the ECtHR). See also, infra, Ch. 3,
S. 3.4.2.
44 E.g., King 2012, pp. 5-6, who explains ‘polycentricity’ by stating that ‘[s]ome issues require
the comprehension of a vast number of interconnected variables in order for one to under-
stand the likely consequences of any change of policy’. A polycentric problem is character-
ised by the fact that ‘the soundness of some proposals is dependent on the comparative
merits of others, the complete comprehension of which is extremely difficult and which
involves considerable guesswork. Resource allocation at the nationwide level is a polycentric
activity par excellence’.
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1.2 RESEARCH TOPIC AND CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.2.1 Socio-Economic Protection under the ECHR
Although many aspects of the ECtHR’s case law and practice lend themselves
for intensive research, this book zooms in on the Court’s socio-economic
protection. It engages with the issue of how the ECtHR can provide effective
fundamental rights protection while not overstepping the boundaries of its
legitimate task. In this regard it is interesting to take the socio-economic
protection of the ECHR as the starting point, for especially when this particular
area is concerned the tension between these two aims becomes readily
apparent. Issues concerning socio-economic rights can be fundamental, yet
at the same time the scope of the Convention and its limited role prevent the
Court from assuming law-making capacities in this regard. Moreover, although
the topic of socio-economic protection under the Convention is discussed in
the literature, it is not granted the attention ‘classic’ rights topics related to
the ECtHR generally obtain. Several articles and book chapters, most of which
were written some years ago, address the socio-economic dimension of the
Convention.45 Generally these highlight important cases and point out wel-
come developments, whereas in some also the shortcomings in the Court’s
decisions and judgments are noted.46 However, only few authors have
addressed in a more fundamental way the question of how the Court should
deal with the sensitive issue of socio-economic rights. In her articles on the
socio-economic protection by the ECtHR – and especially of work-related
rights –, Mantouvalou has provided for a normative account of how the Court
should handle complaints concerning socio-economic rights, namely in an
‘indivisible’ manner based on a positive account of freedom.47 In addition,
Koch has developed a ‘hermeneutical’ perspective to fundamental rights
protection under the Convention that includes civil and political as well as
socio-economic rights.48 In this work, Koch also pays attention to the case
law of the Court in different socio-economic fields like health, education, and
housing.49 The current study aims to add to these important works by, first
of all, providing a more up-to-date account of the socio-economic protection
by the Court, paying particular attention to decisions taken and judgements
rendered in recent years. More importantly, more than most of the existing
literature on the topic, the current research aims at explicitly placing the socio-
45 See Koch 2002; Koch 2003; Mantouvalou 2005; Koch 2006; Brems 2007; Warbrick 2007;
O’Cinneide 2008; Palmer 2009; Palmer 2010; Mantouvalou 2013. In addition, Koch has
written a monograph on the topic (Human Rights as Indivisible Rights. The Protection of Socio-
Economic Demands under the European Convention on Human Rights; Koch 2009).
46 See, infra, Ch. 2, S. 2.6.2.
47 Mantouvalou 2013. See also Mantouvalou 2005.
48 Koch 2006 (see also Koch 2002; Koch 2003; Koch 2009).
49 Koch 2009, Ch. 5-9.
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economic dimension of the ECHR in the broader context of questions surround-
ing the legitimate role of a (supranational) court like the ECtHR, of develop-
ments in fundamental rights adjudication and legal reasoning, and of the
criticism that has been directed at the Strasbourg Court. Indeed, although the
argument that there is no place at all for economic and social rights protection
under the Convention will not even be considered,50 a cautious stance is taken
in that it is assumed that, at some point, the Court may overstretch its powers.
The current study takes on board the shortcomings identified in the literature,
while placing them in context and endeavouring to come up with a construct-
ive response that is in line with the position and competences of the Court.
1.2.2 The Notion of ‘Core Rights’
In addressing the precarious protection of socio-economic rights under the
ECHR, this research contemplates the notion of core rights protection. Why is
this seen as a notion worth exploring, and why is it assumed that it has
potential added value in this regard? The concept of core rights, i.e., the idea
that one can differentiate between the various aspects of a fundamental right
in the sense that some of these aspects are more essential and hence deserve
more protection than others, is often considered redundant. This has to do
with the idea that balancing rights and interests is the appropriate means for
dealing with rights conflicts and that this leaves no room for explicit core rights
protection.51 Moreover, it is generally considered that determining the core
of a right is very difficult, if not impossible. How can it be known what
belongs to the inherent essence of a right and – when there is no objective
answer to this question – who is to decide on this matter?52 Nevertheless,
regardless of these sceptical outlooks, the notion of core rights simply fails
to fade into oblivion. It is in fact regularly taken up in new constitutions,53
and also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) that
50 See, for an altogether critical stance on the ECtHR’s engagement in the socio-economic
sphere, and social security in particular, Bossuyt 2007 (cf. also Bossuyt 2012).
51 In Germany, for example, it is often considered that proportionality analysis will auto-
matically secure the protection of the essence of a fundamental right, albeit in an implicit
manner. See, infra, Ch. 4.
52 Cf. Young 2008, who shows how different approaches to determining the core of a right
‘provide it with paradoxical grounding’, which has to do with ‘the inevitability of disagree-
ment in the ordering of both values and needs’, as well as with the limits of a ‘consensus
approach’ (p. 175).
53 A few examples are the Constitution of Colombia of 1991, Art. 334 (‘In no case shall the
essential core of a right be affected.’), the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, Art. 24(2)(c) (‘[A]
provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom … shall not limit the right
or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content.’), and the
Constitution of Angola of 2011, Art. 236(b) (‘Alterations to the Constitution must respect
… [e]ssential core rights, freedoms, and guarantees.’).
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entered into force in 2009 contains a reference to this idea where it states that
‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this
Charter must … respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’.54 Important
to note is moreover that the notion of core rights is brought up in particular
also in the field of economic and social fundamental rights, which provides
an additional reason for researching its potential in relation to the development
of the ECHR’s socio-economic dimension.55 In the end, the idea that funda-
mental rights catalogues are there to protect first and foremost, or in any case,
the ‘core’ of the rights they enumerate, as such seems hard to contradict. When
rights are not conceived of as ‘trumps’,56 but can be limited in the light of
the general interest or the rights of others, it is generally agreed that at least
their essential aspects should be protected.
Hence, given the reality that core rights notions do play a role at least in
legal thinking, what this research aims to do is to see what practical, rather
than merely symbolical function the concept of core rights can have in the
context of the protection of socio-economic interests by the ECtHR. It will be
examined in what ways it can help the Court in fulfilling its important task
of protecting the rights enshrined in the Convention, while being mindful of
its supranational, subsidiary position and the challenges that relate to this.
Thus, the question central to this research is: what could be the use and
potential added value of the notion of core rights for the reasoning of the Court
in cases concerning socio-economic interests? As mentioned, this question must
be viewed in the light of the specific role and position of the Court and its
aim of providing effective individual protection while leaving the necessary
room for States Parties’ decisions and policies. Especially given this back-
ground, in order to answer the main research question, several sub-questions
need to be addressed. First, it is important to obtain a clear picture of the
Court’s position, the task(s) it is required to fulfil, and the options a court has
– by means of different forms of reasoning – of approaching these. Secondly,
it is necessary to determine what the notion of core rights really can be about,
and more precisely, how it can be used in legal reasoning. And thirdly, the
ECtHR’s current practice with regard to the protection of socio-economic inter-
ests needs to be investigated in order to identify the room for improvement
by means of core rights protection. The final section of this introductory
chapter (Section 1.4) outlines how these various questions will be approached.
54 Art. 52(1) CFR.
55 See, in particular, infra, Ch. 5 and 6, which discuss the notion of core rights, or ‘minimum
core(s) (obligations)’, in the context of the ICESCR and the South African Constitution,
respectively.
56 For the idea that fundamental rights ‘trump’ other rights and interests, see Dworkin 1984.
See however Möller 2012, whose reconstructive theory (based on the practice of constitu-
tional rights law around the world) explicitly abandons the idea of rights as trumps or
side constraints.
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1.3 SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY
Before embarking on the actual research, it is important to say something on
the scope of this project as well as on the terminology used. It is clear by now
that this research deals with the protection offered by the ECtHR in the field
of socio-economic rights and the potential role of the concept of core rights
therein. In this regard it is worth stressing that the investigation in this book
and the arguments presented do not relate to the protection of socio-economic
fundamental rights more generally speaking. The development of economic
and social rights protection and the growing importance of these rights as
norms that can form the basis for judicial review is reason for a lively, ongoing
debate in which scholars and practitioners alike present their different views
on these important issues.57 Although inspiration is definitely drawn from
this debate, the study presented in this book cannot contribute to the broader
discussion on socio-economic rights because the various findings do not apply
to other (judicial) actors and norms outside the Convention that somehow deal
with safeguarding economic and social rights. Indeed, the argument that is
developed is concerned with the protection of socio-economic rights and
interests under classic, civil and political rights norms, and more specifically
with the ECtHR’s unique position and context. Of course, lessons may be drawn
from this and comparisons may be made with other legal contexts, yet this
study does not aim at suggesting what core rights and/or socio-economic
protection in general should be about.58 In turn, this means that although
the particular role and position of the ECtHR are taken as the point of departure,
this research and the eventual conclusions cannot be transposed one-to-one
to the protection of civil and political rights under the Convention. The options
presented and conclusions drawn with regard to the potential use of core rights
are specifically tailored to the subject-matter of socio-economic rights, and can
hence not automatically be applied to the Strasbourg adjudicative process in
general.
It must also be noted that in addressing the question of how the Court
can strike a right balance between the effective protection of individual rights
and a careful approach to Member States’ decisions in cases socio-economic
cases, the focus of this study lies on the reasoning of the Court. That is, the
scope of the research is limited to the interpretation of the Convention and
the review of cases that fall within its scope, as is further elaborated in Chap-
57 For some important, recent contributions to this debate, see, Bilchitz 2007; Fredman 2008;
Langford 2008; Liebenberg 2010; Gearty and Mantouvalou 2011; King 2012; O’Connell 2012;
Young 2012.
58 Regardless of the limited scope of this project and the fact that it does not provide for a
comprehensive theory, however, it will become clear that this research supports certain
normative claims concerning (the development of) the adjudication of fundamental rights
norms, especially at the supranational level. See, for some remarks in this regard, the
concluding Chapter of this book (infra, Ch. 11, S. 11.2).
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ter 3. Consequently, although interesting questions also may arise, for example,
as to the remedies provided in socio-economic rights cases, these will not be
addressed in this thesis.
With regard to the terminology used in this book it is important to clarify that,
generally, the term ‘fundamental rights’ is used, rather than the also commonly
used ‘human rights’. Although the latter term certainly may seem appropriate
in the context of the protection by the ECtHR, a conscious choice has been made
to refrain from using it in most instances. This has to do with the broader
meaning that can be given to the notion of ‘fundamental rights’. Contrary to
‘human rights’, this notion encompasses both fundamental rights protected
at the international or supranational level and ‘constitutional rights’ that
generally can be found in national constitutions. It is appropriate to rely on
this broader notion since in different parts of the research inspiration is drawn
from constitutional doctrine. Employing the notion of ‘fundamental rights’
enhances the comparability of issues and doctrinal insights from both the
supranational and the national level. The term ‘human rights’, moreover, might
wrongly suggest that what is concerned is some kind of ‘meta-notion’ that
is relevant foremost in the political and theoretical rather than in the legal
sphere. This would misrecognise the fact that the ECtHR is a distinctly legal
actor, and that the rights it protects are of concrete relevance at the national
level and in the practice of national courts.59
A second remark on terminology relates to the use of the term ‘socio-
economic rights’, or ‘economic and social rights’. Both terms are used
interchangeably and refer to fundamental rights concerning a broad array of
topics like welfare benefits, education, the provision of health care and housing,
but also work-related rights, etc. Occasionally, the term ‘social rights’ is used
as well, which has to do with the primarily ‘social’ – rather than ‘economic’ –
character of the issues that receive particular attention in this book (housing,
health and health care, and social security).60 The use of these terms demon-
strates, moreover, that this book is not concerned with cultural rights. Especial-
ly in the context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which forms the central focus of Chapter 5 of this
book, cultural rights seem to form a natural extension of the category of
economic and social ones. However, cultural rights and particularly claims
for recognition are of a different nature than issues concerning social measures
59 According to Art. 46 ECHR the judgments of the ECtHR are binding for the parties to the
case. Moreover, due to their erga omnes and res interpretata effects, the judgments and
interpretations of the Court are of general relevance throughout the Member States (cf.
Gerards 2014a, pp. 21-27).
60 See, in particular, infra, Ch. 8, 9, and 10.
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and redistribution, and for that reason they are expressly left out of considera-
tion.61
Lastly, it is worth remarking that ‘core rights’ should not be understood
as a label that is attached to rights or rights norms that are more important
than others. Phrased differently, it is not meant to create or emphasise a
hierarchy amongst rights, in the sense that the right to life would for example
be a core right whereas the right to property would not. Instead, what this
term – admittedly somewhat confusingly – refers to, is that within rights some
aspects can be distinguished that are more important or more fundamental
than others. The term ‘cores of rights’ also could have been adopted to express
this, yet for reasons of legibility and because it is the term customarily used
in the literature as well as in practice, ‘core rights’ is preferred here.
1.4 METHODS AND OUTLINE
This introductory chapter would not be complete without some words on the
methods used. The legal scientific endeavour, or jurisprudence, is generally
hard to capture in terms of truly ‘scientific’ methods.62 Keeping this in mind,
however, in presenting an outline of the remainder of this book some remarks
are made as to how the different research questions have been approached.63
Part I of this book (‘Setting the Stage’) aims at providing the necessary
background information for expounding the possible uses of the notion of core
rights for the ECtHR’s socio-economic protection. Chapter 2 builds on this
introduction by further exploring the problem that is central to this research
and setting the parameters for addressing it. For this chapter, research has
been done into the Convention and the various ECHR provisions, including
the case law generated on the basis thereof. This was combined with an
investigation of ‘doctrine’ more generally, including a broad variety of
academic contributions of a theoretical as well as of a more practical kind.
More precisely, for assessing the role and position of the Court, as well as the
tasks it has to fulfil and the context in which it has to operate, use was made
primarily of academic work on this topic, combined with primary sources as
well as information on the (early) development of the Convention system. After
introducing the ‘civil and political’ Convention and the multi-dimensional task
of the Strasbourg Court, the chapter offers a preliminary image of the Court’s
socio-economic case law. It then tries to make sense of the protection of socio-
economic interests under the Convention by presenting two different, yet
61 See, on the differences between socio-economic and cultural rights and possible clashes
between them, e.g., Young 2008, pp. 119-120 (see also, infra, Ch. 5).
62 On the methods of legal research, see, e.g., McCrudden 2006.
63 This research was completed by the end of 2014. This means that later (case law) develop-
ments and literature (with some minor exceptions) have not been taken into account.
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complementary rationales underlying such protection: the theses of ‘effective-
ness’ and ‘indivisibility’. Although both theses provide an explanation as well
as a justification for granting economic and social rights protection under the
Convention, it is concluded that they do not provide a sufficient starting point
for the Court for dealing with issues of this kind. Chapter 3 presents the
framework within which potential solutions to the problems identified in
Chapter 2 may be found. It takes a step back from the specific Strasbourg
context and illuminates the different stages and accompanying tasks related
to judicial fundamental rights protection. For this chapter, (theoretical) aca-
demic work on the practice of rights adjudication and legal reasoning has been
studied. On the basis thereof, an important distinction is made between the
stages of interpretation (i.e., determining the scope of a right) and application
(i.e., determining whether a limitation of a right was justified), while also the
task of determining the intensity of review is highlighted. A discussion of these
stages and tasks shows the argumentative options available to a court like
the ECtHR when dealing with conflicts between fundamental rights and other
interests.
Part II investigates the ideas of ‘core rights’ and ‘core rights protection’.
It does do so by means of a comparative study of three ‘core rights doctrines’,
which is conducted with the aim of exploring the potential as well as the
pitfalls inherent in these notions. More precisely, by researching legal texts,
case law, and academic discussions concerning this topic, comparative insights
have been gained on the understanding and use of core rights in different legal
contexts, focusing on those aspects that could potentially be interesting for
the Strasbourg context and the ECtHR’s reasoning in particular.64 The studies
presented in Part II could hence be labelled as primarily inspirational in kind.
Chapter 4 looks at a classic example of a core rights doctrine, namely the
German Wesensgehaltsgarantie. This guarantee is taken up in Article 19(2) of
the German Grundgesetz and provides for a limit to limitations of the funda-
64 On the possible goals and pitfalls of comparative (constitutional) law, see, e.g., Jackson 2010;
Jackson 2012. The comparative investigation in this book may be most adequately described
by what Jackson calls the ‘identification of best practices’ or the ‘search for just or good
principles’ (rather than ‘developing a better understanding of other systems’, ‘developing
a better understanding of one’s own system’, or ‘responding to doctrinal or textual ques-
tions’). However, it must be noted that what is sought after here is not so much ‘the best’
way of dealing with socio-economic protection under the Convention, but rather the
comparative insights that can be gained from core rights protection in legal systems that
would ‘best’ fit the practice of the ECtHR, in order to see whether this would also lead
to a ‘good’ approach – or at least one that meets the different demands developed especially
in, infra, Ch. 2 of this book – to the protection of socio-economic interests under the Conven-
tion. To achieve this aim, due account was had to the ‘challenges’ of (constitutional)
comparison, by placing the different uses of core rights in their respective contexts and
having regard to normative claims, while only ‘translating’ them to the Strasbourg practice
in the light of the specific role and position of the Court and the tasks it is required to fulfil
(infra, Ch. 2; Ch. 7).
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mental rights enshrined in this Constitution. The chapter highlights the
different understandings of this provision, thereby illustrating the richness
and possible added value of the very idea of core rights. The chapter also
briefly discusses the right to an Existenzminimum, or subsistence minimum,
because also the interpretation of this right can provide inspiration for (socio-
economic) core rights protection under the Convention. Chapter 5 moves to
an example of core rights protection specifically related to the field of inter-
national socio-economic fundamental rights. It discusses the core obligations
that have been recognised under the ICESCR, thereby showing how the concept
of core rights can be of practical use as well as illuminating how minimum
socio-economic cores can be recognised. The final chapter of Part II, Chapter
6, discusses the debate on the use of core rights for the protection of the
economic and social rights enumerated in the South African Constitution. This
chapter explicitly engages with the way courts can utilise the notion of core
rights – instead of, or in combination with, reasonableness review – in adjudi-
cating individual fundamental rights complaints. It addresses the question
of whether it is a good idea for them to do so, also in the light of concerns
related to judicial capacities and separation of powers.
Part III of this book consists of only one chapter, Chapter 7, which brings
together Parts I and II by confronting the shortcomings of the Strasbourg socio-
economic case law with the insights on core rights gained from the different
core rights doctrines. The chapter first aims to dispel a number of persistent
misconceptions of core rights, which helps to arrive at a broader, more promis-
ing understanding of this notion. Starting from the different and seemingly
incompatible roles of the Court as outlined in Chapter 2, a ‘core rights per-
spective’ is then outlined tailored to the protection of socio-economic interests
in Strasbourg. This perspective is adjusted to the different stages of rights
adjudication discussed in Chapter 3 and includes strategic as well as more
substantive suggestions for how core rights could be used to strike a balance
between effective socio-economic protection and showing deference towards
the Member States.
Part IV turns to the case law of the Court in relation to socio-economic
rights in order to show the room for improvement with the help of a core
rights perspective. The overview presented by no means is exhaustive, and
a conscious choice has been made to include especially those cases that are
either of a recent date – thereby illuminating the status quo in a particular
area of the case law – or very well illustrate particular features and/or short-
comings of the Court’s practice. The cases have been selected by searching
the HUDOC database,65 though not before having had a look at the Court’s
Factsheets and its recent press releases,66 as well as the literature, in order
to obtain a first image of the cases that deserve closer examination. Helpful
65 See the website of the Court www.echr.coe.int (under ‘Case-Law’; ‘HUDOC’).
66 Ibid. (under ‘Factsheets’).
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for identifying important developments were also the cases that have received
particular attention in legal scholarship, in the form of a case-comment in for
example European Human Rights Cases, on legal blogs,67 or elsewhere. First,
Chapter 8 discusses the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning housing interests.
It illustrates the way the ECtHR deals with complaints relating to Roma accom-
modation as well as with other (social) housing issues. Chapter 9 deals with
health and health care issues featuring in the case law of the Court. These
concern the provision of medication or health care, but also, for example,
environmental pollution. The final case law chapter, Chapter 10, covers the
issue of social security and presents a number of cases concerning the reduction
or revocation of pensions and other social benefits. Also in regard to this topic
it becomes apparent that, although seemingly aiming at effective and indivis-
ible protection, the ECtHR does not always manage to provide for a transparent
and consistent interpretation and application of the relevant Convention rights.
Chapter 11, finally, presents the final conclusions. Besides drawing together
the findings of the different parts of this study, it explores several possibilities
for improving the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning the various socio-
economic areas on the basis of a core rights perspective. Coming back to what
was said in this introduction on the current developments in judicial funda-
mental rights protection, the concluding chapter ends with some (potential)
implications of this study for ‘rights reasoning’ more broadly speaking.






2 The ECHR and Economic and Social
Rights Protection
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The European Convention on Human Rights is foremost a civil and political
rights document. The rights norms it enumerates are ‘classic’ ones. They
guarantee civil and political liberties, i.e., the existence of a personal sphere
in which the state is not allowed to interfere. Aiming at the protection of ECHR
rights, however, the European Court of Human Rights is also confronted with
complaints of a more economic or social kind. These concern for example
housing, health and health care, and social security.1 ‘Socio-economic com-
plaints’ bring up the question, first, whether, prima facie, they deserve the
protection of the ECHR. If this is the case, the issue becomes whether in the
individual case at hand protection should be granted.2 Over the past decades
it has become clear that the Court does not categorically exclude economic
and social interests from protection under the Convention. It has held that
diverse issues ranging from pension cuts to environmental pollution and the
lack of medication can be covered by the ECHR. In a significant number of cases
concerning economic and social issues, moreover, the ECtHR has found a
violation of one or more Convention rights.
Thus, the economic and social rights dimension of the ECHR cannot be
ignored. As the Court itself has underlined, a clear distinction between the
civil and political and the economic and social sphere cannot be made.3 Re-
gardless of the Convention’s classical starting point, the protection of socio-
economic interests is therefore merely inevitable. Yet this does not mean that
review of economic or social issues does not bring up any legitimate concerns.
As is evidenced by the literature on the topic, the socio-economic dimension
of the Convention sits uneasily with notions such as (democratic) legitimacy,
subsidiarity, and expertise.4 Therefore, even though it is impossible to exclude
1 See, for an analysis of the case law on these topics, infra, Ch. 8, 9, and 10, respectively.
2 See, on the different stages of fundamental rights adjudication, infra, Ch. 3.
3 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 26 (infra, S. 2.4.1).
4 These concerns are mirrored in the debate on (the desirability of) the adjudication of
constitutional or treaty-based economic and social rights. See, e.g., Gearty, in Gearty and
Mantouvalou 2011, pp. 57-64; O’Connell 2012, pp. 8-17; King 2012, pp. 3-8. In regard to
positive (socio-economic) obligations under the ECHR in particular, see Krieger 2014. Many
of the authors discussing the socio-economic protection offered by the Convention, however,
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the socio-economic sphere from the protected area covered by the Convention,
the scope and depth of the ECHR’s economic and social dimension may be a
point of debate, even more so because of the ECtHR’s intricate role in a ‘multi-
level’ system of fundamental rights protection. It can be asked whether the
role of the Court in treating complaints of a particularly socio-economic kind
is in some way limited. In line with this, an important question is whether
the practice of the ECtHR in the socio-economic field is based on a particular
theoretical approach to economic and social rights protection. And if not,
whether it would nevertheless be desirable that a principled starting point
be present.
It is the purpose of the present chapter to introduce the socio-economic
dimension of the Strasbourg practice as well to further elaborate on these
questions. The chapter presents the Convention articles that have proven most
relevant in developing the socio-economic protection under the ECHR, while
also ‘making sense’ of this phenomenon by answering the question how the
Court’s engagement in this field can be understood. Finally, coming to the
problem that is central to the investigation in this book, this chapter addresses
the chances and (potential) pitfalls of the Court’s socio-economic approach.
In this way, it forms the backdrop against which, later on, the idea and use
of core rights protection can be investigated as a means of addressing the
different concerns.
The chapter is set up as follows. In Section 2.2, some background informa-
tion is given on the ECHR as a civil and political rights document. This is
followed by a brief outline of the position and the role of the ECtHR as a
fundamental rights adjudicator in a multi-level legal system (Section 2.3).
Section 2.4 introduces the socio-economic case law of the Court. It gives an
overview of the relevant Convention articles, by means of which a preliminary
image is created of the kinds of socio-economic issues addressed by the ECtHR.5
Section 2.5 presents two different possible understandings of the development
of the socio-economic dimension of the Convention, namely the ‘effectiveness
thesis’ and the ‘indivisibility thesis’. Both of these theses can explain the socio-
economic protection that has been offered thus far, but they also bring up
questions regarding the direction in which this development could possibly
be heading. In Section 2.6 the criticisms that have been directed at the Court’s
socio-economic case law are mapped out, and it is concluded that it is worth
investigating the notion of core rights for its potential use in addressing these.
generally assess this development in a positive manner. See, e.g., Koch 2002; Brems 2007;
O’Cinneide 2008; Palmer 2009; Koch 2009. See also Leijten 2013; Leijten 2014; Leijten 2015.
5 For a more detailed case law analysis in the light of the objective of this study, see, infra,
Ch. 8, 9, and 10.
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2.2 THE ECHR AS A CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TREATY
The European Convention on Human Rights embodies an agreement between
states striving for the protection of human rights. Its inception can be under-
stood against the background of the human rights movement that evolved
in response to the atrocities that had occurred in the first half of the twentieth
century. More particularly, the origins of the ECHR can be viewed in the light
of the coming into being of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR;
Declaration).6 In 1948 the UDHR was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.7 The creation of this ‘international bill of rights’ formed a
major step in the development of fundamental rights protection beyond the
state and ‘has retained its place of honor in the human rights movement’ ever
since.8 It contains an extensive set of fundamental rights that is not limited
to what are generally termed ‘classic’ or ‘civil and political’ rights.9 Next to,
e.g., the right to life, the prohibition of torture and the right to take part in
the government of his country,10 the UDHR also enumerates economic and
social guarantees. Examples are the rights to work,11 to education,12 as well
as
‘to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control.’13
There is no indication in the UDHR of a hierarchy amongst the different norms
taken up in this comprehensive list. This suggests that civil and political and
socio-economic rights were considered of equal importance.14 However,
against the backdrop of the Cold War and because of the prominent role of
the United States in the universal human rights movement, the equal status
of these rights had become more contentious over the drafting period.15 Im-
portantly, the Declaration did not obtain the character of a legally binding
6 Bates 2010, p. 40.
7 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 1948.
8 Steiner 1998, p. 45.
9 See, on the different ‘generations’ of rights, generally, Tomuschat 2008, p. 25ff.
10 Arts. 3, 5, and 21 UDHR, respectively.
11 Art. 23 UDHR.
12 Art. 26 UDHR.
13 Art. 25(1) UDHR. Art. 25(2) guarantees special care and assistance to motherhood and
childhood. The remaining economic and social rights laid down in the UDHR concern the
right to social security (Art. 22) and the right to rest and leisure (Art. 24).
14 However, Craven 1995, p. 17, fn. 87, notes that it has been argued that the UDHR signals
a preference for civil and political rights, if only because these are listed first.
15 Steiner et al. 2007, p. 136.
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instrument. Rather, it was meant to function as a springboard for treaties that
would have more than merely political significance. This made the differences
between the two sorts of rights less immediately relevant; after all these mainly
become apparent once rights bring along legal obligations states have to
comply with. When eventually binding legal norms were drafted, it was hence
not very surprising that the contents of the UDHR were divided over two
separate covenants.16 The first came to include only civil and political rights,
while the economic, social and cultural ones obtained a separate covenant.
It is well known that the two treaties concerned here, namely the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rigths (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), are quite differ-
ent.17 Whereas the ICCPR rights are phrased as individual and subjective rights,
the ICESCR merely requires states to take steps towards the fulfilment of socio-
economic guarantees, subject to the requirement of progressive realisation and
in the light of the available resources.18 Partly because of the latter’s less
individualised and less concrete character economic and social rights protection
has come to be understood as second-rank. Nowadays still, these rights are
famously labelled the ‘Cinderella of the human rights corpus’.19
In line with the international human rights movement, at the European level,
too, efforts were made after the Second World War to create a ‘Charter of
Fundamental Rights’.20 In May 1948, a preliminary draft of the European
Convention on Human Rights prepared by the legal committee of the European
Movement was adopted.21 Article 1 of this draft held that ‘every State a party
to this Convention shall guarantee to all persons within its territory’ a list of
no less than eleven rights. These included several freedoms (of speech, religion,
association, and from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, and slavery) as well
16 See the analysis, prepared by the United Nations, of the drafting process: Annotations on
the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human rights, UN Doc. A/2929, 10th
Session (1955), p. 7.
17 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entry into force 23 March 1976); United
Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entry into force 23 March 1976).
18 See, for more information on (the differences between) the ICCPR and the ICESCR, infra,
Ch. 5, and especially S. 5.2.1.
19 Fredman 2008, p. 2 (cited by many human rights scholars and other legal writers). Economic,
social, and cultural rights have also been called the ‘poor cousins’ of civil and political ones,
see Saul et al. 2014, p. 1. According to Koch 2002, p. 30, ‘[d]espite the end of the cold war,
economic social and cultural rights enjoy a much weaker protection than civil and political
rights, and we are actually witnessing two concurrent discussions – one concerning the
indivisibility of human rights and another questioning the legal nature of half of the rights,
namely the economic, social and cultural rights’ (see, on the indivisibility of fundamental
rights, infra, S. 2.5.3).
20 Teitgen 1993, p. 5; Bates 2011, p. 18ff.
21 Teitgen 1993, p. 5; Bates 2010, pp. 20-21.
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as equality and freedom from discrimination. Also taken up was the ‘freedom
from arbitrary deprivation of property’.
In 1949 the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe set up a Legal
Committee that was thereafter tasked to proceed with the project.22 Taking
the European Movement’s draft as the starting point, this committee had to
decide on which rights would eventually deserve a place in the Convention.
According to the legal committee’s rapporteur at the time, Pierre-Henri Teitgen,
in doing so
‘the committee agreed without difficulty that the collective enforcement should
extend solely to rights and freedoms: (a) which imposed on the States only obliga-
tions ‘not to do things,’ which would thus be susceptible to immediate sanction
by a court; and (b) which were so fundamental that human dignity and democracy
were inconceivable if they were not respected; it followed that so-called economic
and social rights should be excluded, at least to begin with.’23
On the basis of this it was decided that from the previous list, the ‘borderline
right’ to the protection of property was not to be included.24 Together with
the right to education this right only became part of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.25
The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms eventually entered into force on 3 September 1953.26
According to the Preamble, the aim was to ‘to take the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declara-
tion’.27 The eventual document merely enumerates the guarantees that within
the UN system would later become part of the ICCPR, and can thus be termed
22 This had to lead to a draft recommendation that had to be adopted by a two-thirds majority
of the Assembly, to then be submitted to the Council of Ministers that had to unanimously
agree upon it, as well as to the governments involved. See Teitgen 1993, pp. 9-10. See also
Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 3-4.
23 Teitgen 1993, p. 10.
24 Gerards 2008, p. 659, fn. 15. That the right to protection of property was not included can
also be explained as follows: ‘[I]n the limited time available it simply proved impossible
to draft a provision that outlawed the practice of arbitrary confiscation by totalitarian
regimes but which clearly could not be used as a means to question the nationalization
policies of socialist governments such as that of the UK’ (Bates 2011, p. 24).
25 Cf. Bates 2011, p. 24: ‘The disagreement on the rights to education and property proved
heated and intractable. For practical reasons, therefore, the two rights in question were
left out of Recommendation 38. After pressure from the Assembly at a later stage, they
were included in the First Protocol to the Convention.’
26 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
27 Preamble to the ECHR [emphasis added].
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‘civil and political’ rights.28 Indeed, one reason for this was that the rights
included had to be suitable for adjudication by a court.29 Also important in
the European context was the rise of communism.30 As follows from the report
of the Consultative Assembly,
‘[the committee] considered that, for the moment, it is preferable to limit the
collective guarantee to those rights and essential freedoms which are practiced,
after long usage and experience, in all the democratic countries. While they are
the first triumph of democratic regimes they are also the necessary condition under
which they operate. Certainly, professional freedoms and social rights, which have
themselves an intrinsic value, must also, in the future, be defined and protected.
Everyone will, however, understand that it is necessary to begin at the beginning
and to guarantee political democracy in the European Union and then to coordinate
our economies, before undertaking the generalization of social democracy.’31
It is noticeable from this, as well as from the earlier quote from Teitgen, that
the inherent value of economic and social rights was not questioned as such.
Rather, the time was not yet considered ripe for these rights to be included
in a document containing binding human rights norms subject to collective
enforcement.
The civil and political rights norms that obtained a place in the Convention
can be placed under different headers. First of all the ECHR includes classic
freedoms: the right to life (Article 2), the prohibition of torture (Article 3), the
prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4), the right to freedom and
security (Article 5), no punishment without law (Article 7), the right to respect
28 Not all of the UDHR’s ‘civil and political rights’ were taken up in the Convention. Ex-
ceptions are the right to equality before the law, freedom of movement and residence, the
right to a nationality, etc. (Arts. 7, 13, and 15 UDHR, respectively). See Van Dijk et al. 2006,
p. 5.
29 One of the most outstanding features of the European human rights system was and still
is that it allows for supranational adjudication of these rights on the basis of individual
complaints. See, infra, S. 2.3.
30 According to Harris et al. 2014, p. 1, the Convention ‘stemmed from the wish to provide
a bulwark against communism, which had spread from the Soviet Union into European
states behind the Iron Curtain after the Second World War. The Convention provided both
a symbolic statement of the principles for which West European States stood and a remedy
that might protect those states from communist subversion’. See also Bates 2011, pp. 18-19.
31 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, First Session, Reports, 1949, p. 1144. See also
Krieger 2014, p. 194. In the words of Harris et al. 2014, p. 5: ‘The European Convention
protects predominantly civil and political rights. This was a matter of priorities and tactics.
While it was not disputed that economic, social, and cultural rights required protection
too, the immediate need was for a short, non-controversial text which governments could
accept at once, while the tide for human rights was strong. Given the values dominant
within Western Europe, this meant limiting the Convention for the most part to the civil
and political rights that were essential for a democratic way of life; economic social and
cultural rights were too problematic and were left for separate and later treatment.’
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for private and family life (Article 8), freedom of thought, conscience and
religion (Article 9), freedom of expression (Article 10), freedom of assembly
and association (Article 11), and the right to marry (Article 12). These freedoms
protect an individual sphere that does not allow for state interference. How-
ever, in particular for those rights contained in Articles 8-11, the prohibition
is non-absolute or relative in the sense that in certain circumstances inter-
ferences can be justified.32 Secondly, there are the ‘procedural’ safeguards:
the right to a fair trial (Article 6) and the right to an effective remedy (Article
13). Rather than protecting substantive rights, these provisions ensure the
entitlement ‘to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law’ as well as ‘an effective
remedy before a national authority’ in case of a violation of the Convention.
Finally, there is the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14), which prohibits
unjustified unequal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights.
Over the years, the Convention has been supplemented by various proto-
cols, which incorporate institutional changes33 as well as contain additional
fundamental rights norms. It was already mentioned that the First Protocol
to the ECHR enshrines the right to the protection of property (Article 1) as well
as the right to education (Article 2). Important are for example also the right
to free elections34 (also included in Protocol No. 1), the abolishment of the
death penalty in Protocol No. 13,35 and the ‘free-standing’ non-discrimination
clause laid down in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. The latter provision ensures
that also without a direct link with another Convention right non-discrimina-
tion complaints can be dealt with under the Convention. The protocols are
optional, and not every party to the Convention has ratified every provision
of every protocol. This implies that, regardless of their ‘classic’ character, some
of the rights added are nevertheless too controversial for being agreed upon
by all states that partake in the Strasbourg system of human rights pro-
tection.36
From the 1970s onwards, some efforts have also been made to create a
protocol to the ECHR that would include socio-economic rights.37 In 1970 and
1978, recommendations were adopted that argued in favour of such a protocol,
yet the initiatives were rejected.38 Also more recently action has been under-
32 See, on the absolute versus relative character of rights, infra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
33 See, in particular, Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR, ‘restructuring the control machinery
established thereby’.
34 Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.
35 Art. 1 of Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR.
36 Rainey et al. 2014 (Jacobs, White and Ovey), p. 7. Charts of signatures and ratifications
can be found on the Court’s website www.echr.coe.int (under ‘Official Texts’; ‘Protocols
to the Convention’).
37 For an overview, see Berchtold 1991, p. 355ff.
38 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Recommendation 583 (1970), and Council of
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 838 (1978), respectively. See also Van
Dijk et al. 2006, p. 7.
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taken concerning the possible protection of economic and social rights within
the ECHR framework.39 In 2005, however, the Steering Committee for Human
Rights (CDDH) concluded that ‘it was obvious that such an activity would have
no political support at the present time’.40 Since then, attention for the topic
has faded.41
Just like in the UN system, also under the umbrella of the Council of Europe
the protection of economic and social rights has been given hand and feet with
the help of a separate document. In 1961 the European Social Charter (ESC)
was adopted.42 The ESC contains an extensive list of economic as well as social
rights. These rights are directed at the Member States, phrased in a positive
way in the sense that they require state action to be taken, and guarantee for
example the right to work and just conditions of work,43 as well as the right
to protection of health and social security.44 Like in the UN human rights
context, also at the CoE level the enforcement mechanism of the ESC is of a
different kind than that offered by the ECHR. Meanwhile, the ESC has been
revised and consolidated, and next to a reporting procedure a collective
complaints procedure has been created.45 This has resulted in over a hundred
complaints and an illuminating body of decisions by the European Committee
of Social Rights (ECSR).46 Still, however, the mechanisms for obtaining pro-
tection under the (revised) ESC rank second in comparison to the one created
in the Convention – complaints can indeed only be made collectively, the
decisions of the ECSR are not binding for the parties to a case, and it is therefore
harder to ensure concrete follow-up at the national level. Unsurprisingly, thus,
it is particularly the European protection under the ‘civil and political’ ECHR,
rather than (also) that of the Council of Europe’s economic and social rights
39 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration on the occasion of the 50th an-
niversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1998 (in which the
protection of fundamental social and economic rights was emphasised as an ‘integral part
of human rights protection’); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation
1415 (1999), Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning
fundamental social rights.
40 Council of Europe, Report of 29 June 2005 from the Steering Committee for Human Rights,
CDDH(2005)009, S. 5.4, para. 17. See also Council of Europe, Report of 18 May from the
Working Group on Social Rights GT-DH-SOC(2005)007.
41 Koch 2009, p. 323.
42 Council of Europe, European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, ETS 35. A revised version
of the Charter ((R)ESC) was adopted in 1996: Council of Europe, European Social Charter
(Revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163.
43 Arts. 1 and 2 (R)ESC, respectively.
44 Arts. 11 and 12 (R)ESC, respectively.
45 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective
Complaints, 9 November 1995, ETS 158.
46 For more information and case law, see www.coe.int/socialcharter.
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norms, that is often considered the most effective example worldwide of
supranational fundamental rights protection.47
2.3 THE POSITION AND THE ROLE OF THE ECTHR AS A SUPRANATIONAL
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATOR
According to Teitgen,
‘the Convention which was envisaged had firstly to list the fundamental human
rights and freedoms to be respected and safeguarded in every Member State of
the Council of Europe, and secondly to set up a system of collective enforcement
of those rights for all those States.’48
Indeed, a central reason why the ECHR has come to be perceived as a ‘human
rights protection system of unparalleled effectiveness’49 is that it is backed
by a supranational court capable of rendering binding judgments on the basis
of individual applications.50 Unique at the time, this feature today ensures
that individuals in 47 Member States can resort to the ECtHR if they feel
national courts have not dealt with their fundamental interests in an adequate
manner.51
Originally, the collective enforcement mechanism of the ECHR consisted
of the European Commission of Human Rights (EComHR) and the European
Court of Human Rights in collaboration with the Council of Ministers of the
COE.52 In this setup the EComHR played the most important role in dealing
with fundamental rights complaints. Only in a limited number of instances
cases were referred to the ECtHR.53 This changed on 1 November 1998 with
the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR. With this protocol a single
47 Ryssdall 1996, p. 18, notes that the ECHR ‘has developed into a regional human rights
protection system of unparalleled effectiveness. Its scope, its influence and the number
of states that have agreed to abide by its standards have grown far beyond the most
optimistic predictions of its founders. It is, in my view, no exaggeration to say that, at least
as far as the democratic protection of individuals and institutions is concerned, the Con-
vention has become the single most important legal and political common denominator
of the states of the continent of Europe in the wide geographical sense’.
48 Teitgen 1993, p. 3. See also the Preamble to the ECHR, where it is emphasised that the
Convention aims at taking ‘the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the
rights stated in the Universal Declaration’.
49 Ryssdall 1996, p. 18.
50 The creation of this mechanism was however controversial, see Teitgen 1993, pp. 12-14.
51 According to Art. 35(1) ECHR, ‘[t]he Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted’. See also the other paragraphs of Art. 35 for the different
admissibility criteria.
52 See the original Art. 19 ECHR and Art. 10 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (5 May
1949, ETS 001), respectively.
53 See the original ECHR for the competences of the EComHR and the ECtHR until 1998.
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and permanent European Court of Human Rights replaced the part-time
EComHR and ECtHR.54 Next to interstate applications,55 this court ‘may receive
applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols
thereto’.56 Under the current system, there is a possibility for internal appeal
after a Chamber of the Court has rendered judgment. Within three months,
the parties to the case may in exceptional circumstances request a referral to
the Grand Chamber of the Court. When a panel of five judges accepts this
request, the Grand Chamber delivers a final judgment.57
It is the Court’s task to interpret the rights enshrined in the Convention and
the Protocols thereto and apply them to concrete individual complaints.58
This may sound straightforward, yet in order to elaborate on the problem that
underlies the current investigation it is necessary to problematise this task
to some extent. First of all, it must be kept in mind that the ECtHR is a supra-
national court. It is part of an international organisation, the Council of Europe,
and plays a subsidiary role in a complex, multi-level legal order.59 This im-
plies that it only may step in when national authorities have failed to provide
the necessary fundamental rights protection. At the same time the Court is
a human rights court or ‘fundamental rights adjudicator’. As such, it has the
important task of protecting individuals’ most fundamental interests, which
indeed requires particular dedication. Finally, the ECtHR has also been labelled,
or at least compared to, a ‘constitutional court’.60 Albeit not in the sense of
a supreme court that is able to strike down laws for their incompatibility with
the constitution, this means that it is understood to play a leading and decisive,
or in any case guiding role.61
54 Art. 19 ECHR: ‘To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a
European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as “the Court”. It shall function
on a permanent basis.’
55 Art. 33 ECHR.
56 Art. 34 ECHR.
57 Arts. 43 and 44 ECHR.
58 Cf. Art. 32 ECHR. See, more extensively on the more technical aspects of interpreting and
applying fundamental rights, infra, Ch. 3.
59 On the specific ‘problematic’ of the Court, see, e.g., Gerards 2009, p. 409ff. (with further
references).
60 E.g., Ryssdal 1996; Alkema 2000, pp. 59-60; Wildhaber 2002; Greer 2006, p. 173; Wildhaber
2007, p. 528; Stone-Sweet and Keller 2008, p. 7; Gerards 2009, pp. 409-412; Sadurski 2009;
Hennette-Vauchez 2011; Croquet 2011, p. 308; Sadurski 2012, p. 47; Greer ad Wildhaber
2013; Harris et al. 2014, p. 4.
61 Because the ECtHR does not have the power to strike down national laws, it will never
become fully constitutional (Sadurski 2009, p. 448). It nevertheless has many ‘constitutional’
characteristics: it protects justiciable rights that seem at least de facto – though this depends
to some extent on the jurisdiction – superior to other laws (cf. Raz 1998, pp. 153-154).
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These three different role perceptions, i.e., being a supranational/subsidiary
body, a human rights protector as well as a constitutional adjudicator, can
explain what makes the task of the Court so particularly challenging. All three
roles impose different and sometimes incompatible expectations on the
ECtHR.62 To illustrate this, the different demands the Court faces can be pres-
ented along the lines of two of the dilemmas the Court faces practically on
a day-to-day basis.63
First, the ECtHR has to ensure effective fundamental rights protection while
it also has to take a deferential stance towards the Member States. On the one
hand, the Court has been set up to guarantee a certain level of fundamental
rights protection throughout the Council of Europe Member States. It must
aim at pursuing this task in an effective manner, i.e., ensure that the ECHR
guarantees are not ‘rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are
practical and effective’.64 This means that it sometimes needs to interpret
rights in a manner that was not foreseen at the time the Convention was
drafted.65 It also implies that the Court will from time to time reach a con-
clusion that goes against strongly held national beliefs or long-standing policies
or practices. In its ‘human rights protector’ role, thus, the ECtHR sometimes
needs to be ‘rücksichtslos’ in order to provide for effective rights protection.
On the other hand, the Court is and remains a supranational court. This
means that it must keep a certain distance to what is decided at the national
level.66 ‘Deference’ implies that respect is shown to the will or opinion of
another. In the context of the Court, a deferential attitude is not only an
62 Cf. the tasks of the ECtHR as identified by Gerards 2012, pp. 184-186. Gerards speaks of
the ‘backup’ role that is important for ensuring actual fundamental rights protection, the
standard-setting role that allows for clarifying the level of protection that should be guar-
anteed under the Convention, and the agenda-setting function, by means of which the Court
can place certain topics on the regulative or policy agendas of the national authorities. See
also Gerards 2013, p. 468; Gerards 2014a, pp. 15-17.
63 See, further on the dilemmas the Court faces in the light of its sensitive position and in
relation to the notion of ‘shared responsibility’, Gerards 2014a.
64 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 24.
65 Cf. Tyrer v. the UK, ECtHR 25 April 1978, appl. no. 5856/72, para. 31, where the Court stated
that it ‘cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards
in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this field’, and accor-
dingly held that corporal punishment can fall within the scope of Art. 3 of the Convention.
66 Cf. Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on het use of languages in education in Belgium,
ECtHR 23 July 1968, appl. nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64,
para. I.B.10: ‘[T]he Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise
the life of the society in the State which, as a contracting party, has to answer for the
measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the role of the competent national auth-
orities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery
of collective enforcement established by the Convention. The national authorities remain
free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are
governed by the Convention. Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these
measures with the requirements of the Convention.’
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imperative in itself, demanded by the system of the Convention,67 it also has
a pragmatic purpose. In the end, the ECtHR is dependent on the willingness
of the Member States for the implementation of its judgments.68 A deferential
stance might be worthwhile in this regard. When the Court is ‘going too far’
by rendering far-reaching judgments that encroach to a serious extent upon
national laws and democratic decision-making, this not only potentially con-
flicts with its supranational and subsidiary position, it can also decrease the
inclination of the Member States to comply with the Strasbourg fundamental
rights system in the first place.69
It is true that the aims of ensuring effective protection and showing defer-
ence to the national authorities need not necessarily conflict. The Member
States have willingly subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and
have endowed it with the power to interpret and apply the fundamental
guarantees of the Convention. At the same time it is not hard to imagine that
both demands in fact do regularly collide. Ensuring that fundamental rights
are non-illusory for those who can invoke them can require a strict stance by
the Court that has unwelcome consequences for the state involved. A famous
example is the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom, where the Court held that
the UK had violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 for restricting convicted
prisoners’ right to vote.70 The judgment has been very critically received and
to date there is debate about whether and how to change the legal system in
accordance with it.71 Situations like these can have a chilling effect on the
relation between the Court and the state, which in turn might have a negative
impact on the effectiveness of the supervisory system as a whole.
The second, related dilemma can be sketched as follows. The ECtHR must
offer individual protection while it should at the same time provide general
guidance. As a fundamental rights guarantor it provides a safety net for in-
dividuals who need to be protected against their state or against majority
decision-making that is unfavourable to minority groups.72 In order to guar-
antee the ECHR’s subjective rights, the Court thus needs to take individual
circumstances into account. What is more, it can be argued that the individual
circumstances – sometimes even regardless of the wording of the Convention
67 Cf. Art. 1 ECHR that requires the Member States to comply with the Convention. Art. 35(1)
ECHR underlines this.
68 E.g., Krieger 2014, p. 200. The ECtHR cannot strike down national laws, and leaves it up
to the states to provide the eventual solution. There is (political) pressure to comply with
the ECtHR’s judgments, exercised mainly by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
by supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments and decisions.
69 E.g., Gerards 2014a, pp. 41-46, who holds that in particular with regard to potential inter-
pretative ‘overreach’, that ‘this may not contribute to the willingness of national authorities
to implement the Court’s case law in their own legislation, policies or case-law’ (p. 46).
70 Hirst v. the UK (No. 2), ECtHR (GC) 6 October 2005, appl. no. 74025/01.
71 E.g., Foster 2009; Bates 2014.
72 E.g., Gerards 2012, pp. 184-185.
The ECHR and Economic and Social Rights Protection 33
(narrowly understood) or judgments in earlier cases – from this perspective
need to be decisive.73
Secondly, however, the Court at the same time needs to provide for more
‘objective’ protection, or at least for objective, general guidelines. The ‘consti-
tutional role’ of the Court is more than just a modern label attached to the
ECtHR’s practice that nicely fits the broader badge of ‘constitutionalism beyond
the state’. Rather, the constitutional task of the Court is embedded in the
system of the Convention. The idea is that it is first and foremost up to the
Member States to ensure compliance with the ECHR.74 Article 1 of the Conven-
tion holds that ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Conven-
tion’. Because these rights and freedoms do not necessarily speak for them-
selves, they are in need of clarification by the ECtHR. Indeed, although in
principle the judgments of the Court are only binding for the parties to the
case,75 it is widely recognised that they de facto work erga omnes.76 This means
that the effects of the Court’s judgments can reach beyond the contours of a
particular case. Once the Court interprets or applies the Convention in a
particular manner, the example set will not only trigger individuals in a
situation comparable to that of the applicant to invoke their rights under the
Convention, but it is also likely to be taken as a point of reference by states,
especially by national courts. Thus, to ensure that the necessary guidance is
provided and an appropriate level of protection is guaranteed throughout the
Council of Europe Member States, the Court is required to render principled,
73 See, for the first time that the Court underlined this, Sunday Times v. the UK, ECtHR 26
April 1979, appl. no. 6538/74, para. 65, where it noted that ‘the Court has to be satisfied
that the interference was necessary having regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing
in the specific case before it’. See also Young, James and Webster v. the UK, ECtHR 13 August
1981, appl. nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77. There ‘[t]he Court emphasises once again that, in
proceedings originating in an individual application, it has, without losing sight of the
general context, to confine its attention as far as possible to the issues raised by the concrete
case before it’ (para. 53). Cf. Callewaert 1993, p. 728; Matscher 1993, p. 64.
74 According to Letsas 2007, p. 9, ‘the ECHR is treated by the relevant actors (ie Member States,
applicants, and judges) as enshrining rights that states have a primary duty to respect when
deploying coercive force, as opposed to a secondary obligation to compensate victims should
they be found to be in breach of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights’.
See also Tulkens 2012, pp. 6-10.
75 Art. 46(1) ECHR: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment
of the Court in any case to which they are parties.’
76 Ress 2005, p. 374, speaks of an ‘orientation effect’: ‘There are judgments that the states do
not like and that are not complied with, risking of course that they will be found in violation
of human rights in a new case before the Court. There are examples of a clear reluctance
on the part of some states to follow the reasoning of the Court in the future, but in the
long run all the states have accepted the Court’s jurisprudence.’ See also Gerards 2009,
pp. 409-410; Gerards 2014a, p. 21ff.
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comprehensively reasoned judgments that provide states with more than just
information on the outcome of a single case.77
The demands of individual and of constitutional or ‘general’ justice may
be seen to be in conflict with one another. As a human rights protector, the
Court is likely to emphasise individual protection, whereas its important
guiding role might require more general reasoning. At the same time, the
Court’s subsidiary function seems to demand both: on the one hand, when
the Court sticks to the individual circumstances of a case, judgments that
demand far-reaching (legislative) reparations can be avoided. On the other
hand, however, for being able to protect ECHR rights in a sufficient manner
without the ECtHR having to interfere, states are in need of clear, general
guidelines and criteria determined at the Strasbourg level.
Thus, the Strasbourg Court faces an all but uncomplicated or one-dimensional
task. It can hardly be blamed for the fact that in trying to meet the various
demands and deal with the dilemmas mentioned it has not only been praised,
but criticised as well. Especially over the past years, this criticism has in-
tensified.78 In the media as well as in the political arena, prominent actors
have voiced their doubts about the functioning and future of the Court’s
fundamental rights protection.79 The Court has been accused of interfering
with Member States’ laws and policies more than necessary and of over-
stepping its boundaries as a judicial body.
Another problem that has come to the fore more recently is the enormous
caseload of the Court. Since the 1980s the number of applications has grown
steadily.80 With the inception of the new ECtHR in 1998 and not much later
the accession of several Eastern European states, this growth has everything
but diminished.81 It is fair to say that since a number of years the caseload
of the Court has become a real threat to the functioning of the Strasbourg
fundamental rights system.82 In order to keep the amount of applications
pending before the Court manageable, over the past decade a number of
77 See, on the notion of ‘judicial minimalism’ in the practice of the Court, as well as the
problem that this can lead to a lack of clarity, Gerards 2014a, p. 62ff.
78 Cf. the discussions that evolved since the end of the 2000’s in for example the UK and the
Netherlands. See, e.g., Masterman 2014 and Gerards and Fleuren 2014a, respectively. See
more generally Gerards 2014a, pp. 86-88.
79 Prominent, recent examples are the criticism by the Conservative party in the United
Kingdom, and by the Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland. In both countries, political actors
have even suggested leaving the Convention.
80 Cf. Greer 2006, pp. 33-41. Statistical information on the number of applications, judgments,
by state, etc. can be found via www.echr.coe.int (under ‘Statistics’).
81 The latter development, moreover, has also led to difficult questions regarding the appro-
priate level of fundamental rights protection as well as structural problems. See Letsas 2007,
p. 2; Leuprecht 1998; Greer 2007, p. 105ff.; Sadurski 2012, Ch. 1.
82 As it has often been said, the Court became a ‘victim of its own success’. See Dembour
2002, p. 604.
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measures have been taken. Of crucial importance has been the entry into force
of Protocol No. 14 to the Convention. This protocol includes some institutional
amendments to enable the Court to deal with a greater number of cases in
a shorter period of time.83 At the High Level Conference on the Future of
the European Court of Human Rights in 2010 in Interlaken, Switzerland,
moreover, some further concrete actions were agreed upon,84 as well as in
the Izmir Declaration that was concluded in 2011 in Turkey.85 The High Level
Conference in Brighton in 2012 has shown, however, that there is still much
to worry about.86 In response to the perceived problems of the system, the
government leaders in Brighton decided to devise a new protocol to the
Convention. Once all the Member States Parties to the Convention have ratified
this Protocol No. 15, this protocol shall add a new recital to the ECHR, reading:
‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms
defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they
enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.’
The very fact that it was considered necessary to codify the notion of sub-
sidiarity and the margin of appreciation doctrine may go to show that, with
solving the backlog problem only, the Court will not yet be there.
Evidently, the criticism of the Court’s encroaching upon national prerogat-
ives is more than a problem in the margins that is irrelevant for legal debate.
In particular it is also relevant for the purpose of this study, as the Court’s
task as a protector of socio-economic rights cannot be meaningfully assessed
without having regard to the acceptance and effectiveness of its judgments.
Indeed, the starting point taken here is that it is important for the Court to
83 Protocol No. 14, amongst other things, has amended the Convention so that it now creates
the possibility of single judges to reject manifestly inadmissible applications – committees
of three judges may now declare an application inadmissible and decide on the merits of
a case where the matter at hand is determined by well-established case law of the Court
(see Arts. 27-28 ECHR).
84 Interlaken Declaration, 19 February 2010 (the different declarations can be found on the
website of the Court).
85 Izmir Declaration, 27 April 2011. See, in particular, point 8 of the Preamble (‘Considering
that the provisions introduced by Protocol No. 14, while their potential remains to be fully
exploited and the results so far achieved are encouraging, will not provide a lasting and
comprehensive solution to the problems facing the Convention system’), and point 3 (‘[The
High Level Conference] [t]akes note of the fact that the provisions introduced by Protocol
No. 14 will not by themselves allow for a balance between incoming cases and output so
as to ensure effective treatment of the constantly growing number of applications, and
consequently underlines the urgency of adopting further measures’).
86 Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012. See, in particular, under B. (Interaction between the
Court and national authorities) and under G. (Longer-term future of the Convention system
and the Court).
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not just focus on one of its roles but instead discharge all of its relevant func-
tions, i.e., both its function as an individual rights guarantor and its function
as a constitutional guardian of the Convention, while keeping in mind that
its position is a supranational one. Firstly, its subsidiary role implies that the
Court cannot provide for an all-encompassing rights order that determines
every possible conflict at the national level. Secondly, the Court has to strive
for effective protection as much as possible in individual cases. And finally
and very importantly, in order to manage its caseload and work towards an
enduring, well-functioning system of European fundamental rights protection,
it should set clear, consistent and comprehensible standards with the help of
criteria and guidelines that are relevant for more than one case only. Only
this will allow the Member States to confidently and effectively apply ECHR
standards in their own legal orders. As will become clear in the remainder
of this study, especially also in the context of economic and social interests
it is particularly challenging for the ECtHR to live up to all these expectations.
2.4 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE ECHR
It was explained in Section 2.2 that the ECHR is a typical civil and political
rights document that first and foremost protects negative freedoms, as is
underlined by the wording of the rights it enumerates.87 Article 10, for
example, stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression’,
and that ‘[t]his right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers’. When the Convention is ‘taken literally’ it is
therefore hard to believe that it imposes more than mere duties not to interfere.
Yet over the years it has become apparent from the Court’s case law that the
rights listed in the Convention also entail positive obligations.88 An early
example is presented by the Marckx judgment, in which the Court held that
the fact that in Belgium no maternal affiliation could be established directly
after the birth of an illegitimate child violated the right to one’s family life
(Article 8 ECHR).89 A possibility to do so had thus to be created in order for
Belgium to comply with the Convention.
87 This was illustrated by a Factsheet on the website of the Court concerning ‘welfare rights’.
This factsheet explicitly stated that ‘[t]he European Convention on Human Rights …
guarantees civil and political rights (such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security
and the right to a fair trial). Meanwhile, other Council of Europe instruments, notably the
European Social Charter, concern economic and social rights (such as housing, health, educa-
tion, employment legal protection and social welfare)’. There no longer is a social welfare
factsheet available online (but see for the remaining factsheets www.echr.coe.int, under
‘Factsheets’).
88 See, generally, Mowbray 2004; Xenos 2012.
89 Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74.
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Another point is that the individual rights laid down in the Convention
cannot always meaningfully be characterised as entirely civil or political in
nature. Even a brief look at the case law of the Court reveals that economic
and social interests are protected therein as well. Under the header of rights
to private life, property, non-discrimination, etc., the ECtHR has over the years
reviewed – and found violations in – numerous cases concerning social security
payments, housing laws, environmental nuisances, etc. Inasmuch as the ECHR
norms (or articles) may still be considered to be ‘civil and political’, this no
longer holds true for all of the interests they protect.90
Although in legal scholarship the provision of positive guarantees and the
protection of socio-economic interests are often considered to be closely
related,91 in fact two different things are concerned. The positive obligations
found in the Convention do not always concern economic or social rights,
while the socio-economic guarantees offered by the Court are not always of
a positive kind. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there is a great overlap
between the two, since protection of economic and social interests often
requires that at least some active steps be taken. Therefore, it is submitted here
that it is indeed especially the combination of the two that adds to the Conven-
tion’s socio-economic rights dimension.92
Against this background, this section provides a brief overview of the
Court’s case law on (positive) economic and social matters, which by no means
is meant to be comprehensive. The aim is to generate a general image of what
the socio-economic case law of the Court entails by presenting some illustrative
examples. After introducing the Court’s first explicit acknowledgment of the
fact that civil and political rights and economic and social rights are not fully
separable (2.4.1), these examples will be presented under two different head-
ings. The first of these concerns the socio-economic protection that has been
provided mainly under Articles 6 and 14 ECHR (2.4.2). These articles can be
called ‘procedural’ and ‘non-free-standing’, respectively. As such they indirectly
allow for what can be termed the ‘socialisation’ of the Convention. Secondly,
regard is had to the (self-standing) substantive articles that allow the Court
to engage in the adjudication of a broad range of economic and social interests
(2.4.3). Highlighted are Articles 2, 3, and 8 ECHR, as well as Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention.
90 On the distinction between norms and protected interests as it is used in this book, see infra,
S. 2.5.1. See also, infra, S. 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 (for different explanations for this development).
91 Cf. Möller 2012, who in discussing his ‘global model of constitutional rights’ explicitly links
the two (e.g., p. 5ff.).
92 Cf. also, infra, S. 2.6.2 (on the potential of the ECHR’s socio-economic dimension and the
role of positive obligations therein).
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2.4.1 No ‘Water-tight Division’ Between the Civil and Political and the Socio-
Economic Sphere
The adjudication of economic and social matters under the classic rights norms
laid down in the ECHR is not a recent phenomenon. Although the number of
socio-economic judgments of the Court has increased significantly over the
past years, it was recognised at a relatively early stage that the ‘civil and
political’ character of the ECHR must necessarily be nuanced. It was in a 1979
case under Article 6(1) ECHR (the right to a fair trial) that the Court for the
first time explicitly held that the Convention also protects interests one would
primarily expect to be protected by other human rights treaties.93 In the case
of Airey v. Ireland, it had to deal with the question of whether the Article 6(1)
guarantee of access to court also gives rise to positive state duties.94 Mrs Airey
wished to go to court to obtain a separation from her violent, alcoholic hus-
band, but could not afford any legal assistance. The ECtHR held that the right
to free legal aid can under circumstances also be invoked in civil law suits.
It emphasised the importance of procedural protection, even when this has
substantial implications for a national legal system and brings along significant
costs. In the words of the Court, Article 6 ‘may compel the state to provide
for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for
an effective access to court’.95 The Government had submitted that ‘the Con-
vention should not be interpreted so as to achieve social and economic devel-
opments in a Contracting state’.96 The Court, however, rather than circum-
venting this sensitive point, responded by holding as follows:
‘Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many
of them have implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore
considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an interpretation of the
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not
be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division
separating that sphere from the field covered by the Convention.’97
In this way it made clear that a conceptual distinction between the civil and
the social sphere cannot be made. The Airey case thereby put an end to the
idea that the Convention is concerned strictly and solely with civil and political
interests. It showed the ECtHR’s willingness to conclude on (costly) obligations
93 Cf. Scheinin 2001, p. 34: ‘Under the Convention, the far-reaching procedural safeguards
of … [Article 6] are perhaps the clearest example of the ECHR giving additional protection
to rights that are basically also covered by other human rights treaties.’
94 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73.
95 Ibid., para. 26.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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for the state that can be interpreted as being primarily of a social or economic
nature.
The paragraph just quoted has been referred to regularly in the Court’s
case law,98 which means that Airey has proven not to be merely an exception.
Quite to the contrary, the overlap between the civil and political sphere and
the field of economic and social rights is visible in a still increasing number
of decisions and judgments. These concern Article 6, but also several other
provisions enshrined in the Convention.
2.4.2 ‘Socialisation’ Through Article 6 and Article 14 ECHR
At first glance, the Airey case was not about a substantive socio-economic
matter, such as the provision of housing or health care. It was brought and
adjudicated under Article 6 ECHR, the right to fair trial, which can be con-
sidered to contain (classical) procedural fundamental rights guarantees.99 More
precisely, the case concerned Mrs Airey’s access to court, a right developed
under paragraph 1 of this article. However, it turned out that in order to obtain
such access, Mrs Airey was in need of free legal aid. At a second glance, thus,
the case did (also) concern social protection. The Airey case thereby sets a
perfect example of the inseparability of ‘civil’ and ‘social’ concerns, as the
Court indeed recognised in its judgment.
Next to the ‘procedural’ Article 6 route, there is another route that from
the outset tends to interfere with the strict distinction between civil and poli-
tical and socio-economic interests. Also the non-discrimination principle
enshrined in Article 14 ECHR does not clearly distinguish between different
kinds of guarantees. Perhaps even more obviously than Article 6, this article
ensures protection that can easily trigger social effects, since, once unequal
treatment is considered discriminatory, privileges or benefits provided to one
group need to be distributed amongst others as well, also when they are of
a social kind.100
Both Article 6 and Article 14 thus provide for ‘derived’ socio-economic
rights protection in Strasbourg, in the sense that it is not because of the fact
that the substantive socio-economic interests as such are protected by the
98 See, for a recent example, N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05, para.
44. There, however, the reference was used to underline that ‘[a]lthough many of the rights
it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the Convention is essentially
directed at the protection of civil and political rights’. The dissenters in this case (Judges
Tulkens, Bonello, and Spielmann) have drawn attention to this ‘incomplete and thus
misleading quotation’, which according to them ignores ‘the social dimension of the
integrated approach adopted by the Court’ (para. 6).
99 See, for such a ‘classical’ reading of the judgment, Warbrick 2007, pp. 245-246.
100 However, in order to invoke Art. 14, another substantive Convention right must be involved
as well. See, infra, S. 2.4.2.2.
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Convention that social protection under these articles is granted, but rather
such protection is linked to ensuring procedural safeguards or combating
discrimination. Besides the Airey case, some more examples may serve to
illustrate this.
2.4.2.1 Article 6 ECHR
The right to fair trial enshrined in Article 6 ECHR – to the extent relevant here –
reads as follows:
‘1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a demo-
cratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life
of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice.’101
The right to a fair trial plays a prominent role in the Convention system. Not
only does a great percentage of the applicants invoke this provision, the right
itself also forms one of the cornerstones of the ECHR.102 Article 6 explicitly
deals with procedural guarantees, which implies that it is not the Court’s
function ‘to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national
court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention’.103 The rights guaranteed by Article 6 apply
101 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 6 read: ‘2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a
criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c)
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has
not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot under-
stand or speak the language used in court.’ See, for extensive introductions to this article
and the relevant case law, as well as further references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 511-650;
Harris et al. 2014, pp. 370-492; Rainey et al. 2014, pp. 246-306; Meyer, in Karpenstein/Mayer
2012, pp. 133-204; Peçi et al., in Gerards et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 195-497.
102 According to the Grand Chamber of the Court ‘the right to a fair trial holds so prominent
a place in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6(1)
restrictively’ (Perez v. France, ECtHR (GC) 12 February 2004, appl. no. 47287/99, para. 64).
103 Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 1999, appl. no. 30544/96, para 28.
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in the context of criminal charges104 as well as in disputes regarding ‘civil
rights and obligations’. It is the Court’s broad interpretation of the latter notion
that is crucial for the indirect social protection the right to a fair trial can offer.
Importantly, the Court has interpreted the notion of ‘civil rights and
obligations’ in an autonomous manner, i.e., without considering the defendant
state’s qualification of what is at stake to be decisive.105 Thereby, and by
‘expanding its scope over time, the position has been reached in which most
substantive rights that an individual may arguably claim under national law
fall within Article 6 unless they quintessentially concern the exercise of the
public power of the State’.106 Whereas notably disputes concerning the entry,
conditions of stay, and removal of aliens as well as issues concerning public
service employment and taxes are not considered to be ‘civil’ in nature, Article
6 of the Convention covers a great range of other topics. Most illustrative for
the socio-economic dimension of Article 6 is the application of this provision
in the field of social security. Whereas the Court in several earlier cases bal-
anced the ‘private’ and ‘public’ aspects of disputes concerning this topic in
order to determine whether the applicability of Article 6 was triggered,107
later it more generally incorporated disputes concerning social security, includ-
ing social assistance.108
In fact, the Court’s broad interpretation of ‘civil rights and obligations’
implies that besides social security disputes, all kinds of other social rights-
related disputes are covered by the right to a fair trial as well.109 Admittedly,
the social protection that follows from this is often more indirect compared
to what was granted in Airey, since cost-free assistance of a lawyer may be
considered to be a particularly concrete social advantage. In most cases, Article
6 merely ensures an appropriate procedure without thereby guaranteeing a
substantive individual interest of an economic or social nature. Nevertheless,
at least this means that the various well-worked out guarantees written down
in Article 6(1) of the Convention must be complied with, as well as that in
104 Excluded from criminal charge proceedings are ‘ancillary’ proceedings concerning legal
aid, pre-trial detention, as well as extradition proceedings to face a criminal charge in
another state. Harris et al. 2014, p. 373.
105 König v. Germany, ECtHR 28 June 1978, appl. no. 6232/73, para. 88.
106 Harris et al. 2009, p. 212. In this regard, ‘more recent jurisprudence, by which more and
more rights and obligations have been brought within Article 6, is not always easy to
explain in terms of any distinction between private and public law that is found in European
national law’ (Harris et al. 2014, p. 379).
107 Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 29 May 1986, appl. no. 8562/79, para. 40; Deumeland
v. Germany, ECtHR 29 May 1986, appl. no. 9348/81, para. 60.
108 Salesi v. Italy, ECtHR 26 February 1993, appl. no. 13023/87, para. 19. Since the distinction
between contributive and non-contributive benefits cannot be considered as fundamental,
the right to a fair trial thus applies to all disputes in this field. Cf. Koch 2002, p. 36. Tax
related disputes, however, continue to be excluded from the scope of Article 6. For an
exception, however, see Editions Périscope v. France, ECtHR 26 March 1992, appl. no. 11760/
92, para. 40.
109 One can for example also think of (private) work related disputes.
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social rights disputes covered by Article 6 access to court must be pro-
vided.110 As will become clear later on in this study, the importance of such
‘procedural’ protection for the advancement of socio-economic aims should
not be underestimated.
2.4.2.2 Article 14 ECHR
Article 14 ECHR contains the prohibition of discrimination:
‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.’111
As can be inferred from this wording, Article 14 guarantees the enjoyment
of other Convention rights without discrimination. It is therefore described as
‘parasitic’ and as having ‘no independent existence’.112 Its application, how-
ever, ‘does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive
rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is necessary but also sufficient for the
facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of one or more of the Convention
Articles’.113
The ‘within the ambit’ formulation can be understood as pointing at
something that is more inclusive than the strict scope of a particular ECHR
provision.114 Over time, the Court has come to recognise that Article 14
extends beyond the enjoyment of the Convention rights that states are required
110 Golder v. the UK, EComHR 21 February 1975, appl. no. 4451/70.
111 See, for extensive introductions to this article and the relevant case law, as well as further
references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 1027-1051; Harris et al. 2014, pp. 783-822; Rainey et
al. 2014, pp. 567-594; Sauer, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, pp. 341-358; Gerards, in Gerards
et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 1126-1222.
112 Chassagnou and Others v France, ECtHR (GC) 29 April 1999, appl. nos. 25088/94, 28331/95
and 28443/95, para. 89. As a response to the ‘gap’ that hence exists – in the sense that
Article 14 indirectly ‘permits’ government discrimination when there is no sufficient
connection to another Convention right – the Committee of Ministers in 2000 adopted
Protocol No. 12, providing for a ‘free-standing’ prohibition of discrimination. However,
ratification of this Protocol has turned out problematic. Continuing dependence on Article
14 has therefore led to broadening the use of that Article. Attempts to ‘close the gap’ can
be found in, e.g., Wintemute 2004 and Wintemute 2004a. See also Arnardóttir 2003, pp.
35-37; Arnardóttir 2014, p. 331.
113 See, e.g., Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the UK, ECtHR 28 May 1985, appl. nos. 9214/80,
9473/81 and 9474/81, para. 71; Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, ECtHR 18 July 1994, appl.
no. 13580/88, para. 22; Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1990, appl. no. 20458/92,
para. 22.
114 Wintemute 2004, p. 370; Arnardóttir 2014. For a recent example that shows that a case can
be incompatible ratione materiae when it comes to Article 1 taken alone, while being reviewed
under Art. 1 P1 in conjunction with Article 14, see Puricel v. the UK, ECtHR 14 June 2011
(dec.), appl. no. 20511/04.
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to guarantee. It also attaches to additional rights voluntarily provided by the
state, as long as they fall within the ‘general scope’ of any Convention ar-
ticle115 and regardless of whether these rights are, or are not, of a socio-eco-
nomic kind. In other words, as soon as measures or decisions taken by the
state touch upon a provision of the Convention – irrespective of whether the
Convention would require such (economic or social) measures or decisions –
they must comply with the requirement of non-discrimination.116
In relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (the protection of property), for
example, the accessory character of the prohibition of discrimination implies
that when a social security right is created by the state, a complaint about a
difference in treatment relating to that right will fall within the ambit of this
Article for the purpose of applying Article 14. In the words of the Court:
‘Although Protocol No. 1 does not include the right to receive a social security
payment of any kind, if a State does decide to create a benefits scheme, it must
do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14’.117 Similarly, the Court
has held that ‘there is no right under Article 8 of the Convention to be pro-
vided with housing’, but if a state provides benefits in this field, it must
nevertheless comply with the requirements of Article 14.118
Because of the broad scope of application it has been given by the Court,
‘Article 14 may have a socialising effect on the rights and freedoms laid down
in the Convention’.119 Indeed, economic and social rights are not explicitly
taken up in the Convention, but because of the working of the non-discrim-
ination principle they can nevertheless be protected via the (civil and political)
rights listed therein. The effect of this is limited, however, because
‘a [socio-economic] right does not arise when the preferential treatment by the
authorities is intended precisely to remove an existing inequality or – according
115 See for the first time Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on het use of languages in
education in Belgium, ECtHR 23 July 1968, appl. no. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63,
1994/63 and 2126/64, para. 9.
116 See Kafkaris v. Cyprus, ECtHR (GC) 12 February 2008, appl. no. 21906/04, para. 159, where
the Court stated that ‘[a] measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements
of the Article enshrining the right or freedom in question may however infringe this Article
when read in conjunction with Article 14 for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature’.
According to Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 1051, ‘[i]f, for instance, … [states] proceed to subsidise
a particular religious community or to promote education in a particular language, other
religious communities or other linguistic communities are in principle entitled to the same
treatment’.
117 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 55.
Indeed, in this regard ‘a negative obligation not to discriminate may have positive implica-
tions if the differential treatment concerns distribution of certain benefits’ (Koch and
Vedsted-Hansen 2006, p. 20).
118 Bah v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR 27 September 2011, appl. no. 56329/07, para. 40.
119 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 1051.
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to the case law developed by the Commission and the Court – may be justified
on other objective and reasonable grounds.’120
Distinctions between groups and individuals in the field of health care policy
or social security legislation are omnipresent. Importantly, it cannot always
be argued that persons falling in different categories – which determine
whether or not they receive certain forms of assistance – find themselves in
a comparable position. Even if this is the case, however, distinctions can serve
a legitimate aim and be considered proportional in the light thereof. Although
relevant for ECHR protection in the socio-economic sphere, thus, Article 14 does
not necessarily provide an easy route for obtaining social rights protection.
2.4.3 Socio-Economic Protection Through Substantive ECHR Rights
More direct, though nevertheless called ‘collateral’,121 is the protection of
socio-economic interests under the (other) substantive rights laid down in the
Convention. Whereas claimants under Articles 6 and 14 ECHR require what
is effectively a fair trial or a non-discriminatory situation, under the other
articles relevant here the economic and social nature of their requests may
appear more straightforward. Article 8 of the Convention, for example, is
phrased in relatively open terms. It provides a ‘right to respect for private
and family life’, and especially the former can be understood very broadly.
What is more, the Court’s recognition of the possibility of positive obligations
under this article122 has opened up the possibility for admitting numerous
positive and social private life-related claims about specific socio-economic
measures or benefits.
Next to Article 8 ECHR, several other substantive articles have been im-
portant in the development of the socio-economic dimension of the Convention,
such as Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), and Article 1
of the First Protocol to the ECHR (protection of property). Together with Ar-
ticle 8, these provisions form the focal points of the chapters of this book that
deal with the protection the ECHR offers in the field of housing, health and
health care, and social security.123 The current section mainly aims to intro-
120 Ibid. As the Court has established as early as in 1968, this will be the case when the dis-
tinction does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’, or lacks a ‘reasonable relationship of propor-
tionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’. See, e.g.,
Chassagnou and Others v France, ECtHR (GC) 29 April 1999, appl. nos. 25088/94, 28331/95
and 28443/95, para. 91; Serife Yigit v. Turkey, ECtHR 2 November 2010, appl. no. 3976/05,
para. 67.
121 Cf. also Warbrick 2007, p. 247, who speaks of ‘[c]ollateral protection of economic and social
interests’.
122 E.g., Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, para. 31.
123 See, infra, Ch. 8, 9, and 10.
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duce the different articles, and provide a glimpse of how these civil and
political rights norms ensure the protection of a broad range of economic and
social guarantees.
2.4.3.1 Article 2 ECHR
Article 2 ECHR protects the right to life. It states that
‘1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.’124
The right to life can be considered amongst the most fundamental rights of
the Convention.125 The prohibition to deprive someone of his life is directed
at national authorities, agents, and individuals for which the state can be held
responsible.126 Importantly, the exceptions summed up in Article 2 must be
read narrowly.127 The use of force ‘must be shown to have been “absolutely
necessary” for one of the purposes in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) and, there-
fore, justified in spite of the risks it entailed for human lives’.128 Although
the right to life is not ‘absolute’ in the sense that no exceptions are allowed,129
a successful appeal to one of these exceptions will hence be very rare.
Although Article 2 primarily contains a negative obligation for the state,
it ‘may, as other Convention articles … give rise to positive obligations on
124 See, for extensive introductions to this article and the relevant case law, as well as further
references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 351-403; Harris et al. 2009, pp. 203-234; Rainey et al.
2014, pp. 143-168; Schübel-Pfister, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, pp. 52-69; Mirgaux, in
Gerards et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 25-76.
125 See McCann a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 September 1995, appl. no. 18984/91, para. 147.
See also Schübel-Pfister, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, no. 1.
126 Mowbray 2012, p. 83. According to Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 352 ‘Article 2 can be invoked
in Strasbourg only when its violation is (also) due to a lack of protection on the part of
the national authorities, because complaints can only be directed against acts and omissions
for which the State bears responsibility’.
127 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 403. Cf. also Mowbray 2012, p. 83; Schübel-Pfister, in Karpenstein/
Mayer 2012, no. 29.
128 Stewart v. the UK, EComHR 10 July 1984, appl. no. 10044/82, para. 15.
129 It can, however, be considered amongst the non-derogable rights of the Convention. See
Art. 15(2) ECHR: ‘No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war … shall be made under this provision.’ See Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 403.
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the part of the State’.130 ‘Protection by law’ first of all implies certain pro-
cedural duties. The Court has held that Article 2(1), read in conjunction with
Article 1 of the Convention,131 ‘requires by implication that there should be
some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed
as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State’.132 More
generally, the first sentence of Article 2 is understood to mean that states are
required to take ‘appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their
jurisdiction’,133 i.e., they have a ‘primary duty’ to secure this right by creating
‘an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the commission
of offences against the person, backed up by law enforcement machinery for
the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provi-
sions’.134
The positive interpretation of the right to life has resulted in the application
of this provision not only in situations of conflict or violence, but also in more
‘daily’ circumstances related to hospital and medical treatment, detention, or
environmental matters. In the context of medical treatment the right to life
has played a role in cases where a life-threatening disease was not timely
diagnosed135 or where necessary treatment was refused.136 Also issues con-
cerning (the provision of) medication have come up, in which context, for
example, Article 2 was applied to a complaint concerning a request for a
refund of the cost of drugs.137 Moreover, the Court has also held that ‘an
issue may arise under Article 2 of the Convention where it is shown that the
authorities of a Contracting State put an individual at risk through the denial
130 W. v. the UK, EComHR 28 February 1983 (dec.), appl. no. 9348/81, para. 12.
131 Art. 1 ECHR reads: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.’
132 McCann and Others v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 September 1995, appl. no. 18984/91, para.
161.
133 E.g., L.C.B. v. the UK, ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/198/1001, para. 36.
134 Makaratzis v. Greece, ECtHR (GC) 20 December 2004, appl. no. 50385/99, para. 57. This means
that there must be (criminal) laws against the taking of life. There also need to be regulations
for the use of force by agents of the state like the police as well as for other activities that
involve or might involve a risk to life. These regulations must be enforced by ‘an effective
judicial system’ (Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99,
para. 92. This requirement however ‘does not necessarily require criminal proceedings to
be brought in every case and may be satisfied if civil, administrative or even disciplinary
remedies were available to the victims’). When the laws in place are not respected, this
implies that punishment must be possible.
135 Powell v. the UK, ECtHR 4 May 2000 (dec.), appl. no. 45305/99. The case was declared
inadmissible, but the Court emphasised that it ‘cannot be excluded that the acts and
omissions of the authorities in the field of health care policy may in certain circumstances
engage their responsibility under the positive limb of Article 2’.
136 Mehmet Senturk and Bekir Senturk v. Turkey, ECtHR 9 April 2013, appl. no. 23423/09.
137 Nitecki v. Poland, ECtHR 21 March 2002, appl. no. 65653/01.
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of health care which they have undertaken to make available to the population
generally’.138
Also the treatment – or lack of appropriate treatment – of prisoners has
raised specific issues under Article 2. In particular, the Court has dealt with
various cases of suicide by prisoners, where it has held that ‘[i]t is incumbent
on the State to account for any injuries suffered in custody, which obligation
is particularly stringent where that individual dies’.139 In other contexts in
which individuals are dependent on the state and the authorities for that
reason have a special responsibility, the right to life can also bring along
positive obligations of a particularly socio-economic kind. When the authorities
are aware of a worrisome situation possibly endangering the lives of depend-
ent, vulnerable individuals, regardless of the economic circumstances, they
are required to take the necessary protective measures including the provision
of food and medication.140 Finally, the right to life can be relevant in relation
to the responsibility of the state for environmental pollution.141 Depending
on the dangerousness of the situation concerned, there can be an obligation
for the state to provide information and take the necessary measures in order
to avoid a violation of the Convention.142
The cases dealt with under the right to life as enshrined in the Convention
thus concern a broad variety of topics.143 Whereas at first glance Article 2
mainly applies to the use of force or situations of conflict, its applicability is
much broader. Especially in issues concerning health – ranging from life
threatening diseases to the effects of serious pollution and treatment of those
under the responsibility of the state – , the social dimension of the Court’s
case law under Article 2 becomes apparent.
138 Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 10 March 2001, appl. no. 25781/94, para. 219. Also quite
generally, the Court stated in Calvelli and Ciglio that the positive obligations under Article
2 apply in the public health sphere and ‘require States to make regulations compelling
hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of
their patients’ lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set
up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether
in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible be made
accountable’ (Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, ECtHR (GC) 17 January 2002, appl. no. 32967/96,
para. 49).
139 Keenan v. the UK, ECtHR 3 April 2001, appl. no. 27229/95, para. 91.
140 Nencheva a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 18 June 2013, appl. no. 48609/06.
141 E.g., L.C.B. v. the UK, ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/198/1001, concerning a case of
leukemia resulting from exposition to radiation. In this case it was considered that Article
2 applied, but no violation was found.
142 See Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99. Cf. also
Budayeva a. O. v. Russia, ECtHR 20 March 2008, appl. nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02,
11673/02 and 15343/02, which concerned a natural disaster, and where a violation was
found.
143 Covered are moreover also issues related to abortion, euthanasia and the death penalty.
These issues are not discussed here.
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2.4.3.2 Article 3 ECHR
Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition of torture) reads:
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.’144
The brevity of this provision can be explained by its absolute character: no
justifications can be provided for torture or for treatment or punishment that
is prohibited under this article.145 It has become clear that this absolute pro-
hibition covers a rather broad variety of individual interests. Whereas Article
2 provides ‘protection against deprivation of life only’,146 ‘[o]ther injuries
to the physical – and mental – integrity may in many cases be brought under
Article 3’.147
Next to ensuring that state officials do not actively expose individuals to
torture or other forms of ill-treatment, Article 3 also entails positive obligations
for the state. The ECtHR has held that
‘[t]he obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention
to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures
designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to
ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals.’148
Primarily, these positive measures must constitute effective deterrence as well
as ensure an effective investigation.
In order to get an idea of what socio-economic protection is implied by
Article 3, it is important to ask exactly what kind of treatment or punishment
this provision forbids. How must ‘torture’ or ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ be
understood, and do the words ‘treatment’ and ‘punishment’ imply that only
specific situations trigger the application of this provision? The latter question
must be answered in the negative: the Court has made clear that a limited
overview of the situations covered by Article 3 cannot be given. Instead, it
144 See, for extensive introductions to this article and the relevant case law, as well as further
references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 405-441; Harris et al. 2014, pp. 235-278; Rainey et al.
2014, pp. 169-197; Sinner, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, pp. 69-80; Woltjer and Pachtenbeke,
in Gerards et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 25-76.
145 Like Art. 2, Art. 3 has been considered to belong to the most fundamental of the rights
protected by the Convention, see Soering v. the UK, ECtHR 7 July 1989, appl. no. 14038/88,
para. 88.
146 X. v. Austria, EComHR 13 December 1979 (dec.), appl. no. 8278/78, para. 1.
147 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 353.
148 Moldovan a. O. v. Romania, ECtHR 12 July 2005, appl. nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, para.
98.
The ECHR and Economic and Social Rights Protection 49
has held that in order for this provision to apply the situation an individual
is confronted with must ‘attain a minimum level of severity’.149 It has further
explained that ‘[t]he assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things,
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration
of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age
and state of health of the victim, etc.’.150 This means that there is no single,
clear criterion that is decisive for judging whether something counts as ‘ill-
treatment’, and that the question whether particular circumstances demand
individual protection has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
This relative way of approaching the (positive) obligations that follow from
Article 3 of the Convention does not a priori exclude that a violation is being
found due to socio-economic circumstances. For example, Article 3 has been
applied in cases where houses were destroyed,151 but also where applicants
– as a consequence of such destruction – for years had no appropriate place
to live.152 In the latter case, it was not the lack of an appropriate place to
live as such that was reason for holding Article 3 applicable. Instead, it was
the combination of (aggravating) factors at stake that made the Court decide
that in the circumstances at hand the prohibition of ill-treatment applied.153
A similar conclusion can be distilled from cases concerning prison circum-
stances, which sometimes also attain the minimum level of severity required.
This can be the case especially where prisoners are concerned whose health
is such that they are in need of special treatment,154 or that it requires accom-
modation to be made in order to prevent serious humiliation.155
Most prominent in terms of social protection under Article 3 are perhaps
the cases concerning health and medical treatment apart from those involving
prison situations. In a number of cases, the Court has had to deal with com-
plaints of persons suffering from serious illness who were about to be deported
149 Ireland v. the UK, ECtHR 18 January 1978, appl. no. 5310/71, para. 162.
150 Ibid.
151 E.g., Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR 24 April 1998, appl. nos. 23184/94 and 23185/94,
para. 78.
152 Moldovan a. O. v. Romania, ECtHR 12 July 2005, appl. nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01.
153 These aggravating circumstances concern for example the age of the applicants or racial
motives. Cf. Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR 24 April 1998, appl. nos. 23184/94 and 23185/
94, para. 78. Cf. also the cases of Bilgin v. Turkey, ECtHR 16 November 2000, appl. no. 23819/
94 and Dulas v. Turkey, ECtHR 30 January 2001, appl. no. 25801/94, both of which dealt
with similar fact patters and in which the Court also concluded on violations of Art. 3.
In Orhan v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 18 June 2002, appl. no. 25656/94, para. 362, the Court
however did ‘not find … distinctive elements concerning the age or health of the applicant
or the Orhans or specific conduct of the soldiers vis-à-vis either of those persons which
could lead to a conclusion that they had suffered treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention’.
154 Cf. Farbtuhs v. Latvia, ECtHR 2 December 2004, appl. no. 4672/02, para. 56; Khudobin v.
Russia, ECtHR 26 October 2006, appl. no. 59696/00, para. 93.
155 Even when there is no intention to humiliate the individual, see Peers v. Greece, ECtHR
19 April 2001, appl. no. 28524/95, para. 74.
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to their country of origin. According to the Court, this can amount to a viola-
tion of Article 3 ECHR,156 if only in very exceptional circumstances.157 In
similar vein, in a case concerning an individual asylum seeker who was de-
prived of any means of subsistence and who was living in extreme poverty,
the Court has underlined that
‘it has not excluded “the possibility that the responsibility of the State may be
engaged [under Article 3] in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was
wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference
in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity”.’158
In this case the Court held the state responsible and thus inferred a positive
socio-economic obligation from Article 3 ECHR.159
Thus, Article 3 can be engaged in a variety of circumstances of a socio-
economic nature: in cases related to severe housing conditions or health
problems, as well as when more generally an individual’s living standard is
concerned. What matters is whether the high ‘minimum level of severity’
threshold has been transgressed. This seems most likely when that individual
is dependent on the state and belongs to a vulnerable group.
2.4.3.3 Article 8 ECHR
Article 8 ECHR contains the right to respect for private and family life:
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’160
The interests summed up in Article 8(1) are understood in an ‘autonomous’
manner, and thus the Court is not bound by any national interpretation of
156 D. v. the UK, ECtHR 2 May 1997, appl. no. 30240/96.
157 N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05.
158 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 253.
See earlier, Budina v. Russia, ECtHR 18 June 2009, appl. no. 45603/05; Laroshina v. Russia,
ECtHR 23 April 2002, appl. no. 56869/00.
159 Cf. Koch 2003, p. 23 (on the (possible) social element in Article 3 ECHR).
160 See, for extensive introductions to this article and the relevant case law, as well as further
references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 663-750; Harris et al. 2014, pp. 522-591; Rainey et al.
2014, pp. 334-410; Pätzold, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, pp. 216-248; Forder et al., in Gerards
et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 534-784.
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them.161 Notably, however, instead of providing for clear definitions, the
Court has interpreted Article 8 in a case-by-case manner. This makes it gen-
erally difficult to know what exact guarantees follow from the Court’s case
law. Nevertheless, with regard to ‘private life’, some general guidance has
been provided in Niemietz v. Germany, in which the Court held that
‘it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an ‘inner circle’
in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect
for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and
develop relationships with other human beings.’162
By now it has become clear that interference with physical or moral integrity
is covered by ‘private life’, and so is sexual orientation and activity.163 More
important for the purposes of this study is that the right to respect for private
life can also be triggered in cases concerning the employment sphere.164
Also the Court’s broad interpretation of ‘home’ can be considered relevant
for Article 8’s socio-economic dimension. Whether something constitutes a
home for purposes of the Convention depends on ‘the existence of sufficient
and continuous links with a specific place’.165 In this regard,
‘the length of temporary or permanent stays …, frequent absence … or … use on
a temporary basis, for the purposes of short-term stays or even keeping belongings
in it, do not preclude retention of sufficient continuing links with a particular
residential place, which can still be considered “home” for the purposes of Article 8
of the Convention.’166
A ‘home’ need not be owned or established legally,167 which means that also
those individuals who – due to a lack of alternatives – have established a place
to live without having the permission to do so can expect (some) protection
under the Convention.
161 Harris et al. 2014, p. 522.
162 Niemietz v. Germany, ECtHR 16 December 1992, appl. no. 13710/88, para. 29, where the
Court however also held that it ‘does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an
exhaustive definition of the notion of “private life”’.
163 Likewise, the interpretation of ‘family life’ has developed significantly over time to extend
beyond formal and biological relationships. According to Harris et al. 2014, p. 526, ‘[t]he
development of the idea of “family life” is one of the best examples of the way the Com-
mission and the Court have interpreted the Convention to take account of social changes’.
164 Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, ECtHR 27 July 2004, appl. nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00,
para. 47. See further on this case, infra, S. 2.5.3.3.
165 Lazarenko a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 11 December 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 27427/02, para. 53.
166 Ibid.
167 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92.
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Thus, it can be accepted that Article 8(1) has come to cover a large list of
interests, which may easily include socio-economic ones. Moreover, although
the notion of ‘respect’ as it is mentioned in Article 8 has a ‘negative’ connota-
tion, it has been given a distinctively positive meaning as well. More precisely,
the Court has said that Article 8
‘does not merely compel the State to abstain from … interference: in addition to
this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent
in an effective respect for private or family life … These obligations may involve
the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.’168
The recognition of positive duties implies that the Convention will apply not
only when the interests that fall within the scope of Article 8 are clearly
interfered with, but also when the state arguably failed to take measures to
protect them. What is required here is that ‘there is a direct and immediate
link between the measures sought by an applicant and the latter’s private
life’.169 Such a link has been found to exist, for example, in cases concerning
environmental pollution where the state had failed to take measures,170 but
also where requests for alternative housing were concerned.171 Depending
on how exactly the ‘clear and immediate link’ criterion is being explained,
the protection of Article 8 can thus allow for significant socio-economic pro-
tection under the Convention.
2.4.3.4 Article 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (P1) guarantees the protection of
property and reads:
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his pos-
sessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles
of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accord-
168 X and Y v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 26 March 1985, appl. no. 8978/80, para. 23.
169 Marzari v. Italy, ECtHR 4 May 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 36448/97.
170 Cf. Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, where it was established
that next to interfering with the applicant’s private sphere, ‘the adverse effects of environ-
mental pollution must attain a certain minimum level if they are to fall within the scope
of Article 8’ (para. 69).
171 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06; Winterstein a. O. v.
France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07.
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ance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contribu-
tions or penalties.’172
Article 1 P1 is also interpreted in an autonomous manner. In a case invoking
property protection the crucial question is whether the interest at stake can
be considered a ‘possession’. This first of all depends on the economic value
this interest has or does not have.173 Moreover, for a property right to be
recognised as justiciable under Article 1 P1 it should generally be an existing
right.174 Alternatively, there should be a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining
effective enjoyment of such right.175 A right to acquire property is not recog-
nized.176
Over the years, the Court has given a broad reading to the notion of
‘possessions’. It has recognised that company shares177 and (an application
for the registration of) trademarks178 are covered by it, as well as a ‘right
to a building permit’179 and economic interests connected with the exploita-
tion of a restaurant.180 A legitimate expectation based on a court judgment
or arbitration award that recognises a claim against the state can be successful
in Strasbourg as well.181 These examples signal that, rather than only ‘classic’,
tangible possessions, Article 1 P1 can cover other (legal) entitlements and
constructs representing an economic value, too.
Important is that the right to protection of property may also apply in the field
of social security. For some time the Court has held that when, for example,
172 See, for extensive introductions to this article and the relevant case law, as well as further
references, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 863-893; Harris et al. 2014, pp. 906-919; Rainey et al.
2014, pp. 492-519; Kaiser, in Karpenstein/Mayer 2012, pp. 359-376; Akkermans, in Gerards
et al. (eds.) 2013, pp. 1275-1324.
173 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 866.
174 See Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 869. In the case of Stran Greek Refinieries and Stratis Andeadis
v. Greece, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 13427/87, the Court noted that therefore the
right should be ‘sufficiently established to be enforceable’ (para. 59).
175 Mere ‘hope’ is not enough. See Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, ECtHR (GC)
12 July 2001, appl. no. 42527/98, concerning the expropriation of a painting of the father
of the applicant, in 1946. The right had become non-exercisable and hence did not amount
to a ‘legitimate expectation’ (para. 85).
176 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR 23 November 1983, appl. no. 8919/80, para. 48.
177 Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, EComHR 12 October 1982 (dec.), appl. nos. 8588/79 and
8589/79, p. 76.
178 See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, ECtHR (GC) 11 January 2007, appl. no. 73049/01, para.
78.
179 SCEA Ferme de Fresnoy v. France, ECtHR 1 December 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 61093/00.
180 Tre Traktörer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, ECtHR 7 July 1989, appl. no. 10873/84.
181 E.g., Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl.
no. 13427/87, para. 62.
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contributions had been paid, there could be room for protection under the
Convention.182 In 2005, moreover, it clarified that
‘[i]n the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their
lives, completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits.
Many domestic legal systems recognize that such individuals require a degree of
certainty and security, and provide for benefits to be paid – subject to the fulfilment
of the conditions of eligibility – as of right.’183
The ECtHR stressed that the freedom of the state to decide on whether and what
kind of social security system it creates is not in any way restricted, but if a
state creates a benefits scheme, regardless of whether this scheme is a contribu-
tory or a non-contributory one, ‘it must do so in a manner which is compatible
with Article 14’.184 Since this 2005 decision, both contributory and non-con-
tributory benefits have been awarded protection by the right to property, even
when they are not of an allegedly discriminatory nature.185 This has led to
the rapid development of a Strasbourg social security case law. The issues
the Court has dealt with concern for example access to particular social security
systems or the height of a pension.186 Moreover, the ECtHR has held that even
in a case where a pension was lawfully revoked because it had been erroneous-
ly granted, the protection of property applied.187
Article 1 P1 has also been applied to housing issues. Generally, this is the
case when someone owns a house the use of which is restricted by rent laws
or other regulations.188 Yet also when the applicant is a tenant and does not
own the house he lives in, the right to protection of property can sometimes
be invoked. When a lessee is deprived of the benefit of a renewal option on
182 X v. the Netherlands, EComHR 20 July 1971 (dec.), appl. no. 4130/69; Mrs. X v. the Netherlands,
EComHR 19 December 1973 (dec.), appl. no. 5763/72; Müller v. Austria, EComHR 16
December 1974 (dec.), appl. no. 5849/72; Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 21 February
1997, appl. no. 20060/92.
183 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 51.
184 Ibid., paras. 54-55.
185 That is, even when Art. 14 was not invoked. When discussing the application of Art. 14
(supra, S. 2.4.2.2), it was said that the protection under this article extends to more than
what is covered by the scope of a Convention right. In the social security example, however,
it appears that since the Court has held that both contributory and non-contributory benefits
fall within the reach of Art. 1 P1 for the purposes of applying Art. 14, it has also considered
this to be the case where Art. 1 P1 taken alone was at stake. See, on this development,
Leijten 2013a, p. 325ff. (supra, Ch. 10).
186 See, e.g., Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 March 2007 (dec.), appl. no. 77782/01, and Carson a.
O. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 4 November 2008, ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2010, appl. no.
42184/05, respectively.
187 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05, para. 39.
188 E.g., James a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 21 February 1986, appl. no. 8793/79; Mellacher a. O. v.
Austria, ECtHR 19 December 1989, appl. nos. 10522/83, 11011/84 and 11070/84; Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland, ECtHR (GC) 19 July 2006, appl. no. 35014/97; Lindheim a. O. v. Norway,
ECtHR 12 June 2012, appl. nos. 13221/08 and 2139/10.
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the lease granted by the local authority, he may rely on the protection of
Article 1 P1 against interference with his property.189 Also the loss of a
specially protected tenancy – although the Court has refrained from answering
the question whether this constitutes a ‘possession’ – can lead to review under
Article 1 P1.190
Thus, albeit not so much with the help of particularly positive obligations,
it can be said that the Convention’s property protection extends to some
important socio-economic fields and, for that reason, is of particular interest
for this study.
2.5 MAKING SENSE OF THE ECTHR’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
PROTECTION
As was explained in Section 2.4.1, the Court has for long acknowledged that
there is no ‘water-tight division’ separating socio-economic matters from the
rights protected by the Convention. However, more can be said about the
rationale for recognising so many (positive) economic and social obligations
on the basis of the procedural, substantive and non-discrimination provisions
of the Convention. Having obtained an image of what is understood here by
the ‘socio-economic case law’ of the ECtHR, this section therefore proceeds to
the question of what doctrinal foundations are underlying this phenomenon.
In order to understand the explanations that can be given for the Court’s
case law, first of all further clarification is needed of the distinction made in
this book between fundamental rights norms, and the interests and matters
covered by such fundamental rights norms. This clarification is provided in
Section 2.5.1, where also the practical relevance of the distinction is illuminated.
Subsequently, a look is had at the various ways in which the socio-economic
case law of the Court can be understood. First, the ‘effectiveness thesis’ is
discussed, i.e., the idea that the review of economic and social interests and
matters under civil and political rights norms boils down to effectuating these
norms, rather than creating an ‘new’ category of rights (2.5.2). Providing for
socio-economic guarantees, the argument goes, is what logically follows from
and is implied by the norms listed in the Convention. It is shown that the
Court has used the notion of effectiveness, as exemplified in a number of its
(interpretative) doctrines and practices, to develop the Convention so as to
cover a very broad range of issues including an increasing number of socio-
economic ones. Secondly, attention is had to the notions of indivisibility,
interrelatedness and interdependence of human rights (2.5.3). These notions
imply that there is or should be a clear and meaningful relation between civil
and political and economic and social rights norms. In line with this idea, the
189 Stretch v. the UK, ECtHR 24 June 2003, appl. no. 44277/98.
190 Berger-Krall a. O. v. Slovenia, ECtHR 12 June 2014, appl. no. 14717/04.
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Court has interpreted and applied the ECHR in a way that pays due account
to its connection to other rights. Understood in terms of (explicit) indivisibility,
socio-economic interests and matters feature in the Court’s case law not only
for the mere effectuation of ECHR norms, but also as an acknowledgment of
the importance of economic and social rights as such.
Importantly, the two explanatory theories, i.e., the ‘effectiveness thesis’ and
the ‘indivisibility thesis’, are not mutually exclusive, but instead complement-
ary, and both may help to explain the socio-economic protection provided
at the Strasbourg level. However, they are distinguished here, as they allow
for distinct insights related to the question where the Court’s socio-economic
protection could be heading. In this way, they lay the foundations for the final
part of this chapter.
2.5.1 Distinguishing Between Rights Norms and Interests or Matters
One can go as far as saying that there simply exist no such categories as ‘civil
and political’ and ‘economic and social’. That is however not the stance that
is taken in this book. First of all, this book starts from the assumption that
there does exist an at least relatively clear distinction between civil and political
rights norms, or provisions,191 on the one hand, and economic and social
rights norms on the other. Negatively phrased rights norms which provide
a right for everyone (individually) and concern a ‘first generation rights’
topic,192 can be called ‘civil and political’ norms. An example is Article 8(1)
ECHR: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.’ Also Article 3 ECHR provides a straightforward
example: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.’ On the other hand, a norm like the one enshrined
in Article 9 ICESCR (‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to social security, including social insurance’) does not fall
within this category.193 Although ‘recognising’ could be understood as a
negative duty, it is clear that active steps are required, that the provision is
191 Note that ‘norms’ here in fact refers to the legal wording, i.e., to the provisions as they
are written down in a specific document.
192 On the different generations of fundamental rights see, generally, Tomuschat 2008, p. 25ff.
193 Koch points out that socio-economic rights norms generally follow a ‘means-and-end
formula’, rather than an ‘if-so-formula’. According to Art. 12 ICESCR, for example, in order
to ‘recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health’ (the ‘end’), the state must take certain steps (‘means’), like ‘the
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’. For civil and political
rights, generally speaking, ‘if certain conditions are fulfilled, a certain legal consequence
is to occur or must not occur’ (one is granted the right, except for when certain conditions
are fulfilled) (Koch 2002, p. 31, fn. 8). See also Koch 2003, p. 4.
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directed at the state, and that a typically socio-economic topic (social security)
is concerned.
Admittedly, some norms at first glance seem borderline cases, like the
‘protection of property’ or the ‘right to education’.194 But if one looks at how
these rights are phrased in the context of the ECHR (‘Every natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’, and ‘No person
shall be denied the right to education’), it can be said that also these provisions
encompass classic human rights guarantees. Moreover, at least for the purposes
of this book, in which the object of study is the socio-economic protection
under the ECHR, for labelling rights norms it is also important to look at the
character of the document or treaty they are found in. Considering the tradi-
tionally civil and political European Convention – which was clearly meant
to cover classic rights norms and is even today generally so understood – one
can speak of the norms therein as deserving the same qualification.195
The distinction between different categories of rights norms or provisions
must be distinguished from a distinction between protected interests or matters
of a civil or political character, and those of a socio-economic nature. Both
distinctions do not always match neatly, let alone ally perfectly. The question
of what kind of norm is at stake often leads to a different answer than the
question of what kind of interest is involved. Whereas the prhasing of a rights
norm, according to the explanation given above, can be labelled civil or poli-
tical, this does not necessarily mean that the interests it protects deserve the
same qualification. Think for example of the provision of health care, which
in specific circumstances can be required under Article 3 ECHR.196 Yet, where-
194 See, in the ECHR context, Arts. 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR, respectively. See,
e.g., Palmer 2009, p. 398. It is typically this ambiguous character of these rights that barred
them from being taking up in the original Convention. Consider for example also the right
to form and join trade unions (Art. 11(1) ECHR: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and join trade unions for the protection of his interests’), and the right to legal aid in
criminal matters (Art. 6(3) ECHR: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights: … (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given
in free when the interests of justice so require’). See Brems 2007, p. 135.
195 The Court’s Factsheet on social welfare, that is no longer available online, explicitly stated
that ‘[t]he European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) guarantees civil and
political rights (such as the right to life, the right to liberty and security and the right to
a fair trial). Meanwhile, other Council of Europe instruments, notably The European Social
Charter, concern economic and social rights (such as housing, health, education, employment
legal protection and social welfare)’.
196 Indeed, when topics like these are concerned, it may sometimes even make more sense
to invoke a classical rights norm instead of a social one, This because the rights that are
commonly termed ‘social rights’ still have a second-rank status. In the words of Mantou-
valou, in Grear and Mantouvalou 2011, pp. 86-87: ‘[T]he most pressing question surrounding
the legal protection of civil and political rights – rights which have traditionally been seen
as essential for a state that respects its citizens – have largely been settled today.’ At the
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as it is often possible to characterise a norm in a specific context as being either
civil or political, or economic or social, it might be harder to qualify the inter-
ests that form the background to a specific complaint. When an individual
complains about garbage piling up in his street and the health damage this
might cause, it can be asked whether the actual matter then concerns ‘private
life’, ‘the enjoyment of home’, ‘health’, or his interest in ‘a clean environ-
ment’.197 Also when someone’s social security benefit – and thereby his sole
source of income – is revoked, it is both feasible to conceive of this issue as
concerning property interests, as well as to perceive it as a ‘social’ benefits
or social minimum issue.198
When such different interpretations are possible it is clear that the issues
mentioned could, next to under Article 8 ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
ECHR, respectively, also be brought under a socio-economic norm laying down
a ‘right to housing’, ‘a clean environment’, or a right to ‘social security’ – at
least when and where these rights are justiciable.199 This is an important
point: as was already illustrated by the examples in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3,
what is here delineated as the ‘socio-economic case law’ of the Court is its
case law concerning individual complaints that also, or even most logically fit
a socio-economic rights paradigm. Therefore, and regardless of their adjudica-
tion under a civil or political ECHR rights norm, the interests or matters at stake
in this case law can be described as being of an economic or social kind.200
Why are these distinctions important? One way of interpreting the socio-
economic protection under the Convention is to say that the ECtHR simply
provides protection to individuals when their state fails to do so, and that
labels (should) have nothing to do with this. To single out a part of the Stras-
same time, ‘debates about social and economic rights are far from settled’. See also Fredman
2008, p. 2; O’Connell 2012, pp. 8-17; Young on ‘constituting socio-economic rights’ (2012).
197 Cf., for a comparable Strasbourg case, Di Sarno and Others v. Italy, ECtHR 10 January 2012,
appl. no. 30765/08.
198 Cf. Moskal t. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05; Czaja t. Poland, ECtHR
2 October 2012, appl. no. 5744/05.
199 This may have to do with the fact that one can view the issue in a more or less ‘abstract’
way. An environmental pollution issue might indeed be related to someone’s private life;
the revocation of a benefit can be considered a property rights issue. In more concrete terms,
however, these matters can be described as related to one’s right to housing, or to social
security, respectively. Moreover, a right may be classical, the interests it protects socio-
economic, but the underlying desire (freedom, ability to participate) again more classical
(cf. Young 2012, in particular Ch. 2, p. 34ff.).
200 Cf. Gerards 2008, p. 655, p. 660ff., who also explicitly speaks of environmental, administrat-
ive, housing and other interests one would not first and foremost place under the Conven-
tion, but rather characterise as the subject of economic and social rights treaties. In the later
chapters of this thesis, the case law of the Court will also be grouped under the headers
of ‘health and health care’, ‘housing’ and ‘social security’, which underlines that rather
than merely ‘private life’ or ‘degrading treatment’, this is what the relevant cases are in
fact about. See, infra, Ch. 8, 9, and 10.
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bourg case law and call it ‘socio-economic’ is then nonsensical in the first place.
The problem with this interpretation is that it hardly provides any meaningful
starting point for critically assessing the ECtHR’s practice, neither in terms of
legitimacy or subsidiarity generally, nor in the context of the Court’s multi-
dimensional task, its workload, or the question of what fundamental rights
protection should be about. Instead, given that in daily parlance there is a
distinction between what is called ‘civil’ and ‘political’ and ‘economic’ and
‘social’, it might be wise to use these words in order to get grip on a complex
phenomenon like the fundamental rights protection under the ECHR. It is true
that there is a risk that everything that is termed ‘socio-economic’ in the context
of fundamental rights is perceived as second-rank or of inferior importance.
Awareness of this risk, however, can ensure that it does not predominate the
way in which developments are perceived, while the label ‘socio-economic’
can allow for a careful look whenever the complex and sensitive nature of
socio-economic rights protection justifies this.
Altogether, distinguishing firstly between norms (or provisions) and
interests (or matters), while secondly recognising that both can be civil or
political, or economic or social, mainly serves the aim of clarification and
provides a good starting point for what is to follow. When it is understood
that the ECHR norms are generally considered civil and political, yet some of
the interests they deal with are also, or primarily, socio-economic, an attempt
can be made at providing comprehensible normative explanations for what
is going on at the Strasbourg level.201 This in turn will allow for identifying
the possibilities and (potential) pitfalls inherent in the path the Court is taking.
2.5.2 The Effectiveness Thesis
The first way in which the socio-economic protection under the ECHR can be
viewed places the norms enumerated in the Convention on the foreground.
According to this view, economic and social protection is inevitable and
inherent, not in light of the overall protection of human rights in general, but
as a consequence of the protection of the norms enshrined in the Convention
in particular. It can be argued that states are required to provide a broad range
of guarantees in order to effectuate these classic, civil and political norms.
Thereby they protect a great variety of interests, some of which are everything
but classic, civil or political. In other words, according to the ‘effectiveness
201 Cf. Koch 2006, p. 407: ‘If one interprets the right to life as encompassing a fulfilment
obligation to provide for basic foodstuff and basic health care, it is indeed possible to wipe
out the separation between the two sets of rights. If health care and food are considered
legally relevant for the fulfilment of the right to life, there is no longer any reason to uphold
the distinction between civil and social rights. However, it is hardly that simple, and efforts
to explain away entirely the differences between the two sets of rights do not advance the
conceptual clarification.’
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thesis’ the Court is simply fulfilling its task of interpreting and protecting civil
rights norms in an effective manner, without thereby being hindered, at least
to a too great extent, by generating effects related to socio-economic rights.
In Section 2.4 it was already indicated that some of the rights taken up
in the Convention do not a priori discriminate between the protection of civil
and political and socio-economic interests. In this section the idea of ‘effective-
ness’ will be further elaborated so that it can also explain how the economic
and social dimension of the Convention has developed and expanded over
the years. This requires that next to the Court’s recognition of the fact that
the rights enshrined in the Convention need to be ‘practical and effective’,
attention must be had to more particular aspects of its interpretative instru-
mentarium. Looking at the Court’s teleological and autonomous approach to
the interpretation of fundamental rights, as well as at the ‘living tree’ character
of the Convention, it will become clear that the ‘effectiveness thesis’ forms
a dynamic explanation that is capable of making comprehensible not only the
social dimension of the ECHR, but also the development thereof.
2.5.2.1 Teleological, Autonomous, and ‘Living Instrument’ Interpretation
Interpreting fundamental rights is everything but a straightforward task.
Bygone are the days in which the judge was considered ‘la bouche de la loi’
– a merely passive actor whose acts were determined by that what was written
down. Especially fundamental rights, it is said, are notoriously hard to translate
into concrete legal entitlements. Their wording is generally vague, which
creates room for divergent interpretations. This is a topic that will be dealt
with more extensively in the following chapter.202 For now the aim is to note
that the way the ECtHR has thus far approached its task to interpret the ECHR
rights provides an important explanation for the socio-economic development
of the Convention.
Although the Court has often expressed the importance it attaches to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) articles on interpretation,203
202 See, infra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.
203 United Nations, Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force 27 January 1980). See in particular Art. 31: ‘A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There
shall be taken into account together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provision: (b)
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applic-
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it is explicitly considered that the unique character of the Convention and its
enforcement mechanism allow for distinct interpretive practices.204 In addition
to what the VCLT prescribes, therefore, the Court has over the years ‘developed
innovative techniques of interpretation that reflect the substantive nature of
the Convention’.205 For explaining the effectiveness thesis some of the various
interpretive methods and principles the Court applies can be considered of
particular importance.206
First of all, indeed, the Court directly refers to the principle of effective-
ness207 when it for example states that ‘[t]he Convention is intended to guar-
antee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and
effective’.208 It emphasises the importance of human rights protection and
rightly acknowledges that rights that are considered fundamental should not
merely be illusive or of symbolic value.209 Their worth is truly manifested
only when individuals and minorities can rely on protection that meets their
most fundamental needs and provides actual relief. This requires a flexible
stance towards the kinds of interests rights norms ‘should’ protect.
Indeed, with reference to the principle of effectiveness the Court has been
able to interpret the ECHR in a broad manner.210 Moving beyond formal dis-
tinctions and labels this also implies that – at least prima facie – protection is
required in the socio-economic sphere.211 Effective protection often demands
more from states than to remain passive.212 It asks them to facilitate indi-
viduals so that they can actually enjoy the freedoms they have a right to under
the Convention.213 This holds true regardless of whether such positive action
able in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if
it is established that the parties so intended.’ See further Arts. 32 and 33 VCLT.
204 Cleveland et al. 2009, p. 205. See also, e.g., Matscher 1993, p. 66; Greer 2006, pp. 195-196;
Mahoney 1990, p. 65; Rietiker 2010, p. 246; Senden 2011, p. 73, for the argument that the
ECHR is different from other, more contractual treaties.
205 Mowbray 2005, p. 59, arguing that the provisions laid down in the Convention and safe-
guarded by a supranational and secondary organization, triggered the need for these tailor
made forms of interpretation.
206 See, e.g., on the Court’s specific interpretative methods and principles, Ost 1992; Matscher
1993; Mowbray 2005; Letsas 2007; Gerards 2009; Senden 2011; Gerards 2014b.
207 See, e.g., Senden 2011, pp. 73-77 (terming it the ‘principle of practical and effective rights’).
According to Kosekenniemi, ‘it has become a practice of human rights bodies to adopt
readings of human rights conventions that look for their effet utile to an extent perhaps
wider than regular treaties’ (International Law Commission 2006, p. 216, para. 428). See
also Rietiker 2010.
208 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 24.
209 For some more recent references to the fact that the Convention protects ‘rights that are
not theoretical or illusory but practical and effective’, see Chassagnou and Others v France,
ECtHR (GC) 29 April 1999, appl. nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, and 28443/95, para. 100; Andrejeva
v. Latvia, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 2009, appl. no. 55707/00, para. 98.
210 Rietiker 2010, p. 259; Gerards 2011, p. 32; Senden 2011, p. 76.
211 Mowbray 2005, p. 72.
212 Ibid., p. 78; Senden 2011, p. 76.
213 See, for some examples, supra, S. 2.4.
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means a shift towards social guarantees that ‘traditionally’ were not considered
to be covered by the Convention.
References to effectiveness, however, hardly ever come on their own.
Consider the much-quoted case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, where the
Court noted that
‘the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of
individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied
so as to make its safeguards practical and effective …. In addition, any interpreta-
tion of the rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be consistent with “the general
spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals
and values of a democratic society”.’214
In this way the Court underlined the importance of a ‘teleological’ or ‘meta-
teleological’215 interpretation of the Convention.216 Underlying the Conven-
tion is a number of principles and aims that provide the necessary starting
points.217 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court often grounds its argumenta-
tion on a reference to either the protection of ‘democratic values’218 or ‘human
dignity’219,220 Also ‘personal autonomy’221 and ‘pluralism’222 play an im-
portant role.223 Clearly, some of these underlying principles lend themselves
particularly well for encouraging the protection of economic and social inter-
ests. Especially notions of human dignity and personal autonomy can be
associated with, for example, the need to offer adequate health care and to
guarantee a minimum level of subsistence. Indeed, in M.S.S. v. Greece and
Belgium, the Court repeated that
214 Soering v. the UK, ECtHR 7 July 1989, appl. no. 14038/88, para. 87.
215 Reference is after all not so much made to the original aims related to a specific Convention
article, but rather to the broader aims and principles underlying the Convention as a whole.
See on this term Lasser 2004, p. 206ff.
216 Cf. Lasser 2004, p. 206ff.; Gerards 2009, p. 428-430; Senden 2011, p. 91ff., in particular pp.
105-107, Ch. 9; Gerards 2014a, pp. 37-39. See also Barak’s more general discussion of what
he calls ‘purposive interpretation’, and ‘is considered the best theory of constitutional
interpretation’ (Barak 2012, p. 46). Also according to Rainey et al., realising the objectives
of the Convention is of the utmost importance. This even means that ‘any general pre-
sumption that treaty obligations should be interpreted restrictively since they derogate from
the sovereignty of States is not applicable …’ (p. 71).
217 See, e.g., the Preamble to the Convention. Cf. also De Schutter and Tulkens 2008, p. 169,
p. 213ff.
218 E.g., Vogt v. Germany, ECtHR (GC) 26 September 1995, appl. no. 17851/91; United Communist
Party of Turkey v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 30 January 1998, appl. no. 19392/92, para. 45.
219 E.g., Pretty v. the UK, ECtHR 29 April 2002, appl. no. 2346/02, para. 65: ‘The very essence
of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom.’
220 Ost 1992, p. 292.
221 See, for a recent example, R.R. v. Poland, ECtHR 26 May 2011, appl. no. 27617/04, para.
180.
222 E.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, ECtHR 25 May 1993, appl. no. 14307/88, para. 31.
223 See, generally, Gerards 2011, p. 45ff.
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‘it has not excluded “the possibility that the responsibility of the State may be
engaged [under Article 3] in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was
wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official indifference
in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity”.’224
The case concerned an individual asylum seeker who was deprived of any
means of subsistence and was living in extreme poverty. Combining the
wording of Article 3 with the principle of human dignity, the Court held the
state responsible and concluded that there had been a violation of the Conven-
tion.225 Considering the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention, thus, it gave
substance to the effective protection of individuals’ rights under the ECHR. The
fact that this protection thereby extended well beyond the sphere of civil rights
and brought along positive obligations was no reason for the Court to refrain
from concluding that there had been a breach of the Convention.
Next to teleological interpretation, also the Court’s ‘autonomous’ interpretation
adds to an understanding of the ECHR’s socio-economic dimension that holds
that this phenomenon is a mere corollary of effectuating the (civil and political)
norms of the Convention. Autonomous interpretation means that certain
Convention terms are granted ‘a status of semantic independence: their mean-
ing is not to be equated with the meaning that these very same concepts
possess in domestic law’.226 Letsas has pointed out that autonomous concepts
are seemingly inevitable since there is no shared language on the basis of
which the Convention must be interpreted.227 Hence, the existence of divergi-
ng practices and understandings in the Member States, combined with the
aim of providing effective protection in all Member States, can form a compell-
ing reason for the Court to go its own way.228
The most clear-cut example of how the Court’s autonomous interpretation
leads to the adjudication of economic and social cases under the Convention
is the Court’s understanding of ‘possessions’ as protected by Article 1 of the
224 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 253.
See earlier, Budina v. Russia, ECtHR 18 June 2009 (dec.), appl. no. 45603/05; Larioshina v.
Russia, ECtHR 23 April 2002 (dec.), appl. no. 56869/00.
225 Cf. Koch 2003, p. 23, on the (possible) social element in Article 3 ECHR.
226 Letsas 2004, p. 282. Cf. also Gerards 2009, pp. 430-435; Senden 2011, p. 173ff., and in
particular pp. 176-184, Ch. 12; Gerards 2014a, pp. 39-40.
227 Letsas 2004, p. 279. Cf. also Letsas 2007, Ch. 2.
228 See, e.g., Pellegrin t. France, ECtHR (GC) 8 December 1999, appl. no. 28541/95, para. 63,
where the court finds it important ‘to establish an autonomous interpretation of the term
“civil service” which would make it possible to afford equal treatment to public servants
performing equivalent or similar duties in the States Parties to the Convention, irrespective
of the domestic system of employment and, in particular, whatever the nature of the legal
relation between the official and the administrative authority’. At the same time, however,
it does refer to what Member States have in common when it makes use of its ‘comparative’
method of interpretation, see, infra, S. 2.5.3.3 as well as Ch. 3, S. 3.3.1.
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First Protocol. In the case of Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom the question
was whether this term covers merely contributory benefits or also non-contri-
butory ones.229 In an earlier case the Court had held that Article 6(1) ECHR
(right to a fair trial) was applicable to a dispute over entitlement to non-con-
tributory welfare benefits230 and this was reason to interpret the autonomous
concept of ‘possessions’ accordingly.231 Moreover, the different funding mech-
anisms in the Member States would make it, according to the Court, ‘artificial’
to only include contributory benefits. This would hinder the provision of equal
substantive protection throughout the Council of Europe.232
Thus, not relying on strictly textual interpretations and ignoring national
labels is a means of giving hand and feet to the aim of effectuating the Conven-
tion rights for all individuals in the 47 Member States in a like manner.233
Like a teleological approach, it results in a relatively broad applicability of
the different Convention norms, which makes the inclusion of economic and
social interests more or less inevitable.
Finally, for explaining the fact that the Court has engaged in the protection
of socio-economic interests in an increasing number of cases, one more inter-
pretative principle can be mentioned. It is important to connect the idea of
ensuring effective protection of the rights as they are laid down in the ECHR
to the Court’s recognition of the ‘living instrument’ character of the Conven-
tion.234 For example, in Tyrer v. the United Kingdom – dealing with corporal
punishment and the question whether this constituted ‘degrading treatment’
under Article 3 – the Court held that it
‘must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which … must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it the
Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted
standards … of the member States of the Council of Europe.’235
229 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 47ff.
230 Salesi v. Italy, ECtHR 26 February 1993 appl. no. 13023/87. See also Schuler-Zgraggen v
Switzerland, ECtHR 24 June 1993, appl. no. 14518/89, para. 46: ‘[T]he development in the
law … and the principle of equality of treatment warrant taking the view that today the
general rule is that Article 6 para. 1 does apply in the field of social insurance, including
even welfare assistance.’
231 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 49.
232 Cf. Leijten 2013a; Leijten 2013b.
233 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 50,
where the Court refers to ‘the variety of funding methods, and the interlocking nature of
benefits under most welfare systems’. Cf. Koch and Vedsted-Hansen 2006, p. 24.
234 See also Gerards 2008, pp. 663-664; Senden 2011, p. 145ff., and in particular 161-169, Ch.
11; Gerards 2014a, pp. 36-37. Cf. also Scott 1999, p. 642ff., about categories of rights and
how they can change over time, and Koch 2009, p. 36.
235 Tyrer v. the UK, ECtHR 25 April 1978, appl. no. 5856/72, para. 31. Indeed, this example
also shows a clear link with the Court’s ‘comparative’ approach to interpretation. See, on
this method, infra, S. 2.5.3.3 as well as Ch. 3, S. 3.3.1.
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Hence, it has accepted that the Convention must be interpreted in what is
generally called an ‘evolutive and dynamic’ manner.236 This means that the
Court will recognise new elements within the scope of a Convention right ‘as
soon as it has become clear that such aspects have become accepted throughout
the Council of Europe to be part of the notion of “fundamental rights”’.237
Like a teleological or autonomous interpretation, also this can be considered
a hallmark of the Court’s striving for ‘effectiveness’. With the help of an
evolutive interpretation the Court can ensure that when circumstances or
attitudes change, the Convention norms can continue to provide for effective
protection.238
That this indeed has resulted in increased protection of socio-economic
interests can be illustrated as follows.239 First, the fact that the Court takes
account of developments in the Member States implies that when the practice
in ‘enough’ states justifies recognition of new aspects as falling within the scope
of specific Convention rights, the Court will adjust its interpretation according-
ly. In the context of an expansive welfare state system, therefore, it is not
surprising that over the years the Court has moved in the direction of a more
social reading of the Convention. As an example, again the case of Stec and
Others v. the United Kingdom can be recalled, in which non-contributory benefits
were considered ‘possessions’ because
‘[i]n the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their
lives, completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits.
Many domestic legal systems recognize that such individuals require a degree of
certainty and security, and provide for benefits to be paid – subject to the fulfilment
of the conditions of eligibility – as of right.’240
Also the case of Demir and Baykara can be mentioned. There, the issue at stake
concerned a prohibition on the formation of trade unions for civil servants
and the Court referred to international trends for holding that this fell within
the scope of Article 11 of the Convention.241
236 See on what she calls the ‘principle of evolutive interpretation’ in relation to the Court
Senden 2011, Ch. 7, S. 7.4 (see also pp. 70-73 and Ch. 11).
237 Gerards 2008, p. 663, referring to Prebensen 2000, p. 1128.
238 Or, to make sure that it does not become a ‘dead letter’. See Senden 2011, p. 391.
239 Cf. Gerards 2008, pp. 665-666.
240 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para. 51.
241 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, ECtHR 12 November 2008, appl. no. 34503/97. This approach
however also implies that, when developments are not convincing, the Court will not
increase the ‘social’ protection under the Convention. In the case Stummer v. Austria, ECtHR
(GC) 7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02, for example, the applicant argued that standards had
changed to such extent that prison work without affiliation to an old-age pension system
could no longer be considered to fall under the exception of ‘work required to be done
in the ordinary course of detention’. For that reason it would constitute forced labour
prohibited under Article 4 ECHR (para. 129). Although recognizing that increasing social
security protection for prisoners in Europe was reflected in the 2006 European Prison Rules,
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Hence, the (further) development of social safety nets throughout Europe,
but also the increased pervasiveness of for example environmental regulations,
can influence the direction in which the Convention system evolves.242 As
Palmer has put it, ‘over time, commentators have accepted the increased infer-
ence of affirmative duties as a necessary part of the effective protection of ECHR
rights or as a facet of the “dynamic interpretation of the Convention, in light
of changing social and moral assumptions”’.243
Altogether, this section has illustrated that the development of the Court’s
socio-economic case law can be understood perfectly well within the bound-
aries of the European Convention system. It can be validly argued that it is
to effectuate precisely the civil and political rights norms enshrined in the ECHR
that the Court (increasingly) deals with issues of an economic and social
kind.244 In the words of Scott,
‘[t]he key point is that making rights effective, by way of interpreting rights to
have social and economic dimensions that place positive duties on the state, need
not proceed from borrowing from rights that already have a recognized legal
pedigree as social and economic rights. Instead, effective human rights protection
can, and should, be a result of contextual interpretative analysis of what is needed
to make a right truly a right of “everyone”.’245
the Court however held that ‘having regard to the current practice of the member States,
the Court does not find a basis for the interpretation of Article 4 advocated by the applicant.
According to the information available to the Court, while an absolute majority of Contract-
ing States affiliate prisoners in some way to the national social security system or provide
them with some specific insurance scheme, only a small majority affiliate working prisoners
to the old-age pension system. Austrian law reflects the development of European law in
that all prisoners are provided with health and accident care and working prisoners are
affiliated to the unemployment insurance scheme but not to the old-age pension system’
(para. 131).
242 The question is of course whether evolution always results in ‘more’ protection. Although
there is no agreement on this matter, it has been argued that ‘leveling-down’ is out of the
question, since the Preamble to the ECHR ‘supports a one-way dynamic by referring to
the “maintenance and further realization” of the Convention rights’ (Senden 2011, p. 169,
with further references).
243 Palmer 2009, p. 402, referring to Merrills 1993, p. 102, and Feldman 2002, respectively.
244 This is what Mantouvalou 2005, p. 574, calls the ‘instrumental’ aspect of the integrated
approach, which ‘sees social rights as means for the effective protection of civil and political
rights’. It does not mean, however, that the Court shows no awareness at all of the socio-
economic character of the issues it deals with. In Airey it stated that ‘the Convention must
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions … and it is designed to safeguard the
individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals …’.
However, the Court also noted that it ‘is aware that the further realisation of social and
economic rights is largely dependent on the situation – notably financial – reigning in the
State in question’ (Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 26). Cf.
also Koch 2003, pp. 21-22.
245 Scott 1999, p. 641 [footnote omitted].
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The ‘effectiveness thesis’ hence implies that socio-economic rights protection
could be understood as a mere ‘by-product’246 brought about by the adjudica-
tion of ECHR norms. Certain aspects of economic or social rights, or at least,
some interests or matters that can be labelled as such, are simply protected
because they necessarily fall within the scope of what to-day must be con-
sidered to be protected under the Convention.247 This is unavoidable and
serves a good cause, namely the effectuation of the ECHR.248 However, as will
be elaborated hereinafer, this is not the only way in which the Court’s socio-
economic case law can be explained.
2.5.3 The Indivisibility Thesis
The ECHR-oriented ‘effectiveness’ perspective presented in Section 2.5.2 on its
own can offer an adequate explanation for the development of the Strasbourg
socio-economic case law. It can also show why this development should not
as such be regarded with suspicion, since the protection of socio-economic
interests under ECHR norms fits the aims of the Convention as well as the
practice of the Strasbourg Court. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the
effectiveness thesis does not fully do justice to the importance of economic
and social rights in and of themselves, and that it does not take sufficient
account of the interwovenness of the human rights systems that evolved since
the end of the 1940s. Indeed, complementary to the effectiveness thesis, the
Court’s socio-economic case law can also be explained from a different angle,
i.e., with the help of a broader, ‘integrated’249 image of fundamental rights
246 See O’Cinneide 2008, p. 587, who states that ‘[t]he protection that the ECHR directly confers
upon the destitute is for the most part a by-product of the rigorous application of conven-
tional civil and political rights by the Court: it will rarely take the form of a direct remedy
for the denial of adequate welfare support or other forms of state (in)action in response
to extreme poverty’.
247 Cf. Scott 1989, p. 779ff., for the idea of ‘organic interdependence’, implying that ‘one right
forms a part of another right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right. From
the organic rights perspective, interdependent rights are inseparable or indissoluble in the
sense that one right (the core right) justifies the other (the derivative right)’ (referring to
Raz 1984, pp. 197-199, on ‘core’ and ‘derivative’ rights). Scott distinguishes ‘organic’
interdependence from ‘related’ interdependence, according to which rights ‘are mutually
reinforcing or mutually dependent, but distinct’, ‘equally important and complementary,
yet separate’ (pp. 782-783). Later Scott (1999) dissociated himself from these strict categories.
See for criticism also Koch 2009, p. 32ff.
248 Scott 1989, p. 781, holding that the effectivist or foundational conception of organic inter-
dependence asserts, moreover, that for example ‘the right to an adequate standard of living
is part of or is justified by the right to life because the effectiveness of the latter right
depends on it. The goal is to render rights meaningful and non-illusory. The relationship
is justificatory in nature’ (referring to Raz 1984, p. 198).
249 The approach that evidences this broader view is often described as the ‘integrated
approach’. This term was coined by Scheinin (2001).
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protection. In this explanation, the overall idea of human rights is taken as
the starting point and the ECHR is regarded as being a part of a larger whole,
whereby the ECtHR’s work is seen as contributing to realising more than just
the aims of the Convention. In human rights jargon, what is referred to here
is the idea of the ‘indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness’ of
fundamental rights.250
It is asserted in this section that an exploration of the idea of the indivis-
ibility of fundamental rights can shed a fresh light on the topic of this research
and provide for a fuller understanding of the Court’s socio-economic case law.
To state this argument more fully, this section first presents a brief introduction
of the idea of indivisibility as it is usually understood in the context of inter-
national law. After that, several examples will illustrate the relation between
the notion of what can be called ‘explicit’ or ‘substantive’ indivisibility and
the case law of the Court.251 It must be recalled here that the indivisibility
thesis need not be viewed as completely distinct from the effectiveness thesis.
Most authors link or conflate the two and hold that a practice that is aimed
at effectively protecting the rights enshrined in the ECHR can also contribute
to the ‘indivisible’ protection of human rights more generally. Yet whereas
effective protection can indeed have indivisible effects, the indivisibility thesis
as it is promulgated here foremost refers to an approach grounded on active,
explicit recognition of (the importance of) socio-economic rights norms. ‘Indi-
visibility’ is therefore considered a specific and separate rationale underlying
the Court’s case law, as well as a distinct starting point for assessing the
possible future development of the ECHR’s social dimension.
2.5.3.1 The Indivisibility of Human Rights
Rather than being a recent invention of human rights defenders propagating
the justiciability of all human rights norms, the notion of indivisibility can
be traced back to the time in which the modern human rights acquis came into
being.252 Already the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 421 (V),
dating from 4 December 1950, states that ‘the enjoyment of civic and political
freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and
250 In the following, the terms ‘indivisibility’, ‘interdependence’, and ‘interconnectedness’ will
be used interchangeably.
251 Mantouvalou 2005, p. 575, uses the term ‘substantive integrated approach’. This approach
is to be distinguished from the ‘instrumental aspect’ of an integrated approach, which ‘sees
social rights as means for the effective protection of civil and political rights, and embraces
the idea that the enjoyment of civil and political rights is rendered meaningless if social
rights are neglected’ (Mantouvalou 2005, p. 574).
252 Koch 2009, p. 1: ‘[T]he view that economic, social, cultural, civil and political human rights
are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent goes as far back as human rights them-
selves.’
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interdependent’.253 This resolution considered that all rights laid down in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, i.e., both the ‘civil and political’
and the ‘economic and social’ rights enumerated therein, should be taken up
in one single international treaty. Although subsequently the idea of laying
down the entire human rights catalogue in one binding human rights docu-
ment was abandoned, the idea of interconnectedness did not disappear. It was
already noted in Section 2.2 that it was not because of their ‘unimportance’,
but instead primarily due to the political climate and the perception that
economic and social rights were not immediately applicable, that two separate
covenants were created.254 The Separation Resolution continued to make
mention of the idea of indivisibility and stresses that ‘when deprived of
economic, social and cultural rights, man does not represent the human person
whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man’.255 Also
after the coming into being of the ICESCR, in the Proclamation of Teheran of
1968256 as well as in more recent documents,257 the ‘official’ position of the
UN remained that the covenant covering civil and political rights and the
covenant on economic, social and cultural rights together cover human rights
that are all ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.
Important is also that the Vienna Declaration (1993) stressed that ‘[t]he
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal
253 UN General Assembly, Draft International Covenant on Human rights and measures of
implementation: future work of the Commission on Human Rights, Fifth Session, 4 Decem-
ber 1950, UN Doc. A/RES/421.
254 Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, Tenth
Session, 1 July 1955, UN Doc. A/2929, p. 9. See, on the creation of two separate covenants,
supra, S. 2.2, as well as, infra, Ch. 5, S. 2.5.3.1.
255 UN General Assembly, Preparation of two Draft International Covenants on Human Rights,
5 February 1952, UN Doc. A/RES/453 (IV). The full citation is as follows: ‘Whereas the
General Assembly affirmed, in its resolution 421 (V) of 4 December 1950 that “the enjoyment
of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected
and interdependent”, and that “when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man
does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal
free man”.’ This is also the reason why both covenants had to resemble each other to the
greatest extent possible. See, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants
on Human Rights, Tenth Session, 1 July 1955, UN Doc. A/2929, p. 7. More precisely, they
had ‘to contain “as many similar provisions as possible” and to be approved and opened
for signature simultaneously, in order to emphasize the unity of purpose’.
256 See, for the text of the Proclamation, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2442
(XLII), 19 December 1968.
257 United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July
1993, A/CONF.157/23 (Vienna Declaration), para. 5. See also the Limburg Principles on
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex, reprinted in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987),
p. 123.
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manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis’.258 What this
underlines is that indivisibility is not only imperative in that there exists an
inevitable overlap between the civil and the social sphere. It also suggests that
human rights must be treated as such, i.e., that the international community
and the relevant actors should act in accordance with the idea of indivisibility
and make visible and feasible the inseparableness of the different kinds of
fundamental rights norms.259 Ideally, thus, indivisibility entails that these
norms should be comprehended and applied not in isolation, but in the light
of the larger whole of human rights.260
Also in Europe, the notion of indivisibility has always been subscribed
to. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, on
10 December 1998, a declaration was adopted in which the governments of
the Member States of the Council of Europe reaffirmed ‘the need to reinforce
the protection of fundamental social and economic rights … all of which form
an integral part of human rights protection’.261 What is more, in the Preamble
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that entered into
force in 2009, reference is made to ‘the indivisible, universal values of human
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’.262
It is not strange that the notion of indivisibility is so often brought up in the
field of international and European human rights, since it is strongly based
on widely shared philosophical accounts of what fundamental rights entail.
It is generally argued in legal and philosophical scholarship that only when
positive (social) guarantees are provided, negative freedom can truly be
enjoyed. In this regard scholars such as Sen and Nussbaum, but also Fredman,
have emphasised elements of positive freedom as being of crucial importance
258 Vienna Declaration, para. 5 [emphasis added]. See also the Limburg Principles, p. 123, para.
3: ‘As human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent, equal
attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and
protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights.’
259 According to Koch 2009, p. 4, indivisibility means the acknowledgment of human activity
and human needs as being ‘treaty crossing’.
260 See Koch 2006 and Koch 2009, referring to hermeneutic thinking as a normative explanation
for indivisibility. Cf. Scott 1999, p. 659, who, speaking of the relations between human rights,
points out that ‘imagined, or virtual, dialogues among human rights norms across received
categories find their real world analogue in the institutional dialogues among the different
bodies charged with interpreting various categories of human rights’.
261 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 10 December 1998. See also
Koch 2009, p. 322.
262 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/
01).
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for the fulfilment of human rights.263 The different categories of rights are
considered interrelated, for example, in the sense that ‘[a]ny form of mal-
nutrition, or fever due to exposure, that causes severe and irreversible brain
damage … can effectively prevent the exercise of any right requiring clear
thought’.264 Moreover, ‘[f]amines have never afflicted any country that is
independent, that goes to elections regularly, that has opposition parties to
voice criticisms, that permits newspapers to report freely and to question the
wisdom of government policy without extensive censorship’.265 Thus, both
categories cannot be seen as distinct in the sense that one of them can be taken
seriously while the other is being disregarded.
Nevertheless, regardless of its appeal, the idea that human rights must
be treated as indivisible sometimes seems to be merely a ‘rhetorical slogan,
a sort of mantra that has to be pronounced for the sake of good order, how-
ever, having no substantial significance in itself’.266 According to Cassese,
‘this convenient catchphrase serves to dampen the debate while leaving every-
thing the way it was’.267 Koch in this regard makes a helpful distinction
between indivisibility as a political notion, and indivisibility in the legal sphere.
It is a matter of fact that someone will not survive without food – ‘[h]uman
needs and human activity are not confined to the terms of a treaty’ and this
should be considered relevant at least in a political context.268 It is a different
question, however, whether in a legal context, a judge would also hold ‘that
the right to freedom of expression has been violated because a citizen has not
learnt how to read and write’.269 Indeed, it is clear from the existence of sep-
arate international treaties to protect different categories of rights, that indivis-
ibility is much more contentious as a legal principle than as a political notion.
Nevertheless, Koch has argued that
‘case law from human rights treaty bodies confirms that it is possible to talk about,
e.g., the right to health care, the right to housing and the right to social security
under the conventions on civil and political rights. This is interesting since there
is usually no individual petition right under the conventions on economic, social
263 E.g., Sen 1987, p. 36ff.; Sen 2009, p. 253ff.; Nussbaum 2000, p. 5; Nussbaum 2011; Fredman
2008. What matters are ‘real’ opportunities, and a capabilities approach as proposed
especially by Sen and Nussbaum, therefore, ‘insists that all entitlements involve an affirm-
ative task for the government: it must actively support people’s capabilities, not just fail
to set up obstacles. In the absence of action, rights are mere words on paper’ (Nussbaum
2011, p. 65). See also West 2001, pp. 1906-1912.
264 Shue 1996, pp. 24-25.
265 Sen 1994, p. 34.
266 Koch 2009, p. 3. See also Koch 2006, p. 406: ‘That human rights are indivisible has become
a rhetorical slogan, and it is a regrettable fact that economic, social and cultural rights are
still badly protected compared to civil and political rights.’
267 Cassese 1999, p. 159.
268 Koch 2006, p. 407.
269 Ibid.
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and cultural rights, and it proves that the indivisibility notion does in fact have
a legal content.’270
In order to explain this further it can be helpful to think of human rights
obligations as ‘waves of duties’, an idea that was outlined by Waldron:
‘[E]ach right is best thought of not as correlative to one particular duty (which
might then be classified as a duty of omission or as a positive duty of action or
assistance), but as generating successive waves of duty, some of them duties of
omission, some of them duties of commission, some of them too complicated to
fit easily under either heading.’271
According to Koch, in a legal context this idea of waves of duties
‘sets free socio-economic and civil-political rights from their separated compart-
ments. It provides a new framework for the understanding of the scope of human
rights obligations, and suggests the necessity of a contextual interpretation of human
rights conceivably challenging existing text-conformal interpretative traditions.’272
Thus, from a legal-theoretical perspective, indivisibility may be considered
as requiring authorities, including courts and also the ECtHR, to acknowledge
the non-isolated character of human rights guarantees. The norms as they are
contained in, for example, treaty texts should not be considered merely as self-
standing, specific guarantees. Rather, it should be recognised that they form
part of the larger ideal of human rights protection. In a practical-legal context,
this may require a broader and more inclusive understanding of the kinds
of interests that norms are nominally protecting.
270 Ibid.
271 Waldron 1993, p. 25. See also Koch 2009, p. 30 (and pp. 25-28); Mantouvalou 2005, p. 575.
According to Waldron 1993, p. 7, ‘the argument from first-generation [political and civil
rights] to second-generation rights [socio-economic rights] was never supposed to be a
matter of conceptual analysis. It was rather this: if one is really concerned to secure civil
and political liberty for a person, that commitment should be accompanied by a further
concern about the conditions of the person’s life that make it possible for him to enjoy and
exercise that liberty’.
272 Koch 2009, p. 30. Koch (see p. 14ff., and in particular pp. 27-28) prefers the idea of ‘waves
of duties’ over the use of the tripartite typology that was introduced by Shue and Eide.
See Shue 1996 and see, e.g., the final report by Eide as Special Rapporteur, The Right to
Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987; Eide 1989.
Cf. also Koch 2005. See however older work by Koch (2002, pp. 32-33), where she explicitly
uses the tripartite approach to bridge the two sets of rights. In the following discussion
of indivisibility and the ECHR, no further explicit reference will be made to this well-known
tripartite typology. This because it is not used by the Court (which instead sometimes refers
to a ‘positive-negative’ dichotomy) and moreover ‘does not necessarily bring us further
ahead’ (Koch 2009, p. 28).
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2.5.3.2 The ECtHR and an Indivisible Approach
It is often argued in legal scholarship that the Court’s recognition of positive
obligations in the socio-economic sphere can be seen as evidencing at least
some degree of recognition of (legal) indivisibility. In this regard, Koch has
noted that the ECtHR ‘has been willing to go beyond the wording of the ECHR
and read social elements into the civil rights provisions of the Convention even
though several of the decisions have implications of a more general char-
acter’.273 Indeed, the case law of the Court introduced earlier in this chapter
clearly signals that there is an inevitable intersection between the civil and
the social sphere. Thereby the case law strengthens the perception that human
rights are in fact indivisible, interrelated and independent.
Of the authors who have specifically used the term ‘indivisible’ or ‘inte-
grated’ to describe the Strasbourg practice, Koch and Mantouvalou have delved
more deeply into the normative groundings of this notion in relation to the
ECtHR context.274 Koch, first, has linked the socio-economic rights protection
by this Court to the idea of obligations to fulfil and the transition from ‘a state
governed by law’ paradigm to a ‘welfare state’ paradigm.275 In later work
she has developed a hermeneutic perspective in order to find a satisfactory
normative explanation for this phenomenon.276 The hermeneutic perspective
entails that interpreting a document (the ECHR) ‘is conceived of as a meeting
not only between past and present, but also between text and context, and
the interpreter plays an active part in these meetings’.277 In this regard, ‘the
whole must be understood in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of
the whole’.278 Koch’s theory – with references to pre-understanding279 and
the horizontal280 and vertical structure281 of the hermeneutic circle282 –
273 Koch 2003, p. 25.
274 Koch 2006; Koch 2009; Mantouvalou 2013.
275 Koch 2003.
276 Koch 2006; Koch 2009, p. 37: ‘The relations between facts and norms and component parts
and the unified whole, the UDHR, … trigger some of the pivotal points in hermeneutic
thinking, and it seems to me worth while considering whether a hermeneutic perspective
on human rights interpretation might be profitable in the understanding – and possible
development – of the integrated approach.’
277 Koch 2006, p. 411.
278 Ibid.; Koch 2009, p. 41.
279 Koch 2006, pp. 414-417. ‘Pre-understanding’ concerns the role and perceptions (and pre-
judices) of the interpreter. In this regard, Koch points at the changing pre-understandings
in the context of socio-economic rights protection in the sense that ‘a future horizon will
include social rights as justiciable rights to a wider extent’ (p. 417). See also Koch 2009,
pp. 45-51.
280 Koch 2006, pp. 417-419. This implies that ‘[t]he interpretation should not seek to reconstruct
the original intention, but rather reconstruct the situation – the context – that caused the
adoption of the provision and confront it with our contemporary context’ (p. 419). This
‘fusion of horizons’ fits the Court’s ‘present day conditions’ interpretation and the Conven-
tions living instrument character (see, infra, S. 2.5.2.1). See also Koch 2009, pp. 51-53.
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thereby illuminates the contextual dimension of the Court’s indivisible
approach as well as the development over time thereof.283
Secondly, Mantouvalou’s normative justification for the Court’s indivisible
or integrated approach rests more concretely on capabilities theory.284 More
precisely, she refers to a positive account of freedom as (ideally) underlying
the Court’s approach.285 Focusing explicitly on the ECtHR’s integrated pro-
tection of the right to work, she concludes that
‘[a] positive account of freedom as capability … requires the protection of civil
and political, and economic and social rights, and can shed light on important
principles that are relevant to the protection of labour rights through civil rights
documents … Capabilities theory leads to a better understanding of the notion
of freedom and emphasises the collapse of artificial divisions of rights that tradi-
tionally placed emphasis on some elements of individual well-being (free ex-
pression, for instance), neglecting some others (like the right to work) … In addi-
tion, the understanding of freedom as capability enriches the content of human
rights by moving their content beyond individualism. Finally, the interpretation
of rights in light of this theory is based on values that underlie the Convention,
and recognises aspects of them that have been neglected thus far.’286
Both Koch’s and Mantouvalou’s normative or justificatory theories add to an
understanding of the ECtHR’s socio-economic rights protection that rests on
the idea of indivisibility. Moreover, they may go to show that rather than
merely allowing certain indivisible effects to occur, what the Court is (or should
be) doing is in fact taking an approach that is inspired by this notion. For this it
is needed that socio-economic interests are not merely ‘silently’ included in
civil and political rights norms. Instead, some active or explicit engagement
with these rights or the norms that protect them is required.
281 Koch 2006, pp. 419-423; Koch 2009, pp. 53-56.
282 See, e.g., Gadamer 1989. In Gadamer’s words, ‘understanding is always application’, or,
‘discovering the meaning of a legal text and discovering how to apply it in a particular
legal instance are not two separate actions, but one unitary process’ (p. 309).
283 Koch (2009, p. 37) holds that ‘[a] hermeneutic perspective might be helpful also in under-
standing the dynamic interpretation of the Court reflecting contemporary views on eco-
nomic, social and cultural issues’.
284 See the work of Sen and Nussbaum, e.g., Sen 1987; Sen 2009; Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum
2011.
285 Mantouvalou 2013, p. 547: ‘The statement that human rights are indivisible tells us that
all human rights must be protected, but it does not necessarily require that a particular
body, such as the ECtHR … , which interprets a particular document, such as the ECHR
… , protect all rights. The answer to this question cannot be a conceptual exercise: it has
to involve the values underlying the Convention and the interests supporting the right
to work and rights at work. This justification can be found in the idea of freedom’.
286 Ibid., p. 554.
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The distinction between what merely boils down to effectuating ECHR norms
and a truly indivisibility approach resembles the distinction Mantouvalou has
made between the ‘instrumental’ and the ‘substantive’ aspect of an integrated
approach. The former ‘sees social rights as means for the effective protection
of civil and political rights’,287 whereas the substantive aspect implies that
the Court deliberately takes – or rather: should take – other human rights norms
into account because all norms lay down important values and form part of
the same whole.288 In the words of Mantouvalou, the substantive aspect
‘stems from the belief that social entitlements are as intrinsically valuable as
fundamental civil and political rights are, and “that a moral theory of indi-
vidual dignity is plainly inadequate if it does not take them into account”’.289
This approach
‘shows that the notion of indivisibility of rights means something more than the
instrumental necessity of one group of rights for the effective protection of another
group of rights and puts in question whether it is possible to distinguish in the
abstract which rights fall within each category for the purposes of justiciability.’290
To see whether the ECtHR’s approach can truly be understood as indivisible
in this ‘substantive’ sense, a closer look must be had at its adjudicational
practice. By means of some examples it can be shown that – at least in some
instances – the ideal of ‘indivisibility’ indeed seems to form a driving force.
287 Mantouvalou 2005, p. 574. One could also call this a form of ‘negative indivisibility’. This
would then explicitly have to be distinguished from what Scott calls ‘negative textual
inferentialism’. This means that references to other human rights norms might have the
result of not expanding but rather limiting the scope of socio-economic protection. It would
have ceiling effects by forming a reason for the Court not to interfere in a sphere covered
by another treaty. See Scott 1999, pp. 638-640. See also Koch 2009, p. 29, who talks about
the ‘negative’ counterpart to the integrated approach, which implies ‘developing legal
principles of guidance to law applying bodies when having to decide whether to abstain
from taking into consideration objectives that are usually considered under another legal
instrument and maybe by another treaty’. An example in the practice of the Court could
be Kyrtatos v. Greece, ECtHR 22 May 2003, appl. no. 41666/98, para. 52.
288 See, e.g., Rainey et al. 2014, p. 75: ‘It recognizes that, on the one hand, the enjoyment of
civil and political rights requires respect for and promotion of social rights, and, on the
other hand, that social rights are not second best to civil and political rights.’ Cf. also
Mantouvalou 2005, p. 575.
289 Mantouvalou 2005, p. 575, referring to Waldron 1993, p. 7.
290 Ibid.
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2.5.3.3 References to Economic and Social Rights Norms
The Court’s case law regularly contains references to other international rights
norms than those contained in the Convention.291 These are found under
the header ‘Relevant international materials’, where the Court regularly cites
socio-economic provisions. An example is the case of Stummer v. Austria, where,
amongst other norms, Article 1 of the European Social Charter (right to work)
is mentioned as being relevant to the issue of prison work.292 In the pension
rights case Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, reference is made to Article
69 of the 1952 International Labour Organization’s Social Security (Minimum
Standards) Convention.293 Moreover, the Court also frequently refers to such
norms in the legal reasoning part of its judgments (‘The Law’). It is these
references that – at least when they concern economic and social rights norms –
most clearly illustrate the ‘indivisible’ approach underlying the protection
offered under the Convention.
References in ECtHR judgments to norms outside the Convention generally
are understood to be part of the Court’s comparative, ‘common ground’, or
consensus method of interpretation.294 More than just ensuring the effective
application of ECHR rights, it can be seen that these ‘external’295 comparative
interpretations that are explicitly grounded on other human rights norms or
on decisions or comments by other treaty bodies recognise the importance
of these norms and decisions as such. An example of such indivisibility driven
(rather than purely effectiveness driven) recognition of socio-economic norms
can be found in the case of Van der Mussele v. Belgium, in which the Court,
only four years after Airey, brought up International Labour Organisation (ILO)
Convention 29 in order to construe the meaning of ‘forced and compulsory
labour’ (Article 4 ECHR).296
291 Mantouvalou 2013, p. 538, links this to the idea of ‘cross-fertilization, which is said to take
place when a monitoring body is willing to refer to other bodies’ jurisprudence’. See on
this notion also Helfer and Slaughter 1997, pp. 323-326. See, generally, on the reception
of international law in the practice of the ECtHR, Senden 2011, pp. 355-358.
292 Stummer v. Austria, ECtHR (GC) 7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02, para. 59.
293 Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2010, appl. no. 42184/05, paras. 49-51.
294 See, on this method of interpretation, e.g., Senden 2011, in particular Ch. 6, S. 6.4, and Ch.
10; Gerards 2009, pp. 430-435; Gerards 2011, pp. 74-96; Gerards 2014a, pp. 36-37.
295 See, for the distinction between internal and external components of comparative inter-
pretation, Senden 2011, pp. 115-119. According to Senden ‘[t]he external component of
comparative interpretation refers to the use of sources that are not covered by the internal
component of this method. In general that means reliance on documents or on information
derived from outside the jurisdiction of the Court in question’ (p. 116).
296 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR 23 November 1983, appl. no. 8919/80, para. 32. Also
Article 5 of the European Social Charter (the right to organise) has been mentioned by the
ECtHR on several occasions in the context of complaints under Article 11 ECHR (freedom
of assembly and association). See, e.g., Wilson, National Union of Journalists a. O. v. the UK,
ECtHR 2 July 2002, appl. no. 30668/96, para. 48; Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers
and Firemen, ECtHR 27 February 2007, appl. no. 11002/05, paras. 38-39; Sigurjónsson v.
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There are many more examples to give, but the Court’s integrated inter-
pretation can probably best be illustrated with the help of the case of Sidabras
and Džiautas v. Lithuania.297 In this case the Court grounded its interpretation
not on a social rights norm of which the meaning was closely related to the
ECHR right invoked, but on a socio-economic norm with no direct (textual)
link to the relevant provision of the Convention. The case concerned two
former employees of the former Soviet Security Service (‘KGB’) who were barred
from taking up employment in the public and in the private sector for 10 years.
The question arose in this case whether the issue at stake fell within the scope
of Article 8 (private life) read in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR (the non-
discrimination principle). The Court answered this question as follows:
‘[T]he Court considers that a far-reaching ban on taking up private sector employ-
ment does affect ‘private life’. It attaches particular weight in this respect to the
text of Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter [ensuring the effective protection
of the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon]
and the interpretation given by the European Committee of Social Rights … and
to the texts adopted by the ILO.’298
Thus, the Court explicitly took account of a fundamental rights norm that is
not enshrined in the Convention. With the help of a particular aspect of the
‘right to work’ and the explanation of the European Committee on Social
Rights (ECSR) thereof, it held that the Convention was applicable.299 This
signals, as Mantouvalou puts it, ‘the belief that social entitlements are as
intrinsically valuable as fundamental civil and political rights’.300 Indeed,
a case like Sidabras and Džiautas can rightfully be called a ‘paradigm example
of the substantive integrated approach’,301 i.e., of a perspective that considers
the ECHR rights to be a part of a bigger whole and hence is expressive of the
idea of indivisibility. Interestingly, moreover, rather than only taking account
of rules ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’, the Court has even
given weight to rights contained in international instruments a Member State
Iceland, ECtHR 30 June 1993, appl. no. 16130/90, para. 35; Sørensoen and Rasmussen v.
Denmark, ECtHR 11 January 2006, appl. no. 52562/99, paras. 38 and 72.
297 Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, ECtHR 27 July 2004, appl. nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00.
See also Rainys and Gasparavicius v. Lithuania, ECtHR 7 April 2005, appl. nos. 70665/01 and
74345/01.
298 Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, ECtHR 27 July 2004, appl. nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00,
para. 47.
299 See, for an extensive discussion of this case, Mantouvalou 2005.
300 Ibid., p. 575.
301 Ibid. See on this case in relation to the development of the Court’s socio-economic dimension
also Gerards 2008, p. 665; Koch 2009, pp. 214-216; Rainey et al. 2014, p. 75. The significance
of the case should however be nuanced. As it was a case concerning Art. 14, the Court
only had to determine whether the issue fell within the wider ‘ambit’ of Article 8 ECHR.
Given the importance of (alleged) discrimination claims, it is relatively often willing to
do so. See also Mantouvalou 2005, p. 579.
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party to a case had neither ratified, nor even signed.302 In using rights norms
‘external’ to the Convention in this manner, the Court clearly has gone further
than Article 31(3)(c) VCLT requires for the harmonious interpretation of inter-
national treaty obligations.303 The Court’s approach thereby underlines that
it values other international human rights norms in and of themselves and
that it allows ‘itself to be influenced by economic and social rights norms and
interests’.304
Thus, it can be said that also in practice, the Court has taken an integrated
outlook. This allows it to take into account all relevant norms and integrate
these ‘into a general theory of justice, which will address in a principled way
whatever trade-offs and balancing are necessary for institutionalisation in a
world characterised by scarcity and conflict’.305 The notion of indivisibility
can hence be taken as a rationale that may explain the Court’s socio-economic
practice apart from that of ensuring effectiveness.
2.6 THE ECTHR’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS PROTECTION: POTENTIAL
AND CRITICISM
The effectiveness and indivisibility theses not only give relevant explanations
for the development of the socio-economic dimension of the Convention, they
also form valid justifications for the Court’s active engagement in the socio-
economic sphere. Instead of falling prey to the attractively clear yet artificial
idea that civil and political rights norms are only about the protection of civil
and political interests, they show that the task of the ECtHR cannot be so
restricted. At the same time, looking at the Court’s socio-economic approach
302 See, e.g., Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, ECtHR 12 November 2008, appl. no. 34503/97. In
this case the Court found common ground among the Member States on the basis of
specialised international instruments and state practices without distinguishing ‘between
sources of law according to whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the re-
spondent State’ (para. 78). Also, it mentioned that it ‘has never considered the provisions
of the Convention as the sole framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights
and freedoms enshrined therein’ (para. 67).
303 Cf. Art. 31 VCLT.
304 Koch 2006, p. 408. It shows that these rights are not merely ‘second best to civil and political
rights’, which, according to Rainey et al. 2014, p.75, is an aspect of an integrated approach.
Recently, however, in the case of Berger-Krall and Others v. Slovenia, ECtHR 12 June 2014,
appl. no. 14717/04, concerning specially protected tenancies, the Court ‘recalls that in
defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, it has on several
occasions taken into account elements of international law other than the Convention’ (para.
189), but with regard to the question whether the measure was ‘lawful’ however, it men-
tioned yet did not take into account Article 31 (R)ESC (promotion of access to housing of
an adequate standard). This merely because this norm cannot be interpreted as imposing
an obligation to achieve certain results (see para. 190).
305 Waldron 1993, p. 33.
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from an ‘effective rights protection’ and an indivisible perspective also
uncovers that potentially the protection of socio-economic rights under the
ECHR can go very far. Hence, the fact that a justificatory explanation can be
given for socio-economic protection under the ECHR, as such does not mean
that there are no concerns left. Are there or should there be any limits to what
the Court can do on the basis of the Convention?
This question is particularly relevant in the light of the ECtHR’s position
and role as a supranational rights adjudicator as set out in Section 2.3 of this
chapter. It was explained there that the Court faces the difficult task of doing
justice to individual cases while at the same time providing the necessary
guidelines to Member States confronted with potential violations of ECHR
rights. Its task is to ensure effective respect of fundamental rights while ack-
nowledging their indivisible character, which may demand much-encompass-
ing protection. At the same time, the Court cannot take too activist a stance,
as this is likely to decrease the willingness of Member States to automatically
comply with the standards set. Indeed, looking at the recent criticism discussed
in Section 2.3, it can be argued that there are most certainly some limits to
what the Court can do on the basis of the Convention.
The criticism that particularly focuses on the ECHR’s socio-economic di-
mension also raises another issue. In the recent literature on this topic the
allegation can be found that the Court’s socio-economic protection is too
incremental, or unprincipled, as well as inconsistent. Against the background
of issues of legitimacy and subsidiarity, this criticism more specifically ques-
tions the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning economic and social matters.
The present section elaborates on these points. First, it illustrates that,
regardless of the wording of the norms laid down in the Convention, there
still is plenty of room for further expanding the ECHR’s socio-economic dimen-
sion (2.6.1). After that, building upon the remarks made about the difficult
task of the Court and the criticism uttered, some critical stances regarding in
particular the Court’s socio-economic approach and reasoning are presented
(2.6.2). Showing that in this field of application the Court indeed fails to meet
the various demands it is confronted with, this leads to the conclusion that
the ECtHR’s protection of socio-economic rights is in need of a more principled
approach.
2.6.1 Potential in Terms of Effective and Indivisible Rights Protection
It is interesting to trace back the ECHR’s socio-economic dimension and invest-
igate what protection has been provided thus far. Another question, however,
is where the development of this socio-economic dimension is heading. What
can be learned from the explanations provided in Section 2.5 as to how far
the ECtHR’s engagement can go? In this regard it must be assumed that some
link between socio-economic rights and (the text of) an ECHR provision remains
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imperative. The provisions laid down in the Convention provide for a frame
of reference that cannot be ignored. This has not necessarily anything to do
with a strictly ‘textualist’ or ‘originalist’ approach.306 It does mean, however,
that the socio-economic adjudication under the ECHR is bound by the norms
enumerated in this document, albeit interpretations thereof can take unexpected
directions.
Here, the distinction between indivisible approaches in the political and
in the legal sphere becomes apparent.307 It has been pointed out that ‘legal
bodies are … not convinced that philosophical considerations on human rights
as a consistent whole will necessarily affect legal dogmatism’.308 It is not the
case that the legal field is characterised by such rigidity that there is no room
for flexibility at all – whether or not inspired by philosophical considerations.
However, whereas arguments for non-departmentalised protection can be
convincing in a political context, actors in the legal realm, such as courts, are
nevertheless bound by written rules, legal principles, and legitimate interpreta-
tions thereof. For generating legal protection of social rights under civil rights
norms, there must hence be a certain ‘intimate connection of proximity’
between the two.309 Generally, according to Scott, this need for a textual con-
nection may cause ‘ceiling effects’ in the sense that courts stick to – a limited
understanding of – the rights they are protecting and hold that other (legal)
actors are responsible for the protection of other norms. A treaty body’s
reference to norms other than its own can then serve to limit rather than
expand the scope of protection.310 Also in the case law of the Court examples
of such a ceiling effect can be found. In Kyrtatos v. Greece, where the applicants
complained about environmental pollution, the Court considered that
‘[n]either Article 8 nor any of the other Articles of the Convention are specifically
designed to provide general protection of the environment as such; to that effect,
306 Distinctively ‘originalist’ approaches have also been rejected by the Court itself. See, e.g.,
Loizidou v. Turkey, ECtHR 23 March 1995 (preliminary objections), appl. no. 15318/89, para.
71; Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, ECtHR 6 February 2003, appl. nos. 46827/99
and 46951/99, para. 94.
307 See, supra, S. 2.5.3.1.
308 Koch 2002, p. 37.
309 Ibid., pp. 37-38: ‘We can list numerous examples that some rights are essential to the
enjoyment of other rights, and this should indeed call for political consideration. However,
it is not likely that legal decision-making will be affected by the fact that a social right in
principle can be essential to the enjoyment of a civil right if this link is not otherwise
qualified by a certain intimate connection or proximity. What is good is not necessarily
right. Legal philosophy and legal dogmatism go hand in hand in the sense that legal
dogmatism can be seen as a combination of description and recommendation. However,
not all philosophical arguments will be recognised in a legal context. Rights can be indivis-
ible in a philosophical context yet separated in a legal one.’ See also Koch 2009, pp. 280-281.
310 Scott 1999, pp. 638-640; Koch 2002, p. 36.
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other international instruments and domestic legislation are more pertinent in
dealing with this particular aspect.’311
If anything, thus, it can be said that the ECHR norms can play a role in limiting
the scope and extent of the Strasbourg protection.
At the same time, although the text of the Convention provides for a confined
focus, the limitations that stem from this should not be overestimated. It was
already shown that the ECHR norms are generally broad enough to take into
account a great variety of socio-economic interests. With the help of the Court’s
interpretative techniques, these norms can function in a broad array of
directions. Gerards in this regard refers to the ‘prism character’ of fundamental
rights.312 Once light falls on a prism, a spectre of colours becomes visible.
Gerards holds that ‘[i]t is relatively easy to recognise “new” hues of colour
in the prism of fundamental rights because … the colours run into one another
without logical points of separation’.313 With the help of analogical reasoning
in particular, ever more fundamental interests (colours) can be discerned.
Importantly, moreover, whereas the notions of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivis-
ibility’ may help to understand, and even to justify the socio-economic practice
of the Court, neither of them fences off the further development of this practice.
First, the aim of effectuating ECHR rights, combined with the interpretative
canons of the ECtHR, in principle allows for very far-reaching interpretations
of Convention rights. Secondly, also the aim to provide for truly indivisible
protection can have effects that go far beyond what is already visible in the
Strasbourg case law. This open-endedness of the Court’s socio-economic
protection is clearly illustrated by its doctrine of positive obligations. In Section
2.4.3 in particular, it was shown that the different Convention articles have
come to include positive obligations as well. The relationship between these
positive obligations and the socio-economic dimension of the Convention may
be obvious.314 Where positive obligations are accepted in the field of civil
and political rights norms, they quite often cover interests that would very well
fit the category of social rights.315 Consider the right to respect for the home
311 Kyrtatos v. Greece, ECtHR 22 May 2003, appl. no. 41666/98, para. 52. See also Ivan Atanasov
v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 2 December 2010, appl. no. 12853/03, para. 77.
312 Gerards 2012.
313 Ibid., p. 180, referring to Langford 2008, p. 10.
314 See also Krieger 2014, who, in her article on positive obligations, mainly focuses on socio-
economic rights protection.
315 Cf. Koch 2002, p. 31, who states that ‘one of the main reasons [against socio-economic
guarantees as rights] is that economic, social and cultural rights are considered positive
resource-demanding rights in opposition to the civil and political rights that are seen as
cost-free and negative in the sense that they indicate the areas in which the states must
not interfere’. Cf. also Koch 2009, pp. 5-9; Scott 1989, p. 833, for some more ‘dichotomous’
arguments related to the (perceived) character of socio-economic and civil and political
rights.
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(Article 8(1) ECHR): understood in a classical sense, this norm may well apply
to issues involving home searches, and thereby foremost the privacy of the
applicant, whereas a positive obligation might entail that no eviction of unlaw-
fully residing persons may take place without investigating possibilities for
alternative housing.316 Important is that the room for positive obligations
can hardly be called limited. When a negative right is concerned, the state
only has to do one thing, namely refraining from interfering with the indi-
vidual’s interests. However, when the question is whether and what action
needs to be taken, in order to for example effectively guarantee respect for
someone’s private life, the list of obligations that could potentially be con-
sidered necessary seems more or less infinite.317
Another example of the potential for further socio-economic protection
is offered by – the still relatively new – Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the
Convention.318 Different from Article 14, the applicability of this non-discrim-
ination provision is not dependent on any other substantive provision of the
Convention. In this way Protocol No 12 aims at ‘broadening in a general
fashion the field of application of Article 14 …’.319 Particularly, it has been
argued, the former can expand the already ‘socialising’ effect of the latter.320
Without it being necessary to claim that an interest falls within the ambit of
a classic Convention right, Article 1 P12 can be invoked when socio-economic
laws or policies are concerned.321 For example, when an individual is con-
fronted with allegedly discriminatory housing regulations, regardless of
316 Cf. Winterstein a. O. v. France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07 (where the Court
went short of recognising such an obligation, see, infra, Ch. 8).
317 In the words of Koch 2002, p. 33: ‘[T]he Court has not developed a general theory of positive
obligations, and we find ourselves without legal principles according to which we can decide
when one legal body is allowed or obliged to take into consideration objectives that are
usually considered under another legal instrument and may be by another legal body’.
With regard to Article 8, Cousins 2008, p. 48, holds that ‘the Article has a potentially very
broad reach as issues concerning personal and family life can, in principle, bring in almost
any issue concerning an individual’. Cf. also Feldman 1997; Warbrick 1998, p. 34.
318 Art. 1 P12 reads: ‘1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status. 2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground
such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.’
319 Explanatory report to Protocol No 12, para. 10, available at www.conventions.coe.int.
320 Brems 2007, pp. 162-163; Mjöll Arnardóttir 2014, pp. 332-334 (who however holds that
because of a broad interpretation of the ‘ambit’ of Art. 14, there will not be much of a
difference (p. 345)).
321 According to Brems 2007, p. 162 ‘[t]his innovation may result in large numbers of claims
being brought before the Court in many ‘new’ areas, including the entire field of social
rights’.
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whether these have an impact on his private life or property rights or not,
he can invoke his right under the Convention.322
Finally, brief mention can be made of the greater focus on economic
and social rights due to the economic and financial crises that have arisen in
the past years. Together with the increased acceptance of socio-economic righs
in general, this has led to an increased number of social rights complaints and
proceedings. Besides under treaties like the (Revised) European Social Charter,
these are also regularly brought under the Convention.323 Also in this regard,
although it is not a given that the Court will make use of it to a greater or
a lesser extent, there is certainly room for further expansion of the socio-
economic dimension of the Convention.
Thus, regardless of the need of a textual connection between the Convention
text and socio-economic rights, it is clear that what effective Convention
protection requires is not a priori limited.324 Also the opportunities for the
development of an indivisible approach are still plentiful, since there is a great
number of economic and social rights norms left the Court could actively link
to the protection offered under the Convention.325 The fact that there is hence
no automatic stopping-point for the recognition of socio-economic rights under
the ECHR, begs the question how far the Court nevertheless can and will go
in this regard.326
322 It must however be noted that, at least thus far, the practical added value of Article 1 P12
has turned out to be limited. The Court explained in the case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina that it interprets ‘discrimination’ under this article in the same way as under
Art. 14 ECHR. See Sejdic en Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR (GC) 22 December 2009,
appl. nos. 27996/06 34836/06, para. 55. Cf. also Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands,
23 October 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 34880/12, para. 28.
323 See, for example, the various (recent) crisis-related social security complaints that are
discussed in, infra, Ch. 10.
324 Cf. Gerards 2008, p. 686, who stresses that ‘a further rise of “borderline cases” is to be
expected in the future. In academic literature, an increase is expected in the acceptance
of new fundamental rights, reflecting novel aspects of various conditions of human life
relating to food, environment, and resulting from technological advances in mass com-
munications, information technology, and reproductive techniques. It is highly probable
that these future developments will even further soften the borderline between fundamental
rights and what are currently called “individual interests”, especially in the field of social,
economic and cultural rights’.
325 With the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in this regard a new source
has come into being. The Charter also includes economic and social rights norms, and
although the effect of these might be limited, there is nevertheless room for linking their
underlying principles to the various rights of the Convention.
326 Cf. Kapuy 2007, p. 238, who holds that in regard to the socio-economic protection under
the Convention, ‘[a] great deal has changed … over the past twenty or more years. What
future developments there will be remains a crucial question for individuals whose rights
in social security disputes have been violated, but also an exciting one for observers of
the European protection system of human rights’.
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2.6.2 Criticism of the ECtHR’s Reasoning in Socio-Economic Cases
Discussing the socio-economic case law of the ECtHR, Brems holds that ‘[t]here
is an inherent tension between this reality of indivisibility, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the need for the Court to draw the line somewhere with
regard to its competence to deal with social rights’.327 In relation to the
Court’s reasoning on socio-economic matters, however, other – related –
concerns have been voiced as well. The Court should not go ‘too far’, yet in
addition to this the literature suggests that its reasoning is characterised by
certain shortcomings. The Court’s socio-economic case law has been called
‘incremental’ – which not necessarily is a problem as such but can become
one once the complex task the Court faces is considered. Also, the Court has
been accused of using an opaque approach and, thereby, creating uncertainty
for states as well as for (potential) applicants. Whereas it has often stressed
that the Convention ‘does not guarantee, as such, socio-economic rights’,328
it remains unclear about how much and what kind of (indirect) socio-economic
protection can nevertheless be expected.329 It is important to investigate the
different critical remarks in relation to the position and the role of the ECtHR,
which will lead to the conclusion that a more principled approach might be
required.
One of the things that is considered problematic in regard to the Court’s
development of the socio-economic protection is that it often reasons in a case-
by-case fashion. Although in several socio-economic cases it has concluded
that there had been a violation of the Convention, these conclusions are gen-
erally unaccompanied by principled reasoning and closely linked to the par-
ticular facts of the case. This means that great effort is required in order to
understand from the case law what socio-economic guarantees more generally
follow from the Convention. Case-based reasoning also relates to Gerards’
prism metaphor.330 It can be said that ‘[t]he flowing character of the colours
of the fundamental rights prism can … easily result in a case-based argument-
327 Brems 2007, p. 165: ‘Obviously, where the line is drawn will be determined not by the logic
of the social rights that are indirectly protected, but by the logic of the civil and political
rights into which they are incorporated.’ According to Koch 2002, p. 34, ‘[i]t is an open
question how far this integrated approach can and should be taken’. See also Krieger 2014,
p. 200, who notes that it is not a matter of altering the systematic of the Court’s practice.
What matters is ‘den längst in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs angelegten methodisch-
dogmatischen Vorkehrungen Rechnung zu tragen, die subjektiv-rechtlich einklagbaren
Handlungspflichten mit dem Konsensprinzip ebenso wie mit den Grundsätzen von Gewalt-
enteilung und Demokratie in Mehrebenensystem in Einklang zu bringen: der angemessen
begrenzten Anwendung der dynamisch-evolutiven Auslegungsmethode und der Be-
stimmung der Kontrolldichte im Rahmen des Beurteilungsspielraums der Mitgliedstaaten’.
328 Cf. Pancenko v. Latvia, ECtHR 28 October 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 40772/98.
329 Cf. Leijten 2014.
330 Gerards 2012, pp. 178-180.
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ative approach that is strongly supported by analogical reasoning’.331 Ana-
logical reasoning can have unintended and undesirable effects, leading courts
where they did not intend to go or giving the suggestion of broader develop-
ments that are in fact not there.332
Also Mantouvalou and Palmer hold that the incremental, case-oriented
approach of the Court in socio-economic issues is problematic, mainly because
of the opacity that results from this. According to Mantouvalou a court like
the ECtHR can no longer rely on dichotomies stemming from the Cold war.
It should ‘tackle social rights issues according to a coherent theory of adjudi-
cation, instead of having recourse to case-by-case solutions that lack compre-
hensive reasoning’.333 Palmer sees improvement, but also holds that ‘in the
light of differences between national policies and administrative procedures
for the fair distribution of public resources, the incremental approach to the
protection of socio-economic rights through the interpretation of Articles 6
and 14 ECHR remains problematic’.334
Indeed, the idea that ‘cases make bad law’335 is especially relevant in the
sensitive field that forms the focus of this study. After all, focusing on cases
and their analogies leaves little room for developing a principled approach
to this expanding field of Convention protection, even though judgments can
have far-reaching policy and budgetary effects.336 Much attention is always
had to the Court’s interpretative principles, i.e., to problems inherent especially
in its autonomous and evolutive approach. According to Gerards, however,
‘the criticism that is often rendered on the Court’s use of such methods misses
the point’, and the actual (interpretative) problems may in fact lie in the Court’s
incremental approach and analogical reasoning.337 This means that if one
wants to solve particular issues concerning the Court’s case law, this is where
potential room for improvement could be found.
Another strand of criticism of the Court’s socio-economic case law is that it
tends to promise a lot, while eventually, actual protection is not often granted.
In more technical terms: the ECtHR’s interpretation generally leaves room for
prima facie protection of economic and social interests, but at the application
stage not much of this protection is left. Krieger in this regard speaks of ‘ein
331 Ibid., p. 180.
332 Ibid., p. 183.
333 Mantouvalou 2005, p. 584.
334 Palmer 2009, p. 397.
335 With reference to the context of the Court, see Gerards 2012, p. 183. In his famous dissenting
opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401 (1904), US Supreme
Court Justice Holmes wrote that ‘[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad law’. See also,
e.g., Schauer 2006; Sunstein 1996, pp. 67 and 72.
336 According to Mantouvalou 2005, p. 583, ‘[t]he adoption of the integrated approach has not
been a matter of conscious choice for the ECtHR. That is why it is still unclear what exactly
it entails and what outcomes it may lead to’.
337 Gerards 2012, p. 183.
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leeres Versprechen’ (‘an empty promise’).338 Of course, it is almost self-
evident that fundamental rights do not work as trumps in the socio-economic
sphere.339 Most of the time there are important general interests and budget-
ary concerns at stake. The way a state shapes its welfare policies lies at the
heart of its democratic prerogatives. In the light of this, however, it must be
asked whether it is sensible to hold that a great variety of socio-economic
interests are covered by the Convention in the first place. Should there be a
promise of meaningful review when it is likely that the Court defers to the
position of the national authorities and eventual protection is more or less
illusory? There are plenty of socio-economic interests that can be directly linked
to, e.g., an individual’s private life. The question is however whether all of
these should be allowed to form the starting point for review under the Con-
vention when only few stand a chance against the general interests con-
cerned.340
Of particular relevance here is also the Court’s use of the margin of appre-
ciation. Developed for granting deference to decisions of the national author-
ities, and thus underlining the Court’s subsidiary task, this doctrine has become
one of the scapegoats of those who critically analyse the Strasbourg funda-
mental rights system. It is said that the margin ‘has become slippery and
elusive as an eel’ and seems to be used ‘as a substitute for coherent and legal
analysis of the issues at stake’.341 In line with this, Palmer speaks of the
‘variable use of the malleable margin of appreciation’ as undermining the
development of a more coherent approach to socio-economic protection.342
338 Krieger 2014, pp. 191-193.
339 See in this regard also the ‘progressive implementation’ requirement in the context of socio-
economic protection under the ICESCR, infra, Ch. 5, S. 5.2.2.
340 Harris et al. 2009, pp. 365-366: ‘It must be said also that the Court’s expansive approach
to the scope of private life holds out a promise of protection of individual interests which
ultimately is rarely conceded by the Strasbourg authorities. The margin of appreciation
allowed to states to determine what is required by “respect” and what interferences are
“necessary in a democratic society” means that there are substantial burdens for an indi-
vidual in making out his case successfully in Strasbourg even if he is able to identify his
interest as falling within “private life”. In fact, it would appear that establishing the relev-
ance of a private life interest under Article 8(1) is relatively straightforward, the greater
challenge is proving that there has been a disproportionate interference with that interest.’
Cf. also Gerards 2012, p. 187ff. (on ‘delineating fundamental rights); Harris et al. 2014, p.
531.
341 Lord Lester of Herne Hill 1998, p. 76. See, for criticism on this doctrine, also, e.g., Kratochvíl
2011. See, further on the margin of appreciation, infra, Ch. 3, S. 3.5.
342 Palmer 2009, p. 399. In the words of Krieger 2014, p. 209: ‘Entscheidend für die Legitimität
der Spruchpraxis ist … eine konsistente Bestimmung des Umfangs der Kontrolldichte.’
See also p. 212.
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Unsurprisingly, the Court’s incremental approach in combination with its broad
interpretation and hesitant application leads to a great measure of uncer-
tainty.343 This is problematic not only for academics trying to make sense
of the development of the Convention. It is also a shortcoming in practical
terms where the interests of the Member States responsible for compliance
with the Convention and the needs of individuals are concerned.
Altogether, it can be said that the Court has mainly been concerned with
individual situations and with interpreting the Convention in a way that
implies protection for complaints of a not so typically ‘civil and political’ kind.
It is praiseworthy that it has created this room, thereby showing the willing-
ness to move beyond categorisations of rights that should no longer form the
starting point for a meaningful fundamental rights approach. According to
the literature, however, in doing so it has failed to ‘develop a position on socio-
economic rights as such’.344 In other words, no matter how much protection
has been offered, the Court’s approach
‘has been flawed by a deep-seated reluctance … to define appropriately the para-
meters of its own adjudicative role in shaping the normative content of resource-
intensive rights through the development of values and principles embodied in
the ECHR’. [To a certain extent this] continues to undermine the development of
a principled justificatory framework for the protection of socio-economic rights
in member states.’345
But what about the notions of effectiveness and indivisibility? It is worth
underlining here that although the theses presented in Section 2.5 allow for
comprehending the developments thus far, they arguably cannot do much
more than that. Obviously, both ideas serve well as a starting point for ensur-
ing individual protection, which is what the practice of the Court should focus
on. However, it has been argued that the Court also needs to consider other
aims. It should also be mindful of its supranational task and show deference
to national (democratic) decisions. It moreover has a ‘constitutional’ task in
the sense that it should provide the necessary guidance to the Member States.
Hence, whereas effectiveness and indivisibility serve one of the main aims
of the Court and may urge it to recognise socio-economic interests as part of
the Convention rights, reliance on these notions cannot as such ensure that
the Court in its socio-economic case law strikes the right balance between
individual, subsidiary and standard-setting protection.
343 Mantouvalou 2013, p. 530: ‘Even though the [ECtHR] has sometimes been willing to expand
the scope of civil and political rights in the area of labour rights, at other times there has
been uncertainty, which is evident both in the outcomes reached and the reasoning’.
344 Brems 2007, p. 164.
345 Palmer 2009, pp. 399-400.
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The same goes for the normative justifications that according to Koch and
Mantouvalou (should) underlie the Court’s indivisible approach.346 A
hermeneutic approach that allows for interpreting the rights norms of the
Convention in their broader context can ensure indivisible protection un-
restricted by traditional labels.347 Again, however, it focuses on creating inter-
pretative room rather than on developing a principled approach to dealing
with this leeway. Also the idea of freedom as a normative starting point for
providing indivisible protection can be said to provide an interesting focus
underlying a protective mechanism that captures both classic and social
interests, and negative and positive ones.348 It can clarify what the Court’s
socio-economic protection should be about, but fails to illuminate the way in
which the Court in its reasoning can combine the protection of freedom with
showing respect for national considerations and decisions.
Hence, effective and indivisible rights protection is at most a partial answer
to the challenges the Court is facing. A principled approach, it can be argued,
would be in need of additional starting points that allow the Court to really
‘shape’ its effective and indivisible protection. Ideally, these not only provide
the necessary space for integrated rights protection that does justice to human
needs and wants, but also fit the institutional position of the Court and the
various roles it is expected to play.
2.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has served a number of purposes. First, it aimed at introducing
the ECHR’s socio-economic dimension by showing how the different Convention
articles can be engaged in the protection of economic and social interests.
Secondly, it tried to make sense of this development by introducing two, partly
overlapping outlooks on how this development can be understood. And
thirdly, it problematised the approach of the ECtHR by pointing out some
crucial questions and criticisms with regard to the further development of the
ECHR’s economic and social dimension.
The chapter could not have addressed these different topics without first
analysing the specific background of the European Convention and the Court.
The former was introduced as a civil and political rights treaty that foremost
aims at the protection of civil and political liberties. This ‘classic’, ‘negative’
character of the Convention not only follows from the wording of the different
norms it enumerates, it also is apparent from the historical groundings of the
Convention. Like in the UN context, under the umbrella of the Council of
346 See, supra, S. 2.5.3.2.
347 Koch 2006; Koch 2009.
348 Mantouvalou 2013.
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Europe economic and social rights have been laid down in a separate instru-
ment (the (R)ESC), the status of which ranks second to that of the ECHR.
From the inception of the Convention, the collective enforcement mechan-
ism this treaty envisaged has been one of its distinguishing features. Today,
the ECtHR is perceived as setting an unparalleled example of effective supra-
national fundamental rights protection. Nevertheless, the smooth functioning
of the Convention system cannot be taken for granted. With a steadily growing
number of applications the Court has been confronted with a serious backlash
endangering the functioning of the Strasbourg system. Moreover, especially
in recent times the Court has been subject to serious criticism. The different
avenues of criticism, it was argued, can be viewed against the backdrop of
the Court’s complex, multi-dimensional task. As a supranational court – as
an important strand of criticism confirms – it is expected to take a deferential
stance towards democratically legitimised decisions made at the national level.
At the same time, the Court was created to serve the important task of pro-
viding effective fundamental rights protection, while it is also confronted with
the demand for clear and general standards that enable the Member States
to, where possible, ensure Convention guarantees by themselves. In addressing
the criticism and assessing the Court’s practice more generally, it is of para-
mount importance that, rather than highlighting a specific one, all of these
aspects of the Court’s task are taken into account.
Coming to the socio-economic dimension of the ECHR, attention was had
to the various relevant Convention articles and the way in which these allow
for the protection of interests of an economic or social kind. With the help
of a broad interpretation of certain Convention norms as well as the recognition
of positive obligations, growing attention has been dedicated to such interests.
Anticipating a more thorough investigation of the Court’s protection of socio-
economic interests in later chapters of this study, it was shown that the ECtHR
by now is dealing not only with classic freedoms like the right to life, the
freedom of expression or of religion, but also with issues concerning social
security benefits, housing policy, work-related rights, etc.
The socio-economic protection offered by the Court was then explained
by outlining two different ‘theses’. The effectiveness thesis provides an under-
standing of the development of the Convention’s socio-economic dimension
that rests on the need to ‘effectuate’ Convention norms even if this requires
moving beyond their foremost classic and negative character. The different
interpretative canons of the Strasbourg Court, in combination with its willing-
ness to recognise positive obligations, can explain the ECtHR’s (increasing)
interference in the socio-economic sphere. An alternative yet related thesis
is that of indivisibility. The idea of the interrelatedness, interconnectedness
and indivisibility of civil and political and economic and social rights was
presented as another angle from which the socio-economic dimension of the
ECHR can be perceived. According to this idea, it is not the mere effectuation
of Convention norms, but rather also the importance of economic and social
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rights as such that explains the Court’s engagement in this field. An important
illustration of this idea is provided by the Court’s explicit references to eco-
nomic and social rights norms outside the Convention.
At least for analytical purposes, it is not necessary to make a choice
between the effectiveness and the indivisibility thesis. In discussing the future
potential of the protection of socio-economic interests under the Convention,
it was shown that both understandings create room for further entering the
field of economic and social rights, albeit a link with the wording of the ECHR
norms remains imperative. At the same time, it was argued that reliance on
these theses alone fails to form a sufficient starting point for a principled socio-
economic case law. Even though they provide an explanation of, as well as
a justification for the Court’s interference in this sphere, more seems required
for a sufficient response to the criticism directed at the Court and improving
its reasoning in socio-economic cases in particular.
In this chapter it was everything but suggested that the Court should refrain
from interfering in the social sphere altogether. Rather, the concern that has
been voiced is how it can bring the evolving Strasbourg rights protection
system in line with the different roles the Court is required to fulfil.349 How
can it provide for economic and social protection while refraining from over-
stepping the borders of its legitimate task? And more concretely, how can its
reasoning be improved in order to ensure effectiveness while granting defer-
ence and providing for a more principled standard? In scholarly literature,
some authors have already hinted at the possible role of ‘core rights protection’
in relation to the ECtHR’s socio-economic case law.350 Besides further invest-
igating the socio-economic case law as well as the reasoning of the ECtHR, it
is the particular purpose of this study to thoroughly explore this possibility
for enhancing the Court’s socio-economic practice in line with the parameters
introduced in this chapter. Before starting this investigation, the following
349 See Krieger 2014, p. 200, who notes with regard to the protection of positive interests that
it is not a matter of altering the systematic of the Court’s current practice. What matters
is ‘den längst in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs angelegten methodisch-dogmatischen
Vorkehrungen Rechnung zu tragen, die subjektiv-rechtlich einklagbaren Handlungspflichten
mit dem Konsensprinzip ebenso wie mit den Grundsätzen von Gewaltenteilung und
Demokratie in Mehrebenensystem im Einklang zu bringen’.
350 See Brems 2007, p. 167 (‘[T]he Court might want to examine which benefits it can draw
from the work accomplished by the social rights experts of other entities. In addition to
defining the essence of each right, the UN General Comments have, in particular, emphas-
ized issues of availability … , acceptability and quality.’), and also Koch 2002, p. 46ff.
(speaking of ‘[t]he existence of minimum core standards?’); Koch 2003, p. 23 (asking
‘whether the Court has established a not very well defined minimum core right to treatment
for dying patient[s] without anyone to take care of them’); Palmer 2009, p. 408ff. (speaking
of ‘developing core responsibilities for socio-economic provision’ in relation to Arts. 2, 3,
and 8 ECHR); Koch 2009, p. 181ff. (asking whether there is ‘a minimum core right to social
cash benefits’ under the Convention). Cf. also Gerards 2008, pp. 688-689; Gerards 2012,
p. 195 (concerning the practice of the ECtHR in general).
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chapter first provides some insights in the practice of fundamental rights
adjudication, and rights reasoning in particular, to provide the necessary
background for understanding where improvements to the Court’s reasoning
could be made.

3 The Stages of Fundamental Rights
Adjudication
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter aimed at setting the baseline for understanding the
development of the socio-economic dimension of the ECHR. It was concluded
that the socio-economic case law of the ECtHR is in need of a more principled
approach. It is the purpose of this research to investigate what the notion of
‘core rights’ can add in this regard. However, before the idea of core rights
can be explored and confronted with the practice of the Strasbourg Court, some
further stage-setting needs to be done. It has become clear in Chapter 2 that
much of the criticism of the ECtHR’s socio-economic case law has to do with
perceived shortcomings in the Court’s reasoning. For exploring means for
improvement, thus, it must first be understood what possibilities the Court
has in this regard.
Important is that in fundamental rights adjudication different stages can
be distinguished that together form the framework for a court’s reasoning in
a given case. These stages and the ways in which they can be approached will
be outlined in this chapter. This reveals the different tasks inherent in the
adjudicative process the fulfilment of which may help to structure the eventual
judgment. In this way, the chapter will serve as the background against which
later the different manifestations of core rights can be grouped and under-
stood.1
The two main stages of fundamental rights adjudication distinguished in
the present book are the determination of the scope of the right at stake
(interpretation) and the review of the justification given for interfering with
that right (application).2 This distinction follows from the structure of funda-
mental rights and moreover serves a number of practical aims. Next to these
stages, the task of determining the intensity of review can be identified. The
determination of the intensity of review is generally not considered to form
a separate adjudicative stage, but it is submitted here that this task is of central
1 See, infra, Ch. 7, and in particular S. 7.2.2.
2 The starting point here is that there are two main stages. In the literature sometimes also
a third stage is recognised. This third stage concerns that what happens after a violation
has been found and can hence be called the ‘remedy stage’. See Barak 2012, pp. 26-27;
Gerards 2005, pp. 28-29 (with regard to equality issues). This possible third stage, however,
is beyond the scope of this book.
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importance to the work of (supranational) courts ruling on conflicts concerning
fundamental rights and, for that reason, deserves separate attention.
Although this book concentrates on the ECtHR, this chapter speaks of ‘courts’
more generally. Taking the Strasbourg context as the point of departure would
create the risk of limiting the view to the ECtHR’s current practice. Thereby,
too little attention would be given to alternative approaches to the different
stages and tasks that might prove valuable for the remainder of this book.
At the same time, because of this study’s focus, there is no need for providing
an exhaustive overview of all the shapes fundamental rights adjudication can
take. The eventual aim is to improve the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court
and the options presented should hence be sufficiently relevant to this court’s
problematic.
In the following, first of all the distinction made between the different
stages and tasks relevant to fundamental rights adjudication will be further
illuminated (Section 3.2). After that, the interpretation stage, the application
stage,3 and the task of determining the intensity of review are explored separ-
ately. The focus thereby lies on the array of alternatives available to courts
when they are dealing with the respective tasks. First, the determination of
scope is discussed (Section 3.3). It is explained that, at this stage, a court can
opt for a more wide or a more narrow scope. Also it is seen how the positive
or negative, classical or socio-economic character of the rights concerned may
have an impact on the determination of the prima facie meaning of fundamental
rights norms. Secondly, in Section 3.4, the focus shifts to the review of the
justifications given for interferences with fundamental rights. It is set out in
this section that courts can opt for a broader or narrower definition of limita-
tions of rights and that they can use different tests for establishing whether
such limitations pass muster. They can apply a proportionality test and engage
in ‘balancing’ interests, but they also could rely on more categorical and less
ad hoc forms of reasoning. Finally, in Section 3.5, the determination of the
intensity of review is discussed. Here it is explained that courts usually apply
either more fluid or less flexible levels of scrutiny, and that the factors that
determine the level of intensity can vary, too. The findings of this chapter are
summarised in Section 3.6.
3 ‘Application stage’ must not be confused with the moment at which the applicability of
a right is determined (that, indeed, is here termed the ‘interpretation stage’). Application
is used here to mean the same as ‘reviewing the justification’ or ‘reviewing the limitation’,
i.e., applying the applicable right to the circumstances of the case at hand.
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3.2 THE STRUCTURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STAGES OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
It might seem natural that, when talking about fundamental rights adjudication,
a distinction is made between the determination of scope and the review of
the justification.4 Former ECtHR Judge Fitzmaurice, for example, stated in his
dissenting opinion in the case of Marckx v. Belgium that the two main stages
distinguished here ‘are elementary, standard propositions which should not
need stating because they are such as everyone would assent to in principle’.5
Still, it is worth explaining in some detail why this distinction is so valuable
in adjudicating fundamental rights cases.6 Next to that, it requires clarification
why in this research a third important task, i.e., the determination of the
intensity of review, is singled out.
3.2.1 Distinguishing Between Two Main Stages
In legal scholarship the distinction between determining the scope of rights
and assessing the justification for limitations of these rights is generally
recognised. It stems from the idea that most fundamental rights are no ab-
solutes. It is recognised that individual rights alone do not suffice to meet the
needs of society, and that there can be countervailing (legal) interests that
under certain circumstances take precedence. Alexy, in his famous Theorie der
Grundrechte,7 explains the existence of limits to constitutional rights by linking
this to the differentiated structure of fundamental rights.8 The concept of a
limit to a right signals that there are two things, connected by a ‘relation of
limitation’. First, there is ‘the right in itself, which is not limited, and secondly,
there is what is left over when the limit has been applied, i.e., the right as
4 See, e.g., Faigman 1992, pp. 1522-1523; Alexy 2002, p. 196ff. (cf. also p. 84ff., 178ff.); Van
der Schyff 2005, p. 11ff.; Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 620; Cohen-Eliya and Porat 2010,
p. 263; Barak 2012. Many high courts around the world have adopted this distinction, see,
Gardbaum 2007, pp. 806-807; Möller 2012, p. 23. According to Weinrib 2006, p. 93: ‘In the
postwar juridical paradigm, the determination of whether a right has been infringed requires
a two-stage analysis.’
5 Marckx v. Belgium, ECtHR 13 June 1979, appl. no. 6833/74, see paras. 3-5 of the dissenting
opinion.
6 Not in the least because some authors do question the relevance of the distinction, or at
least do not use it, especially when it comes to human rights issues. See, e.g., Matscher 1998,
p. 18 and 37; Letsas 2007; Greer 2006; Miller 2008; Webber 2009; Jakab 2010; Letsas 2014.
7 Alexy 1985; Alexy 1994. In what follows, references will be made to the 2002 English
translation by Julian Rivers, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Alexy 2002).
8 Alexy 2002, p. 178ff.
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limited.’9 Hence, a differentiation is made between the scope of a fundamental
right, and the room for limitation – or extent of protection.10
Phrased in this way, the distinction is of relevance not only at a conceptual
level; it also plays a crucial role in the practice of fundamental rights adjudi-
cators. It implies that courts must differentiate between the right and its scope
on the one hand, and the question to what extent in a given case this right
deserves protection on the other. More concretely this means that a court first
needs to interpret the relevant right in order to see whether the complaint
brought before it falls within this right’s scope.11 Only when this preliminary
question is answered in the affirmative, it can review the justification adduced
for the interference and reach a conclusion on whether the individual interest
eventually is protected or not.
An example can clarify this. Article 11 ECHR, which contains the ‘freedom
of assembly and association’, reads as follows:
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on
the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of
the administration of the State.’
The first paragraph of this article states the rights norm in question. It makes
clear that everyone enjoys the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, etc. In
order to know when this right applies, it must be determined what ‘peaceful
assembly’ as well as ‘association with others, including the right to form and
join trade unions for the protection of his interests’ exactly means. The scope
of this right, in other words, needs to be identified. Paragraph 2, then, indicates
that in certain circumstances Article 11 ECHR can be justifiably limited. For
this to be the case, the limitation must be prescribed by law.12 Moreover, it
must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, i.e., meet the requirements of
proportionality, while fulfilling at least one of the purposes mentioned.13 The
phrasing of this particular fundamental rights norm thus clearly supports the
9 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
10 Barak 2012, p. 19. See also Alexy 2002, p. 196.
11 This can be called the ‘threshold question’, see Faigman 1992, pp. 1522-1523.
12 Note that the word ‘law’ in the Convention means not just formal laws, or statutes. The
Court has explained this notion ‘autonomously’, and moreover in a ‘substantive’ way.
Sunday Times v. the UK, ECtHR 26 April 1979, appl. no. 6538/74, para. 47.
13 See, for a further discussion of proportionality, infra, S. 3.4.2.
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idea of a division between the determination of scope and review of the
justification. Whereas paragraph 1 states the prima facie right, paragraph 2
contains the ‘limitation clause’.14 The same goes for a number of other ECHR
norms, such as Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article
9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), and Article 10 ECHR (freedom
of expression). Also Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (protection of
property) communicates a clear division – just like indeed many of the norms
enshrined in other fundamental rights catalogues.
Nevertheless, an express distinction in the wording of a right is not necessary
for distinguishing between the two stages of adjudication in practice. Many
fundamental rights norms do not contain express limitation clauses included
in the article itself. Instead, in several fundamental rights documents the rights
that are protected are enumerated as such, and the conditions for limitation
relevant for these rights can be found in a general limitation clause.15 Most
often such a clause can be found at the end of the list of rights that is taken
up in a constitution or treaty.16 Moreover, there is a category of fundamental
rights that neither contain a separate limitation clause, nor are subject to a
general one, but for which an ‘unwritten limitation clause’ applies.17 The
possibility for limitation is then implied in the right at stake and can only be
14 In the words of Alexy, 2002, p. 185, a ‘limiting clause is part of the complete constitutional
norm which states how what is prima facie guaranteed by the constitutional right is or
may be limited’. He holds that also qualifications in the norm of a right can be perceived
as ‘constitutionally immediate limits’ and gives the example of the ‘peaceably and without
weapons’ qualification in the rights norm of Art. 8(1) GG, the freedom of assembly. Because
such a qualification can be perceived as a description ‘of the material extent of the guarantee
contained in a constitutional provision’, he considers it to be a limiting clause applicable
to the prima facie right (pp. 185-186). See, for a different view, Barak 2012, p. 33.
15 See, e.g., Art. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: ‘The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society’. Also the South African constitution contains a general limitation clause:
‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
factors, including a) the nature of the right; b) the importance of the purpose of the limita-
tion; c) the nature and extent of the limitation; d) the relation between the limitation and
its purpose; and e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose’(Art. 36(1)). For some rights,
however, the South African Constitution also contains specific limitation clauses. See, infra,
Ch. 6, S. 6.2. A final example is the clause contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, in Art. 52(1): ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence
of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may
be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’
16 See, e.g., the South African Constitution and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
17 Alexy 2002, p. 185, 188.
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seen from its application in practice.18 Finally, there is the category of ‘ab-
solute rights’.19 These rights are ‘non-derogable’ in the sense that they cannot
be limited.20 When an absolute right is interfered with, it is also violated.
In other words, ‘[t]he extent of their protection or realization is equal to their
scope as their limitation cannot be justified’.21 The twofold structure of deter-
mination of scope and evaluation of limitations therefore does not seem
relevant to these rights. This does not mean, however, that absolute rights do
not have to be adjudicated in a ‘structured’ way. Just like limitable funda-
mental rights they require interpretation, i.e., the scope of what is absolutely
protected needs to be identified. Only once it is found that the interest com-
plained about falls within the reach of a right, and is effectively interfered
with, the conclusion follows that the right is violated. Article 3 ECHR provides
a good example. According to this norm ‘No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. As already indicated
in Chapter 2, the ECtHR explains this article in an absolute manner,22 and what
it needs to do is therefore to answer the scope question by deciding what
‘torture’ or ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ entails.
The distinction between scope and limitations fits well with an understanding
of rights as principles. According to Alexy, derogable fundamental rights have
a ‘double aspect’ and contain both rules and principles. The right as stated
can be perceived as the ‘rule’, but it is not a ‘complete rule’ as it does not allow
for solving a case by mere subsumption. Instead, there is room for competing
interests, which means that a balance needs to be struck between the right
and one or more of these interests. In this regard the constitutional right can
be perceived as a principle, or, in Alexy’s terminology, as an ‘optimization
requirement’.23 It cannot be conceived of as a rule that – when valid – is fully
protected. Rather, as a principle it states what is prima facie required, and it
is up to a court to then ‘review the limitation’, i.e., decide whether the funda-
18 Consider for example the rights laid down in the US Constitution. See, e.g., Gardbaum 2007,
who emphasises the power to override rights, even though it ‘tends to be somewhat
obscured in the United States by the absence of express limits on rights and, thus, a textually
mandated two-stage process of rights adjudication’ (p. 789).
19 Also called ‘unqualified’ rights, see Kavanagh 2009, p. 257.
20 And thereby not in the sense of Art. 15(2) ECHR, where certain exceptions to the derogabil-
ity of ECHR rights in times of emergency are outlined.
21 Barak 2012, p. 27.
22 Cf. Ramirez Sanchez v. France, ECtHR (GC) 4 June 2006, appl. no. 59450/00, para. 115. See,
supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.3.2. See, however, on the debate on het absolute character of Article 3,
Smet 2014 (with further references) and Van der Schyff 2014, p. 68.
23 ‘Principles are optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied
to varying degrees, and that the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not on what
is factually possible but also on what is legally possible. The scope of the legally possible
is determined by opposing principles and rules’ (Alexy 2002, pp. 47-48).
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mental rights principle, or rather the principle with which it conflicts (the
competing interest), prevails.24
However, for relying on a bifurcated approach it is not necessary to con-
ceive of rights as principles in the way Alexy does. Alexy’s theory implies
that whenever a conflict between a fundamental rights principle and another
principle occurs, neither will enjoy ‘precedence per se’.25 Importantly, thus,
his theory does not prioritise fundamental rights over other principles or
interests. Rights can however also be perceived as particularly important, and
a priori weighty ‘rules’. This does not have to mean that they are seen as
‘trumps’26 in the sense of not allowing for any interference whatsoever, yet
it does imply that rights have a special status conferred on them.27 Barak,
for example, distinguishes quite strongly between ‘constitutional rights’ and
‘public interest’ concerns.28 The reason he does not want to use the term ‘prima
facie rights’ is because in his view, also when a fundamental right is limited,
this does not alter this right’s scope at the constitutional level.29 In other
words, he accords a special status to the right as it is initially stated, which
may then also be reflected in a court’s interpretation or its review of limita-
tions. Thus, although Alexy’s is probably the most sophisticated explanation
of the structure of rights, acting upon this structure as such does not require
that rights are understood in his particular way.
At the same time, of those authors who do not see rights as principles, some
thereby also explicitly reject a bifurcated approach. Sceptics of the idea of
24 Ibid., p. 50ff.
25 Ibid., p. 51.
26 Dworkin 1984. Dworkin’s notion of ‘trumps’ and the related distinction between principles
and policies (Dworkin 1977, Dworkin 1985) as well as Habermas’ description of rights as
firewalls (Habermas 1996, p. 254; see also Rawls’ priority of the right over the good, Rawls
1993, p. 173) present an image of rights as blocking any potentially overriding powers or
interests Cf. also Fried 1978, p. 81. In its pure form, however, this idea has been criticised,
for it would imply that the category of rights could only be a very limited one. Kumm
2004, p. 592, for example points out that the category of these absolute rights would be
mainly empty, or, that this asks for a definition of rights that includes ‘only the reasons
against which the rights-holder enjoys categorical protection’. This however, entails the
problem of dealing with infringements of an individual’s interest that is massively dis-
proportionate. The categorically exclusion of reasons does not take account of this. The
possible exception given by authors defending the ‘trumps theory’ is in case of genuine
‘catastrophe’. As Schauer 1993 (p. 424) however points out, this does not explain ‘the
possibility that deontologically conceived rights may have to be overridden when interests
would otherwise have to be sacrificed to a very large, but short of catastrophic, extent’.
27 Cf., for a critical response to Alexy in this regard, e.g., Habermas 1992, p. 309ff., 317.
28 Barak 2012, p. 39ff.
29 Ibid., pp. 37-38: ‘[W]hen a constitution defines a right (“scope”), and at the same time allows
for the placement of justifiable limitations upon the realization of that right through sub-
constitutional law (“the extent of its protection”), the existence of the power to limit the
realization of the right, in and of itself, cannot turn the constitutional right into a prima
facie right’.
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distinguishing between the determination of what is prima facie covered by
a right and applying this ‘principle’ in the light of conflicting ones, underline
that this distinction should be at most of inferior concern.30 What counts when
fundamental or human rights are at stake is after all the end-result.31 It is
not necessary to speak of prima facie application since, in the words of Jakab,
‘provisions protecting fundamental rights (… [like] the freedom of speech)
do not prohibit a restriction … of the freedom of expression, only its breach’.32
Strictly seen, the latter point is correct, yet it does not follow from this that
there can be no reasons for determining a ‘prima facie right’ at all.
Indeed, next to the somewhat theoretical reason related to the structure
of rights, there are certain other considerations that argue in favour of dis-
tinguishing between the stages of interpretation and review of the limitation.
First, this distinction can help to make visible what are actually the rights (or
interests) that can be labelled ‘fundamental’. It requires fundamental rights
to be stated and delineated as recognisable individual spheres, before they
are shaped by majority concerns and decisions. According to this argument,
whilst majority interests might impart a presumptive validity to limitations
of rights by the state, these should not conceal what these rights are first and
foremost about.33 The identification of prima facie rights is important not only
for individuals who want to know when they can invoke their rights, but also
for state authorities whose responsibilities are thereby clarified, too. It illumi-
nates from what point on a legislative or executive act or omission is perceived
as interfering with something that is part of the realm of fundamental indi-
vidual rights. That is when the least intrusive measures need to be opted for
and when it must be possible to state a sufficient justification.34 Alternatively,
the awareness that a fundamental right will be interfered with may be reason
to preclude the act in order not to touch upon it in the first place.
30 On a more theoretical level, moreover, it is argued that rights and other interests are
‘conceptually interconnected’ or ‘interdependent’. See Fallon 1993 and for a comment on
his view Schauer 1993.
31 E.g., Miller 2008; Webber 2009. See, with regard to the ECtHR. Both do not make a clear
distinction between methods and principles important for the definition of scope and
methods and principles concerning the review of justification. See also Ostrovsky 2005,
p. 57, who in discussing the margin of appreciation also not clearly distinguishes between
making interpreting a right and applying it. According the Gerards and Senden 2009, p.
623, ‘[i]nterpretation is thus regarded as a conglomerate of judicial decision making where
only the final result counts’.
32 Jakab 2010, p. 150.
33 Cf. Faigman 1992, pp. 1525-1526. Linked to this is the idea that only by distinguishing the
different tasks it can be ensured that rights are interpreted without taking into account
the interests of the majority, whereas these indeed are of crucial importance at the second
stage. See, for a further discussion of this point, infra, S. 3.3.3.
34 Cf. Barak 2012, p. 22, who holds that the burden of proof of such a justification falls on
the state. See further Barak 2012, p. 435ff.
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A two-stage approach is also important for the identification of judicial
competences. More precisely, the distinction between interpretation and
application is helpful because it enables the demarcation of the judicial task.
Interpreting rights at a separate, preliminary stage urges a court to explain
why its jurisdiction does or does not extend to the case at hand. In other
words, by means of interpretation it needs to clarify whether and why the
individual interest does or does not fall within the scope of the right invoked.
Only when it is convincingly argued that it does, a court is competent to
review the matter.
In the light of these points, it can be said that especially also in the context
of the ECtHR it is important to appreciate the distinction between the determina-
tion of scope and the application of a right. The ECtHR has to adjudicate the
rights laid down in the Convention, of which some highly relevant ones, as
was already discussed, contain an express limitation clause and hence urge
for making this distinction.35 Perhaps more importantly, also the specific role
and position of the ECtHR as outlined in the previous chapter,36 underline
the need for bifurcated fundamental rights review. The ECtHR plays a guiding
role, and needs to illuminate the standard set by the Convention in order for
the Member States to apply this standard by themselves. Moreover, in order
to not encroach upon state powers to a too serious extent, it should be clarified
when and why the review of a case is a task for the Strasbourg court. A trans-
parent determination of whether a Convention right is involved, and a justifica-
tion is thus required, can help to meet these demands. Indeed, considering
the multidimensional task of courts like the ECtHR that should not exclusively
aim at ensuring effective, eventual individual protection, but also provide
insightful reasoning, an undifferentiated approach seems unsatisfying.
Altogether, thus, this section has shown that the distinction between the two
main stages of determining the scope and reviewing the limitation of a right
is logically linked to the structure of fundamental rights. It is important,
moreover, as it shows what fundamental rights are, where a court’s compet-
ences start and end, and when a justification needs to be provided. How
exactly the different stages have to be approached is yet another issue, and
a particularly intricate one. Before discussing this issue, however, first the task
of determining the intensity of review will be further introduced.
35 See, in particular, Arts. 8-11 ECHR. Indeed, the distinction between the two phases generally
plays an important role in the argumentation of the Court. The ECtHR habitually makes
explicit that what it is doing is first determining whether or not the interest at stake falls
within the right concerned, and only if that is the case it proceeds to the application stage.
See Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 620. However, Gerards and Senden make clear that the
Court sometimes, problematically, refrains from making a clear distinction. See also Leijten
2014, pp. 114-115.
36 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.3.
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3.2.2 The Task of Determining the Intensity of Review
In the introduction to this chapter it was indicated that next to the stages of
interpretation and application it is valuable to also highlight the task of deter-
mining the intensity of review. This task is related mainly to the application
stage. After a court has determined that an individual interest falls within the
scope of a fundamental rights norm, it proceeds to reviewing the justification
given for the interference and as a part of this process it decides – either more
implicitly or explicitly – on the measure of deference that should thereby be
granted.
An important reason for discussing this task separately can be found in
the particular aim of this research, which is to identify how the idea of core
rights can aid the adjudicative practice of the ECtHR in particular in dealing
with socio-economic issues. Singling out the task of establishing the appropriate
level of review could help to uncover possibilities for doing so that would
have gone unnoticed had the investigation been restricted to the two stages
dictated by the structure of fundamental rights. Besides this, there are two
other reasons for why the intensity of review is considered a vital issue here.
These relate to the character of fundamental rights review on the one hand,
and to the supranational context in which the ECtHR is operating on the other.
When dealing with fundamental rights issues a court is generally con-
fronted with a conflict between the State and an individual.37 Phrased differ-
ently, in the context of fundamental rights conflicts a court usually has to
decide on individual rights in the light of the room allowed to more general
interests – or the rights of others – for interfering with these rights. These
‘other’ interests often are protected by means of a formal act or an authoritative
decision, which cannot be considered lightly. Particularly according to the
theory of separation of powers, courts need to grant a certain measure of
leeway to publicly accountable bodies and democratic decision-making.38
Indeed, whereas there is generally some room for individualised review of
the effects of majority decisions, it remains the prerogative of authorities with
(indirect) democratic legitimacy to balance individual and other concerns. In
order to position themselves in relation to these authorities and their decision-
making powers, it is necessary for courts to expressly take a deferential stance.
37 Of course there is also the ‘horizontal effect’ (‘Drittwirkung’) of fundamental rights (e.g.,
Möller 2012, pp. 10ff.). At least in the case of the ECtHR, however, complaints can only
be filed against the state. To the extent that horizontal protection is relevant in this context,
it relates to the obligations of the state for ensuring this protection. Harris et al. 2014, pp.
23-24, speak of the ‘misleading’ use of the term Drittwirkung in this regard, and note that
there is a special responsibility for the state in case of ‘privatisation’.
38 The counter-majoritarian difficulty (Bickel 1986) concerns the problem that unelected judges
overrule the decision-making of elected officials. See also Waldron 2006 (on ‘the core of
the case against judicial review’). See however Ely 1980.
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Furthermore, especially in the context of supranational rights adjudication
the notion of intensity of review is an important one. Even more so than for
national (constitutional) courts, for supranational courts it can be said that
their task is of a subsidiary nature,39 and thereby inherently limited. Whereas
the former at the national level are to counterbalance decisions taken by the
legislature or the executive, and can with relative ease engage in a dialogue
with the other branches, the position of the latter is a more complex one. A
supranational court’s intervening power is generally subject to political con-
cerns and when lacking the power to strike down national laws, the success
of its efforts is for a great part dependent on acceptance and willingness at
the national level. In line with this, a supranational court like the ECtHR will
often be ‘too far away’ from the national level to assume the authority to
closely scrutinise what has occurred there.40 This seems to hold true especially
when it comes to culturally or politically sensitive matters. Thus, providing
for a measure of deference allows a supranational court to act in accordance
with its subsidiary position, and can increase the acceptance of its judgments.
Given these points, however, it can be asked why one should speak of the task
of determining the intensity of review in the sense of ‘taking a decision’ on the
appropriate level of strictness. Should there not simply always be a great
measure of deference? Indeed, the limited role of (supranational) courts implies
that their review should generally be of a deferential kind. At the same time,
when the protection of fundamental rights is concerned this is not always the
case. The reason for diversification, i.e., for sometimes opting for a more, and
sometimes for a less deferential stance, is that regardless of the position of
courts the importance of fundamental rights sometimes requires close scrutiny.
It was already illustrated in the previous chapter that fundamental rights
norms can cover a great variety of interests.41 They can cover environmental
nuisances or claims for higher pensions, but also instances of torture or serious
interferences with someone’s privacy. Not all of the issues covered by rights
norms can be considered as fundamental: whereas in relation to some issues
there may be ample room for differentiated ways of ensuring protection, when
very serious interferences are concerned, a stricter stance seems appropriate.
39 In fact, the task of a supranational court can be said to be of a ‘double’ subsidiary nature.
Not only does it need to have regard to the (democratic) decisions made at the national
level, but also to how the national courts have resolved a rights conflict.
40 In the words of the Court: ‘Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs,
the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreci-
ate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally
respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it its “manifestly without reasonable founda-
tion”.’ See James and others v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR 21 February 1986, appl. no. 8793/79,
para. 46.
41 Cf. Gerards 2004, p. 139; Gerards 2005, pp. 79-81, on the need for differentiation in the
intensity of the assessment in equal treatment cases.
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Hence, the intensity of review is not something that is static, but instead may
require a decision in the light of the individual interest concerned and the more
specific room for manoeuvre that should be accorded to the state.42
Another point is whether, given the particular role and position of (supra-
national) courts, a measure of deference should not also be explicitly con-
sidered at the interpretation stage. A theoretically sound answer could be that
because fundamental rights issues concern conflicts between the state and
individuals they explicitly do not allow for showing deference, i.e., for leaving
room for democratic preferences, at the interpretation stage. Prima facie rights,
different from the room for limitation, need to be determined to the greatest
extent possible without taking into account what the legislature considers to
be covered by fundamental rights, as this could make actual individual pro-
tection illusory.43 However, in practice also at the interpretation stage a court’s
(supranational) position may result in some form of deference. This may for
example entail that individual rights are not interpreted in the broadest way
possible. A very generous interpretation would after all increase the fields
and cases in which a court has the final say,44 and this may be particularly
problematic when (morally or politically) sensitive issues are concerned.45
However, what is in this book referred to as the task of determining the
intensity of the review, relates to the choice made for a measure of deference
at the application stage, when it is reviewed whether, in the light of the
fundamental right at stake, an interference is justified. To the extent that
‘interpretive deference’ is nevertheless relevant for this research, it will be dealt
with in the following section, where the element of scope is discussed.
3.3 THE FIRST STAGE: DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Defining the scope of a fundamental right forms an important step in the
process of fundamental rights adjudication, yet there is no single answer to
the question how this should be done. It was indicated in the introduction
to this chapter that the different steps a court needs to take when dealing with
a fundamental rights complaint imply possibilities for taking one argumentat-
ive path rather than another. Also the definition of scope involves deliberate
choices, informed by more and less authoritative viewpoints. The measure
42 In this regard ‘it is interesting to examine what possible gradations in the intensity of the
assessment are possible, what effects the variation in intensity may have on the judicial
assessment … and what factors should be decisive when determining the appropriate level
of intensity’ (Gerards 2005, p. 81). To these issues, infra, S. 3.5 will turn.
43 See, infra, especially S. 3.3.3.
44 See, on the delineation of fundamental rights in the Strasbourg context, Gerards 2012, p.
187ff.
45 Cf. e.g., Vo v. France, ECtHR 8 July 2004, appl. no. 53924/00, where the Court refrained from
determining when, in the light of Art. 2 of the Convention (the right to life), ‘life begins’.
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of leeway a court has in choosing amongst the various options depends on
the interpretative traditions considered important in a certain legal culture.46
It is the aim of this section to elucidate the different possible approaches to
determining the scope of a right that have at least the potential of being
relevant to the Strasbourg practice.
As a preliminary, it is useful to stress that ‘determining the scope of a right’
does not demand that for all imaginable interests, a court’s judgment clarifies
whether or not they are covered. Rather, the starting point is whether the
individual interest involved in a particular case can be subsumed under the
relevant norm’s header. Hence, ‘determining the scope of a right’ in fact must
be taken to mean ‘determining whether the individual interest at stake falls
within the scope of the right’.47 For practical reasons, however, this chapter
will mainly speak of ‘determining the scope of a right’.
Since determining the scope of a right is a matter of interpretation, this
section first looks at the practice of interpreting fundamental rights norms
(3.3.1). Subsequently, other perspectives are addressed that can inform a
decision on the scope of a right (3.3.2). Finally, this section discusses why state
interests should not play a role at the interpretation stage, and the problems
this may lead to when rather than negative, positive (socio-economic) interests
are concerned (3.3.3).
3.3.1 Interpreting Fundamental Rights
In order to see if an individual interest is sufficiently related or not to the
fundamental rights norm invoked, this norm must be interpreted. Doctrines
of constitutional and fundamental rights interpretation have been discussed
in abundance and in much depth elsewhere.48 In Chapter 2, moreover, the
interpretative methods and principles most relevant for the ECtHR and this
study in particular have already been illuminated.49 Rather than providing
a thorough investigation of such methods and principles, therefore, this section
only briefly mentions a few pertinent issues.
46 Barak 2012, pp. 63-64: ‘[A]lthough the judge is sometimes accorded judicial discretion by
the system, this discretion is bounded by a limited set of values, traditions, history, and
text that are unique to the system in which he operates’.
47 Cf. ibid., p. 23, where he argues that the scope generally is not as time and place dependent
as limitations are. This is true, but he is also right in writing that the scope depends on
the rules of interpretation. This means that, for example in the case of the ECHR, the idea
of a ‘living instrument’ weakens the ‘static’ character of the scope of a right.
48 With regard to the different aspects of the ECtHR’s interpretive practice, see Gerards 2009;
Senden 2011.
49 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2 in particular.
106 Chapter 3
The interpretive aids that can be used in fundamental rights adjudication are
manifold. Some of them are very well known and broadly shared, while others
are less common because they for example relate to the practice of a specific
court. There are methods of interpretation that explicitly focus on the relevant
fundamental rights norm and its (static) meaning, while others rely on more
dynamic sources and ideas not necessarily captured in the norm itself.
Examples of the former are textual and originalist interpretation – methods
that that are known for aiming at finding the ‘true’ meaning of a right accord-
ing to what the text prescribes or its initiators intended, respectively.50 While
textual interpretation explicitly looks at the wording used, originalism (or
‘intentionalism’) focuses on the subjective intent of the drafters of specific
fundamental rights. Both methods are often combined in the sense that what
is sought after, is that what the founding fathers of a particular rights docu-
ment thought they were writing down.
Other methods of interpretation include purposive, or teleological inter-
pretation, as well as comparative interpretation. Teleological interpretation
refers to the aim behind a provision or, alternatively, to the overarching
objectives of the rights document.51 This implies that the interpreter moves
beyond the intended meaning of a text, i.e., beyond what can be termed the
‘subjective purpose’ relevant for originalism or intentionalism,52 and also looks
at the aim behind the provision or the system as a whole (‘objective pur-
pose’).53 Comparative interpretation, on the other hand, makes use of com-
parative insights for determining the way in which the scope of a rights norm
must be interpreted.54 The idea behind this is that many jurisdictions share
basic fundamental understandings and that comparative insights can therefore
be helpful. Especially for a supranational court (internal) comparative inter-
pretation can aid in finding the right middle way between too much restraint
and activism. Once societal developments or understandings of rights are
50 These methods are especially visible still in the US (debate on the) interpretation of the
constitution.
51 Barak 2012, p. 45, states that ‘the right’s scope is determined by the interpretation of the
legal text in which it resides’. This should be done according to ‘what is considered the
best theory of constitutional interpretation, the theory of purposive interpretation’ (p. 46).
Cf. Barak 2005; Du Plessis 2002, paras. 32-52. See also, with regard to the ECtHR, Senden,
p. 55ff., 91ff., in particular pp. 105-107, Gerards 2009, pp. 428-430; Senden 2011; Gerards
2014a, pp. 37-39.
52 Barak 2012, p. 48.
53 Ibid., p. 48: ‘[P]urposive interpretation, with its holistic approach, takes into account both
subjective and objective purposes … The constitutional purpose is therefore a synthesis
between the study of the subjective purpose, as provided by the constitutional text and
other external sources, and from the objective purpose, as provided again by the constitu-
tional text and external sources … in case of conflict the latter “intention” will have the
upper hand.’ See also Barak 2005, p. 371; Du Plessis 2002, paras. 32-42.
54 See on this method of interpretation in relation to the practice of the ECtHR, e.g., Senden
2011, in particular Ch. 6, S. 6.4, and Ch. 10; Gerards 2009, pp. 430-435; Gerards 2011, pp.
74-96; Gerards 2014b, pp. 36-37.
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recognised and accepted by Member States, this can provide a good reason
for a supranational court to develop its interpretation accordingly.55 Some-
times consensus amongst Member States seems required, at other times a clear
trend may be considered convincing enough, too.56 It was already explained
in Chapter 2 that both a teleological and a comparative method of interpreta-
tion are of particular relevance to the Strasbourg practice.57
What particular method(s) a court opts for, partly depends on the interpretative
principles that are considered relevant in a given legal context.58 An example
can be given in relation to the principle of ‘evolutive’ interpretation. As in-
dicated previously, according to this principle interpretations of rights can
change over time.59 When a court attaches value to an interpretation that
keeps pace with societal changes, it is less likely that it will adhere to a textual
method of interpretation compared to a consensus or a teleological method
of interpretation. Also, it was said that in relation to some rights norms, the
ECtHR relies on the principle of autonomous interpretation.60 Such an inter-
pretation expressly does not look at what certain notions imply in terms of
national legal positions and for that reason can help identifying prima facie
guarantees that ensure actual protection.61 Also this principle can hence pro-
vide the necessary guidance in determining which methods to use in inter-
preting a particular rights norm.
Indeed, relevant for choosing between as well as combining adequate
methods and principles of interpretation, is the particular adjudicative context.
When it comes to the adjudication of fundamental rights, interpretative tech-
niques must be used that fit the specific characteristics of these rights. Typical-
ly, fundamental rights provisions are more open-textured and vaguely formu-
lated than other legal guarantees, thereby creating quite some room for creative
interpretations as well as for development over time. Whether this is desirable,
55 E.g., Senden 2011, p. 66ff.
56 See, with regard to the ECtHR, ibid., p. 245ff.
57 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.1 and S. 2.5.3.3, respectively.
58 See, for the distinction between interpretative methods and principles, Senden 2011, especial-
ly Ch. 4, and pp. 390-391.
59 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.2. See also, e.g., in relation to the ECtHR, Letsas 2012; Gerards
2008, p. 663-664; Senden 2011, Ch. 7, S. 7.4 (see also pp. 70-73 and Ch. 11).; Gerards 2014a,
pp. 36-37. Barak speaks of ‘pouring new content into old constitutional principles’ (2012,
p. 65). Next to the examples given in Ch. 2, this principle is clearly illustrated in a judgment
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht concerning life imprisonment without parole in
which this court stated that ‘[s]ince the adoption of the Basic Law, our understanding of
the content, function, and effect of basic rights has deepened. Additionally, the medical,
psychological, and sociological effects of life imprisonment have become better known.
Current attitudes are important in assessing the constitutionality of the imprisonment. New
insights can influence and even change the evaluation of this punishment in terms of human
dignity and the principles of a constitutional state’. See BVerfGE 45, 187.
60 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.2.
61 Cf. Letsas 2004; Gerards 2009, pp. 430-435; Senden 2011, p. 176ff., Gerards 2014a, pp. 39-40.
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however, depends on the way fundamental rights are perceived, as well as
on the particular role and competences conferred upon a court vis-à-vis the
other branches.
Finally, what must be noted in regard to the interpretation of fundamental
rights is the importance of consistency. Even though it could be argued that
effective, individual protection of fundamental rights demands a case-by-case
determination of a norm’s scope, it is generally agreed that once an interpreta-
tion has been given it acquires a certain permanence. Consistency implies that
an interpretation is taken seriously by courts in future cases, and can hence
be relied on by prospective complainants as well.62 Gardbaum, who describes
the determination of scope as a determination of a right’s internal limits, holds
that ‘once [these are] specified, they always apply so that, where triggered,
there simply is no constitutional right to be infringed’.63 In turn, what has
been considered to be covered by a rights norm, will continue to be understood
as such in future cases. This is not to say that interpretations of a right, or
‘internal limits’, can never be adjusted. Indeed, certain interpretive starting
points just discussed especially allow for this to happen, albeit in a transparent
manner. It does mean, however, that the scope of a right must be determined
keeping in mind that it will be meaningful beyond the specific context of a
rights case. Closely related to the importance of consistent interpretation is
the idea of ‘analogical’ interpretation, i.e., of determining whether or not a
specific interest falls within the scope of a right by comparing the case to
earlier cases.64 On the basis of analogies, similarities, and differences found,
it can be decided whether the interest deserves prima protection.
3.3.2 Wide Scope versus Narrow Scope
As indicated previously, most individual fundamental rights norms contain
‘vague’ wording that is open to different understandings. One can think of
liberties like the ‘freedom to expression’ or ‘freedom of religion’, both of which
can be explained as covering less or more individual interests. For example,
the right to freedom of expression can include a prima facie right to offend or
stigmatise, whereas this could also be considered to fall outside of this right’s
scope. Even more indeterminate is the scope of general rights to liberty and
62 Cf. Barak 2012, p. 23, who holds that ‘the extent of the right’s realization or protection
changes from time to time and from one issue to another, reflecting the needs of the time
and place … The scope of the right itself, on the other hand, reflects the fundamental
principles upon which the community is built, as interpreted according to the rules of
constitutional interpretation. A change in the right’s scope comes only via constitutional
amendment or a change in the court’s interpretation of the constitutional text’.
63 Gardbaum 2007, p. 803.
64 Cf., in relation to the practice of the ECtHR, Gerards 2012.
The Stages of Fundamental Rights Adjudication 109
equality, like the ones enshrined in the German Basic Law.65 It is the inter-
preter’s outlook on the desired inclusiveness of a right that can influence the
shape these rights will obtain in practice.
Indeed, besides the different interpretative methods and principles just
mentioned, also a court’s – or a given legal culture’s – preference for a broad
or rather a narrow understanding of the concept of ‘fundamental rights’ can
play an important role in the determination of scope. A distinction between
the two approaches is clearly visible in legal thinking as well as in legal
practice. Usually the two strains of thought not only inform the scope of rights,
but also the accompanying room for limitations.66 On the one hand, it is
argued that both should be defined in a broad manner.67 The idea is then
that once an extensive interpretation of a fundamental right is given, there
should be more room for justifiably interfering with this right.68 On the other
hand, fundamental rights can be defined more narrowly. Incorporating only
few, particularly fundamental interests, is generally considered to leave little
room for limitations and is likely to result in a less deferential attitude in
applying the right. This section explores the reasons for choosing either of
the two approaches to the extent that they concern the first stage of funda-
mental rights adjudication.69
Alexy is a clear proponent of a broad definition of fundamental rights. He
holds that ‘[a] wide conception of scope is one in which everything which the
relevant constitutional principle suggests should be protected falls within the
scope of protection’.70 According to Alexy a narrow interpretation is problem-
atic, because the conclusions it prescribes do not ally with the permissive
character of the norms enumerated in the constitution.71 Excluding certain
modes of exercising a right72 ‘means that acts which have the characteristics
set out in the scope of constitutional permissive norms do not enjoy constitu-
tional protection if they have further characteristics which are to be classified
65 Art. 2(1) GG provides that ‘[e]very person has the right to free development of their
personality, to the extent that they do not infringe the rights of other s or offend against
the constitutional order or public morals; Article 3(1) GG reads: ‘All people are equal before
the law.’
66 See, e.g., Alexy 2002, p. 201; Kumm 2004; Kumm 2006; Kumm 2006a; Gerards and Senden
2009.
67 E.g., Alexy 2002, Kumm; 2004 Van der Schyff 2005; Barak 2012; Van der Schyff 2014. More
generally Gerards and Senden 2009.
68 E.g., Kumm 2004, p. 583.
69 See for a further exploration of the ‘application parts’ of both approaches, infra, S. 3.4.1.
70 Alexy 2002, p. 210. Van der Schyff 2014 also proposes a wide definition specifically in the
context of the ECtHR.
71 Alexy 2002, p. 205.
72 See Alexy’s discussion on the theory of Müller 1969 (ibid., p. 202ff.).
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as unspecific modes of exercise’.73 A rightsholder is consequently left with
a liberty without the right to decide on the manner he wants to make use of
it.74
Alexy’s preference for a wide scope can be said to generate space for
constitutional courts functioning as forums for principled justification.75 In
the words of Kumm:
‘Alexy’s construction of the relationship between judicially enforced constitutional
rights and the democratic process is guided, ultimately, by the idea of realizing
substantive justice as defined by the model of constitutional rights as principles.
Rather than asking what justifies the ‘countermajoritarian’ imposition of outcomes
by non-elected judges, he asks what justifies the authority of a legislative decision,
when it can be established with sufficient certainty, by way of principled reasoning,
that the decision clearly falls short of what constitutional justice requires.’76
In this way, Alexy’s understanding of the scope of rights and the role of rights
review can be linked to the more general idea of a ‘culture of justification’,77
i.e., to the idea that governmental action whenever it interferes with the indi-
vidual sphere must be duly justified.78 Also Möller, in expounding his ‘global
model of constitutional rights’,79 ties a broad interpretation of rights to the
idea of justification. For him, ‘the point of rights … is not to single out certain
especially important interests for heightened protection’.80 Rather than setting
up some kind of threshold, ‘the scope of freedom protected by rights must
73 Ibid., p. 205. Instead, ‘Everything which has at least one characteristic, which – viewed in
isolation – would suffice to bring the matter within the scope of the relevant right, does
so, regardless of what other characteristics it has’, and ‘within the semantic leeway of the
concepts defining the scope, wide interpretations are to be adopted’. Alexy 2002, p. 210;
Alexy 1980, p. 186ff. A court should not take what falls within the scope of a right, away
from it. When choosing between a relaxation of the meaning of a right or of the limitations,
the latter should be preferred also for ‘a citizen … who is interested in the form of argument
and justification as well as the decision itself will find it more honest and more persuasive
if the refusal to extend the protection of constitutional rights is justified by appeal to the
constitutional rights of others or to competing public interests which the Constitution to
be respected, than if he is told that his behaviour is not materially specific, or that it is
covered by general laws, or that it is excluded from protection for some other reason which
takes it outside the scope’. See Alexy 2002, pp. 212-213.
74 Cf. Isensee 1980, p. 10ff.
75 Kumm 2004, p. 384.
76 Ibid., p. 589.
77 See, on a ‘culture of justification’, e.g., Mureinik 1994; Dyzenhaus 1998; Cohen-Eliya and
Porat 2011. Cf. also Cohen-Eliya and Porat 2013 (reviewing Barak’s theory of proportionality
in the light of the idea of a culture of justification) and Van der Schyff 2014 (speaking of
the ECHR and the ‘constitutionalisation of disputes’, p. 73ff.).
78 E.g., Barak 2012, p. 22.
79 Möller 2012. His theory is ‘reconstructive’, in the sense that ‘it is a theory of the actual
practice of constitutional rights law around the world’ (p. 2).
80 Ibid., p. 87
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extend to everything which is in the interest of a person’s autonomy’.81 Com-
bining a broad understanding of autonomy, with the acknowledgement of
a right to autonomy, this means that
‘any state action or omission which affects a person’s ability to conduct his life
according to his self-conception interferes with a constitutional right and thus
triggers the duty of justification: to be legitimate, the state policy which denies the
right-holder some element of control over his life must take his autonomy interests
adequately into account.’82
As such, a broad scope provides individuals with a possibility to demand
reasons for the decisions made by the majority, even when this often – and
especially when more trivial interests are concerned – does not lead to the
finding of a violation. In any case, including much in the scope of a right
ensures that those cases that deserve eventual protection are not overlooked.83
What, then, would argue in favour of the second approach, i.e., in favour of
a generally more narrow definition of scope? It can be said that according to
a narrow approach ‘rights cover only a limited domain by protecting only certain
especially important interests of individuals’.84 Phrased differently, it holds
that only individual interests that are particularly qualified enjoy protection,85
so that instead of encompassing ‘[s]uch mundane matters as the prima facie
right to ride horses in public woods or to feed pigeons in public squares’,86
a right to liberty would for example be limited to what could be called its more
81 Ibid., p. 77.
82 Ibid., p. 95. Indeed, although Möller considers that the two-stage approach to rights, ‘reflects
a useful way of splitting the question of whether the person’s autonomy interest have been
taken seriously’ (p. 207), his approach clearly emphasises the second part of the test. This
follows from the fact that in his account also trivial and even immoral activities are prima
facie covered by the category of rights.
83 See Van der Schyff 2005, p. 32: ‘[T]he justification or source of a wide approach in respect
of the protection rendered by a given right is to be sought in the primary function of a
declaration of rights: namely that of a guarantor of fundamental rights. In other words,
a wide interpretation should be followed in order to extend protection in terms of such
a declaration to as many forms of conduct and interests as possible, both in range and depth,
thereby contributing to the optimal satisfaction of its purpose as the primary, or at least
an important, fundamental rights protection’. See, with reference to the ECHR, also Van
der Schyff 2014.
84 Möller 2012, p. 2, who holds that this understanding is one of the characteristics of the
dominant narrative of the philosophy of fundamental rights. However, he argues that under
the global model of constitutional rights one can no longer speak of such a narrow inter-
pretation.
85 Cf. Kumm 2004, p. 583, referring to the US Supreme Court’s understanding of rights and
their limitations.
86 Ibid., p. 584; BVerfGE 39, 1; BVerfGE 88, 203.
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essential features.87 Generally, two sets of reasons have been given for opting
for a narrow, or ‘limited’ understanding of the scope of rights.
First, there are the arguments that focus on the particular role of courts,
perceived in the light of the balance amongst the different powers. Supporters
of a narrow scope hold that a broad definition of fundamental rights creates
too much room for courts to interfere with the choices made by the legis-
lature.88 It would ‘disable the legislature in favor of the courts, which would
be empowered, in many cases, to strike down unfavorable legislation that
might interfere with individual rights’.89 Even if a court does not have the
power to invalidate legislative acts, it can be questioned whether its compet-
ences should stretch so far that it has a say on virtually every thinkable conflict
of interests. This would after all be the consequence of interpreting funda-
mental rights in a very wide, or practically unlimited manner.
Secondly, reasons in favour of a limited scope of rights can be based on
a preferred understanding of fundamental rights as being truly fundamental
in kind, rather than as principles upon which no special status is conferred.90
According to this line of argument it is undesirable to frame every conceivable
individual interest in terms of a fundamental (or constitutional) right, as this
might lead to the ‘constitutionalisation’ or ‘juridification’ of society.91 In other
words, an almost limitless prima facie understanding of rights may entail
inflation of the concept of fundamental rights.92 In this regard it has been
argued that ‘a premature rhetoric of rights can inflate expectations while
masking a lack of claimable entitlements’.93 Conceiving of rights in a broad
manner could ‘lead first to delusion and then to frustration’, since much of
what seems to be guaranteed is subsequently excluded from protection by
means of legitimate limitations.94
The problem is then how to come to an appropriate delineation of the
category of fundamental rights.95 Generally, it is considered important that
in outlining a right’s scope, state interests should not be taken into account.
87 Ibid., p. 589 (referring to the US tradition). Cf. Ely 1980.
88 Cf. Van der Schyff 2005, p. 213 (with references); Alexy, 2002, p. 211; Gerards and Senden,
2009, p. 626. See also, infra, S. 3.2.1.
89 Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 626.
90 Cf. Alexy 2002, as discussed in, supra, S. 3.2.1.
91 Cf. Möller 2012, p. 107; Van der Schyff 2014, p. 73ff.
92 See, on the argument of ‘constitutional rights-ification’, Alexy 2002, p. 213, referring to Starck
1981, pp. 245 -246; Möller 2012. Cf. also Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 626ff; Gerards 2012;
Gerards 2014.
93 O’Neill 1996, p. 133.
94 Alexy 2002, p. 345 (on the criticism directed at his two-stage approach; referring to Isensee
1980, pp. 382-383).
95 In the view of Griffin, for example, there are criteria for delineating what does and what
does not belong to the notion of fundamental human rights. His substantive account is
based on ‘personhood’ and uses this idea as a threshold for distinguishing such rights from
mere personal interests. See Griffin 2008, pp. 32-33. For critique see Möller 2012, p. 60ff,
who instead focuses on (a protected interests conception of) ‘autonomy’.
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It is obvious, however, that especially when for the reasons stated above a
more limited interpretation of a fundamental right is favoured, there is a risk
that its contours will nevertheless be influenced by state concerns and general
interests. This point of concern will be elaborated further in the following
subsection.
Besides the different reasons for and against a broad interpretation of funda-
mental rights, two final remarks can be made on this topic in relation to the
current study. First, it must be kept in mind that the adjudicative context
concerned here, namely that of the ECHR, is a supranational one, and that this
sheds a particular light on the arguments presented. Importantly, to the extent
that the arguments in favour of a more narrow understanding of prima facie
guarantees focus on the appropriate and practically feasible role for courts
in the broader web of public authority, they arguably gain particular signific-
ance in the context of supranational fundamental rights adjudication. The
deference associated with this kind of adjudication provides a ground for not
engaging in every individual interest-related matter. Rather, courts like the
ECtHR emphasise that they are no ‘courts of fourth instance’, i.e., not tasked
to review the justification of every decision taken at the national level. For
the Strasbourg court, moreover, also the workload argument is a valid one.
The enormous backlog it has been facing for years now, intuitively would
argue for everything but an ‘as wide as possible’ interpretation of ECHR
rights.96 However, as was explained in Chapter 2, at the same time the Stras-
bourg Court is there to provide ‘practical and effective’ fundamental rights
protection, and it is of course true that a broad interpretation of rights ensures
that even when interests appear trivial at first, the Court can review the matter
at hand in order to see whether there has nevertheless been a breach of a
fundamental ECHR right.
Secondly, and finally, it is worth noting that the wide/narrow distinction
need not be a matter of either/or. A wide scope can be opted for with regard
to the interpretation of one norm, while a court decides in favour of a more
narrow approach in regard to another. Moreover, a wide scope need not be
limitless in the sense that practically every time a right is invoked, a court
considers that the claimant’s interest falls within its scope.97 In turn, ‘narrow-
96 According to Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 629: ‘The stage of the definition of scope would
become rather empty if all individual interests, however far removed from the core of the
right in question, were covered by the Convention. Instead, the determination of the scope
of fundamental rights must be taken seriously so as to avoid having the court become
overburdened with cases that have little to do with fundamental rights.’ See also Gerards
2014, on ‘the relationship between proliferation of rights and the case load of the ECtHR’.
97 Barak, who clearly prefers a broad interpretation, in this regard says the following: ‘The
interpretation of the constitutional text should not include, as per its proper interpretation,
tenuously related issues not reflecting the reasons for which it was made’ (Barak 2012, p.
71).
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ness’ does not necessarily imply that a prima facie right covers only a very
limited number of interests, or that the interests that are considered to fall
within a norm’s scope cannot change or increase over time. Indeed, there are
several in-between options a court may consider, too.
3.3.3 The Anti-Majoritarian Scope, Negative Rights and Positive Guarantees
It was already hinted at previously that courts should determine the scope
of a right only on the basis of factors related to the right itself. State interests
should not be a relevant consideration in defining what actually constitutes
a fundamental right. Before moving to the second adjudicative stage, this
subsection investigates this idea more thoroughly and asks in particular what
this means for cases involving negative guarantees as well as for those that
deal with positive obligations.
It is generally considered that in searching for a proper balance between
individual rights and democratically legitimised decisions and actions, suffi-
cient account must be had to the majoritarian principle that imparts a pre-
sumptive validity to state action. However, what should be prevented is that
the majority also decides what is covered by the category of rights in the first
place. Consider the example of the freedom of speech, which is considered
to be a basic right and has therefore obtained a prominent position in constitu-
tions and other fundamental rights catalogues. Thereby, however, protection
against the majority is not automatically guaranteed. To avoid that individual
guarantees like the freedom of speech become meaningless, it must be ensured
that the interpretation of rights occurs independently of majority interests. What
‘speech’ in concreto means should not be for the government to decide, as true
protection of this right thereby could become illusory.98 State interests only
should be taken into account at the right time and place, i.e., after it is decided
that an individual interest is covered by a right.99 As was argued in Section
98 In the words of Faigman 1992, p. 1528: ‘The meaning of the Constitution derives from factors
outside the will of the majority. If the Constitution operates as a bulwark against majority
tyranny, the majority’s reasons for acting cannot define what actions constitute tyranny’.
99 Cf. Gerards and Senden 2009, p. 624: ‘Whereas the courts must place the constitution in
the forefront when defining individual rights, they have to step back when scrutinizing
the limitation of these rights so as to respect the primacy of the legislature.’ Also Barak
makes clear that the proper place of public interest considerations in a two-stage approach
to fundamental rights adjudication is not the determination of scope (Barak 2012, p. 76).
Instead, these concerns need to inform the proportionality test. See also, e.g., Van der Schyff
2005, p. 33; Van der Schyff 2014. According to Emiliou 1996, p. 53, ‘[t]he doctrinal separation
between the constituent elements of basic rights and their limits avoids the inclusion of
public interest and welfare considerations directly in the element of basic rights themselves.
In this way, the danger of arbitrarily restricting freedom by way of an ad hoc definition
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3.2.1, the importance of an independent interpretation of prima facie rights
forms an important reason for why a distinction between the stages of inter-
pretation and application should be made in the first place.
It must however be emphasised that it is not an easy task to determine
the reach of a fundamental rights norm purely on the basis of the right
itself.100 It is difficult to perceive of a right in isolation from its particular
societal context as well as from (state) traditions and practices.101 Any de-
lineation, therefore, runs the risk of being at least indirectly influenced by a
‘balancing’ of individual and general interests. For this reason the desirability
of an anti-majoritarian scope may well form another ground for opting for
a (very) broad interpretation of rights. After all, the more the prima facie
understanding of a right encompasses, the less likely it is that minority interests
are insufficiently taken into account, and where appropriate, the general
interest may still prevail at the application stage.
Yet whereas such an approach may seem harmless in the context of negat-
ive freedoms, it is argued here that it is somewhat more problematic when
complaints about omissions by the state are concerned. Generally, it is con-
sidered that the interpretation in cases concerning positive claims can proceed
in the same way as when negative aspects of rights are concerned.102 In prin-
ciple, also for defining prima facie positive guarantees it is desirable to refrain
from taking state interests into account,103 and it can be argued that the inter-
pretation of a right’s positive scope should hence also take place in a ‘generous’
manner. According to Barak:
‘First, one has to establish the scope of the positive constitutional right in question.
That task is achieved through the process of constitutional interpretation, and the
rules of constitutional interpretation apply. The positive constitutional right, much
like the negative one, is interpreted from a generous viewpoint. The scope of the
of basic rights is also avoided, ultimately ensuring optimal freedom’. See, for further authors
(and jurisdictions) supporting this idea, Barak 2012, p. 77.
100 Cf. Fallon 1993, p. 344: ‘In American constitutional law, rights typically do not operate,
as we often assume, as conceptually independent constraints on the powers of government.
We have no way of thinking about constitutional rights independent of what powers it
would be prudent or desirable for government to have.’
101 In particular in a supranational rights context, moreover, it can be asked whether a fully
independent approach to determining the scope of a right is always possible. Consider
for example the ECtHR’s ‘consensus method of interpretation’. This method can hardly
be understood as leaving out state concerns, but rather takes the standards applied in the
different Member States as the starting point for determining what an ECHR right should
prima facie entail. By applying a consensus method of interpretation, however, the Court
not only has regard to consensus amongst legislatures, but instead to national standards
– including those that are approved of or set by national highest court – more generally.
See, on consensus interpretation, e.g., Senden 2011, Ch. 6 and 10; Gerards 2009, pp. 430-435;
Gerards 2011, pp. 74-96. See also, infra, S. 3.3.1.
102 Gerards and Senden 2009; Barak 2012. See on this topic also Lavrysen 2014.
103 Gerards and Senden 2009.
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positive constitutional right may conflict with the scope of another constitutional
right – whether positive or negative. The resolution of the conflict is not through
the limitation of the scope of the positive constitutional right.’104
It can be asked, however, whether giving a broad, ‘independent’ interpretation
to positive (aspects of) rights is this straightforward. The scope a right deter-
mines a court’s competences, but it also informs the other branches about when
a fundamental right is at stake. Although an interference with a prima facie
right does not automatically entail a breach of this right, a ‘rights statement’
can thus serve to show that there are certain obligations, which can only
remain unfulfilled once there is a sufficient justification. However, there is
an important difference between negative and positive obligations in this
respect. Whereas in the case of negative guarantees prima facie protection means
that the authorities need to refrain from doing something, i.e., do nothing, unless
there is a satisfactory reason for acting, in the case of positive obligations action
needs to be taken, except for when the authorities can adduce a sufficient justi-
fication for failing to fulfil the relevant right.
If rights statements are taken at least somewhat seriously, thus, especially
a broad interpretation of positive prima facie rights and obligations can be
problematic. This can be the case for example when a court states that as of
right, in principle everyone needs to be provided with adequate housing or
the necessary medication.105 Particularly when it comes to positive (socio-
economic) guarantees adjudicated under negative, classic rights norms, there
will then be a risk that a court is perceived as acting in a too activist manner.
Indeed, rather than opting for an explicit, wide positive scope, the desire to
avoid a ‘majoritarian’ interpretation may then result in the fact that no clear
decision on the scope of a right is taken at all, i.e., that no distinction is made
between interpretation and application and the court instead resorts to an
overall test of whether the omission of the state was justified. In the light of
the importance of a bifurcated approach, such a practice seems question-
able.106
104 Barak 2012, pp. 429-430. To be sure, when speaking of positive constitutional rights, Barak
does not only refer to rights norms or provisions, but also to ‘positive rights’ that are aspects
of the broader right as stated.
105 Alexy, however, speaking of rights to positive state action, holds that ‘[i]t is the hallmark
of balancing that more is prima facie required than definitively’, thereby trying to overturn
the critique that especially in the case of social rights, it is impermissible to state broad
rights that can then be limited as this would lead ‘first to delusion and then to frustration’
(2002, p. 345).
106 Cf. also Leijten 2015.
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3.4 THE SECOND STAGE: APPLICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (REVIEWING
THE LIMITATION)
In line with what was said in the previous section, it is clear that, rather than
at the interpretation stage, state interests should foremost play role in the
eventual review process. Having account to state interests in applying funda-
mental rights ensures ‘an institutional dialogue about rights between the three
arms of government, in contrast to representative or judicial monologues about
rights’.107 In determining what rights eventually entail, in other words,
account must be had to public concerns and majority decisions in particular.
It is in accordance with a traditional understanding of the separation of powers
that the legislator, first, decides on the distribution of freedom by means of
generally applicable laws. Only thereafter, a court can judge upon individual-
ised claims, in the light of this democratically legitimised legal framework.108
In dealing with prima facie rights in relation to other ‘goods’, however, a
range of possible approaches is thinkable. Different approaches are discussed
and defended in detail elsewhere, and in line with the aim of this chapter the
goal of this section is instead limited to introducing a few possible outlooks
that are or could be relevant to the ECtHR’s practice. First, the possibilities for
applying fundamental rights will be phrased in terms of a wide versus a
narrow understanding of limitations (3.4.1). Subsequently, more specific
approaches to the application of fundamental rights are discussed, whereby
the focus lies on the ideas of proportionality and ‘balancing’ on the one hand,
and more categorical tests on the other (3.4.2).
3.4.1 Broad Definition of Limitations versus Narrow Definition of Limitations
Just like the scope of a fundamental right, the possibility of limiting funda-
mental rights can be understood either more broadly or more narrowly. As
was already mentioned, the interpretation and the application stage interrelate
on this point, and the reasons for preferring one understanding rather than
the other are hence similar to those discussed in Section 3.3.2.109 It is worth
coming back to this issue, however, because it forms the baseline for the
various approaches to rights review that will be discussed in following sub-
section. First, when many interests fall within the category of fundamental
rights, this means that a great variety of disputes are perceived as conflicts
107 Debeljak 2008, p. 423.
108 For a recent contribution to the theory of separation of powers and the debate on the distinct
roles of the different branches, see Möllers 2013.
109 In sense that a choice can be made for defining the scope and the limitation narrowly, or
understanding both in a broad manner. See, supra, S. 3.2.2. But cf. Barak 2002, p. 72, who
also presents a possible second and third view (wide scope, narrow limitations; narrow
scope, wide limitations).
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between the general interest and an individual fundamental right. From this
it seems to follow that there should be ample room for limitations, in the sense
that not all of these conflicts – and not even the majority of them – are then
likely to constitute a breach of a fundamental right.110 The combination of
a ‘wide scope’ and a ‘wide’ understanding of justifiable limitations corresponds
with what was called a ‘culture of justification’.111 This idea requires that
a state provides reasons for its actions or omissions in a broad array of fields,
and holds that it is the task of the court to assess these reasons. It also has
the effect that the ‘interim’ conclusion that a state act or omission infringes
upon a fundamental right, is not a very informative one, in the sense that
‘having a right’ does then not necessarily confer much on the rightsholder,112
except for him having the right to have his complaint reviewed.
Secondly, according to a more ‘narrow’ approach only interests that are
‘qualified’, i.e., that can truly be considered to stand out from individual
interests more generally, fall within the category of fundamental constitutional
or human rights. In turn, this means that there is less room for legitimate
interferences. A narrow understanding of rights and limitations allies with
a more limited understanding of the role ascribed to courts: rather than having
the competence to review and judge upon complaints concerning a great deal
of the conflicts that occur in modern society, it circumscribes this role so that
it only covers the power to conclude on issues in which truly fundamental rights
at stake. In line with this, the mere fact that an interest falls within a rights’
scope has some predictive value to what the final outcome might be. There
is, after all, less room for a flexible approach, because the seriousness of the
infringements that come before a court demand prescribes a generally strict
form of review.113 The same argument applies to cases concerning positive
obligations: when only a limited range of positive claims is perceived to be
prima facie protected, it will be more difficult to justify an omission.
110 In the practice of the Bundesverfassungsgericht this can mean that an infringement interfering
with the penumbra of a right is justified as long as it was made in a procedurally correct
fashion. According to Kumm 2006, p. 348, the requirements laid down in the limitation
clause of Art. 2(1) (‘rights of others, constitutional order, public morals’), ‘in the juris-
prudence of the Court translate into the requirements of legality and proportionality’, and
in case of a limitation of a not so crucial aspect of a right this test is easier to meet.
111 See, on a ‘culture of justification’, Mureinik 1994; Dyzenhaus 1998; Cohen-Eliya and Porat
2011. Cf. also Cohen-Eliya and Porat 2013 (reviewing Barak’s theory of proportionality in
the light of the idea of a culture of justification) and Van der Schyff 2014 (speaking of the
ECHR and the ‘constitutionalisation of disputes’, see p. 73ff.).
112 Speaking of Alexy’s theory, Kumm explains that ‘[h]aving a right does not confer much
on the rights holder; that is to say, the fact that he or she has a prima facie right does not
imply a position that entitles him/her to prevail over countervailing considerations of policy’
(Kumm 2004, p. 582).
113 Hence, when it takes a ‘particularly qualified’ interest to speak of a fundamental right, the
importance of this interest should be mirrored in the fact that only few limitations can be
justified. When there is no such interest, this means that there is no room for judicial
assessment under a fundamental rights norm in the first place.
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Especially when backed by an individual complaints mechanism, like in
the case of the ECHR, one of the purposes of a fundamental rights catalogue
seems to be to detect those instances in which the authorities have gone too
far, or alternatively, have done too little. This could be reason to argue for
broad possibilities of review, as long as democratically supported reasons for
interferences or omissions are taken serious. At the same time, the institutional
setting of a court like the ECtHR may form an argument for not giving a too
wide interpretation to both scope and limitations. After all, it can be asked
whether supranational courts are always equipped for reviewing a very broad
range of fundamental rights-related issues. In the previous chapter it was
submitted that the ECtHR needs to provide for effective individual protection,
but that it also is expected to outline a clear, basic standard that provides the
necessary guidance to the Member States.114 It is because of these different
and sometimes conflicting aims, that the choice for one approach rather than
the other is hard to make. Fortunately, the wide-narrow divide is not as
dichotomous as it might appear: just as in the case of interpretation, a middle
way may be available. Different rights, moreover, may ask for different
approaches. Important is that a court’s attitude in relation to this issue is not
a given, but can be chosen and adjusted, at least to the extent the particular
legal context allows for this.
3.4.2 Proportionality (Balancing of Interests) versus More Categorical Modes
of Review
Besides the distinction between a broad and a more narrow understanding
of limitations, there are different ways in which a court can reach a conclusion
on the question of whether an interference with a right was justified. In parti-
cular, courts can either rely on proportionality review and ad hoc balancing
exercises, or revert to more categorical modes of testing. As part of the broader
debate on the role of courts the vices and virtues of both approaches have
– especially in the US – been extensively discussed.115 The arguments in
favour of or against one of the two types of approaches are closely connected
with questions on how courts can best ensure the rationality and insightfulness
of their argumentation, as well as some degree of legal certainty and fore-
seeability of the law. In discussing the different arguments, the current section
114 According to Letsas 2007, p. 9, ‘the ECHR is treated by the relevant actors (ie Member States,
applicants, and judges) as enshrining rights that states have a primary duty obligation to
respect when deploying coercive force, as opposed to a secondary obligation to compensate
victims should they be found to be in breach of the Convention by the European Court
of Human Rights. This attitude towards the ECHR is no less shared in Member States which
follow dualism and in which domestic courts may not have jurisdiction to apply the
Convention’. See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.3.
115 See, e.g., Schlag 1985; Aleinikoff 1987; Pildes 1994.
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will focus on those aspects of the debate that are or could become relevant
for the Strasbourg practice.
Since most fundamental rights are relative in nature, as has been discussed
previously,116 there is in certain circumstances room for justifiably not ful-
filling them. The measure by which the extent of the realisation of a right is
measured is often that of proportionality. Put simply: ‘Proportionate limitations
of rights are justifiable; disproportionate ones are not’.117 Proportionality
entails more than the question of whether a limitation is proportional in the
sense that there is a proper relation between the aims of the limitation and
the means used. Instead, the proportionality of an interference is reviewed
in the light of the fundamental nature of the right concerned. Only when the
benefit of realising the purpose of the limitation is greater than the costs
associated with the limitation of the right, it can be justified.118
The popularity of proportionality is mirrored in the fact that in many
constitutions and other fundamental rights instruments this test is prescribed
in more or less direct wording by (general or specific) limitation clauses.119
Several articles of the ECHR for example require that an interference with a
right is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.120 This is generally reviewed by
means of a proportionality test. Also the three-fold requirement related to the
right to freedom enumerated in the German Grundgesetz – ‘Every person has
the right to free development of their personality, to the extent that they do
not infringe the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or
116 See, supra, S. 3.2.1.
117 Rivers 2006, p. 174 (speaking of the Convention rights/the Human Rights Act).
118 In the words of Barak 2012, p. 132: ‘Typically, proportionality is described as a criterion
determining the proper relation between the aims and the means. This description may
be misleading. It may suggest that the only relevant factors in considering proportionality
are the purposes and the means chosen to achieve it; this is not accurate. The means chosen
are not only examined in relation to the purpose they were meant to achieve; they are also
examined in relation to the constitutional right. They provide the justification for limiting
the right. Only means that can sustain both examinations are proper means. Only when
the social importance of the benefit in realizing the proper purpose is greater than the social
importance of preventing the harm caused by limiting the right, can we say that such a
limitation is proportional. Thus, proportionality examines the purpose of the means, the
constitutional right, and the proper relationship between them.’
119 See, for an example of a general limitation clause that explicitly refers to the principle of
proportionality, Art. 52(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which
– for the relevant part – reads: ‘Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may
be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’
120 Cf. Arts. 8-11 ECHR, dealing with the right to respect for private and family life; the freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; the freedom of expression; and the freedom of assembly
and association, respectively. These articles expressly require an interference to be necessary
in a democratic society (and lawful), which is followed by a list of legitimate aims.
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public morals’121 – tends to be translated into demands of proportionality.122
The same can be said for the requirement of ‘reasonableness’.123
This does not mean, however, that there is only ‘one’ proportionality test.
Proportionality review comes in various forms, and its application is coloured
by the relevant legal culture.124 Generally, however, the principle of pro-
portionality is concretised into four sub-principles or tests.125 First, a limita-
tion of a right should serve a legitimate aim. Secondly, it should meet the
requirement of suitability for achieving the desired (legitimate) objective. This
means that the law or measure the affects the right at stake should realise or
at least advance the (legitimate) aim of that law or measure. When this is not
the case, the interference is disproportional. Thirdly, there is the principle of
necessity, which requires infringing measures to go no further than is necessary
to achieve their objective.126 The question that needs to be asked is whether
there would have been less interfering means available by which the purpose
would have nevertheless been realised. A positive answer would imply that
the right concerned is breached. Finally, there is the aspect of proportionality
in the narrow sense, or proportionality stricto sensu, i.e., the requirement of a
proper relation between the fulfilment of the purpose and the harm done to
the right at stake.127 The mode of assessment used to determine the latter
is what Alexy, and with him many others, has termed ‘balancing’.128
Indeed, ours, it is said, is an ‘age of balancing’.129 Regardless of the im-
portance of the lawfulness, the suitability, and the necessity test, it is the idea
of balancing that is omnipresent in today’s legal thinking and practice practice.
In the words of Pildes,
121 Art. 2(1) GG.
122 Kumm 2006, p. 348.
123 Cf. Art. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitutional
Act 1982: ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.’
124 Cf. Bomhoff 2014, for the argument that ‘balancing’ in fact means different things in different
settings.
125 Möller 2012, pp. 13-14 (referring to the test of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht), Ch.
7. See also Alexy 2002, p. 66 (with references, see fn. 82); Rivers 2006, p. 178. For a slightly
different understanding, see Barak 2012, p. 131, who identifies the following components:
‘proper purpose, rational connection, necessary means, and a proper relation between the
benefit gained by realizing the proper purpose and the harm caused to the constitutional
right’.
126 In the wording of the Bundesverfassungsgericht: ‘The end cannot equally well be achieved
by the use of other means less burdensome for the individual’ (BVerfGE 38, 281, (302)).
127 See, for an extensive study of this requirement in the practice of the ECtHR (and the Court
of Justice of the European Union), Den Houdijker 2012.
128 Alexy 2002, p. 100.
129 This term is borrowed from Aleinikoff’s influential article ‘Constitutional Law in the Age
of Balancing’ (Aleinikoff 1987).
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‘[c]ontemporary constitutional law presents most constitutional conflicts as ones
between individual rights and state interests. The central role that metaphors of
judicial balancing play in modern constitutional decision making emerges from
organizing constitutional conflicts in these terms. When rights and state interests,
each with their claim to legitimacy, are perceived to be in collision, we are com-
pelled toward “weighing” the “strength” of state interests against the “degree”
of intrusion on individual rights. “Balancing” becomes the principle technique of
judicial decision.’130
Important in this regard is that the eventual balancing test is not only the most
prominent one of the different tests, but that in reviewing cases concerning
(positive) socio-economic obligations, it may also be considered the only
meaningful one. In the words of Möller:
‘The statement that constitutional rights law is all about proportionality must be
qualified slightly because proportionality is generally applied only with regard
to negative civil and political rights … It does not make much sense with regard
to, in particular, socio-economic rights and positive obligations because in almost
all circumstances the realization of those rights requires scare resources; therefore
any limitation will always further the legitimate goal of saving resources and will
always be suitable and necessary to the achievement of that goal. The only meaning-
ful test would be the balancing stage.’131
It can be argued, however, that also negative rights can be costly, while on
the other hand it is conceivable that a limitation of a positive right is not
suitable or necessary for the achievement of any more specific goal. Nevertheless,
also because in the case of omissions – when the state arguably has done ‘too
little’ – it is harder to ask whether the ‘aim’ was legitimate, and the ‘means’
suitable or necessary, there is a great likelihood that review of positive rights
boils down to an overall balancing exercise.
According to Aleinikoff, balancing is ‘uncontroversial today because of its
resonance with current conceptions of law and notions of rational decision-
making’.132 He holds that the balancing metaphor takes two distinct forms:
First, a court can be guided by the fact that one interest ‘outweighs’ the other,
and secondly, a court may conclude its test by stating that a ‘fair balance’ was
struck.133 Both conceptions have in common the idea that constitutional law
130 Pildes 1994, p. 711.
131 Möller 2012, p. 179.
132 Aleinikoff 1987, p. 944. Also: ‘If constitutional interpretation is ultimately a reflection of
larger, deeper trends in social consciousness, we may now simply be deaf to the criticisms
of balancing. It is deeply engrained in us to see law as a forum for competing interests
and moral and legal choice as turning on an evaluation of the strength of those interests’
(p. 1004).
133 Ibid., p. 946.
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concerns disputes regarding competing interests, and the ‘claimed ability to
identify and place a value on those interests’.134
Alexy embraces the idea that constitutional conflicts are ‘organized around
the dynamics of individual rights versus state interests’.135 Concurrently,
however, he argues that ‘[s]uch interests and requirements cannot have weight
in any quantifiable sense’.136 According to his ‘Law of Competing Principles’,
in the case of a conflict between an individual right and a state interest neither
of these enjoys ‘precedence per se over the other’.137 Both have equal weight
in the abstract, but one principle can be more important in a concrete case.
The relation of precedence of one principle over the other is hence a conditional
one: ‘The circumstances under which one principle takes precedence over
another constitute the conditions of a rule which has the same legal conse-
quences as the principle taking precedence.’138
Alexy’s theory is famous for the fact that it deduces the necessity of a
balancing act from constitutional rights norms in their capacity as prin-
ciples.139 As was mentioned previously in this chapter, principles require
optimisation, but they only do so to the extent legally and factually possible.
The requirement of balancing – or: the principle of proportionality in the
narrow sense – is derived from what is legally possible. Confronted with a
conflict between principles, thus, according to Alexy it is imperative that the
Law of Competing Principles be applied.140
Regardless of these justifications, however, balancing is often criticised for
giving too much leeway to the court in charge of the balancing exercise.
Consider for example the criticism propelled by Habermas concerning the
Alexy-inspired case law of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.141 Habermas
considers the ‘Wertordnungslehre’, which rests on the idea of fundamental rights
as value-laden principles that are to be optimised, to be an expression of wrong
134 Ibid., p. 946.
135 Which Pildes seems to reject, see Pildes 1994, p. 749.
136 Alexy 2002, p. 52.
137 Ibid., pp. 51-54 (referring to BVerfGE 51, 324 (345)).
138 A more technical reading of the ‘Law of Competing Principles’ (LCP) is: ‘If principle P1
takes precedence over principle P2 in circumstances C: (P1 P P2)C, and if P1 gives rise to
legal consequences Q in circumstances C, then a valid rule applies which has C as its
protasis and Q as its apdosis: C _ Q.’ (Alexy 2002, p. 54.)
139 Ibid., pp. 66-69. Or, as the Bundesverfassungsericht has stated, it emerges ‘basically from the
nature of constitutional rights themselves’. See BVerfGE 19, 342 (348f.); BVerfGE 65, 1 (44).
140 Alexy 2002, p. 67. Rather than considering it to be a logial necessity, Barak instead considers
proportionality review ‘the best’ manner possible for dealing with conflicts involving rights
(Barak 2012, p. 243). Möller, then, provides a substantive moral underpinning for Alexy’s
formal approach (Möller 2012, p. 2, fn. 1).
141 Habermas 1992, p. 309ff.
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self-image of this court.142 Balancing does not always lead to one necessary
outcome, yet Alexy argues that it should not be regarded as a non-rational
or irrational procedure for that reason.143 The rationality of balancing indeed
is not derived from the decision-making process leading to conditional prefer-
ences on the basis of the Law of Competing Principles, but instead from the
justification of this statement of precedence. It is hence the rationality of the
established statement that is important, which comes about by using ‘all the
arguments available in constitutional argumentation generally’.144 The constit-
utive role for balancing exercises leads to the Law of Balancing that can be
phrased as follows: ‘The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment
to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the
other.’145
This, however, does not answer the other point of criticism, namely that
a balancing test is too ad hoc. Balancing review focuses on the specific char-
acteristics of a single fundamental rights matter and therefore does not have
much predictive value. More generally, it is also argued that balancing may
fail to recognise the crucial importance of fundamental rights. Even when not
thinking of rights as trumps, it can be asked whether (certain aspects of)
fundamental rights should in fact be capable of being ‘balanced away’.146
Finally, indeed, a more or less exclusive focus on balancing has the effect that
142 Habermas (ibid., pp. 310-311) distinguishes between values and norms (and considers
fundamental rights to belong to the second category): ‘Prinzipien [in Habermas’ understand-
ing: ‘norms’, not Alexy’s ‘principles’] oder höherstufige Normen, in deren Licht andere
Normen gerechtfertigt werden können, haben einen deontologischen, Werte hingegen einen
teleologischen Sinn. Gültige Normen verpflichten ihre Adressaten ausnahmslos und
gleichermaßen zu einem Verhalten, das generalisierte Verhaltenserwartungen erfüllt,
während Werte als intersubjektiv geteilte Präferenzen zu verstehen sind.‘ ‘Wer die Ver-
fassung in einer konkreten Wertordnung aufgehen lassen möchte, verkennt deren spezifisch
rechtlichen Charakter; als Rechtsnormen sind nämlich die Grundrechte, wie moralische
Regeln, nach dem Modell verpflichtender Handlungsnormen geformt – und nicht nach
dem attraktiver Güter’ (p. 312).
143 Alexy 2002, p. 100ff.
144 Ibid., p. 101: ‘Since conditional statements of preference lead to rules, the justification of
these is similar to the justification of other rules derived from the provisions in the constitu-
tion. In the latter case, all kinds of constitutional arguments can be made, and this hence
also goes for the case of conditional statements of preference.’
145 Alexy 2002, p. 102. ‘Degree’ and ‘importance’ can indeed not be quantified in such way
that an ‘intersubjectively binding calculation of the result’ can take place. See Alexy 2002,
p. 105.The Law of Balancing does however identify what it is that counts, namely the degree
to which one principle is not satisfied, versus the importance of satisfying the other. The
lack of a concrete standard is made up for by the balancing model as a whole that ties the
Law of Balancing to the general theory of rational legal argumentation (p. 107). Just like
in the case of a separate determination of the scope of rights, it can be argued that in case
of positive obligations it is more difficult to ‘balance’ the different interests. See, for the
distinction, based on Alexy’s model, between negative and positive rights, Klatt 2011.
146 Cf. Von Bernstorff 2011 (according to whom a strong judicial focus on balancing ‘versperrt
… die Herausbildung einer kerngehaltsschützenden menschenrechtlichen Rechtsprechung’
(p. 167)). See also Von Bernstorff 2014.
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the other important questions (necessity, suitability) do not obtain the attention
they deserve. Arguably, the questions of whether an interference is suitable
for achieving the aim and necessary for doing so can be dealt with in a more
objective manner on the basis of more factual observations.147 One way to
address the different concerns would hence be to emphasise the other tests,
making them more workable where necessary.148 It must be kept in mind,
however, that also the tests of suitability and necessity are not without prob-
lems, and can likewise evoke criticism.149
A different response would be to opt for a more ‘categorical’ approach. Rather
than proposing ad hoc balancing this approach to reasoning fundamental rights
cases uses rule-like tools.150 Categorical approaches rely on legal categories
that allow for classifying circumstances, thereby determining the legal outcome
without having to ‘weigh’ the relevant rights and interests against each
other.151 An example is the use of ‘exclusionary reasons’,152 which Pildes
has defined as ‘reasons not to act’.153 These are reasons which a state by defi-
nition cannot invoke as justification for limiting rights: ‘[E]xclusionary reasons
are preemptive, in that they categorically rule out the reasons they exclude.
Thus, exclusionary reasons are not weighed against the reasons they exclude;
rather they prevail in such conflicts.’154 When an interference with a funda-
mental right is grounded on an exclusionary reason, a court will decide in
favour of the individual, whose rights are then considered to be breached.
Another form of ‘categorical’ reasoning would be to single out a category of
especially important aspects of a right. Particular consequences can then be
linked to this, in the sense that once such an aspect is concerned, a very strong
147 As Gerards 2013, p. 488, holds with regard to the ECtHR: ‘[I]f the Court would find, on
the basis of empirical data, that the means chosen were inadequate or unnecessary, there
would be no further need for it to investigate whether, in the end, the legislature or the
administration did strike a reasonable balance’.
148 See, for suggestions with regard to the necessity test, e.g., Gerards 2013, Bilchitz 2014a; Von
Bernstorff 2014.
149 Indeed, it may be that extensive empirical data are needed in order to determine whether
an interference was truly ‘necessary’. This also goes for the question what the alternatives
would be, en to which extent these would be effective.
150 See, e.g., Sullivan 1992, who speaks of ‘brightline boundaries’.
151 The difference between the two modes of thinking is well visible in the historical distinction
between the German value-based ‘Interessenjurisprudenz’ and more systematic ‘Begriffsjuris-
prudenz’. Barak 2012, pp. 503-504. See also Schauer 1981; Sullivan 1992. Pildes 1994, speaks
of ‘avoiding balancing’ when he emphasises how in an era in which a balancing approach
is held to be dominant, what courts in fact do is rather a qualitative than a quantitative
exercise. In other words: conditions are formulated that enable a court to determine the
case without truly having to ‘weigh’ the individual right against state interests.
152 Raz 1990, p. 190; Pildes 1994. For critique, see, e.g., Edmundson 1993.
153 Pildes 1994, p. 712.
154 Ibid., referring to Raz 1990: ‘The very point of exclusionary reasons is to bypass issues of
weight by excluding considerations of the excluded reasons regardless of weight.’
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justification is required or an interference is simply not allowed. Categorisation
may result in the identification of different kinds of ‘rules’ for different (aspects
of) rights. Even with such differentiation, it can provide relative predictability
as categories apply to more than one case only.
If a categorical approach is taken, however, a potential problem surfaces
that concerns the formation of appropriate legal categories. When the applic-
able category determines the outcome of a case, but also when it merely
informs the strictness of the test, the definition of the category or the ‘rule’
becomes of crucial importance.155 Indeed, when a categorical approach is
used, it is likely that a body of case law will emerge that concentrates on the
creation of new categories or the modification of already existing ones.156
Categorical approaches hence may seem to provide clarity and be of less ad
hoc character, they also entail a degree of creativity and case-based analogy
reasoning.157 It is the task of the court to employ this creativity in an adequate
manner to guarantee consistency and predictability, which in fact is not much
less of a challenge than the task it faces when it resorts to a balancing
approach.
Looking at proportionality/balancing versus categorisation debate, it is not
immediately clear which approach is preferable. This is even more so because
the two approaches cannot be fully separated to the extent that the act of
‘categorising’ may also be based on a kind of balancing, even if this balancing
is of a more definitional or interpretative kind.158 It can be asked, however,
whether it is actually necessary to make a choice between a completely balanc-
ing-oriented approach and a completely categorisation-based approach. In fact,
the different outlooks can relatively easily be combined, whereby categorisation
can influence the ‘how’ of proportionality review. In particular, in respect to
(one or all of) the respective tests (suitability, necessity, balancing) regard can
be had to certain pre-fixed ‘rules’ or considerations. These can for example
determine certain ‘thresholds’ that inform the applicable test. For example,
the suitability and necessity requirements could be applied more strictly in
a case in which a ‘high level’ right is at stake.159 With regard to balancing,
155 This does not mean that these categories are only based on rights considerations. Rather,
policy concerns and general interests can be taken into account for the determination of
a category, see Barak 2012, p. 504.
156 Ibid., p. 504.
157 According to Barak (ibid., p. 505), ‘[s]uch creativity is expressed through a constant re-
examination of the scope, the status, and the application of existing categories, as well as
the creation of new ones’.
158 Cf. Stone Sweet and Mathews 2011.
159 The proper purpose requirement should be informed by a distinction between ‘fundamental’
or ‘high level’ rights and ‘all the other rights’, see Barak 2012, p. 531ff. The quality of the
right hence sets the threshold for the proper purpose requirement. Also the rational con-
nection component should pay due account to the character of a fundamental right and
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the ‘exclusionary reasons’ approach can be used for certain interests, while
for others ad hoc balancing could be applied. More or less in line with this,
Barak suggests a ‘principled balancing formula’, which reflects ‘a general legal
norm which sets a constitutional principle that applies on a set of similar
circumstances’.160 In this way, ‘balancing’ could have more rule-like character-
istics and an approach to proportionality review influenced by categorical
reasoning can be developed.
In sum, at the application stage, different judicial approaches are thinkable.
At the outer edges of the balancing-categorisation continuum there are
approaches that focus on case-based circumstances that are ‘weighed’ and
balanced against each other in an ad hoc fashion and pre-fixed categories that
determine whether a right has been violated or not, respectively. Between these
extremes, additional options can be found. Generally, it can be said that
although proportionality review is currently the predominant method of rights
application, it can easily be informed by at least some ‘rules’ that follow from
earlier case law and set the stage for the particular instance of review. This
study will return to the different tools a court has at its disposal in this respect
when discussing possible ways for the ECtHR to enhance its socio-economic
rights review by means of a ‘core rights perspective’.161
3.5 DETERMINING THE INTENSITY OF REVIEW
It was explained at the outset of this chapter that, next to the stages of inter-
pretation and application, special regard must be had to the definition of the
intensity of the court’s review. This has to do with the purpose of this chapter,
namely to illustrate the different moments in the process of adjudicating a
fundamental rights case at which a court can choose between different
approaches. The task of determining the intensity of review does not represent
an independent stage, but can rather be understood as a sub-part of the ap-
plication stage. Indeed, the intensity of review is generally considered to be
determined before the eventual proportionality or other test is applied and
it is decided whether the right concerned has been breached.
In Section 3.2.3 it was explained why the intensity of review must be
determined in the first place. The reason for this is that the variety of (more
and less fundamental) issues a court is confronted with demands that the
strictness of the test varies, too.162 It was also submitted that especially a
necessity, moreover, should be perceived as a ‘threshold’ and not lead to balancing (p. 338,
541).
160 Ibid., p. 544.
161 See, infra, Ch. 7, and especially S. 7.4.
162 Craig 2006, p. 657; Gerards 2004, p. 139; Gerards 2005, pp. 79-81.
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supranational fundamental rights court like the ECtHR can be expected to
‘generally’ show a reasonable measure of deference. In its function as a guar-
antor of fundamental individual rights that have been disregarded at the
national level, however, in certain circumstances strict review seems required.
In this section, different approaches to determining what level of strictness
is appropriate are explored.
As a note on terminology, it must be stressed that a distinction can be made
between ‘standards of review’ or ‘levels of scrutiny’, and the notion of ‘defer-
ence’. All three notions are intrinsically linked to the question of how strict
a court’s test should be, but the first two concepts indicate the thoroughness
of the test that will be applied, while ‘deference’ refers to the amount of
distance that is considered appropriate in a particular case. Hence, the latter
is mainly used to emphasise the degree of ‘passivity’ of a court, rather than
the action that is taken. Nevertheless, just like in the practice of most courts,
these different concepts will be used more or less interchangeably here.
In the following, attention will first be had to the distinction between
‘sliding scale’ approaches to determining the strictness of the test and ‘categor-
ical’ levels of intensity (3.5.1). Combined with a basic explanation of the pros
and cons of the two different approaches, this will serve to grasp the questions,
options and limitations a court faces in relation to its task of determining the
intensity of review. After that, the grounds for determining the appropriate
intensity of review will be discussed (3.5.2). When deciding on the leeway
that is granted, a court can look foremost to the right or interest that is at stake
and reach a conclusion on the basis thereof. Alternatively, it can take into
account multiple considerations in order to make a well-founded decision on
the intensity of the test.
3.5.1 Fluid Degrees of Deference versus Categorical Levels of Scrutiny
The different approaches to the determination of the intensity of review can
roughly be placed under two distinct headings. There are approaches that work
with fluid degrees of deference, whereas also models with more strictly separ-
ated levels of intensity can be identified.163 A preference for the latter – more
‘categorical’ approach – is especially visible in the US. Outside the US, and
indeed also in the Strasbourg case law,164 a less tangible ‘degree’ of deference
usually characterises the applicability test.
Deference can be understood as the competence of a court to conclude on
a violation only if any reasonable person could see that the measure taken
was not appropriate or unreasonable. It can also imply that the court asks
whether the measure is ‘arbitrary’, ‘clearly excesses the bounds of discretion’,
163 See, for this distinction, also Gerards 2004.
164 See, e.g., Arai-Takahashi 2002; Gerards 2004; Greer 2006; Christofferson 2009; Gerards 2011a.
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or is based on a ‘manifest error’.165 At the same time, a ‘narrow margin of
appreciation’ can demand a detailed and thorough investigation of the justifica-
tion adduced for the interference with a right.166 Although the outer extremes,
i.e., a check of ‘arbitrariness’ or rather a very strict form of review, are less
and more likely, respectively, to result in the finding of a violation, one of
the characteristics of an approach that relies on ‘degrees of deference’ is that
it remains unclear what the applicable degree exactly implies. Moreover, when
it comes to such an approach the ‘degrees in-between’ are often even harder
to concretise. In this regard one can speak of a ‘sliding scale approach’, which
due to a lack of clearly separated levels may lead to confusion as regards the
exact requirements as well as the expected outcomes of a particular intensity
of review.167
By contrast, a more categorical ‘levels of intensity’ approach can be taken.
The notion of ‘categorisation’ was discussed in the previous section, where
it was presented as a particular approach to reviewing the justification
advanced. This idea may also be used, however, merely in relation to the
determination of the strictness of this review. The best example of a more
‘categorical’ approach to determining the intensity of the test applied in a given
case can be found in the US. According to Barak, there, ‘the categorical
attributes of the right determines the level of constitutional scrutiny; that level
of scrutiny, in turn, determines the limitations that may be placed on the rights
at issue’.168
Traditionally, US black letter law distinguishes between three basic stand-
ards of review. The weakest form is labeled the ‘rational basis test’. This test
will be passed if the state’s action was rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose.169 The burden of proof lies on the individual complaining
of an alleged fundamental rights violation, and thereby the instances in which
his interests prevail are rare. On the other end of the spectrum, ‘strict scrutiny’
can be found. When this level of intensity is applied, state action has to be
165 E.g., Gerards 2011a, p. 87 (with further references).
166 Gerards 2004, p. 140 (with regard to the ECtHR’s non-discrimination review): ‘In these
cases, the ECHR is willing to probe rather deeply into the reasonableness and legitimacy
of the objectives themselves. Furthermore, the Court is especially severe with respect to
the suitability, necessity and proportionality of the difference in treatment’ [footnote
omitted].
167 Gerards (ibid., p. 141) with regard to the ECtHR notes that ‘[i]n between the two extremes
of a wide and narrow margin of appreciation … there are many hybrids. Although the
ECHR seems to have recognized this, it has not opted for a clear division in different levels
of intensity having concrete and measurable effects for the substantive review of a justifica-
tion. Instead, the Court sometimes speaks of the accordance of “a certain margin of appreci-
ation”, “a margin of appreciation”, or of “less discretionary power of appreciation”, without
indicating the effects of such an in-between form’.
168 Barak 2012, p. 506.
169 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); 449 U.S. 166, 175, 177 (1980); 385 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
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necessary (narrowly tailored) for achieving a compelling government pur-
pose.170 It is up to the government to show that there is no less intruding
alternative with which the – compelling – interest can be achieved. In this
context there is a presumption in favour of the right, and the strict scrutiny
test is hence famous for being ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’.171 Finally,
different from the ‘fluid’, sliding scale model just presented, the US model also
knows a clearly delineated in-between tier, namely, ‘intermediate scrutiny’.
According to this test an interfering law must be ‘substantially related to an
important government purpose’.172 Here, the government’s purpose does
not need to be compelling, and neither do the means have to be necessary.
However, this level of scrutiny does shift the burden of proof from the indi-
vidual applicant contending a breach of his fundamental right, to the state.
Thus, the categorical approach as it is illustrated by the model used in the
US is characterised by – at least173 – three concrete tiers of scrutiny. These
are intended to cover all possible cases, i.e., also the cases in between the ones
that deserve a very strict test and a very deferential one, and also provide for
a clear indication of what the different levels of strictness in fact imply.
A comparison of the fluid and the categorical approach shows that a model
consisting of clearly divided and described levels of scrutiny provides for more
clarity than a sliding scale approach. Such clarity is provided not only with
regard to what kinds of scrutiny exist in the first place, but also when it comes
to the accompanying requirements and the outcome of a case. However, this
comes with a serious downside. Depending on how exactly it is determined
what tier of scrutiny should be applied, a categorical approach may lack the
necessary flexibility for dealing with conflicts involving fundamental rights.
Once a case falls into a specific category, after all, there is no room for the
court to apply a different test than the one this category prescribes.174
In turn, when it comes to a sliding scale approach, it is the potential
flexibility this approach is associated with that can be considered its most
laudable characteristic. It allows for adjusting the strictness of the test to the
unique fundamental rights issue at stake. Especially for a court like the ECtHR,
which aims at individual rights redress, this seems to be important. Moreover,
once a ‘certain’ margin of appreciation is opted for, this generally does not
bring about concrete expectations as to what is required – let alone as to what
will be the outcome of the case.
170 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
171 Gunther 1972, p. 8.
172 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983).
173 It is generally recognised that there are in fact more levels that have been developed in
judicial practice. See, e.g., Sunstein 1996, p. 77; Gerards 2005, pp. 393-395; Chemerinsky
2006, p. 542.
174 Indeed, as was also explained in, supra, S. 3.4.2, the question then becomes how the different
categories are determined in the first place.
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Nevertheless, the question remains whether the benefits of flexibility
outweigh the lack of clarity it brings along. In answering this question a final
issue cannot go unnoticed, namely, the question of which factors are considered
relevant in deciding on the applicable standard, whether this is a fluid one
or not.
3.5.2 Determination on the Basis of the Right versus on the Basis of a Com-
bination of Factors
For providing a basic outlook on the different modes of determining the
intensity of the review it is important to analyse the factors that are considered
relevant for deciding the level, degree, or measure of deference to be employed.
Put differently: what is the determination of the strictness of the test based
on and to what extent does this matter?
In typical US fundamental rights review, the applicable level of scrutiny
depends on the right that is concerned, in the sense that it is determined on
the basis of the ground of discrimination at stake. As was just indicated, the
interest of the state must always pass the rational basis test, but when specific
rights are at stake, stricter tests will be applied. For example, according to the
US doctrine intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test in cases concerning
gender discrimination, and those involving discrimination against non-marital
children. Strict scrutiny is used when discrimination based on race or national
origin is evaluated, or when alleged discrimination of aliens (generally) is
concerned.175 Grounding the choice for a particular level of scrutiny on the
individual fundamental right at stake does not mean that state interests and
the rights of others are completely left out of the equation. To the contrary,
they play a crucial role in the actual assessment of the justification. In the
categorical ‘tiers of scrutiny’ approach, after all, what is demanded in terms
of the general interest is very well described.
A ‘rights-based’ approach seems attractive from the perspective of clarity
and predictability, but is not always unproblematic. First, there is the issue
of the level of abstractness. It may be asked whether the categorisation is based
on the general right that is at stake, e.g., by linking the level of scrutiny to the
‘right to life’ or the ‘right to privacy’ broadly speaking, or rather on a more
concrete interpretation of what is at stake for the individual concerned.176
Secondly, there is the inherent difficulty of determining which rights (or
aspects thereof) deserve more or less intensive review. Especially when the
175 See, e.g., Chemerinsky 2006, p. 671-672.
176 In this regard, it must be noted that the US approach, with its focus on the ground of
discrimination concerned, does not necessarily take account of the severity of the interest
involved. Discrimination on a less ‘serious’ ground may nevertheless have great impact
on the individual concerned.
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category to which a specific right belongs is likely to determine the outcome
of the review of an interference with this right, identifying the rights or inter-
ests that deserve a thorough investigation of the justification adduced is a
challenging exercise.
Alternatively, of course, an approach can be used that allows for taking
more factors into account, such as the nature and level of intrusiveness of the
measures taken or the actions not taken. The Strasbourg margin of appreciation
for example ‘will vary according to circumstances, subject matter and back-
ground’.177 This may have the effect that ‘a wide margin is usually allowed
to the State under the Convention when it comes to general measures of
economic or social strategy’,178 whereas the right these measures interfere
with may at the same time speak in favour of a stricter test. Although an
approach that looks at different factors is more flexible, it is equally vulnerable
to criticism, albeit for different reasons. Once a choice is made for having
regard to more than just the right at stake, the question arises exactly which
other factors should be considered relevant. It may be questioned, for example,
whether it is relevant that the measure was part of heavily debated social
policy reforms, or whether its aim or the possibility of alternatives should be
considered important. A court can also take into account the seriousness of
the effects of the particular interference, or leave this out of the equation. The
‘relevant factors’ are hence difficult to determine, and to this it can be added
that when aiming at taking into account ‘all’ relevant considerations advance
is thereby taken on what is meant to be part of the eventual review. It may
then easily occur that a court does not determine the applicable intensity of
review as the starting point for reviewing the issue at hand, but that it con-
cludes that the non-finding of a violation implies that the state acted within
its margin of appreciation.
At least, the benefit of taking into account multiple considerations, in line
with that of a ‘sliding scale approach’, is that there is some flexibility with
regard to the relevant factors and/or the way in which these are balanced
against one another. Again, however, the potential lack of clarity and predict-
ability clearly argue against such an approach. Finally, what is preferred in
this regard is indeed inherently related to whether a choice is made for a wide
or rather a more narrow understanding of scope and limitations. In case of
the latter, the issue of intensity of review may be somewhat more straight-
forward as the cases concerned are then generally of a more ‘fundamental’
kind. Yet when the former is opted for, it becomes all the more important that
a court develops a well-thought-out and variable approach to the intensity
of review.
177 E.g., Petrovic v Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1990, appl. no. 20458/92, para. 38.
178 E.g., Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 12 April 2006, appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01,
para. 52.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has investigated the different stages of fundamental rights ad-
judication. It explored the interpretation stage, the review of the justification,
and the determination of the intensity of this review. The aim of this was first
of all to show that distinguishing these stages is important, since they address
different issues that require distinct judicial approaches and methods. It was
shown that a court needs to decide, first, whether in a given case the individual
right or interest concerned is prima facie protected by the norm invoked. Only
if this threshold question is answered in the affirmative, the court can review
whether an interference with this right can be justified. Also the task of deter-
mining the intensity of review was presented as an important one. In conflicts
concerning fundamental rights and state interests a (supranational) court needs
to take a deferential stance towards decisions made at the national level. Since
fundamental rights issues may vary greatly, however, this measure of deference
cannot always be the same.
Secondly, next to emphasising (the distinction between) the different stages
as such, this chapter has shown that a court has multiple options at its disposal
when dealing with the different tasks. At both adjudicatory stages, but also
when a decision is being made on the strictness of the courts’ review, different
paths can be chosen. At the interpretation stage, a court can make use of
different interpretive methods and principles, and moreover opt for a wider
or rather a more narrow understanding of (certain) rights. Generally, it is
considered that state interests should not be taken into account at the inter-
pretation stage, yet it was shown that especially when positive rights are
concerned this is not an easy task.
When applying the right, i.e., when reviewing the limitation, a choice can
be made between a wide and a more narrow understanding of limitations.
Besides, when reaching a conclusion on the justification adduced, a proportion-
ality test can be applied – which usually means that a court will engage in
‘balancing’ the different interests at stake. Alternatively, it can opt for less ad
hoc, ‘categorical’ methods of review, or combine proportionality analysis with
more rule-like tools.
Finally, when it comes to deciding on the strictness of the review, one
possible approach is to use clearly separated levels of strictness that prescribe
a particular test – and sometimes also a particular outcome. Another option
is to choose for a ‘sliding scale’ model of deference, which implies that more
fluid degrees of strictness are employed, the effects of which are less predict-
able. Moreover, a distinction was made between approaches that determine
the measure of deference on the basis of the right concerned, and others that
take more factors into account.
With the help of the different discussions, a picture has emerged of the ad-
judicatory process as a process consisting of various tasks that can be accom-
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plished in different ways. This does not mean that a court always has to choose
between extremes. Often, a middle way or combination of approaches is
possible. Important is that these different approaches exist and that a choice
for one approach rather than the other – albeit influenced by the relevant legal
culture and traditions – is not a given.
All of the issues touched upon in this chapter could have been discussed
in much greater detail. The overall aim of this chapter has however been to
‘set the stage’: to provide an insight in the framework of adjudication and
fundamental rights reasoning that can be taken as the starting point for the
remainder of this study. Although the chapter spoke of ‘courts’ generally,
alternated with some references to the specific practice of the ECtHR, the dis-
cussion has focused on what are, or could be, more or less feasible options
for the Strasbourg court. It is against the background of these options that later
on in this study the different manifestations of core rights and their potential
value for the ECtHR’s reasoning in socio-economic cases can be understood
and assessed. In the next part of this book a look is had at different core rights




4 The Wesensgehaltsgarantie and the German
Constitution
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Part II of this book (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) explores the notions of core rights
and core rights protection. It does do so by means of a comparative study of
three ‘core rights doctrines’, which is conducted in order to investigate the
potential as well as the pitfalls inherent in these notions. Thereby, the aim is
to gain insights on the understanding and use of core rights in legal reasoning
that could potentially be interesting for the ECtHR’s protection of socio-economic
rights.1 In selecting the cases for this part of the study, a choice was made
for three of the most well-developed core rights ‘doctrines’, namely the German
Wesensgehalt doctrine, the protection of (minimum) core rights in the context
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
the debate on the use and added value of core rights for the protection of socio-
economic rights under the South African Constitution. Although these doctrines
might not represent an exhaustive picture of what core rights protection can
be about, they do allow for capturing the most significant features thereof,
both in the context of civil and political and of economic and social rights,
and at the national as well as at the international level.2
The first chapter of this part of the book discusses the German Wesensgehalt
doctrine. In order to obtain a clear image of what this doctrine is about the
chapter introduces the idea behind the Wesensgehaltsgarantie as well as its more
concrete implications and content. It is demonstrated that the Wesensgehalts-
garantie, which is laid down in Article 19, Section 2 of the German Grundgesetz
(the German Constitution or Basic Law; GG), first and foremost aims at prevent-
ing fundamental rights from becoming meaningless. The Wesensgehaltsgarantie
conceives of the idea of ‘core rights’ as a positive, ‘defensive’ idea that under-
1 On the possible goals and potential pitfalls of comparative (constitutional) law, see, e.g.,
Jackson 2010; Jackson 2012. In conducting the various comparative (or ‘inspirational’) studies,
the different challenges of this exercise were taken into account in the best way possible.
That is, the (legal) historical and cultural contexts of the different core rights doctrines have
been regarded and described to the extent relevant for the current study. Moreover, for
‘translating’ the various core rights possibilities to the Strasbourg context, concern was given
to the practice of the Strasbourg Court and the possibilities of rights reasoning as outlined
in, supra, Ch. 2 and 3, respectively (see for this ‘translation’, infra, Ch. 7).
2 See further, infra, Ch. 7.
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lines the importance of a broad range of fundamental rights as a category of
individual guarantees, the essence of which deserves special protection.
In line with this, the reason to start Part II with a discussion of the German
Wesensgehaltgaratie is that this doctrine presents a ‘traditional’ understanding
of the notion of core rights. It perceives of this idea as a starting point for
developing a protective mechanism against too extensive limitations of funda-
mental rights. The Wesensgehaltsgarantie is often characterised as a ‘Schranken-
Schranke’, i.e., a limit to limitations.3 This understanding can be taken as a
point of departure for a further exploration of the possibilities and potential
pitfalls inherent in the use of cores of rights in the following chapters.
To ensure a fair picture of the German doctrine and its implications, the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie will be presented in the broader context of the German
Grundgesetz. The discussion will focus on the meaning of Article 19, Section 2
GG, as well as on the role of this norm in the German approach to fundamental
rights protection. In scholarly work, and especially in numerous commentaries,
the various aspects of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie have received ample attention,
which it why this topic can be discussed into relatively great detail. In Section
4.2 Article 19(2) GG is introduced and the provision’s background, addressees
and applicability are briefly discussed. Section 4.3 then concerns the debate
on the concrete meaning and content of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. In the more
than sixty years of the existence of Article 19(2) GG there has remained quite
some controversy over its precise interpretation and material protection. The
debate concerns first the question of whether the Wesensgehaltsgarantie provides
objective protection or rather (also) creates a subjective, individual guarantee.
Secondly, the debate is about the important issue of whether the core of a right
is to be understood in an absolute or in a relative manner, i.e., whether the
core of a right is independent from context and bars a balancing exercise, or
instead always hinges upon the circumstances of the case. It is important to
carefully look into both facets of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie debate as these shed
light on when core rights could be utilised, i.e., at what stage of fundamental
rights adjudication, as well as on how this could be done, at least according
to the German constitutional law understanding.
It must be noted at the outset that the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie is
discussed in this book for the inspiration that can be found in its theoretical
features, rather than for the role it plays in German constitutional adjudication.
As Section 4.4 will show, the practical meaning of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
in German constitutional doctrine has remained limited. This section however
also addresses some alternative notions resembling core rights that are readily
visible in the practice of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and that may prove
inspiring for the current research, too.
3 E.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Vorb., no. 144, Art. 19 II, no. 7; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 865.
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4.2 ARTICLE 19, SECTION 2 GRUNDGESETZ
Article 19, Section 2, of the German Constitution from 1949 reads as follows:
‘In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden.’
This can be translated as follows:
‘In no case may the core content of a constitutional right be infringed.’4
Article 19(2) GG is designated ‘Sicherung des Wesengehalts’5, ‘Garantie des Wesens-
gehalts’6, or simply ‘Wesensgehaltsgarantie’7. These descriptions stress the sec-
tion’s two most important aspects: the provision first concerns the Wesen, i.e.,
the core or essence, of constitutional rights, and secondly, it aims at the assurance
or guarantee thereof.
Next to the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, there are three more provisions contained
in Article 19 GG. The article deals with the limitation of constitutional rights
more generally, as well as with their applicability to legal persons and the
right to access to court. More precisely, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is found
amongst the Verbot des einschränkenden Einzelfallgesetzes (Article 19(1), first
sentence GG),8 the Zitiergebot (Article 19(1), second sentence GG),9 the Geltung
für Juristische Personen (Article 19(3) GG)10 and the Rechtsweggarantie (Article
19(4) GG).11 Especially the guarantees laid down in Article 19(1), namely, that
4 Alexy 2002, p. 432. Where possible, translations of the norms enshrined in the German
Basic Law have been provided on the basis of Alexy 2002 (Appendix: The Constitutional
Rights Provisions of the German Basic Law). Furthermore, citations from German literature
in this chapter have been provided with a non-official translation, i.e., a free translation
by the author.
5 E.g., Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 8ff.
6 E.g., Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 33ff.
7 E.g., Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 19ff.
8 Art. 19(1) GG, first sentence: ‘Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grundrecht durch Gesetz
oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes eingeschränkt werden kann, muß das Gesetz allgemein
und nicht nur für den Einzelfall gelten’ (‘To the extent that this Basic Law permits a
constitutional right to be limited by statute or on a statutory basis, that law must apply
generally and not for a specific case.’).
9 ‘Außerdem muß das Gesetz das Grundrecht unter Angabe des Artikels nennen.’ See Art.
19(1) GG, second sentence (‘Apart from that, the statute must identify the constitutional
right by its article.’).
10 ‘Die Grundrechte gelten auch für inländische juristische Personen, soweit sie ihrem Wesen
nach auf diese anwendbar sind.’ See Art. 19(3) GG (‘Constitutional rights are also valid
for domestic legal persons, to the extent that their substance makes them so applicable.’).
11 ‘Wird jemand durch die öffentliche Gewalt in seinen Rechten verletzt, so steht ihm der
Rechtsweg offen. Soweit eine andere Zuständigkeit nicht begründet ist, ist der ordentliche
Rechtsweg gegeben. Artikel 10 Abs. 2 Satz 2 bleibt unberührt.’ See Art. 19(4) GG (‘If any
person’s rights are violated by a public authority, they have access to the courts. If no other
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a limitation of fundamental rights must always be of a general nature and
that the fundamental right that is being limited is identified in the statute, are
often considered to be relevant for the interpretation of the Wesensgehaltsgaran-
tie, as will be seen later. This can be explained by the fact that also the Allgemei-
nheits- and Zitiergerbot explicitly concern restrictions to the limitation of rights.
With regard to Article 19 GG it is often held that it forms part of a general
fundamental rights doctrine.12 In any case the provisions of Article 19 GG
do not contain self-standing fundamental rights.13 Rather, they concern re-
quirements for the addressees of the different provisions concerning the
protection of fundamental rights laid down elsewhere.14 At the same time,
when a fundamental rights-related act of the state is in breach of Article 19,
Section 1 or 2 GG, this means that the fundamental constitutional right con-
cerned is likewise violated.15 Hence, a failure of the state to keep intact the
core content of a fundamental right, means that a limitation of this right went
too far and thus constitutes its violation. The law or act concerned is then
unconstitutional, and must be regarded as null and void.16
Before further expanding on when exactly this is the case, the current
section will first present some more background information on the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie and the ideas behind it (4.2.1). Thereafter, the discussion will
proceed to the question of who exactly is bound to take Article 19(2)GG into
account (4.2.2). Finally, the applicability, or scope, of this guarantee will be
addressed (4.2.3).
courts with jurisdiction are established, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. Article
10(2)(2) remains unaffected.’).
12 This goes at least for Sections 1-3. See, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19, Vorb.,
no. 3; Sachs, in Sachs 2012, Art. 19, no. 7. However, although this is clearly true when it
comes to Art. 19(3) GG, for Sections 1 and 2 this is less obvious. It depends on whether
these guarantees are considered relevant for all types of fundamental rights, or just for
certain categories thereof (Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 3). See further,
infra, S. 4.2.3.
13 See, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19, Vorb., no. 4. See also Sachs, in Sachs
2012, Art. 19, no. 7; Hofmann, in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no.
4; Drews 2005, p. 16; BVerfGE 1, 264 (280); BVerfGE 117, 302 (310): ‘Soweit die Beschwer-
deführerin einen Verstoß … gegen Art. 19 Abs. 1 und 2 … rügt, macht sie nicht die Verlet-
zung eines Grundrechts geltend.’
14 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19, Vorb., no. 4. See also, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013,
Art. 19 II, no. 7; cf. Zivier 1960, p. 35. According to Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 7, Art.
19 ‘trifft ergänzende Anorderungen für die Anwendung der Grundrechtsgewährleistungen’.
15 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 4.
16 E.g., Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 48. See also Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, pp. 876-877; Dreier, in Dreier
2013, Art. 19 II, no. 19; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, No. 47; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber
2012, Art. 19, no. 32; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 43; Hofmann, in Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 17; BVerfGE 22, 180 (219f.).
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4.2.1 Historical Background
Article 19(2) GG is often described as an ‘originäre Neuschöpfung’, i.e., as an
‘original creation’.17 A predecessor of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie can, at least
in German constitutional history, not be found.18 This can be explained by
the fact that the Wesensgehalt as it is generally understood assumes a positively
defined sphere of individual liberty. It builds upon the idea that there exists
a separate sphere of self-realisation that is independent from the aims and
purposes of the state and that even the legislature has to respect.19 At the
time of the Weimar Republic, this was not yet an accepted notion. The power
of the legislature at the time was such that fundamental rights could be limited
to the extent that practically nothing remained.20 Fundamental rights were
therefore sometimes characterised as ‘leerlaufend’ (‘running idle’)21.
Even though at the time of Weimar Republic the idea of a separate, pro-
tected individual sphere had not yet led to a distinct understanding of the
relation between constitutional rights and ‘ordinary’ legislation that allowed
for the security of fundamental rights,22 this understanding was beginning
to develop and the question was asked whether the power of the legislature
should not be more restrained. In the light of this, the thought came up that
there should perhaps be an ‘unchangeable’ core of fundamental rights.23 This
development partly explains why after the Second World War, guarantees
of core rights entered German constitutional law.24 Obviously, moreover, the
disrespect of constitutional rights by the Nazi regime also played a significant
17 Remmert, in Maunz/Durig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 2; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II,
no. 1; Zivier 1960, p. 1 (speaking of a ‘verfassungsrechtliches Novum’).
18 Stern however, points out that in the Argentinean Constitution of 1853 a comparable
guarantee can be found. Nevertheless, this guarantee has in no way influenced the coming
into being of Art. 19(2) GG (Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 838). See also Drews 2005, p. 28, fn.
31; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 1; Häberle 1989, p. 374ff., p. 386ff.
19 Cf. Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 2.
20 See, e.g., Drews 2005, p. 26.
21 Ibid., p. 26.
22 Remmert, in Maunz/Durig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 2. See also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber
2012, Art. 19, no. 19.
23 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 1; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19,
no. 2.
24 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 4. Guarantees resembling Art. 19(2)
GG were first taken up in the constitution of several federal states. See the Constitution
of Hessen of 1946 (‘Soweit diese Verfassung die Beschränkung eines der vorstehenden
Grundrechte durch Gesetz zuläßt oder die nähere Ausgestaltung einem Gesetz vorbehält,
muß das Grundrecht als solches unangetastet bleiben.’); the Constitution of Baden from
1947 (‘Soweit diese Verfassung die Beschränkung eines Grundrechtes durch Gesetz vorbehält
oder die nähere Ausgestaltung einem Gesetz vorbehält, muß das Grundrecht als solches
unangetastet bleiben.’); and the Constitution of Saarland of 1947 (‘Die Grundrechte sind
in ihrem Wesen unabänderlich. Sie binden Gesetzgeber, Richter und Verwaltung unmittel-
bar.’).
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role in the creation of specific guarantees to prevent that fundamental rights
could too easily, or even entirely be ignored.25
A first proposed reading of the core rights guarantee that was to be laid
down in the post-war German Constitution, was the following:
‘Eine Einschränkung der Grundrechte ist nur durch Gesetz und unter der Vorausset-
zung zulässig, daß es die öffentliche Sicherheit, Sittlichkeit oder Gesundheit zwin-
gend erfordert. Die Einschränkung eines Grundrechts oder die nahere Ausgestaltung
durch Gesetz muß das Grundrecht als solches unangetastet lassen.’26
Another proposal, made by the then Parliamentary Council, was somewhat
more concrete. It stressed that, instead of interfering with the ‘fundamental
right as such’, it was in fact an interference with the Wesen, the ‘core’ of a right,
that had to be forbidden: ‘Soweit nach den Bestimmungen dieses Grund-
gesetzes ein Grundrecht eingeschränkt werden kann, darf es in seinem Wesens-
gehalt nicht angetastet werden.’27 Later the Wesensgehaltsgarantie was given
its present wording (‘In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesens-
gehalt angetastet werden’), and it was grouped together with the Allgemeinheits-
and Zitiergebot in one single provision.28
Even though in the drafting period the difficulty of determining the inviol-
able substance of a right had been put on the table, it was not discussed at
any length.29 The historical background of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie hence
does not tell much about how it should be understood. Indeed, the most
important insight that can be inferred from the provision’s genesis is that it
came into being because there was an awareness of the danger that funda-
mental rights could become meaningless especially through acts of the legis-
25 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 4; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 864; Dreier,
in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, No. 2; Herbert 1985, p. 322; Drews 2005, p. 28; Zivier 1960, p. 74.
26 Art. 21 Abs. 4 Verfassungsentwurfs von Herrenchiemsee [emphasis added] (‘A limitation
of fundamental rights is only possible by means of a legislative act and under the condition
that the limitation is required for the protection of public order, morals or health. The
limitation of a fundamental right or the further concretisation thereof by means of a
legislative act should leave intact the fundamental right as such.’). See also Stern 1994, Bd.
III/2, p. 841ff. Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 5, points out that it is
remarkable that in this reading, not only ‘Einschränkungen’ (limitations) but also ‘Ausgestal-
tungen durch Gesetz’ (definitions, explications through law) are mentioned. This implies
that, next to when a right is limited, also when it is ‘interpreted’ the core must be protected.
27 ‘In so far as a fundamental right can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution, its core must not be touched upon.’ See Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012,
Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 6.
28 Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 7-9. Attempts to include the Wesensgehaltsgarantie in the ‘Ewigkeits-
klausel’ of Art. 79(3) GG (the section that indicates the aspects and articles of the Constitution
that may never be changed) remained without success. See Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19
II, no. 2.
29 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 8, 10; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19
II, no. 2.
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lature. This concern can therefore serve as the starting point for the remainder
of this discussion.30
4.2.2 Addressees of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
The text of Article 19(2) GG does not indicate a particular addressee.31 As
follows from its historical origins, however, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie was
created in the light of the danger that especially legislative acts would render
fundamental rights meaningless, since usually it is the legislature who is
involved in the regulation and the limitation of rights. It is hence not disputed
that in any event the legislature is bound by the Wesensgehaltsgarantie.32
Beyond this point of agreement, however, different views become apparent.
Some hold that Article 19(2) GG only addresses the legislature,33 or at least
discuss the Wesensgehaltsgarantie only in relation to the legislative branch.34
Most authors, however, rather insist that ‘alle drei Gewalten’, i.e., the legis-
lature as well as the executive and the judiciary, are bound by the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie.35
There is something to say in favour of the view that the Wesensgehalts-
garantie exclusively binds the legislature, as it can be argued that Section 2
of Article 19 GG naturally needs to be read in relation to Section 1 of that
Article. Since the Allegmeinheits- and the Zitiergebot are exclusively directed
at the legislative branch,36 obliging it to refrain from creating limitations to
fundamental rights that only apply to a single case and to always cite the
article that is being limited, it can be contended that the same goes for the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie.
Nevertheless, the arguments that favour a broader understanding of the
addressees of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie appear more convincing. First, on the
connection with Article 19(1) GG it can be said that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
30 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 10; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art.
19, no. 2.
31 Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 33; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 36.
32 See, e.g., Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 877ff.; Drews 2005, pp. 23-24; Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig
2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 26.
33 E.g., Häberle 1983, p. 236; Dürig 1953, pp. 329-330, 336, and in light of a discussion of the
fundamental right to protection of property, Chlosta 1975, p. 39. Cf. also Enders, in Epping/
Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 21ff.
34 E.g., Krüger 1955, p. 599ff.
35 See, e.g., Drews 2005, p. 24. Examples are Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 11; Remmert,
in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 27; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no.
36; Von Hippel 1965, p. 47 and 40ff.; Jäckel 1967, p. 44ff.; Schlink 1976, p. 80; Schneider
1983, p. 34ff.; Zivier 1960, p. 85ff.; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 877ff.
36 At least this is the general understanding. See, e.g., Jäckel 1967, p. 44; Jarass, in Jarass/
Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 1ff.; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 1, 13ff.; Hofmann, in Schmidt-
Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 7ff. But see also Schneider 1983, p. 37.
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was expressly laid down in a separate section and was not included in Sec-
tion 1 as a ‘rule of limitation’. Secondly, the provision’s wording forms an
argument in favour of a broader understanding. Different from Section 1 it
does not speak of ‘Gesetz’, but explicitly stresses that ‘in keinem Falle’, i.e., ‘in
no case’, the core of a right can be infringed upon.37 Sachs in this regard con-
cludes as follows:
‘Trotz entstehungsgeschichtlicher Verbindungen zu den Anforderungen an ein-
schränkende Gesetze … ist die ebenso apodiktisch wie umfassend formulierte
Garantie für jede Person oder Stelle maßgeblich, die der Grundrechtsbindung
unterliegt.’38
Moreover, an argument in favour of a wider reading of the provision is that
the very rationale of including the core of rights provision was the protection
against the possible nullification of fundamental rights. From that perspective,
regarding the legislature as the only addressee of the guarantee would limit
its effectiveness in an undesirable manner. As Zivier has noted, it is not decis-
ive whether an infringement of a right occurs by means of a statute or in a
different way,39 and therefore all state powers that can potentially ‘empty
out’ the importance of fundamental rights must be considered to be addressees.
Finally, this particular reading finds support in the text of Article 1, Section 3
GG. In this section, found at the beginning of the German fundamental rights
catalogue, it is stressed that ‘[d]ie nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetz-
gebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes
Recht’.40 When the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is understood as further elaborating
what these fundamental rights require, it should in line with Article 1(3) GG
be understood as counting for all three branches of government.41
Regardless of the conclusion that all branches are concerned, however, it is
generally accepted that the legislature is primarily addressed.42 This indeed
37 Brüning puts it as follows: ‘Mag die Genese der Vorschrift primär auf eine Anwendung
bei der gesetzlichen Einschränkung der Grundrechte hindeuten, so kann aufgrund der
allumfassenden Formulierung “in keinem Falle” dabei nicht stehen geblieben werden.’ See
Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 36. See also Zivier 1960, p. 85; Jäckel 1967, p. 44;
Drews 2005, p. 28ff.
38 ‘Notwithstanding the links in the drafting history with the requirements for limiting statutes,
the cryptically as well as comprehensively worded guarantee addresses every person or
institution that is bound by the fundamental rights.’ Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 33.
39 Zivier 1960, p. 85.
40 Art. 1(3) GG (‘The following constitutional rights bind the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary as directly applicable law.’).
41 Drews 2005, pp. 28-29. See also Jäckel 1967, p. 44, fn. 2; Schneider 1983, p. 37, who in this
context points out that the guarantee of Art.19(2) GG has an ‘accessory’ character.
42 Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 11; Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2,
no. 27; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 25; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19,
no. 34.
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follows from the simple fact that when a fundamental right is limited in a
potentially too far-reaching way, this is usually due to a legislative, rather than
an administrative or judicial act.43 As mentioned above, of all branches, the
legislature is most likely to be confronted with a situation in which decisions
must be made regarding the width/extent and depth of (general) limitations
of constitutional rights.44
As Remmert puts it, for determining the extent to which the other state
powers are bound by the Wesensgehaltsgarantie it ‘ist maßgeblich, inwieweit
von Entscheidungen der Executieve oder der Judikative eigenständige Gefahren
für den faktischen Bestand der Grundrechte ausgehen können’.45 It must be
asked when and in what circumstances exactly Article 19, Section 2 GG becomes
a relevant touchstone for administrative and judicial acts. It turns out that this
is not often the case. Generally, the executive and the judiciary are thought
to have an ‘eigenständiges “Aushöhlungspotential”’46 only when they work
on the basis of vague legal terminology or when they have wide discretionary
powers that can be used in such a way that the core of a right is infringed
upon.47
In explaining this, Drews makes a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
binding of the other branches.48 She stresses that executive acts, for example,
must always be based on an act of parliament. When a statutory act does not
comply with the Grundgesetz, i.e., is not in compliance with Article 19(2) GG,
then it is not the administrative act, but rather the legislation itself for which
the Wesensgehaltsgarantie becomes the relevant touchstone. The addressee is
then still the legislature – in these situations there is no specific role for Article
19(2) GG as a yardstick for executive acts.49 When, however, the statutory
act on which an administrative act is based itself is in compliance with the
Constitution, the executive is ‘indirectly’ bound to comply with Article 19(2).
After all, in a situation like this it is the executive’s task to act in compliance
with the statute, and hence in line with what Article 19, Section 2 GG requires.
Nevertheless, it is firstly the conditions and the priority of the law that it then
43 Cf. Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 25; Drews 2005, p. 31.
44 Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 11. Indeed, also from the case law of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht it follows that it is mostly a legislative act, i.e., a statute that is tested for being
in compliance with Art. 19(2) or not. There exist only of few examples concerning executive
or judicial acts. See for several references Drews 2005, p. 25, fn. 16 and 17, respectively.
45 ‘[It] is important to what extent decisions of the executive and the judiciary can in them-
selves create a danger for the factual meaning of fundamental rights’. Remmert, in Maunz/
Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 27.
46 Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 27.
47 Ibid. See also, Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 881; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, nos. 36-37; Schneider
1983, p. 32ff.
48 Drews 2005, p. 30ff.
49 Ibid., p. 30.
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needs to respect. The manner in which the executive in this situation is bound
by the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is therefore of an indirect kind.50
On the other hand, Article 19(2) GG is ‘directly’ relevant when a statute
creates discretionary powers, or is open to different interpretations, and there-
fore compliance of the executive with the statutory text does not necessarily
imply that the Wesensgehalt of fundamental rights is left intact.51 In these
circumstances the executive’s exercise of discretion can be tested against Article
19(2) GG directly, rather than against the statutory act on which it was based,
since the statute leaves the necessary ‘elbow room’.52 The executive is then
not ‘indirectly’, but ‘unmittelbar’, or ‘ungefiltert’ bound by Article 19(2).53 Some-
thing similar goes for the judiciary: when decisions are taken or judgments
are reached by a court having latitude in dealing with a statute that is in itself
constitutional and ‘core avoiding’, it is obliged to act in conformity with Article
19, Section 2 GG.54 Article 18, second sentence GG presents a clear illustra-
tion.55 According to this provision the extent to which rights can be forfeited
is to be determined by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. It goes without saying that
in making this determination, the core of the right at stake should be protected.
A final remark concerning the addressees of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
concerns the following: regardless of the ‘in keinem Falle’ formulation, it can
be doubted whether the Wesensgehaltsgarantie binds the ‘verfassungsändernden’
and the ‘Hoheitsrechte übertragenden’ legislature, i.e., the legislature that is
competent to amend the constitution and the legislature that transfers sovereign
power, respectively.56 With regard to the former it is considered that the
relevant requirements for changing the constitution are exhaustively laid down
in Article 79, Section 3. This important provision holds that any changes that
alter Article 1 or Article 20 GG are forbidden.57 In this reasoning, Article 19(2)
50 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
51 See also Schneider 1983, p. 35.
52 Drews 2005, pp. 31-32.
53 Ibid., p. 32 (with furhter references). See also Stern 1994, Bd. III.2, p. 881.
54 Drews (2005), p. 32, 296. Cf. also Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 37.
55 Art. 18 (in its entirety) reads: ‘Wer die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung, insbesondere die
Pressefreiheit (Artikel 5 Absatz 1), die Lehrfreiheit (Artikel 5 Absatz 3), die Versammlungs-
freiheit (Artikel 8), die Vereinigungsfreiheit (Artikel 9), das Brief-, Post- und Fernmelde-
geheimnis (Artikel 10), das Eigentum (Artikel 14) oder das Asylrecht (Artikel 16a) zum
Kampfe gegen die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung mißbraucht, verwirkt diese
Grundrechte. Die Verwirkung und ihr Ausmaß werden durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht
ausgesprochen.’
56 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 28.
57 Art. 79(3) GG: ‘Eine Änderung dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche die Gliederung des
Bundes in Länder, die grundsätzliche Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Gesetzgebung oder
die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig’
(‘Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their
participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles
1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.’).
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GG would not have to be taken into account.58 Yet, since Article 79, Section 3
GG prohibits any alteration by the constitution-changing legislature of what
is called the Menschenwürdegehalt,59 this conclusion is valid only to the extent
that it is considered that the Wesensgehalt does not equal the Menschenwürde
guarantee. When both are considered identical, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie must
be said to de facto bind the ‘verfassungsändernden’ legislature as well.60 The
‘sovereign power transferring’ legislature needs to take account of Article 79(3)
GG, too.61 Also here, thus, a direct role for Article 19, Section 2 GG seems to
be lacking.62 Again, however, this would be different if one would accept
that Article 19(2) and Article 1(1) GG are identical, or at least that the Menschen-
würdegehalt covers the Wesen of a right.63 Finally, as far as the implementation
and carrying out of EU law leaves the legislative, executive, or judiciary power
some discretion, Article 19, Section 2 GG is considered to be (directly)
relevant.64
Thus, the conclusion must be that in determining the addressees of the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie, the outcome should not so much depend upon historical
understandings, possible relations with Article 19(1) GG, or on the question
of which branch is most likely to touch upon the core of a right. Instead, the
importance of fundamental rights and the aim of preventing these from be-
coming futile should form the focal point. The Wesensgehaltsgarantie, therefore,
binds – with the exceptions just mentioned – all national branches whenever
they can place the essence of a fundamental right at risk.
4.2.3 Scope of Application
Next to the addressees of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, it is important to also pay
some attention to the ‘object’ of this provision. It must be asked what can be
understood by ‘Grundrecht’ (‘fundamental right’) and hence, when exactly
58 BVerfGE 109, 279 (310); Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 11; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art.
19, no. 35; Hofmann, in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 18.
59 Art. 1(1) GG: ‘Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen
ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.’ (‘Human dignity is inviolable. It is the duty of
all public authorities to respect and protect it.’)
60 As this is a matter concerning the meaning, or the content of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, it
will be discussed in more detail in, infra, S. 4.3.2.
61 See Art. 23(1), third sentence, GG.
62 See Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 32; Drews 2005, p. 38, who speaks
of ‘indirekten Schutz’. But see Hofmann, in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011,
Art. 19, no. 16.
63 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 32. For secondary European Union
law, more or less the same could be said, see Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs.
2, no. 33.
64 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 35; Drews 2005, p. 42f. See more
generally Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 201.
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Article 19(2) applies. At first glance, discussing this in detail might seem
irrelevant, since it is a matter specifically linked to the German Constitution
and the rights it protects. Nevertheless, as the issue of the object of Article
19(2) centres on the question to what kind of rights a guarantee like the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie can logically apply, the conclusions reached are relevant for
the possibilities for using the idea of core rights also beyond the specific
German context.
First of all, the notion of ‘Grundrecht’ refers to the fundamental rights laid
down in the German Basic Law.65 However, in the academic literature both
a narrower and a broader interpretation of ‘fundamental right’ have been put
forward. The difference in understanding can be partly explained by whether
or not Article 19(2) GG is read in conjunction with Section 1 of that article.66
When it is considered that the two provisions are related and the term ‘Grund-
recht’ means the same for both,67 and moreover when it is understood that
Section 1 is only relevant for rights that contain express possibilities for limita-
tion, then this would imply that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie only applies to a
limited number of constitutional guarantees.68
The applicability of the Allgemeinheits- and the Zitiergebot does not, however,
have to be understood in such a limited way. It also has been argued that these
provisions apply to all ‘defensively’ formulated fundamental rights norms,
i.e., negative freedoms,69 as well as to what in Germany are called ‘grundrechts-
gleiche Rechte’.70 The latter are rights that fall outside the fundamental rights
catalogue enumerated in the first chapter of the German Constitution, but that
can nevertheless form the basis for a constitutional complaint.71 In line with
this, the object of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie can be understood in the same,
broader manner. Some even allege that Section 1 – and thereby also Section 2 –
concerns also equality rights and norms the text of which requires active
65 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 19 (indicating that the Wesensgehalts-
garantie does not apply to the fundamental rights laid down in the constitutions of the
federal states – unless these constitutions contain a similar requirement).
66 Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 21ff.
67 Cf., e.g., Chlosta 1975, p. 39ff.; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 8; Enders, in
Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 21.
68 Remmert, in Mauz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 21 (with references). See also, e.g., Enders,
in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, nos. 21, 23.
69 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 1, no. 31; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012,
Art. 19, no. 22. Drews 2005, p. 46, speaks in this regard of an ‘abgeschwächte Variante’,
a ‘weaker variation’ of the interpretation of S. 2 in light of S. 1 of Article 19 GG.
70 See, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 1, no. 34.
71 Art. 93(1), under 4a, GG establishes that the Bundesverfassungsgericht shall rule ‘über Verfas-
sungsbeschwerden, die von jedermann mit der Behauptung erhoben werden können, durch
die öffentliche Gewalt in einem seiner Grundrechte oder in einem seiner in Artikel 20 Abs.
4, 33, 38, 101, 103 und 104 enthaltenen Rechte verletzt zu sein’ (‘on constitutional complaints,
which can be raised by anyone on the grounds that their constitutional rights, or their rights
contained in articles 20 (4), 33, 38, 101, and 104, have been infringed by a public authority’).
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performance by the state, as well as so-called positive obligations.72 From
this perspective, the ‘Grundrecht’ notion has a very broad reach and the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie accordingly covers a large number of fundamental guarantees.
However, it has already become clear that a reading of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
that relates to Article 19(1) is not imperative.73 The ‘in keinem Falle’ phrasing
can indeed be linked to the situations covered by Section 1, but for the reasons
mentioned above, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie can just as well be disconnected
from the Allgemeinheits- and the Zitiergebot.74 Indeed, in line with a ‘teleo-
logical’ understanding the applicability of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is likely
to be understood more broadly compared to Section 1. Therefore, according
to Remmert, if one looks at the meaning and purpose of the norm, namely
to protect fundamental rights from substantively running idle, it makes sense
to apply Art. 19(2) GG to all fundamental rights that can be hollowed out by
acts of the state.75
It can be said that the general aim to prevent the core of fundamental rights
from being infringed upon allows for understanding the term ‘Grundrecht’
in such a way that as many fundamental norms as possible obtain the
necessary protection.76 The reason why one cannot simply speak of ‘all’ funda-
mental rights norms is merely that the protection of the core of a right should
at least be logically possible.77 In this respect, there is no problem as far as
negatively formulated fundamental freedoms are concerned, regardless of
whether these contain a specific limitation clause or not, since interferences
with these rights can be forbidden to the extent that they do not even leave
the essence of a right intact.78 Likewise, it is imaginable that the state dis-
respects the core of a right when it does nothing, or does ‘too little’.79 Hence,
it can be said that also positively formulated guarantees run the risk of becom-
72 I.e., positive obligations that do not directly follow from the positive wording of a right
but are implied by negatively formulated fundamental rights. See, for references as well
as inherent complications, Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 I, no. 32f.
73 See, supra, S. 4.2.2. Cf. also Drews 2005, pp. 47-48.
74 See, supra, S. 4.2.2.
75 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 22.
76 Cf. also Drews 2005, p. 48; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 44; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth
2012, Art. 19, no. 8.
77 Cf. Drews 2005, p. 45, with regard to Freiheitsrechte: ‘Wenn also gefragt wird, welche Freiheits-
grundrechte der Wesensgehaltsgarantie unterfallen, so geht es um diejenigen Rechte mit
der Eigenschaft, dem Inhaber einen Handlungsspielraum einzuräumen, innerhalb dessen
er sich nach seinem Willen betätigen kann, also z.B. um die Rechte aus Art. 2 II 1, Art. 2
II 2, Art. 12 I oder Art. 14 GG.’
78 See, e.g., Drews 2005, p. 46. Cf. also Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 10; Drews 2005,
p. 47f.; Herbert 1985, p. 331; Jäckel 1967, p. 45; Krüger 1955, p. 599; Remmert, in Maunz/
Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 23; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 878; Zivier 1960, p. 85; Brüning,
in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 36.
79 Drews 2005, pp. 56-57.
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ing futile and require the protection of Article 19 Section 2 GG.80 There are
only few positively formulated guarantees,81 however, and it is therefore
important to note that there is also a category of positive obligations that do
not follow directly from the text of the constitution, but that have been inferred
from negatively formulated norms. This was the result of the development
from a liberal to a social Rechtsstaat, and of the growing importance of the
idea that it is the state that needs to create and secure the conditions in order
for individuals to make use of their fundamental freedoms in the first place.82
For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is mainly important to note that
the reading provided here implies that the state can violate the Wesensgehalts-
garantie when it does not, at least to a certain minimum degree, ensure that
positive rights, regardless of whether these have been expressly laid down
in the Constitution, are guaranteed.83 In the words of Drews:
‘[S]oweit die Grundrechte Gewährleistungsnormen zugunsten “realer Freiheit“ seien,
sei es nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die Vernachlässigung staatlicher Schutzpflichten
und die Vorenthaltung staatlicher Leistungen bei Unterschreitung einer grundrecht-
lich gebotenen Mindestausstattung Art. 19 II GG verletze.’84
When it comes to equality rights, views are more divided.85 This has to do
with the fact that many authors regard Gleichheitsrechte86 as having a distinct
structure.87 They do not come with a specific possibility for limitation, and
it is instead in any case forbidden to constrain equality guarantees as they are
formulated.88 Article 19(2) GG, according to this view, then is not applicable.89
80 Ibid. Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 23, 45.
81 Drews 2005, p. 54.
82 Ibid. [footnotes omitted]. Cf. BVerfGE 33, 303 (331).
83 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 23, 45; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art.
19 II, no. 10; Drews 2005, p. 54ff. Cf. also Häberle 1983, p. 369ff., 422ff.
84 ‘To the extent that fundamental rights are norms securing “actual freedom”, it cannot be
excluded that – in the event a constitutionally guaranteed minimum is not assured – the
neglect of protective duties and the denial of state performance is in breach of Art. 19(2)
GG.’ Drews 2005, p. 56.
85 See, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 24. Cf. also Jarass, in Jarass/
Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 8.
86 As Gleichheitsrechte are considered Arts. 3(1-3) and 6(5) GG. Also, there are grundrechts-
gleiche Gleichheitsrechte, these can be found in Arts. 33(1-3) and 38(1), first sentence, GG.
87 Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art 19 II, no.9; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 21.
88 There is hence no ‘outer layer’ that can justifiably be interfered with. According to Dreier,
in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 9, equality rights carry ‘ihr Wesenskriterium im allgemeinen
Verbot sachwidriger Ungleichbehandlungen … gleichsam in sich’.
89 However, a different conclusion can be reached here as well. The ‘absoluteness’ of the
prohibition of discrimination can just as well be understood to signal a fundamental rights
‘core’: in no case, shall discriminatory treatment take place. This insight becomes especially
relevant in a context in which the non-discrimination principle is linked to other funda-
mental rights (as in the context of the ECHR), while then a ‘core’ aspect of these funda-
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Only when it is considered that the ‘interference-model’ also applies to funda-
mental equality norms, and certain limitations are hence possible, the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie could become relevant.90
Thus, although seemingly uncomplicated at first sight, the term ‘Grundrecht’
clearly has led to some discussion. The conclusion can be that, in the light
of the aim of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, the term ‘Grundrecht’ is mostly under-
stood in a broad, rather than in a narrow manner. Thereby it is important to
stress that, although there remains some doubt as to equality rights because
of their special structure, positive rights and obligations – also when these
are recognised under negative fundamental rights norms – are generally
considered to fall within the scope of Article 19, Section 2 GG, which means
that their core must always be protected.91
4.3 THE MEANING OF THE GERMAN WESENSGEHALTSGARANTIE
The discussion thus far has already presented a number of views on several
aspects of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. Compared to the question of the concrete
meaning of the Wesensgehalt, the debate on the addressees and applicability
of Article 19(2) GG is however fairly straightforward. Indeed, as Drews has
put it, there are only two things about the Wesensgehaltsgarantie that are really
beyond dispute.92 First of all it is clear that, as was already mentioned, the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie is not a self-standing fundamental right.93 Secondly,
it is not disputed that an interference with a fundamental right that breaches
Article 19, Section 2 GG, is unconstitutional.94 By contrast, and perhaps not
surprisingly, the content of the Wesensgehalt, i.e., its meaning for different
fundamental rights and in the adjudication of individual cases, is a highly
mental rights can be said to be their non-discriminatory provision. Cf. also, infra Ch. 5,
S. 5.5.1; Ch. 7, S. 7.4.2.1.
90 See, for the implicit possibility that Art. 19(2) GG applies, Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber
2012, Art.19, no. 22; Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 24; Drews 2005,
p. 59. Finally, yet this seems relevant only in the specific German constitutional context,
an argument similar to the one used to justifiy the application of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
to positive rights and obligations can be given to include ‘grundrechtsgleiche Rechte’. When
it is considered that the difference between the ‘official’ ‘Grundrechte’ and the ‘grundrechts-
gleiche Rechte’ is merely terminological and does not see to the content of and the protection
provided by both categories, the term ‘Grundrecht’ in Art. 19(2) can be considered directly
applicable to ‘grundrechtsgleiche Rechte’, too. See, e.g., Drews 2005, p. 53; Jarass, in Jarass/
Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 8; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 9; Remmert, in Maunz/
Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 25.
91 The applicability of the idea of core protection to positive rights will be confirmed and
further explored in the following, see, infra, Ch. 5 and 6.
92 Drews 2005, pp. 16-17.
93 See, supra, S. 4.2.
94 Ibid.
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controversial matter.95 Article 19, Section 2 GG has been described as ‘bisher
konturloseste Norm des Grundgesetzes’,96 but it has also been characterised
as ‘zentrale Sicherung gegen inhaltliche Aushöhlung’97. The difficulties related
to identifying cores of rights in a workable manner are such that, even after
more than 60 years since the provision came into being, a broadly shared
understanding of the content of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is still lacking.98
In the following, the complicated question as to how, if at all, cores or
rights can be identified, will nevertheless be taken up. The ambition is thereby
not so much to resolve the matter and provide for a decisive answer. Rather,
the perspective taken here will be that of an outsider, whose goal is not to
take a stand in the debate but rather to describe the dominant standpoints
that have been propagated. A more or less descriptive overview of the different
interpretations and, where possible, their weight in the debate, will offer a
fair picture of how in theory, but also in practice, the Wesensgehalt of rights
is recognised and dealt with.
The debate on the meaning of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie can be systematised
by focussing on two distinct issues. The first point to be discussed concerns
the question whether the protection of Article 19, Section 2 GG is objective or
rather subjective in kind (4.3.1). Also from the case law of the Bundesverfassungs-
bericht it does not become entirely clear whether this provision is directed at
individual rightsholders (a subjective reading) or instead (also) at fundamental
rights ‘in general’ (an objective reading).99 The second important matter worth
addressing is whether the ‘Wesen’ should be understood in an absolute or in
a relative way. This has implications for the test applied by courts and the
relation between the Wesensgehaltsgarantie and the requirement of
proportionality. The absolute-relative question has been extensively discussed
in various scholarly articles and dissertations. These signal numerous detailed
and nuanced views on the matter, some of which will be outlined below (4.3.2).
4.3.1 Objective versus Subjective Protection
Of the two main focal points of the debate on the meaning of the Wesensgehalts-
garatie, i.e., the absolute-relative and the objective-subjective question, the latter
is the easier one to deal with. By contrast, as will become clear soon, the debate
on whether cores of rights should be, or are indeed understood in an absolute
or in a relative manner, is a very technical one that meanwhile has become
95 See Drews 2005, p. 59ff.
96 Dürig 1956, p. 133.
97 Schneider 1983, p. 17.
98 See Drews 2005. In her dissertation Drews tries to unravel the discussion that has come
to include numerous positions and has become quite untransparent for that reason.
99 See Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 868ff.; Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 315; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art.
19, no. 45.
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the subject of numerous detailed interpretations. That the objective-subjective
issue is more straightforward, however, is not to say that an unequivocal
conclusion can be reached on the matter of whether ‘Grundrecht’ refers to an
individual right or not. In concreto, the debate centers around the question
‘ob unter ‘Grundrecht’ im Sinne des Art. 19 II GG das subjektive Grundrecht des
Einzelnen zu verstehen ist oder aber das “objektive Grundrecht“, womit … das
Grundrecht in einer über die subjektive Schutzposition des Einzelnen hinausgehen-
den Bedeutung gemeint ist, gleichsam als das Grundrecht “in seiner Bedeutung
für die Allgemeinheit“.‘100
In the following, the subjective interpretation will obtain the most attention.
One important reason for this is the aim to present the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
in such a way that inspiration is provided for a possible use of the idea of
core rights in the context of the ECtHR. The subjective interpretation fits best
with the field of international human rights adjudication since it underlines
the importance of individual protection. Before turning to this point, however,
some remarks will be made with regard to the objective theory.
4.3.1.1 Objective Protection
Logically, the supporters of the ‘objective theory’101 interpret the term ‘Grund-
recht’ in an ‘objective sense’.102 This means that the focus lies not on the indi-
vidual protection a fundamental right offers, but instead on the fundamental
rights norm as such.103 When the objective interpretation is followed and
‘Grundrecht’ is understood as ‘Grundrechtsartikel’, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie must
be understood as forbidding any interference with a fundamental rights norm
100 ‘… whether the term “fundamental right” in Art. 19(2) GG is to be understood as referring
to the subjective individual right or to the “objective fundamental right” going beyond
the subjective position of an individual, quasi to the fundamental right in its meaning for
society in general.’ Drews 2005, p. 17. Also the Bundesverfassungsgericht has asked ‘ob Art.
19 Abs. 2 GG die restlose Entziehung eines Grundrechtskerns im Einzelfall verbietet oder
ob er nur verhindern will, dass der Wesenskern des Grundrechts als solcher, zB durch
praktischen Wegfall der im Grundgesetz verankerten, der Allgemeinheit gegebenen Garantie
angetastet wird’. See BVerfGE 2, 266 (285). This question was answered differently in
different cases, see Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 315; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 45. See
also Jäckel 1967, pp. 57ff., who presents the distinction in terms of a Rechtsstellungsgarantie
v. an Institutsgarantie (a guarantee of a ‘legal status’ or ‘position’ v. of a ‘legal institution’).
101 See for this term Schneider 1983, p. 79.
102 According to Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nr. 20, ‘[d]as Wort Grundrecht
kann sprachlich sowohl das Grundrecht als objektiv-rechtliche, den Staat verpflichtende
Norm als auch das Grundrecht als subjektives Recht bezeichnen’. See on this theory, e.g.,
Drews 2005, p. 77ff., and for an overview of supporters of the objective view, p. 299. Some
supporters are (implicitly) Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 13; Jäckel 1967, pp. 57ff.,
91, 108, 111ff.; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9.
103 E.g., Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 12.
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that has the effect of nullifying this norm in the constitutional order.104
Inversely, this implies that in an individual case someone can be deprived
of his right entirely, as long as beyond his individual situation, the right itself
remains meaningful.105
What exactly this means remains relatively unclear in the literature,106
but a common understanding of the objective theory is that it is mainly ‘institu-
tional’ in character.107 It is then seen to relate to the guarantee of particular
‘Einrichtungen’ (‘institutions’) that can be deduced from certain constitutional
provisions, such as marriage, or personal property, which have to be
guaranteed in a general fashion.108 Whereas a narrow interpretation of ‘Ein-
richtung’ in this regard would unduly limit the application of the Wesensgehalts-
garantie, the notion of ‘institutions’ is usually understood in a broader sense
in order to include more generally the fundamental rights laid down in the
German Constitution.109 In this regard one can also speak of a ‘social theory’,
i.e., an understanding that emphasises the importance of fundamental rights
for society in general, rather than their importance for an individual case or
person:110
‘Der Schutz des Art. 19 II GG, in diesem Sinne auf das Grundrecht als “Einrichtung
des Lebens“ bezogen, ist demnach – im Vergleich zum Schutzumfang nach der
subjektiven Theorie – allgemeiner Art. Nicht die konkrete Grundrechtsposition
einer einzelnen Person ist es, auf die der Wesensgehaltsschutz abzielt, sondern die
“generelle Bedeutsamkeit einer Grundrechtsbestimmung für die Verfassungsord-
nung insgesamt“, ihre Bedeutung für “das soziale Leben im Ganzen“.‘111
The objective theory may seem to be at odds with the idea behind fundamental
rights, i.e., with the idea that these rights first and foremost provide individual
protection. However, the fact that the objective theory in Germany nevertheless
finds significant support should not be understood as signalling that there
are some who simply do not think of fundamental rights as subjective, indi-
vidual guarantees. Rather, it is in order to give the Wesensgehaltsgarantie a
104 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 13. Cf. BVerfGE 100, 313 (376).
105 See, e.g., Herbert 1985, p. 324.
106 See, in more detail, Drews 2005, p. 78ff.
107 Ibid., p. 80ff. See also, e.g., Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 27; Jäckel 1967,
p. 57ff. One can also speak of a ‘Grundrechtsnorm als objektieve Rechtseinrichtung’, see
Herbert 1985, p. 324.
108 Cf. Stern 1994, Bd. III/1, p. 774ff.
109 Drews 2005, p. 81.
110 See, e.g., Chlosta 1975, p. 40.
111 Drews 2005, p. 81 [footnotes omitted] (‘The coverage of Art. 19(2), in this sense relating
to the fundamental right as “institution of life”, is – in contrast to its coverage according
to the subjective theory – of a general nature. It is not the specific fundamental rights
position of an individual that the protection of the Wesensgehalt aims at, but rather the
general significance of a fundamental rights norm for the entire constitutional order, its
meaning for “social life” in its entirety.’)
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workable meaning, that some authors favour an objective understanding.112
In practice, examples can be found of instances in which fundamental rights
are taken away completely.113 To make sure that in the light of this fact
Article 19(2) GG is not devoid of meaning it is then argued that this provision
underlines not so much the subjective, but rather the objective importance of
rights’ cores.
4.3.1.2 Subjective Protection
The subjective view holds that in every individual instance the Wesen of a
fundamental right needs to be protected.114 The main argument for this point
of view is the aim of Article 19, Section 2 GG in particular, as well as the aim
of fundamental rights protection more generally. Dürig, for example, indicates
that the underlying idea of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is that ‘[d]er Grundrechts-
träger darf nicht zum Objekt des staatlichen Geschehens gemacht werden’.115
The term ‘Grundrecht’ in Article 19, Section 2 GG is hence to be read as referring
to an individual, subjective right.116 More in general, it is held that from the
historical background and aim of the Grundgesetz it must be inferred that its
protection concerns individuals and their isolated legal positions.117 Accord-
ing to Pieroth and Schlink:
‘Im Zweifel ist der Wesensgehalt in der Gewährleistung nicht für die Allgemeinheit
sondern für den Einzelnen zu suchen. Den Einzelnen sind die Grundrechte verbürgt,
112 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 20, 37; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010,
Art. 19, no. 42; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art.
19 II, no. 14. Cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 27 (with various
examples).
113 Cf. Herbert 1985, p. 324; Jäckel 1967, p. 111; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 46; Enders,
in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 27. Think about life-long sentences, deadly police
shooting, etc. Cf. BVerfGE 45, 187 (270f.); BVerfGE 109, 133 (156); BVerfGE 115, 118 (165).
See, however, infra, S. 4.3.1.2, for the argument that this can be explained in other ways,
too.
114 See, generally, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 20; Drews 2005,
p. 77; Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 319; Borowski 2007, p. 287; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, pp. 868-870;
Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, nos. 45-46; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, nos.
26, 28; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, nos.
13-14; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2012, Art. 19, no. 42. For support of this view see also, e.g.,
Dürig 1956; Herbert 1985; Krüger 1955, Schlink 1976; Von Hippel 1965; Chlosta 1975 (see
for further references Drews 2005, p. 299).
115 ‘The rightsholder must not become the object of state action.’ Dürig 1956, p. 136.
116 See, e.g., Von Hippel 1965, p. 48, fn. 4; Herbert 1985, p. 324, 332, pp. 334-335.
117 See, e.g., Chlosta 1975, p. 41ff.
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und wenn der eine von seinen Grundrechten keinen Gebrauch mehr machen kann,
dann nützt ihm nicht, dass ein anderer es noch kann.’118
In this regard it can even be said that the dismissal of the subjective interpreta-
tion misconceives what the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is all about.119
It must be noted, however, that a purely subjective interpretation of the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie is hard to ally with the practical finding that sometimes
the complete derogation of a fundamental right is held constitutional. This
interpretation hence does not always seem to be meaningful.120 Various
authors, perhaps for that reason, do not conceive of the matter as an either/or
question. They contend, at least implicitly, that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie can
have both an objective and a subjective meaning.121 Borowski, for example,
holds that because fundamental rights first and foremost constitute individual
rights, Article 19(2) GG in any case must be understood as being relevant for
rights as subjective guarantees.122 When no clear choice is made, however,
it mostly remains unclear if and why in certain cases – and if so, in which
cases – the Wesensgehaltsgarantie does not require protection of an individual
position. At the same time examples of a complete erosion of an individual
right have been explained by other limits inherent in the Constitution, or with
the help of other constructions, and therefore the mere existence of such
examples does not necessarily imply that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is irrelevant
in those instances.123
4.3.2 Absolute versus Relative Understandings of the Wesensgehalt
Above, it has been mentioned that, besides the ‘subjective/objective’ debate
there is also a debate on the absolute or relative nature of the Wesensgehalt.
Sometimes it is held that the objective-subjective question and the absolute-
relative question are inherently related.124 This is to say that when, for
example, the objective-subjective matter is resolved in favour of a subjective
118 ‘In case of doubt the Wesensgehalt must be considered relevant for he individual rather than
for society in general. Fundamental rights belong to individuals, and if one individual can
no longer make use of his fundamental rights, the fact that someone else can is of no use
to him.’ Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 319.
119 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 20.
120 Cf. what was just mentioned in, supra, S. 4.3.1.1.
121 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, nos. 13-14. Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art.
19, no. 42; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, nos. 27-28.
122 Borowski 2007, p. 287.
123 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, nos. 14, 16 (with further references); Brüning,
in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 42; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 29.
See also Von Bernstorff 2011, pp. 175-176. See further the discussion on the Wesensgehalts-
garantie and the Verhälnitsmäßigkeitsgrundsatz in, infra, S. 4.3.2.2. and 4.4.1.
124 See, e.g., Drews 2005, pp. 60-61.
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interpretation, it is likely that the meaning of the Wesensgehalt is considered
to be circumstantial or relative.125 Inversely, when the Wesensgehalt is con-
sidered to be absolute, this might invite a non-subjective perception of the
protected core.126 Regardless of the possible connections between the answers
given to both questions, however, in this section the absolute and the relative
theories will be introduced as independent theses, providing for insights in,
as well as signalling concerns with regard to fundamental rights adjudication
and the role cores of rights can play therein. Compared to the objective-subject-
ive thesis, the absolute-relative question is in that regard the ‘eigentlich bedeut-
same’,127 since it deals with the actual content of the Wesensgehalt and the
concrete way in which it is protected. It is this issue that is most often problem-
atised, and the stance one takes here is decisive for the understanding, use
and value that can be attached to Article 19, Section 2 GG.
The essential question, in short, is whether the Wesensgehalt of a right
implies an absolute or rather a relative boundary.128 In other words:
‘Enthält jede Grundrecht einen Kernbestand an “Substanz“, der niemals in Frage
gestellt werden darf und der damit als Wesensgehalt absolut gegenüber jeder
staatlichen Einwirkung geschützt ist? ... Oder ist der Wesensgehalt eines Grund-
rechts für jeden Fall seiner Anwendung gesondert durch ein Abwägen der im
Einzelfall widerstreitenden Interessen zu ermitteln, mit der Folge, dass der Wesens-
gehaltsschutz nur relativ wirkt?’129
First, the absolute theories will be discussed, followed by an overview of
various relative understandings.
125 After all, when one insists that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie concerns the core of individual,
subjective rights, and it becomes apparent that sometimes these rights are nevertheless
eroded completely, the conclusion must be that the subjective Wesensgehalt is still subject
to a proportionality test, and hence determined in a relative way. See further S. 4.3.2.2.
However, it is also said that for those who think the Wesensgehalt of a right is relative, the
objective-subjective question does not even need to be asked. Cf. Drews 2005, p. 60.
126 Or, it is an absolute understanding of the core of rights that necessitates asking the objective-
subjective question in the first place. E.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 16.
127 Drews 2005, p. 61.
128 Ibid., p. 60. See also p. 62ff.
129 ‘Does every fundamental right provide for a substantive core, that may never be put into
question and that thereby is protected in an absolute way against state interference? Or
is the Wesensgehalt of a fundamental right only to be determined in the context of a specific
case by means of balancing the conflicting interests at stake, as a result of which the
Wesensgehalt only has a relative meaning?’ Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs.
2, no. 36 [footnotes omitted].
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4.3.2.1 Absolute Theories
According to various ‘absolute theories’, the ‘Wesen’ of a fundamental right
is something absolute.130 This means that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie ‘absolutely’
protects those aspects of a constitutional right, without the availability of which
one can no longer speak of that right.131 These aspects form the actual ‘Kern’,
or alternatively the ‘substance’ or ‘heart’ of a fundamental right.132
Absolute theories are generally considered to be founded on a spatial
understanding of fundamental rights.133 This means that a fundamental right
is seen as a structure that consists of two parts, ‘nämlich einem inneren, dem
“Kern”, vor dem der Staat in jedem Fall Halt zu machen hat sowie aus einem
weiteren, diesen “Kern” umgebenden Bereich, in den einzudringen dem Staat
nicht schlechthin verwehrt ist’.134 Alternatively, one can visualise the core
of a right by thinking of different layers covering the ‘Wesen’ of a right, as
for example the peel of a piece of fruit.135 Important is that as long as a
limitation of a fundamental right only interferes with the ‘peripheral part’,
i.e., with the area surrounding the core, it may be constitutional.136 This is
the case when the requirement of Verhältnismäßigkeit137 (proportionality) is
met, which requires that a limitation is suitable, necessary, and proportional
in the narrow sense.138 What characterises an absolute understanding of the
Wesensgehalt is hence that in the predetermined ‘core area’ the requirement
of proportionality does not apply.139 There can be no justification for inter-
fering with the Wesen of a constitutional right, i.e., there are no ‘höherrangigen
130 See, generally, Drews 2005, p. 62ff.; Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no.
36ff.; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, pp. 865-868; Pieroth/Schlink 2010, no. 314; Borowski 2007, p.
288ff.; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 41ff.; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19,
no. 29ff.; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no.
16ff.; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 40f. Authors that (explicitly) favour an
absolute view are, e.g., Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Chlosta 1975; Dürig
1956; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 31; Herbert 1985; Jäckel 1967; Krüger
1955; Schlink 1976; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 865ff.
131 Drews 2005, p. 62, referring to Knüllig 1954, p. 118, 124.
132 See, e.g., Krüger 1955, p. 599. See also Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 314.
133 Drews 2005, p. 63. But cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 29.
134 Drews 2005, p. 63 [footnote omitted] (‘… namely an inner part, the “core”, in which the
state can in no case interfere, as well as another, this core surrounding area, in which
interferences are not by definition precluded’).
135 See, e.g., Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 875; Herbert 1985, p. 323. Drews notices that the image
of the skin of a fruit is however less suitable since it draws attention to the most outer layer,
and by piercing through the peel the ‘core’ is not yet interfered with (Drews 2005, p. 63,
fn. 222).
136 E.g., Borowski 2007, p. 288.
137 The idea of Verhaltnismäßigkeit will be further discussed in, infra, Sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.4.1.
138 E.g., Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 289ff. In German, the terms ‘Geeignetheit’, ‘Erforderlichkeit’,
and ‘Angemessenheit’ are used. See on the different aspects of a proportionality analysis
also, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.4.2.
139 Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 16.
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Güter’.140 The protection is unqualified and balancing of the right at stake
with the purposes of the state does not take place.141 In an early comment
on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie Krüger argues that, even though limits to funda-
mental rights are necessary,
‘[d]ie Eigenart des Grundgesetzes besteht darin, daß es nichtsdestoweniger im
letzten der Autonomie des Bürgers den absoluten Vorrang zuerkennt: Im Bereich
des Wesensgehaltes entscheidet allein der Bürger über das Ob und Wie des Ge-
brauches der Freiheit.’142
Indeed, from the genesis of the German Constitution and the role of Article
19, Section 2 therein, it can be inferred that there is a sphere that needs to be
protected from interferences by the state.143 To the absoluteness of this con-
clusion adds the wording ‘in keinem Falle’, as this implies that there are no
exceptions and limitations of the core are prohibited.144 Also the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht has held that, because of this wording, ‘die Frage, unter welchen
Voraussetzungen ein solcher Eingriff ausnahmeweise trotzdem zulässig ist,
ist … gegenstandslos’.145
More particularly, it is not seldom contended that especially ‘personality-
aspects’ of rights – also because of their link with the Menschenwürdegehalt –
are protected in this absolute manner. In the words of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht:
‘Selbst schwerwiegende Interessen der Allgemeinheit können Eingriffe in diesen
Bereich nicht rechtfertigen; eine Abwägung nach Maßgabe des Verhältnismäßigkeits-
grundsatzes findet nicht statt … Dies folgt einerseits aus der Garantie des Wesens-
gehalts der Grundrechte (Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG), zum anderen leitet es sich daraus ab,
140 See Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 867; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 40; Sachs, in
Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 41.
141 E.g., Borowski 2007, p. 288;
142 Krüger 1955, p. 597 (‘It is a specific characteristic of the Constitution that it nevertheless
in the end grants absolute priority to citizens’ autonomy: When the Wesensgehalt of a right
is concerned, it is up to the citizen to decide whether and how to make use of his freedom.’).
143 See also, supra, especially S. 4.2.1.
144 See, e.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 37; Stern, Bd. III/2, p. 867.
However, since it is not entirely clear what ‘in keinem Falle’ refers to, this argument should
not be given too much weight. See Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 15, fn. 55.
145 BVerfGE 7, 377 (411) (Apothekenurteil) (‘The question, under which circumstances such an
interference can exceptionally be accepted, is of no relevance.’). See, e.g., Remmert, in
Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, nos. 38f.; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 41; Hofmann,
in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 17; Brüning, in Stern/Becker
2010, Art. 19, no. 40.
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dass der Kern der Persönlichkeit durch die unantastbare Würde des Menschen
geschützt wird.’146
Regardless of such statements, however, it cannot be said that every time it
comes to the question of the core of a right, balancing exercises are truly
avoided.147 Instead, as many authors point out, the German Constitutional
Court’s case law is neither consistent, nor clear on this matter.148
Absolute protection would imply that not even for the protection of the rights
of others, an individual can be limited in the exercise of his core rights.149
Herbert however contends that in the case of conflicts between (core) funda-
mental rights, protection of the Wesensgehalt is sometimes necessarily ‘only’
relative.150 In Herbert’s view, the guarantee will apply only if there is no
such conflict, i.e., if in opposition to the interference with a right, no other
fundamental rights concern is found, but rather public aims that cannot directly
be legitimised with reference to fundamental rights. In cases where there is
only one individual fundamental right at stake, in other words, the qualifica-
tion that something is proportional implies that the Wesensgehalt is not inter-
fered with; in these cases the protection of the concrete core indeed has an
absolute meaning.151
Although the majority of authors appear to favour an absolute understanding
of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie,152 this understanding leaves open a crucial ques-
tion. Indeed, little is said on what exactly the cores of the different fundamental
rights enshrined in the German Constitution consist of, and how these can
be identified.153 Even though it is regularly held that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
146 BVerfGE 80, 367 (373) (Tagebuchaufzeichnungen) (‘Even heavy-weighing general interests
cannot justify interferences in this area; a balancing in accordance with the proportionality
principle is not to be carried out … This follows on the one hand from the Wesensgehalts-
garantie, on the other hand it can be traced back to the fact that the core of ‘personality’
is protected by the inviolable guarantee of human dignity.’). Cf. also Enders, in Epping/
Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, nos. 148, 131; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 17.
147 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 36; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012,
Art. 19, no 30. See also BVerfGE 80, 367 (373).
148 Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 40; Hofmann, in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/Hofmann/
Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 17.
149 Krüger 1955, p. 599.
150 Herbert 1985, p. 333.
151 Ibid.
152 Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9. Authors that (explicitly) favour an absolute
view are, e.g., Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Chlosta 1975; Dürig 1956; Herbert
1985, Jäckel 1967; Krüger 1955; Schlink 1976; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, pp. 865-868.; Enders,
in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 31.
153 Drews 2005, p. 63 (who holds that only few authors actually address this question). Cf.
also Pieroth/Schlink 2012, no. 314.
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is comparable to the Menschenwürdegehalt,154 the fact that this would make
Article 19(2) GG more or less redundant is one reason to hold differently.155
It is agreed, however, that the (absolute) Wesensgehalt in any case is interfered
with, when any ‘Störungsabwehranspruch materiell-rechtlich beseitigt oder
wenn seine wirkungsvolle Geltendmachung verfahrensrechtlich verwehrt
wird’.156 Moreover, as follows from the case law too, the content of the
Wesensgehalt, even in an absolute understanding, should be determined for
each fundamental right separately.157 Moreover, as Remmert emphasises:
‘Hat ein Grundrecht unterschiedliche Verpflichtungsgehalte, Schutzrichtungen
und Funktionen, wird der Wesensgehalt auch insoweit unterschiedlich zu
bestimmen sein.’158 This underlines that it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to provide general information with regard to the content of the Wesens-
gehalt.159
Herbert nevertheless attempts to provide some overarching insights. Having
established that the Verhalnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz plays a very important role
in fundamental rights adjudication, and that this leads to a loss of practical
meaning for Section 2 of Article 19 GG,160 he tries to concretise the additional
value of this provision. Herbert distinguishes the Wesensgehalt from that what
is left over after a proportionality test has taken place. In doing so he under-
lines the positive understanding of the Wesensgehalt, which ‘kann vielmehr als
Leitprinzip dienen bei der Klärung der Frage, in welchem Maße der sachliche
Gehalt des Grundrechts aufgrund seiner wesensgemaßen Struktur und Funk-
tion Bewahrung beansprucht und Entfaltung verdient’.161 To determine the
content of this ‘guiding principle’, that indeed determines whether or not a
154 Cf. Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 41; BVerfGE 80, 367 (373f.); Sachs, in Sachs
2011, Art. 19, no. 43; Borowski 2007, p. 288, with further references (fn. 305); Stern III/2,
p. 873f.; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9.
155 Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 41. Cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no.
28.
156 Cf. BVerfGE 61, 82 (113) (‘… right to fend off interferences substantively is annulled or
its efficient invocation is procedurally precluded’); Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art.
19 Abs. 2, no. 43; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 41; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art.
19, no. 44.
157 BVerfGE 22, 180 (219) and BVerfGE 109, 133 (156): ‘Der unantastbare Wesensgehalt eines
Grundrechts muss für jedes Grundrecht aus seiner besonderen Bedeutung im Gesamtsystem
der Grundrechte ermittelt werden’. See also Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs.
2, no. 40 (emphasising the word ‘seinem’ in Article 19(2) GG); Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 874;
Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 44; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 26;
Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 15.
158 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 40 [footnote omitted] (‘If a fundamental
right provides for different obligations, directions of protection and functions, the Wesens-
gehalt will have to be interpreted accordingly.’).
159 Cf. Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 41.
160 Herbert 1985, p. 330.
161 Ibid., p. 333 (‘… can serve as a guiding principle when assessing the issue to which extent
the substantive content of the fundamental right calls for preservation and deserves to be
developed’).
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proportionality test is necessary in the first place, the starting point must be
the ‘sachliche Geltungsgehalt’ (‘material scope’) of a right,162 from which the
Wesensgehalt can be delineated.163
Next to emphasising that the content of the core right follows from the
meaning of the right itself, Herbert identifies a few more general
guidelines:164 First, the character and function of fundamental rights provides
some guidance.165 Fundamental rights are first of all rights of individuals,
and as such they primarily serve to guarantee self-determination in fields
typically imperilled by state powers, as well as secure the conditions and
possibilities for the free and self-accountable development, participation and
contribution of the individual in the community.166 Fundamental rights are
concerned with individual persons, and the more the freedom of the individual
concerns a social relation or function, the more broadly can the authority of
the legislature be understood.167 This does however not mean that the Wesens-
gehalt is limited to aspects of the private sphere. After all, various fundamental
rights move beyond this sphere and concern for example public speech, or
association and assembly.168
Secondly, according to Herbert, also the ‘dignity of man’, the Menschen-
würde, forms a guiding principle that ensures a minimal level of individual
autonomy and social dignity.169 He thereby seems to suggest that the core
of a right at least includes its Menschenwürde aspects, but that these do not
exhaust the Wesensgehalt. It remains unclear, however, whether his theory
implies that the ‘remainder’ of the Wesensgehalt should also be determined
by (what comes closest to) the Menschenwürdegehalt. Potentially, at least, this
notion could play such a role by pointing out the direction in which one should
look for determining core aspects.
Finally, Herbert argues that comparative insights can be helpful in deter-
mining the Wesensgehalt of a right. This means that other bodies of law or legal
obligations may help in clarifying the contours of a right’s core. Referring to
prohibitions following from the ECHR, as well as ius cogens, he however notes
that these usually present an absolute minimum that mostly does not reach
the level of protection that is or should be granted by Article 19(2) GG.170
This means, hence, that comparative international insights in the German
162 Ibid., p. 331. Cf. also Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, no. 44.
163 Ibid., p. 331 (where several examples concerning German constitutional rights are given).
164 Ibid., p. 332.
165 Cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 31, referring to the ‘Wortlaut, Sinn
und Zweck’ (the wording, meaning, and aims) of fundamental rights as providing the
necessary guidelines.
166 Herbert 1985, p. 332. Cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 28.
167 Herbert 1985, p. 332.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., pp. 332-333.
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context would not suffice for determining the Wesensgehalt as one would then
end up with a ‘too’ minimal protection.171 Like in the case of the Menschen-
würdegehalt, comparative insights can however point out the direction in which
to look; they can form the stepping-stones for carving out a more inclusive
‘minimum’ protection through Article 19(2) GG.172
In sum, it can be concluded that those who favour an absolute understand-
ing of the Wesensgehalt, stress the importance of giving Article 19, Section 2
GG a meaning of its own. Moreover, and most importantly, they emphasise
the importance of the protection of individuals against the state. This does
not merely imply that a core is absolutely protected, but also that the meaning
of this core is ‘absolute’, i.e., established in an abstract, case-independent fashion.
‘Absolutists’ hold that there needs to be a predetermined area the legislature,
as well the executive and the judiciary, cannot touch upon. Delineating and
defending this area is hence what the Wesensgehaltsgarantie should be used
for.
Static versus Dynamic Absolute Theories
Before moving to a discussion on the relative understanding of the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie and a further exploration of the relation between this guarantee
and the Verhaltnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz, one last aspect of the absolute theory
should be looked into. Generally, the absolute theory is thought to be a very
strict one.173 A distinction must however be made between those who support
a, what Drews calls, statisch-absolute Theorie and those who believe the core
of a right must be understood as dynamisch-absolut.174 At least with regard
to the content175 of the Wesensgehalt, the latter interpretation is not a strict
one – it holds that the core of a right is dynamic and can change over time.
According to Herbert, it implies that the Wesensgehalt should not be understood
as a ‘versteinerte Kern’:176
‘Die Grundrechte sind auf die soziale Wirklichkeit bezogen, die stetem geschicht-
lichem Wandel unterliegt. Im Vorgang ihrer “Konkretisierung” bleibt ihr sachlicher
Gehalt von sozialem Wandel nicht unberührt. Soweit die Verfassung ‘offen‘ ist
171 However, Herbert’s article was written in 1985, and it can be argued that international legal
standard setting – not in the least by the ECtHR – has expanded to such extent that this
point is no longer valid.
172 Cf., infra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2.
173 Cf. Knüllig 1956, p. 118 (who is speaking of those ‘core’ elements of a fundamental right
that remain the same regardless of any changes in the perception of the right).
174 Drews 2005, pp. 65-66.
175 And indeed, not with regard to the protection offered, in the sense that when a ‘dynamic
core’ is identified, it is absolutely protected and no exceptions are hence possible. See, on
the distinction between absolute content and absolute protection, infra, Ch. 7, especially
S. 7.2.1.
176 Herbert 1985, p. 334. Cf. also Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 875, who takes into account the
historical development of the fundamental right when the Wesensgehalt is to be determined.
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und durch den Text der Norm begrenzte Auslegung ihres Inhalts mit dem Blick
auf die reale Umwelt zuläßt und ermöglicht, trägt das nicht zu ihrer allmählichen
Auflösung, sondern zu ihrer “Verstetigung” bei. … [Auch] der jeweilige Wesens-
gehalt hat, wenngleich mit gebremster Dynamik, teil an der Entwicklung des
Grundrechts.’177
By way of example, Herbert mentions the fundamental right to protection of
property as a right the Wesensgehalt of which has altered over time – from the
guarantee of ‘freien Herrschaftsbeliebens’, i.e., the unlimited right to do with your
property whatever you like, to protection merely of ‘private use’ of property
and the right to dispose of it.178 More broadly speaking, according to the
‘dynamic’ theory, (social) changes in society and a changing understanding
of what fundamental rights should provide for, can affect the Wesensgehalt
and alter its content. In this way, the advantage of ‘absolute’ protection of an
important fundamental rights interest can be combined with the possibility
to adjust the definition of the core of rights to reflect new circumstances.
Phrased differently, the strict character of the absolute understanding can be
nuanced and ‘softened’ by the idea that fundamental cores need not be deter-
mined once and for all. Of course this brings along extra, and particularly
difficult questions, as when and how an absolute core should be altered, to
which the literature does not provide concrete answers.
4.3.2.2 Relative Theories
According to a relative understanding of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, the Wesen
of a right does not constitute an absolute, pre-determined boundary to limita-
tions to the exercise of that right. Rather, a right’s Wesen is something that
needs to be determined in the context of a specific case by balancing the
different interests.179 Different from the ‘absolute’ understanding, a relative
Wesensgehalt does not preclude a proportionality test, but instead the Wesen
177 Herbert 1985, p. 334 (‘The fundamental rights [enumerated in the Grundgesetz] relate to
social reality, which is subject to constant historical change. In the course of their “concretisa-
tion”, their substantive content remains not unaffected by social change. To the extent that
the constitution is “open” and enables and allows for an interpretation of its content in
the light of social reality, this does not contribute to it subsequent dissolution, but rather
to its “consolidation” … the respective core right [as well], participates, albeit less dynamic-
ally, in the development of the fundamental right.’).
178 Herbert 1985, p. 334. Cf. also Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19, no. 31.3.
179 See, generally, Drews 2005, p. 66ff.; Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no.
36ff.; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, pp. 867-868; Pieroth/Schlink 2010, no. 313; Borowski 2007, p.
287f.; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19, nos. 41ff.; Enders, in Epping/Hillgruber 2012, Art. 19,
no. 29ff.; Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth 2012, Art. 19, no. 9; Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, nos.
17-18; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, nos. 40f. For some supporters of a relative
theory, see Von Hippel 1965; Zivier 1960; Hamel 1957; Alexy 2002; Häberle 1983; Kaufmann
1984; Borowski 2007.
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is that what is left over once such a test has been performed. Hence, the Wesen
of a right is what results from the adjudication of a fundamental rights case,
rather than that it guides this process by being determined on forehand and
‘steering’ the way in which a court deals with a given rights issue.180 How-
ever, apart from sharing the assumption that the Wesensgehalt is by definition
circumstantial, relative theories are based on different perceptions of the role
of (the cores of) fundamental rights in relation to conflicting interests and
societal aims. By presenting different ‘relative’ views, this section gives an
overview of what the relative theory can stand for.
First and foremost, a relative understanding of the Wesensgehalt can imply that
Article 19, Section 2 GG de facto equals the requirement of proportionality, i.e.,
the Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz.181 According to Von Hippel, every funda-
mental rights norm can only be effectuated, if and to the extent there are no
higher-ranking interests conflicting with the freedom protected.182 Limitations
of fundamental rights are, according to this view, always allowed, as long as
they serve interests that outbalance the individual fundamental rights interest
at stake.183 Important to note is that when general (societal) interests prevail,
this cannot mean that the Wesensgehalt of the individual right is interfered
with.184 Instead, this signals that the limitation is actually in compliance with
the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. The core of a right is not interfered with at all, but
the Wesen of a right is ‘outlined’ in the sense that only when a decision on
proportionality is taken it becomes clearer what the Wesensgehalt could entail
in the first place.
In Von Hippel’s view, this understanding makes the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
more or less redundant, as it really does not add anything to the Verhältnis-
mäßigkeitsgrundsatz.185 The same position has been taken by Zivier.186 Zivier
mentions three starting points that have to be taken into account when funda-
180 Cf. Herbert 1985, p. 333, who introduces his absolute understanding as a ‘positive’, guiding
norm, implying that a relative understanding does not play this role, but should rather
be seen as the ‘residue’ of a balancing exercise. See, supra, S. 4.3.2.1.
181 Especially, e.g., Von Hippel 1965; Hamel 1957; Zivier 1960. See further Drews 2005, pp.
67-68. Cf. also Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, nos. 17-18.; Sachs, in Sachs 2011, Art. 19,
no. 42; Brüning, in Stern/Becker 2010, Art. 19, no. 40. See on the requirement of proportion-
ality, generally, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.4.2.
182 Von Hippel 1965, pp. 25-26. Cf. also p. 47.
183 Indeed, it is not necessary that the countervailing interests are of a fundamental nature.
Cf. Herbert 1985, p. 333, who instead holds that only when this is the case, a core right can
be relative.
184 Von Hippel 1965, p. 47. An understanding that in exceptional cases allows for interferences
with the core of a right, is a different ‘relative’ understanding (Cf. infra, Ch. 7, S. 7.2.1.).
See, for examples of relative core protection understood in this way, infra, Ch. 6, S. 6.5.2,
and, more indirectly, Ch. 5.
185 See Drews 2005, p. 67.
186 Zivier 1960.
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mental rights are interpreted. First of all, attention has to be paid to the funda-
mental rights norm itself. Secondly, account needs to be taken of the possibility
to limit the fundamental right, and, thirdly, of the relation between this possib-
ility and the fundamental rights norm.187 From this he infers that the Wesens-
gehalt of a right can only be determined when both the ‘Grundrechtssatzes’ and
the ‘Vorbehaltssatzes’ are considered, i.e., balanced against each other. According
to Zivier, ‘[d]ies ist … nur nach dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz möglich’.188
From the positions of Von Hippel and Zivier one can quite easily move to
Alexy’s understanding of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. Also Alexy sees a close
connection between the Wesensgehaltsgarantie and the Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrund-
satz. He grounds his view on his constitutional rights theory, and on the idea
of fundamental rights as principles in particular.189 His theory, which was
introduced already in Chapter 3,190 in brief entails that fundamental rights
are ‘optimisation requirements’, which can be fulfilled to different degrees
depending on the legal and factual possibilities.191 As principles, fundamental
rights can conflict with other principles concerning the general interest. When
this is the case, neither the individual interest nor the general interest takes
precedence per se.192 Instead, the principle of proportionality becomes of
crucial importance.193 Alexy’s theory implies that even when the individual
interest at stake involves a very important aspect of a fundamental right, this
alone is not a reason to give precedence to it.194 The prima facie rights that
are put forward by constitutional provisions can always – depending on the
concrete circumstances – be outbalanced by limitations of a more forceful
character. What matters is the relation between the degree of interference and
the importance of satisfying the competing interest. Alexy by no means denies
that there are limits to limitations of fundamental rights.195 These limits how-
ever cannot be determined at the outset but are, indeed, always dependent
on the requirement of Angemessenheit, i.e., proportionality in the narrow
sense.196 Speaking of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie in particular, Alexy holds that
‘[t]he absolute theory goes too far in saying that there are legal positions such
187 Ibid., p. 76ff. See also Drews 2005, p. 68.
188 ‘This is only possible according to the Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz.’ Zivier 1960, p. 79.
189 Alexy 2002. More precisely, according to Alexy fundamental rights have both a ‘rule’ and
a ‘principle’ aspect, see, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1. See also Borowski 2007, pp. 287-288.
190 See, supra, Ch. 3, and in particular S. 3.2.1 and 3.4.2.
191 Alexy 2002, pp. 47-48. See also Alexy 1992, p. 120; Alexy 1987, p. 407.
192 Alexy 2002, pp. 51-54.
193 Alexy 2002, p. 65.
194 This follows from the ‘Law of Balancing’, see Alexy 2002, p. 102, see also, supra, Ch. 3, S.
3.4.2.
195 Alexy 2002, p. 192.
196 Ibid., p. 194. Cf. also Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 18; Hofmann, in Schmidt-Bleibtreu/
Hofmann/Hopfauf 2011, Art. 19, no. 18.
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that no possible legal reason can ever restrict them’.197 He does not deny
that there are conditions under which it is very likely that there is no conflict-
ing principle that can ever take precedence of an individual right. When this
is the case, ‘essential cores’ become visible.198 This ‘absolute’ conclusion is
however still something relative – it is grounded on a specific relation between
the different principles at stake, and there always remains a possibility that
competing principles do take precedence if the facts of a case would be differ-
ent.199 The Wesen of a right cannot be identified without first balancing the
relevant principles against one another. It is the Angemessenheit, the proportion-
ality in the narrow sense, that enables the assessment of the various legal
possibilities, and hence to determine the relative core of a fundamental right.
Borowski concurs with Alexy’s interpretation: he holds that even though
what follows from the proportionality test is a ‘rule-like core’, this ‘rule’
nevertheless remains dependent on a rights-principle being balanced against
conflicting principles. The upshot is hence that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
‘hat daneben materiell keine eigenständige Bedeutung. Damit dürfte feststehen,
daß mangels autoritativer Festsetzung eines absoluten Wesensgehalts die Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie gem. Art. 19 Abs. 2 GG im Sinne der Theorie vom relative Wesens-
gehalt zu deuten ist.’200
The conclusion that the individual core of a right can never be affected as long
as state or other interests are of higher importance nevertheless remains
somewhat counterintuitive. After all, fundamental rights are generally con-
sidered to provide protection against the will of the majority, and should
therefore not entirely be dependent on state interests. Hamel tries to clarify
the matter by referring to the ‘social aspect’ of fundamental rights.201 In his
view, ‘[d]er verfassungspolitische Sinn der Menschenrechte und der Grund-
197 Alexy 2002, p. 195
198 Ibid., referring to Häberle 1983, p. 64: ‘What is described as the inviolable “core” of freedom
of action, or freedom of contract, is that area in which there are without question no
legitimate legal interests capable of limiting constitutional rights which are of equal or higher
value.’
199 Alexy 2002, pp. 195-196. See also Borowski 2007, p. 287ff. Borowski holds that the absolute
theory holds that the core of a right has a ‘rule character’, whereas the periphery must
be understood as a principle. Nevertheless, ‘[m]angels besonderer autoritativer Festsetzung
bleibt diese Regel jedoch jederzeit insofern vorläufig, als besondere Umstände eine Über-
prüfung und gegebenenfalls Korrektur erfordern. Mit der Begründung der Wesensgehalts-
Regel aus Prinzipienkollisionen ist jedoch die Position der absoluten Wesensgehaltsgarantie
bereits verlassen’ (p. 289).
200 Borowski 2007, p. 290 (‘… besides that, the rule has no self-standing substantive significance.
As a result, it should be clear that as there is no authoritative definition of an absolute
Wesensgehalt, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie according to Art. 19(2) GG must be understood in
line with the theory of the relative Wesensgehalt.’).
201 Hamel 1957, pp. 23-24, 38-39.
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rechte umfaßt den sozialpolitischen’.202 Individual rights do not only concern
individual freedoms, but also individual duties, and are inherently related
to human coexistence.203 Referring to the fundamental ‘Berufsfreiheit’ (freedom
of profession), as well as to the protection of property and the freedom of
association, Hamel stresses that these rights (and their cores) must be under-
stood in light of the purpose of fundamental rights in a ‘soziale Rechtsstaat’.204
It is the task of the state to develop the ‘Werte menschlicher Gemeinexistenz’.
Limitations of fundamental rights that are necessary to serve this goal cannot
be said to interfere with the Wesen of these rights.205 Indeed, the Wesen of
a right cannot be determined without considering such limitations.
Another, somewhat different relative approach follows from the theory laid
out by Häberle.206 Häberle’s influential work on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
not only presents a rich example of a relative understanding of Article 19(2)
GG, it moreover incorporates this understanding into a broader institutional
theory of fundamental rights and their limits.207 While most authors take
this as the starting point, Häberle’s theory argues against the ‘Eingriffs- und
Schrankendenkens’ that is predominant in German constitutional law.208 He
does not regard freedom, and the constitutional rights that protect individual
freedoms, as ‘Reservaten individueller Beliebigkeit’ (‘areas of individual
discretion’),209 which exclude room for definition by the legislature. According
to this interpretation, rights are understood as ‘boundless’, at least before they
are restricted ‘from outwards’.210 Instead, Häberle considers rights as being
limited ‘from the outset’. He stresses that there is a strong link between rights
and their boundaries – these boundaries ‘wiesen dem Grundrecht den Platz
zu, den es von vornherein im Ganzen der Verfassung einnimmt’.211
Häberle’s theory thus focuses on the ‘ineinanderstehen’ of freedom and law,
i.e., on the interrelatedness of the two.212 He argues that it is generally mis-
202 ‘The constitutional-political meaning of human rights and fundamental rights comprises
a socio-political one.’ Hamel 1957, p. 23.
203 Ibid., p. 23-24. Cf. the individual-oriented theory presented by Herbert, 1985. See, supra,
S. 4.3.2.1.
204 Hamel 1957, p. 39. This moreover goes for all fundamental rights, see p. 40.
205 Ibid., p. 41ff.
206 See, foremost, Häberle 1983, but also Häberle 1989.
207 The following, however, should not be confused with the ‘institutional’ objective understand-
ing of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. See, supra, S. 4.3.1.1.
208 See, e.g., Häberle 1983, p. 3.
209 Ibid., p. 152, referring to natural law ideas, as well as to the theories of Jellinek, Schmitt
and Kelsen.
210 Ibid., p. 51ff., 126ff. Cf. the two-fold structure of fundamental rights as is was discussed
previously. See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1. The distinction Häberle speaks of resembles that
between prima facie and ‘eventual’ rights.
211 Ibid., p. 51 (‘… give the fundamental right its position in the Constitution in the first place.’).
212 Ibid., p. 152, 161, 225.
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conceived that freedom and law refer to each other, which in the context of
fundamental rights implies that these rights form a system of ‘rechtlich ge-
regelter Freiheit’ (‘regulated freedom’).213 Fundamental rights are not ‘be-
schränkt’, i.e., not ‘limited’ by the legislature, but instead have immanent
boundaries. They are not only ‘defensive’ rights, but they belong to the state
instead, and have the aim to protect ‘incorporated’ citizens rather than purely
‘autonomous’ ones.214 The task of the legislature is therefore not to limit ‘pre-
existing’ rights when this is deemed necessary, but instead to identify the
boundaries of fundamental rights and thereby determine what these entail
in the first place. In this way ‘[j]ede Begrenzung ist zugleich inhaltliche Be-
stimmung, punktuelle Inhaltsbestimmung des Grundrechts’.215
For the Wesensgehaltsgarantie this means that Häberle sees the ‘Wesen’ of
fundamental rights, just as these rights themselves, as from the outset deter-
mined in the light of conflicting interests: ‘[D]er Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte
[ist] keine Größe …, die “an sich” und unabhängig vom Ganzen der Ver-
fassung und den neben den Grundrechten anerkannten Rechtsgütern zu
gewinnen ist.’216 More particularly, the determination of fundamental rights
takes place by means of a balancing test, and the same goes when it comes
to settling the ‘core’ of a right.217 The Wesensgehaltsgarantie as understood
by Häberle is thus identical to the requirement of proportionality. Interestingly,
however, he endeavours to demonstrate that this is not contradictory to the
idea of fundamental rights as important ‘institutions’ nor to the very notion
of core rights, by explaining that it is exactly the balancing that enables to
demarcate fundamental rights as ‘institutions’ from other legal interests, or
Rechtsgütern.218
All in all, Häberle’s relative theory does not depart from the other relative
views presented here when it comes to the conclusion that ‘cores’ are by
definition relative because they exist only by virtue of a proportionality
213 Ibid., p. 152.
214 Ibid., p. 19.
215 ‘Every limitation is at the same time a substantive determination, an exact determination
of substance of the fundamental right.’ Ibid., p. 180.
216 Ibid., p. 58 (‘The Wesensgehalt of fundamental rights is no factor … that can be determined
an sich and identified independently from the whole of the Constitution and the interests
recognised next to the fundamental rights’. See also Häberle 1989, p. 388; Häberle 1983,
p. 61, and 183, where he formulates it as follows: ‘Welche Bedeutung dies Begrenzungs-
und Gestaltungsfunktion für den Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte und die wesensmäßigen
Grundrechtsgrenzen besitzt, ist unschwer zu erkennen: Der Gesetzgeber, der die Grundrech-
te in de beschriebenen Weise ausgestaltet, stattet sie mit ihrem jeweiligen Wesensgehalt
aus, d.h. er schafft Normenkomplexe und einzelne Rechtsinstitute, welche zum Wesen des
betreffenden Grundrechts gehören, oder (und) er schafft die Voraussetzungen dafür, daß
die einzelnen Grundrechtberechtigten in der Lage sind, vom Wesen ihrer Freiheit Gebrauch
zu machen. Daß die Funktion des Gesetzgebers auch wesentlich mit dem “Ineinanderstehen”
von Recht und Freiheit zusammenhängt, liegt auf der Hand.’
217 Häberle 1983, p. 31, 51, 58.
218 Ibid., p. 125.
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analysis. Nevertheless, his account of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie signals an
important and particular outlook. Whereas Alexy – as well as implicitly also
most of the other ‘relativists’ – builds his relative theory on the idea that
individuals have broad, prima facie rights that should be upheld to the greatest
extent possible, Häberle does not distinguish between a ‘prior’, broadly under-
stood fundamental right and the limited version of this right after a – po-
tentially justifiable – interference has taken place. Häberle’s institutional theory
does not speak of pre-existing rights, but of rights that are determined in a
legal context. Thus, in his view, also cores of rights are by definition carved
out by the legislature.
One last account to be briefly mentioned in this section is that of Kaufmann,
who explicitly rejects an ‘institutional’ characterisation of fundamental rights
and is sceptical when it comes to the Wesensgehalt as it is commonly under-
stood, namely in a ‘substance-ontological’ sense.219 From his point of view,
the search for a substantial Wesensgehalt is ‘sinnlos’.220 Law, according to
Kaufmann, is relational, rather then substantive:
‘Ein Recht kann gar nicht sinnvoll ohne Bezug (Relation) zu anderen Rechten und
Rechtssubjekten gedacht werden. “Recht” ist nicht dann gegeben, wenn ein be-
stimmter “Zustand” … geschaffen ist, sondern wenn das “rechte Verhältnis” besteht
zwischen den Personen sowie den Personen und den Dingen.’221
Also the Wesen of a right can therefore only be understood in a relational sense.
Hence, when it comes to a limitation of a fundamental right, there is nothing
left over that can be described as a ‘meßbaren, zählbahren, wägbaren “Wesens-
gehalt”’.222 Kaufmann argues that his theory is neither absolute, nor relat-
ive.223 Drews however, makes clear that his understanding of the Wesensgehalt
could be positioned amongst the relative theories.224 After all, Kaufmann
sees a central role for the principle of balancing in order to determine the
‘rechte Verhältnis’ he considers crucial.225 And even when the result of this
balancing is not labelled ‘Wesensgehalt’ – for he indeed abolishes this de-
piction –, Kaufmann in fact does the same thing as the other relativists, namely
219 Kaufmann 1984, p. 390ff. Kaufmann points at the fact that different theories speak of a
‘Restbestand’, or a ‘substantielles Minimum’.
220 Ibid., p. 391.
221 Ibid., p. 393. (‘A right cannot be understood in a meaningful way, but in relation to other
rights and rightsbearers. One cannot speak of “law”, when a certain condition is created
… but when an “adequate relation” exists between persons as well as between persons
and things’.)
222 Ibid., p. 392.
223 And for that matter, he also holds his theory to overcome the distinction between ‘objective’
and ‘subjective’ theories. See ibid., p. 394, 397, and, supra, S. 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2.
224 Drews 2005, p. 69ff.
225 Cf. Kaufmann 1984, p. 396.
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determining the limits to limitations with the help of a circumstantial pro-
portionality test.226
Altogether, the different relative theories have in common that they emphasise
the possibility of limiting fundamental rights. They do not recognise a core
that is determined in advance and they deny that such a core should take a
guiding role in the adjudicative process by defending a particular area of
freedom against interference by the state. Rather, they state that what can be
considered the Wesen of a right always has to be determined by taking into
account countervailing interests. Indeed, this Wesen might still be considered
to be ‘absolutely protected’ in the sense that it cannot be interfered with, which
is in fact what Article 19(2) GG dictates. It is, however, relative because what
the core is cannot be determined in an absolute way. The main difference
between the different relative theories is then that some of them focus on the
technical impossibility of avoiding a balancing test for determining whether
an interference with a prima facie right is justified (e.g., Alexy, Borowski),227
whereas others stress the socio-political or institutional character of funda-
mental rights (e.g., Hamel, Häberle) – and thereby the impossibility of taking
a bifurcated approach and determining a prima facie right in the first place –
in order to explain why the protection of the core of a right is by definition
relative.
4.4 CORE RIGHTS IN THE PRACTICE OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
Already in the introduction to this chapter, it was noted that the German
Wesensgehaltsgarantie as it is laid down in Article 19(2) GG would be discussed
mainly for its theoretical relevance. The debate that has just been outlined
shows a rich array of understandings of the idea of protecting the core, or
Wesen, of fundamental rights. Not only the addressees and the object of pro-
tection of Article 19(2) GG have been subject to discussion, elaborate arguments
have also been put forward regarding whether cores of rights are something
‘absolute’, or rather necessarily dependent on the case at hand. In terms of
practical relevance, there is less that can be said. Although for this study no
extensive research has been done into the case law of the German Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, it can be concluded on the basis of the literature and (up-to-
date) commentaries that in practice Article 19(2) GG does not play an explicit
role. However, this does not necessarily imply that the protection of cores of
rights cannot be considered an important value underlying in a more general
way the practice of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
226 Drews 2005, pp. 70-71.
227 Thereby relying on the binary structure of fundamental rights. See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
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Therefore, after having made a few remarks as regards the limited concrete
relevance of Article 19(2) GG (4.4.1), the concluding part of this chapter will
also look beyond this specific constitutional provision (4.4.2). It is submitted
here that besides the manifold theoretical insights that can be gained from
the academic debate on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, for the purpose of this
research another ‘core rights guarantee’ apparent in German constitutional
law should be discussed. Especially given the emphasis of the present study
on the protection of economic and social rights in particular, the guarantee
of an Existenzminimum (subsistence minimum) and the way this guarantee
has been elaborated in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s case law is worth
attention. This will not only present an example of how the protection of
essential (socio-economic) levels of a right plays a concrete role in fundamental
rights adjudication in Germany, but may also provide an interesting source
of inspiration for the ECHR system.
4.4.1 The Limited Practical Use of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
As mentioned previously, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has held with regard
to interferences with the core of a right, that because of the wording of Article
19(2) GG, ‘die Frage, unter welchen Voraussetzungen ein solcher Eingriff
ausnahmeweise zülassig ist, ist … gegenstandslos’.228 Some authors consider
this to be a confirmation of the fact that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is something
absolute. This could be considered true when ‘absolute’ protection is under-
stood merely as ‘not allowing for any exceptions’. However, the quote of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht does not rule out a ‘relative’ understanding in the
sense that what is to be protected ‘absolutely’, can only be determined in a
relative manner, i.e., by taking into account the particular circumstances at
stake in a given case. In this understanding, the concrete added value of Article
19(2) GG to the test of proportionality may seem non-existing.
When looking at the reasoning of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it becomes
clear that, indeed, this court generally resorts to proportionality analysis and
‘balancing’. The question of what concerns the core of a specific right is then
answered on the basis of the Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz and not determined
on forehand.229 In a case concerning the fundamental right to liberty of the
person,230 for example, it concluded that
228 BVerfGE 7, 377 (411), see, supra, S. 4.3.2.1.
229 E.g., Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 39.
230 Art. 2(1) GG reads: ‘Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, soweit
er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder
das Sittengesetz verstößt’ (‘Every person has the right to free development of their personal-
ity, to the extent that they do not infringe the rights of others or offend against the constitu-
tional order or public morals.’).
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‘[d]er schwerwiegende Grundrechtseingriff, den die möglicherweise lebenslange
Verwahrung bedeutet, verstößt nicht gegen die Wesensgehaltsgarantie, solange
gewichtige Schutzinteressen den Eingriff zu legitimieren vermögen und insbe-
sondere der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit gewahrt ist.’231
This does not imply that there can be sufficient reasons for interfering with
the Wesen of a right. Rather, as long as there are sufficient reasons – and an
interference is thereby proportional – the Wesen of a right has not been touched
upon.
In German constitutional law, the omnipresence of the requirement of
proportionality has had the effect that interferences with fundamental rights
are not seldom held to be unconstitutional, even if they cannot (yet) be said
to have touched upon the possible Wesen of a right.232 From this it follows
that, in practice, when an interference is, or could arguably be considered to
be in violation of the core of a right, the Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz generally
functions as the relevant criterion.233 In this respect, a distinction can be made
between a proportionality analysis in the context of negative, or ‘defensive’
guarantees, and positive (aspects of) fundamental rights.234 With regard to
the former it is noted that the Übermaßverbot is the most important criterion
for determining whether or not an interference can be justified. This require-
ment prohibits ‘übermäßigen Eingriffen’ (disproportionate interferences), and
hence implies that ‘“[i]n keinem Falle” darf … eine konkrete Beeinträchtigung
eines Freiheitsgrundrechts in Bezug auf den verfolgten Zweck ungeeignet,
nicht erforderlich oder unverhältnismäßig sein’.235 Also the Menschenwürde-
gehalt is of crucial relevance here, and can likewise ‘stand in the way’ of a more
specific Wesensgehalt test.236 When it comes to positive (aspects) of rights,
active participation by the state is required and the state is instead confronted
with the ‘Untermaßverbot’.237 This means that it is not allowed to ‘do too
little’ and provide for insufficient, or ‘undersized’ protection. Also this require-
ment is seen to have the effect that the Wesengehaltgarantie requirement becomes
redundant, since core rights protection is in fact included in proportionality
review.
231 BVerfGE 109, 133 (156) (Sicherungsverwahrung) (‘The enormous interference a potentially
life-long detention means, does not violate the Wesensgehaltsgarantie as long as important
protected interests can justify the interference, and the principle of proportionality in
particular is respected.’). Cf. also BVerfGE 117, 71 (96) (gefährliche Straftäter); BVerfGE 115,
118 (165) (Luftsicherheitsgesetz); BVerfGE 27, 344 (352) (Ehescheidungsakten).
232 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 18.
233 E.g., BVerfGE 22, 180 (219). Cf. Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 38.
234 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 42.
235 Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 43. (‘In no case may a concrete interference with a fundamental
freedom be unsuited, unnecessary, or disproportionate with regard to the aim pursued’).
236 Cf., on the role of this guarantee in relation to the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, supra, S. 4.3.2.1.
237 Remmert, in Maunz/Dürig 2012, Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 45.
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The conclusion must thus be that the added value of the Article 19(2) GG
in everyday practice is limited, if not non-existent.238 Remmert holds that
the Wesensgehaltsgarantie essentially is simply a notion summarising principles
that can be inferred from the Constitution even if there would not be Article
19(2).239 Likewise, Häberle concludes that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
‘ist die deklaratorische Sanktion, die zusätzliche und überflüssige Sicherung von
Prinzipien, die bereits in der Verfassung zum Ausdruck gelangt sind. Seine Be-
deutung erschöpft sich darin, die Prinzipien in spezifischer Weise in einer Formel
zusammenzufassen. Auch ohne ausdrückliche Wesensgehaltsgarantie ist der für
jedes Grundrecht gesondert zu ermittelnde “Wesensgehalt“ von der Verfassung
gewährleistet.’240
In line with these comments, the limited use of the Wesengehaltgaratie can be
considered to result from the presence of other constitutional instruments, in
particular the notion of proportionality, that serve equally well the goal of
judging whether or not an interference with a fundamental right is justified.
However, this does not mean that the idea of protecting, at the very least, the
core of a right does not play a valuable role for determining how to make use
of these instruments.
4.4.2 An Alternative Example: The Right to an Existenzminimum
Speaking of the protection of essential guarantees apart from that (explicitly)
based on the Wesengehaltgarantie, there is one example from the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’s practice that cannot go unnoticed. In its recent case law, this
court has recognised an individual right to an ‘Existenzminimum’, i.e., a subsist-
ence minimum or a ‘dignified minimum existence’.241 As will become clear
especially later on, this right is highlighted here not for its close, doctrinal
relationship to Article 19(2) GG in particular – which is in fact not there242 –,
but instead because of its particular relevance for the study into core rights
possibilities that can potentially be helpful for the socio-economic practice of
the ECtHR.243
238 E.g., Ibid., Art. 19 Abs. 2, no. 47.
239 Ibid., Art. 19, Abs. 2, no. 47.
240 Häberle 1983, p. 234. (‘[The Wesensgehaltsgarantie] is the declaratory sanction, a complement-
ary and redundant guarantee of principles that are already expressed in the Constitution.
Its meaning is limited to summarising the principles in a specific way in one formula. Even
without an explicit Wesensgehaltsgarantie the Wesensgehalt, which is to be determined for
each fundamental right individually, is guaranteed by the Constitution’.
241 BVerfGE 125, 175, 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 February 2010 (Hartz IV), para. 133ff.
242 See however Herbert 1985, p. 334 (supra, S. 4.3.2.1), who mentioned the Existenzminimum
as an example of the protection of the Wesen of a right.
243 See, in particular, infra, Ch. 7.
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4.4.2.1 The Absolute Right to an Existenzminimum
The Existenzminimum, or subsistence minimum, is not a recent legal pheno-
menon in Germany. Already for a long time, the duty to provide for this
minimum has been considered to follow from Article 20(1) GG.244 This pro-
vision holds that ‘[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and
federal social state’ and is known as the ‘social state principle’.245 Article
20 does not fall under the header of ‘Basic Rights’ but forms the start of the
chapter of the Grundgesetz on ‘The Federation and the Länder’. This means
that the protection of the subsistence minimum was considered only a duty
for the state, and not a subjective, individual constitutional right. Thus,
although the state had to provide for tolerable living conditions on the basis
of statutory entitlements in the law,246 individuals could not go to court
arguing that their fundamental rights had been breached when the state
allegedly failed to do so.
On the basis of two landmark cases dating from 2010 and 2012, this has
now changed.247 In the Hartz IV judgment, as well as later in the Asylbewerber-
leistungsgesetz (Asylum Seekers Benefits) judgment, the Bundesverfassungsericht
has clarified that the Existenzminimum can be seen as an individual, constitu-
tional right.248 The Hartz IV case concerned the constitutionality of social
assistance benefits paid under federal legislation. As of 2005, the Second Book
of the German Code of Social Law arranges for basic provisions for employable
persons either without any income or earning low wages. The payments are
not linked to prior wages and are completely tax-funded. They include, next
to a standard benefit, benefits for accommodation and heating, and became
known as Hartz IV. With regard to these benefits, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
held that Article 1 GG (human dignity), in combination with Article 20 (the
“social state principle”), confers a right on individuals to a dignified minimum
existence.249 According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the right to an Existenz-
minimum
244 BVerfGE 1, 97 (104). See, e.g., Bittner 2011, p. 1942.
245 ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.’
246 E.g., BVerwGE 1, 159 (161).
247 Hartz IV and BVerfGE 132, 134, BvL 10/10, of 18 July 2012 (Asylum Seekers Benefits), respect-
ively. However, combining Art. 20 with Art. 1 GG (human dignity), already in the early
1990s the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that in the field of income tax, the taxpayer must
be allowed a tax-free income that ensures an existence in human dignity (e.g., BVerfGK
82, 60). In order for parents to provide for their children, moreover, aliments to be paid
have to be tax free. Also, it became clear that the subsistence minimum cannot take the
form of retroactive payments, but has to be provided for immediately. See BVerfGE 5, 237.
248 See, on this development also, e.g., Seiler 2010; Kingreen 2010; Schnath 2010; Hörmann 2010.
As Bittner notes, ‘[t]he special thrust of the Hartz IV decision is its subsequent step from
a state’s obligation to formulate an individual’s enforceable constitutional right to statutory
state benefits as the reverse image of the state’s obligation’. Bittner 2011, p. 1944.
249 Hartz IV, para. 133ff.
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‘only covers those means which are vital to maintain an existence that is in line
with human dignity. It guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform
fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses both the physical existence of
the individual, that is food, clothing, household goods, housing, heating, hygiene
and health …, and ensuring the possibility to maintain inter-human relationships
and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and political life.’250
The 2012 Asylum Seekers Benefits judgment on the other hand, concerned
benefits paid under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act 1993 (AsylbLG). This
statute arranged for a ‘separate rule for social benefits’ in the sense that asylum
seekers were not covered by arrangements made in the Second (including Hartz
IV) and Twelfth Book of the Code of Social Law, but by this statute. The
benefits granted under the AsylbLG were adjusted to the needs of people only
staying in Germany for a short time and were significantly lower.251 Over
time, however, the arrangements of the AsylbLG were also applied to people
who remained in Germany for a significant period of time due to humanitarian
reasons (e.g. war refugees); they received the lower benefits for up to four
years. Importantly, moreover, the rate of the benefits had not been increased
since 1993, when the statute entered into force.252
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, asked to decide upon the constitutionality
of section 3(2)(2) and (3) in conjunction with section 3(1)(4) of the AsylbLG,
in this case held that
‘[w]enn Menschen die zur Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen Daseins
notwendige materiellen Mittel fehlen … ist der Staat im Rahmen seines Auftrages
zum Schutz der Menschenwürde und in Ausfüllung seines soziaalstaatlichen
Gestaltungsauftrages verpflichtet, dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass die materiellen
Voraussetzungen dafür Hilfebedürftigen zur Verfügung stehen … Als Menschenrecht
steht dieses Grundrecht deutschen und ausländischen Staatsangehörigen, die sich in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufhalten, gleichermaßen zu. Dieser objektiven Verpflich-
tung aus Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG korrespondiert ein individueller Leistungsanspruch, da
250 Ibid., para. 135. Indeed, there is a right to both the physical and socio-cultural aspects
thereof. Cf. Bittner 2011, pp. 1952-1953: ‘The Court explicitly denied a division of this
guarantee into an absolute part (for example food, housing and clothing) and additional
parts covering the participation in social and political life’. See, for a different view, Egidy
2011, p. 1976.
251 The shortfall was calculated to be at least 31 percent. See also Winkler and Mahler 2013,
p. 391.
252 In fact, already for some time, and especially after the Hartz IV judgment, doubts had been
voiced as regards the constitutionality of the act. See, e.g., Kingreen 2011; Hörmann 2012,
p. 208; Haedrich 2010, p. 227; Görsch 2011, p. 646.
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das Grundrecht die Würde jedes einzelnen Menschen schützt … und sie in solchen
Notlagen nur durch materielle Unterstützung gesichert werden kann.’253
Thus, it was clarified that the right to a subsistence minimum applies to all
persons, regardless of their residential status, in Germany.254
Why can the protection of a right to an Existenzminimum be understood as
a kind of core rights protection?255 This is the case because it ensures that
there is always an absolute minimum provided for that cannot be interfered
with. Rather than implying a right to material prerequisites and means of
subsistence generally, the right to an Existenzminimum protects the ‘Wesen’
of the guarantee of human dignity in combination with the Sozialstaatsprin-
zip.256 It does not entail a right to the full range of possibilities of participating
in social, cultural and political life, but ensures that there is always an
‘essential’ level thereof. Importantly, the guarantee of an Existenzminimum is
‘absolutely’ protected. It is based on the guarantee of human dignity (Article 1
GG), which is considered to not allow for any exceptions. In other words, once
the Bundesverfassungsgericht has found an interference with human dignity,
it does not review this interference in the light of the requirements of
proportionality but instead directly finds that the constitution has been vi-
olated.257 This implies that also the right to an Existenzminimum is a strict,
non-derogable guarantee. Interesting, moreover, is indeed that this ‘essential’
253 Asylum Seekers Benefits, para. 63 [emphasis added]: ‘When people lack the material means
to guarantee a life in dignity … the state is – in accordance with its responsibility to protect
human dignity and in compliance with its general social state mandate – obliged to ensure
that the material conditions are provided to those in need. As a human right, this fundamental
right is granted to Germans as well as foreigners residing in Germany alike. This objective
obligation inferred from Article 1 S. 1 GG corresponds with an individual entitlement to
state action, because the fundamental right protects the dignity of every single person …
and in circumstances of economic distress it can only be guaranteed through material
support’.
254 The Bundesverfassungsgericht underlines this by referring to Germany’s obligations under
international law: it refers to secondary EU law (EC Directive 2003/9 (laying down mini-
mum standards for the reception of asylum seekers) of 27 January 2003, O.J. 2003, L 31/18)
as well as to Articles 9 and 15(1) ICESCR (the right to social security and to take part in
cultural life) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Arts. 22(1) and 28 of
the CRC). See Asylum Seekers Benefits, para. 94. On the importance of external references
for determining core obligations, see, infra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2.
255 Cf. Egidy 2011, p. 1972.
256 The right to an Existenzminimum ‘only covers those means which are vital to maintain an
existence that is in line with human dignity. It guarantees the whole subsistence minimum
by a uniform fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses both the physical existence
of the individual, that is food, clothing, household goods, housing, heating, hygiene and
health’. See Hartz IV, para. 135. See also Asylum Seekers Benefits, para. 90.
257 See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 1(1), nos. 43, 46.
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protection of socio-economic interests, is provided under a norm that is of
a particular ‘civil and political’ kind.258
4.4.2.2 Procedural Requirements
In addition to what was just said, it must be noted that the absolute character
of the right to an Existenzminimum is of a particular kind. After all, that what
is protected in an absolute manner is stated in relatively vague terms. In fact,
in the Hartz IV case, after concluding that there was an individual right to
an Existenzminimum, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the constitution does
not permit for determining the precise shape of this right.259 Thereby, it
seemed to imply that what it in concreto means, i.e., what it ‘absolutely’ pro-
tects, is eventually left to the legislator to decide. No wonder, therefore, that
scholars have called the right to an Existenzminimum ‘seiner Natur nach relat-
iv’.260 Indeed, according to this view there are still no exceptions possible,
yet it is the content of the minimum that is not entirely ‘pre-determined’, and
thereby is considered ‘relative’.
However, the Bundesverfassungsgericht continued by stating that even though
it cannot determine the requirement’s exact contours, this does not mean that
there cannot be any meaningful judicial assessment. It first of all stressed that
the leeway of the legislature ends where the subsistence minimum provided
is “evidently insufficient”.261 Within this leeway, it can review the basis and
methods of calculation of the benefits, even if it cannot set any quantified
requirements. In the words of the FCC:
‘The protection of the fundamental right therefore also covers the procedure to
ascertain the subsistence minimum because a review of results can only be carried
out to a restricted degree by the standard of this fundamental right. In order to
ensure the traceability of the extent of the statutory assistance as commensurate
with the significance of the fundamental right, as well as to ensure the review of
the benefits by the courts, the assessment of the benefits must be clearly justifiable
on the basis of reliable figures and plausible methods of calculation.’262
258 This is particularly interesting in regard to the possibilities of core rights protection for
the ECtHR. See, further on how the right to an Existenzminimum provides an interesting
example in this regard, infra, Ch. 7.
259 Hartz IV , para. 142.
260 Indeed, the ‘absoluteness’ of the right is of a distinct kind. Cf. Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art.
1(1), no. 155; Neumann 1995, p. 429; Bittner 2011, p. 1953. Seiler 2011, p. 504, even holds
that, because the right has to be carved out by the legislature, it is by nature relative.
261 Hartz IV, para. 141: ‘Since the Basic Law itself does not permit any precise figure to be put
on the claim, the material review as regards the result is restricted to whether the benefits
are evidently insufficient’ (referring to BVerfGE 82, 60 (91-92)).
262 Hartz IV, para. 142.
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More concretely, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that four criteria need to
be complied with: 1) the legislature needs to cover and describe the objective
of ensuring an existence in line with Article 1(1) in conjunction with Article
20(1); 2) it needs to select – within its margin of appreciation – a procedure
of calculation fundamentally suited to an assessment of the subsistence mini-
mum; 3) in essence, the necessary facts must be completely and correctly
ascertained, and 4) the legislature needs to stay within the bounds of what
is justifiable within the chosen method and its structural principles at all steps
of the calculation process.263
In the Hartz IV case, the conclusion was that the benefits granted were not
‘evidently insufficient’. Also the first three of the set of requirements had been
met. However, since in calculating the subsistence minimum some expenditures
were not fully considered and deductions had been estimated randomly, the
fourth requirement, which is essentially one of consistency, had not been
fulfilled.264 This, indeed, constituted sufficient reason for the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht to conclude that there had been a breach of Article 1(1) in con-
junction with Article 20(1) GG.265
In the Asylum Seekers Benefits judgment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht added
that if the legislature in its protection of this minimum uses different methods
of calculation for different groups, this must be objectively justified.266 Like
the Hartz IV benefits, it did not consider the asylum seeker benefits to meet
the different procedural requirements. Moreover, it held that these were in
fact ‘evidently insufficient’.267 This because the level of the payments had
not changed since 1993 to take account of the considerable inflation since that
time and regardless of the fact that Article 3 (3) of the relevant statute provided
for regular adjustments.268 Also the fact that the asylum seekers benefits were
one-third lower than those provided under the Second and Twelfth Book of
263 Ibid., para. 143. These can be translated in the ‘rationale’, ‘transparency’ and ‘consistency
requirement’, see Bittner 2011, p. 1948.
264 Hartz IV, para. 171. There it holds that ‘“random” estimates … run counter to a procedure
of realistic investigation, and hence violate Article 1.1 of the Basic Law in conjunction with
the principle of the social welfare state contained in Article 20.1 of the Basic Law. To make
it possible to examine whether the valuations and decisions taken by the legislature cor-
respond to the constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with human
dignity, the legislature handing down the provision is subject to the obligation to reason
them in a comprehensible manner; this is to be demanded above all if the legislature
deviates from a method which it has selected itself’. See, for a more detailed overview of
the (very detailed) review of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bittner 2011, pp. 1949-1950.
265 Hartz IV, para. 144, 210.
266 Asylum Seekers Benefits, para. 97. See also para. 99.
267 Ibid., paras. 106-115.
268 Ibid., paras. 108-111.
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the Code of Social Law, led to the straightforward conclusion that the constitu-
tional right to an Existenzminimum had not been guaranteed.269
Altogether, the approach taken by the Bundesverfassungsgericht is an interesting
one that allows for some valuable insights. First, it is often argued in respect
of the use of ‘core rights’ that it is not suitable or possible for a court to identify
these, at least not without duly considering the circumstances of a particular
case and the general interests at stake therein. The Bundesverfassungsgericht
has solved this by opting for a quite abstract guarantee of a subsistence mini-
mum that is hardly objectionable and moreover fits the aims and development
of the Grundgesetz.270 It thus shows that a court is capable of defining core
guarantees independent from the case at hand. Secondly, although one could
say that this is ‘meaningless’ as the exact content is still left to the legislator
to determine, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has found an interesting way of
giving the abstract core requirement and the fact that it cannot be interfered
with ‘bite’. This it has done by opting for a ‘second step’, namely, the
concretisation of the right to a subsistence minimum with the help of specific
conditions the method used by the legislature needs to be in line with. Con-
sidering the sensitive field of social policy, it has thereby refrained from
determining a quantitative minimum – which is indeed not the task of judicial
body – while nevertheless providing for a clear standard that can guide the
legislative as well as the adjudicative practice.
As already indicated, the full implications of this example of ‘core rights
protection’ – for the field of socio-economic protection and in particular that
of the Strasbourg Court – will only become apparent later on in this book.271
It nevertheless made sense to outline this particular guarantee at this point,
not only because it concerns a German example that should hence find its place
in the chapter on German law, but also because it was thereby already shown
that regardless of the apparent redundancy of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie in legal
practice, the idea of (absolute) protection of essential levels of a right can play
a meaningful role in the adjudication of fundamental rights.
4.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an overview of the debate on the German Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie. The goal was not to come up with yet another theory on the
269 Ibid., paras. 112-115.
270 Having held for a long time that the duty of providing for a subsistence minimum could
be conferred on the state on the basis of the social state principle (which does not entail
individually enforceable fundamental rights), in the cases presented above it goes one step
further. Combining the Sozialstaatsprinzip with Art. 1(1) GG, an actual and autonomous
right to a subsistence minimum has been identified.
271 Infra, Ch. 7.
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proper understanding of Article 19, Section 2 GG. Instead, taking into account
the overall direction this research is planned to take, the objective was to
present a mostly descriptive account of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, including
theoretical as well as more practical insights, that can moreover be useful for
the chapters to come. The most important findings will briefly be summarised
here.
First, from the genesis of Article 19(2) GG it was inferred that the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie was created in order to ensure that fundamental rights could
no longer be limited too easily, or even entirely. At the time of drafting the
Grundgesetz, there was a particular awareness that (especially) the legislature
could form a danger for the realisation of fundamental rights. Hence, holding
that ‘[i]n keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet
werden’, Article 19(2) GG can be seen as a provision that emphasises the
importance of fundamental rights, thereby recognising that at least the core
of these rights must at all times be protected in order to render them meaning-
ful.
It was discussed that throughout the years, many legal writers have
reflected on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie and how exactly it is to be understood.
What followed from this was a diverse picture containing various understand-
ings of what core rights protection, or ‘placing a limit on limitations’, can
entail. After having elaborated on the issue of the addressees of the Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie – which led to the conclusion that this norm generally is con-
sidered to bind the legislature as well as the executive and the judiciary –,
several insights concerning the debate on the scope of application of this norm
were presented. It has become clear that Section 2 of Article 19 GG is under-
stood to apply to as many fundamental rights as is logically possible. In order
to increase the value of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, not only classical fundamental
rights norms are concerned, but also other rights that can (justifiably) be
limited. Important for the purposes of this research, is that this implies that
the Wesen of a right can be interfered with when ‘too little’ is done, i.e., in the
case of positively formulated norms or positive aspects of (negatively formu-
lated) rights. This provides a first indication of the fact that, besides in the
context of negative guarantees, ‘core rights’ can also be important in the case
of ‘positive’ (socio-economic) claims.
As regards the content of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, the chapter first dis-
cussed the objective-subjective debate. This debate concerns the question
whether the core of fundamental rights norms needs to be protected ‘for society
in general’, or rather for individual, subjective cases. It has been demonstrated
that, in the light of the aim of fundamental rights protection, the latter seems
to be the preferable understanding. The most important point that was dis-
cussed with regard to the Wesensgehaltsgarantie was however whether the
boundary it sets is of an absolute, or rather of a relative nature. The absolute
interpretation is an attractive one, for it underlines the importance of individual
freedoms and guarantees a predetermined area in which state interference
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is not allowed. Difficult to answer, however, is the question of how the Wesen
of a right should be determined, even when the guarantee of human dignity,
as well as comparative insights and the character of fundamental rights can
provide important starting points. Relative theories instead hold that core rights
protection will always be the result of a balancing exercise. This is not to say
that they do not provide for absolute protection and instead allow for justifiable
interferences with rights’ cores. Rather, according to the various ‘relativists’
the core itself is non-absolute or relative because it necessarily is dependent
on the specific circumstances and other interests at stake. In discussing different
relative theories, a distinction was noted between those that start from prima
facie rights the core of which might become apparent after a balancing exercise
has taken place, and those that do not think in terms of prima facie rights at
all but instead hold that what rights – and thereby their cores – are cannot
be seen apart from a specific societal and legal context. Altogether, the various
understandings of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie have served to show that core
rights protection can be perceived in different ways. What exactly the content
of the core of a particular right is, and what role it should play in a court’s
reasoning, can hence be a point of discussion, and arguably needs to be deter-
mined in the way best suited to (the demands of) the particular legal context.
The final part of this chapter dealt with the practice of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht. It was illustrated that in the German context the Verhältnismäßig-
keitsgrundsatz, i.e., the requirement of proportionality, is of crucial importance.
In practice, this means that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie appears superfluous.
Nevertheless, protecting their essence can be considered a relevant principle
underlying the rights enshrined in the Grundgesetz. Arguably, this also becomes
apparent from the example of the right to an Existenzminimum. This example
was brought up to show how the Bundesverfassungsgericht has defined an
individual ‘core’ guarantee of a subsistence minimum that cannot be interfered
with. It has concretised this socio-economic guarantee in a way that leaves
room for the legislature albeit allowing for judicial review on the basis of
certain ‘procedural’ requirements. Besides the insights on the different (absolute
and relative) understandings of the Wesensgehalt, this example of the right to
a social minimum may prove to be valuable for developing a core of rights
perspective for the ECtHR.
5 The ICESCR and Minimum Core
Obligations
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In German constitutional doctrine, the notion of core rights relates to a specific
constitutional provision and underlines that there are (absolute) limits to
limitations of rights. However, the idea of core rights also features in legal
discourse and practice in other ways, elsewhere. Of particular interest for the
purposes of this study is the field of international economic and social rights
law, and more specifically the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR; Covenant).1 Also in this context, in the academic
debate as well as in the policy and practice related to the ICESCR, the notion
of core rights protection holds a prominent place.
More precisely, where international socio-economic rights are concerned,
the label used is often that of ‘minimum cores’ or ‘minimum core obligations’.
This label refers to the recognition of core aspects that constitute the most basic
and important guarantees or obligations related to a particular socio-economic
right. The current chapter aims at explaining and investigating the idea of the
minimum core by describing how it evolved and by presenting an account
of its implications. It discusses the contribution the minimum core has made
to the development of the ICESCR rights as well as some of the complications
inherent in this concept.
The reason why a discussion of the concept of minimum core obligations
is of particular interest for this research is not just the fact that it provides
insights quite distinct from the ones that can be derived from the discussion
of German constitutional law. The panorama that is about to be presented has
great inspirational potential also because it explicitly concerns the protection
of economic and social rights.2 After all, at the heart of this study lies the
question of whether and how cores of rights can be useful for improving the
ECtHR’s reasoning in cases concerning the protection of exactly these rights.
1 As was already briefly indicated in the introduction to this book (supra, Ch. 1, S. 1.3), the
present study uses the term ‘socio-economic rights’, or ‘economic and social rights’, rather
than ‘economic, social, and cultural rights’. This for reasons of legibility, but most important-
ly because the eventual aim is to come up with suggestions exclusively for the protection
of economic and social rights under the Convention.
2 However, also in the previous chapter this emphasis on socio-economic protection was
already visible (see, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.2.2.).
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In this regard it can be recalled that protection of economic and social rights
is a particularly delicate matter that brings up specific problems in relation
to democratic decision-making and resource allocation. When looking at the
ICESCR system for inspiration, it must be kept in mind that, in the context of
the ECtHR, what is at stake is not protection on the basis of socio-economic
norms, but rather the protection of socio-economic interests on the basis of
norms that are of a civil and political kind. Nevertheless, a discussion of the
ICESCR allows for drawing interesting parallels. To the extent that the specific
features of core rights protection that are presented here relate to or confront
the particularities of economic and social rights, they may often also be of
relevance for the Strasbourg socio-economic case law.3
In order to illuminate the relevant features of the idea of cores of rights
in the context of the ICESCR, this chapter starts out with an introduction to the
Covenant (Section 5.2). This introduction pays attention to the requirement
of ‘progressive realisation’ and the problems that occur when attempts are
made at effectuating broadly stated economic and social rights. Section 5.3
presents a discussion of the idea of the minimum core and the way in which
it is perceived to address these problems. Section 5.4, then, illuminates the
content of the minimum core. In this section, an overview is given of the
concrete minimum cores recognised on the basis of the ICESCR. Section 5.5
addresses the way in which minimum cores are determined, by presenting
an analysis of the various cores that can be useful also beyond the ICESCR
context. The main conclusions of the chapter are summarised in Section 5.6.
5.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS
The idea of minimum cores in the field of social and economic rights is gen-
erally considered to be introduced by the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR; Committee), the body that is
tasked with monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR.4 The notion has
its genesis in General Comment No. 3 of this Committee on the nature of States
3 According to various authors, moreover, the particular concept of minimum core obligations
can also be of use in different contexts. According to Young 2008, p. 118, ‘the concept of
a minimum core is not confined structurally at least, to economic and social rights. Conceiv-
ably, claimants and advocates could apply the concept of a minimum essential content
to all universal, compelling, and predictable interests appropriately labelled as rights’. See
also Bilchitz 2003, p. 13.
4 As will be seen shortly however, at the time the CESCR introduced this notion, there had
already for some years been discussion on the identification of core elements. See, infra,
S. 5.3.1. But see also Bilchitz 2003, p. 13, who states that ‘it is arguable that the origins of
this concept do not merely lie with the third General Comment released in 1990, but rather
that its emergence has to do with its usefulness in addressing questions of importance in
the enforcement of rights’.
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Parties’ obligations, dating from 1990.5 Before turning to General Comment
No. 3, however, a short introduction to the ICESCR may serve to illustrate the
coming into being of this Covenant (5.2.1). Besides that, this section illuminates
the difficulties related to the effectuation of economic and social rights, which
eventually have led to the adoption of the idea of the minimum core (5.2.2).
5.2.1 Binding Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
It was already briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR; Declaration), adopted in 1948, contains a nearly
complete range of fundamental rights.6 The UDHR was, however, merely a
declaratory document and the rights it contains still had to be laid down in
a binding international bill of rights in order to sort actual legal effect. As the
result of extensive discussions and under pressure from the Western-dominated
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations General
Assembly eventually agreed to create not one such bill, but to divide the rights
into two separate covenants.7 One of these had to cover civil and political
rights while the other had to take up the economic, social and cultural rights
enumerated in the Declaration.8 Those favouring the drafting of two separate
covenants argued that the former ‘were enforceable, or justiciable, or of an
“absolute” character, while economic, social and cultural rights were not or
might not be’.9 Economic, social and cultural rights were seen as not imme-
diately applicable – they were considered not truly ‘individual’ rights and
were regarded as guarantees that required the state to take positive action.10
The process of translating the economic and social rights recognised in
Articles 22-28 UDHR – dealing with, e.g., social security, an adequate standard
of living, housing and education – into binding treaty obligations took until
5 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2(1) of the Covenant), 14 December
1990, E/1991/23 (General Comment No.3).
6 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.2. In the Declaration, the ‘socio-economic’ right of everyone ‘to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family’ (Art.
25, S. 1) can be found in the same list as for example the prohibition of torture (Art. 5) and
the right to freedom of movement (Art. 13). See, e.g., Eide 2001, pp. 14-15. Nevertheless,
the UDHR can be said to signal somewhat of a preference for civil and political rights,
if only because these rights are stated first, followed by the more economic and social ones.
Cf. Craven 1995, p. 17.
7 See the analysis, prepared by the United Nations, of the drafting process: Annotations on
the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human rights, Tenth Session, 1 July 1995,
UN Doc. A/2929 (Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human
Rights), p. 7. See also Eide and Rosas 2001, p. 3; Craven 1995, pp. 17-20.
8 Together called the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’.
9 Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, p. 8. Cf.
also Eide 2001, p. 10.
10 Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, p. 8.
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1966. The delay was caused by considerable debate on the nature of States
Parties’ obligations, which took place against the backdrop of the difficulties
arising out of the Cold War and opposition from various countries.11 When
the General Assembly eventually adopted the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, this did not mean that all concerns
related to the creation of a list of binding socio-economic rights had been
resolved.12 According to the official UN position the covenant covering civil
and political rights, and the one on economic, social and cultural rights,
together cover human rights that all are ‘universal, indivisible and interde-
pendent and interrelated’. Therefore, ‘[t]he international community must treat
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and
with the same emphasis’.13 However, the specific character of economic and
social rights and the political sensitivities that surface in this context have
continued to overshadow these rights’ importance. In comparison to civil and
political rights, the economic, social and cultural rights that were laid down
in the ICESCR have proven difficult to realise and have been considered second
rank ever since this document came into being.14
11 Steiner et al. 2007, p. 271; Craven 1995, pp. 20-21.
12 E.g., Alston 1987.
13 United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12 July
1993, A/CONF.157/23, para. 5. See also the Limburg Principles on the Implementation
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/
1987/17, Annex (Limburg Principles), reprinted in 9 Human Rights Quarterly 1987, p. 123,
para. 3: ‘As human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent,
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion
and protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights.’ The
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/
C.12/2000/13 (Maastricht Guidelines), reprinted in 20 Human Rights Quarterly 1998, p. 692,
at para. 4, state that because of their indivisibility, ‘states are as responsible for violations
of economic, social and cultural rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights’.
See, on the notion of indivisibility also, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.3, and in particular S. 2.5.3.1.
14 E.g., Eide and Rosas 2001, p. 3; Robertson 1994, pp. 693-694. In their recent and extensive
commentary on the ICESCR, Saul et al. (2014) start on a positive note by stating that
‘economic, social and cultural rights have long been seen as the poor cousins of civil and
political rights’, and that ‘[o]verall, … economic, social and cultural rights have moved
from the subject of theoretical debates (are they “real” and “enforceable” rights?) to being
increasingly accepted as important international norms with significant practical application’.
They refer to the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (United Nations General
Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 5 March 2009, A/RES/63/117, which
entered into force in May 2013 (Optional Protocol to the ICESCR)) as being indicative for
this development.
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5.2.2 The Requirement of Progressive Realisation
When it was decided to divide the content of the UDHR over two separate
covenants, it was stressed that because of the indivisible character of the
different categories of rights, both covenants at least had to resemble each other
to the greatest extent possible.15 Nevertheless, even a superficial glance at
both treaties reveals that their setup and wording differs in significant ways.
Whereas the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
generally uses terms as ‘everyone has the right to …’, or ‘no one shall …’, the
ICESCR instead speaks of ‘States Parties’ that ‘recognize the right of everyone
to …’.16 One of the most important differences between the ICESCR and the
ICCPR can be found in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. This article forms the keystone
of the Covenant, laying out the obligations of states with regard to the rights
enumerated in the document. It stipulates that
‘each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressive-
ly the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all ap-
propriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’17
In other words, the extent to which ICESCR rights like the right to work, social
security or the highest attainable standard of health must be guaranteed is
not necessarily the same for all states, as it is subject to the resources available.
Moreover, it follows from Article 2(1) that the standard of implementation
of the ICESCR is ‘progressive realisation’, which means that the rights contained
15 See, Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, p.
7. More precisely, they had ‘to contain “as many similar provisions as possible” and to
be approved and opened for signature simultaneously, in order to emphasize the unity
of purpose’.
16 Note that the formulation of socio-economic rights in the UDHR did contain the words
‘everybody has the right to …’, signaling that when translated into binding legal guarantees,
their phrasing had been weakened down.
17 Art. 2(1) ICESCR [emphasis added]. Art. 2(1) of the ICCPR instead establishes the obligation
of each State Party ‘to respect and ensure’ the rights recognised therein. The CESCR,
however, does not want to recognise a sharp distinction between both Articles 2(1). In its
General Comment No. 3, para. 1, it states that ‘while great emphasis has sometimes been
placed on the difference between the formulations used in this provision [Art. 2(1) ICESCR]
and that contained in the equivalent article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, it is not always recognised that there are also significant similarities. In
particular, while the Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the
constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations which
are of immediate effect’. See on the nature and the drafting of Article 2(1) ICESCR, e.g.
Alston & Quinn 1987, pp. 165-181; Sepúlvelda 2003, Ch. 4, pp. 133-134; Griffey 2011, pp.
280-285.
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therein can be realised to various degrees.18 This is remarkable, and indeed
there is no such provision in the ICCPR, which rather contains obligations of
result that require the state not to interfere with the rights protected unless
there is a proper justification for doing so. The references to ‘available re-
sources’ and the concept of progressive realisation relate to the perceived
special character of the rights protected by the ICESCR. They are an expression
of the drafters’ acknowledgement of the fact that most States Parties to the
Covenant would not have the means to fully realise every economic, social
and cultural right immediately upon ratification or even shortly thereafter.19
Even though Article 2(1) is in line with practical realities and the perceived
differences between the two types of human rights,20 the progressive
realisation standard is said to have hindered the conceptualisation as well as
the monitoring of ICESCR rights.21 On the one hand, what argues in favour
of the standard is that it acknowledges that the obligations under the ICESCR
may be so onerous that not every state will be able to comply with them
straightaway. In this regard, rather than resigning to the fact that a right would
then simply not be guaranteed at all, the obligation to ensure compliance
progressively is meant to ensure that at least best efforts are being made. The
non-fulfilment of a right in its entirety hence should not stand in the way of
guaranteeing this right at least in so far as the available resources allow for.
On the other hand, it can be asked whether this ‘special treatment’ of duties
related to the fulfilment of economic and social rights does justice to the
importance of these rights and the awareness that the difference between civil
and political and socioeconomic rights is, in the end, artificial. After all, also
realising civil and political rights can be costly and difficult. More important
from a practical point of view is however that the requirement of progressive
realisation can provide what has been called ‘a loophole large enough in
practical terms to nullify the Covenant’s guarantees: the possibility that states
18 See, for an elaborate discussion of this requirement, Saul et al. 2014, Ch. 3, and in particular
pp. 151-157. Cf. also Craven 1995, pp. 129-134; Alston and Quinn 1987, pp. 172-177.
19 Chapman and Russell 2002a, pp. 5-6. However, even though realization may vary in
different contexts, the requirement of progressive realization is understood as in principle
prohibiting retrogressive measures. See, e.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9;
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10
(General Comment No. 13), para. 45; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard
of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4 (General Comment
No. 14), para. 32; Report of the High commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation
of economic, social and cultural rights, 8 June 2009, E/2009/90, para. 15; Griffey 2011, pp.
281-282.
20 Like the belief that resource constraints are especially, or even exclusively related to the
provision of socio-economic rights. See, for this, and other alleged differences related to
states’ obligations under the two categories of rights, e.g., Sepúlvelda 2003, pp. 122-133.
21 Chapman and Russell 2002a, p. 4.
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will claim lack of resources as the reason they have not met their obliga-
tions’.22 Indeed, particularly in the light of the ‘availability of resources’
phrasing, the obligation to ‘only’ progressively guarantee economic and social
rights can become empty.23 A state can, at least theoretically speaking, always
claim that at a particular moment in time, due to a lack of resources, it simply
could not comply with one or more aspects of an ICESCR right. Because the
available resources differ from state to state, the progressive realisation stand-
ard recognises an element of subjectivity that makes that obligations are not
uniform or universal and that may obscure evaluating compliance with the
Covenant.24
It is a challenge per se to identify effective approaches to the implementa-
tion of ICESCR rights. In May 2013 the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR has
entered into force, allowing for individual and collective communications, but
thus far only sixteen states have ratified this protocol and no communications
have yet been addressed.25 Primarily, the CESCR has supervised (as it continues
to do) the national implementation of the Covenant on the basis of regular
reports by the States Parties written in conformity with the ‘reporting guide-
lines’.26 However, supervising whether states comply with the requirement
of progressive realisation in the light of their particular resource constraints
brings along significant methodological difficulties. It is very difficult, if not
impossible for the CESCR to determine or verify a state’s maximum available
resources, or to check if best efforts were made to achieve an adequate stand-
ard of protection.27 Effective monitoring would require an enormous amount
of high quality data and statistics, as well as a good overview of national
22 Chapman and Russell 2002a, p. 5. According to Steiner et al. 2007, p. 275, ‘[g]overnments
can present themselves as defenders of ESR without international imposition of any precise
constraints on their policies and behaviour’.
23 Steiner et al. 2007, p. 275. But cf. the Limburg Principles, p. 125, para. 21: ‘Under no circum-
stances shall this [the obligation to realise progressively the full realisation of the rights]
be interpreted as implying for states the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full
realization.’
24 Cf. Chapman 1996.
25 See the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, and for a chart showing the status of ratifications,
treaties.un.org.
26 See the CESCR’s most recent Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be Submitted
by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights’, adopted on 18 November 2008, E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009. Cf.
also the Limburg Principles, pp. 131-134, paras. 74-91.
27 E.g., Chapman and Russell 2002a, p. 5: ‘This necessitates the development of a multiplicity
of performance standards for each enumerated right in relationship to the varied social
development and resource contexts of specific countries’. See also Chapman 1996, p. 29ff;
Robertson 1994 (introducing a methodology for measuring state compliance with the
obligation to devote the maximum available resources). According to Fredman 2008, p. 82,
there has been progress in the assessment of resource use. She refers to the publication
Dignity Counts (Hofbauer et al. 2004) that demonstrated the possibility of assessing the
sufficiency of government investment, the equity of the expenses by the government and
their efficiency.
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developments over time. Only on the basis of correct and precise information
it can possibly be assessed whether states are indeed using all their available
resources in order to move expeditiously towards full implementation of the
rights laid down in the ICESCR.28 Thus, no matter how sensible the requirement
of progressive realisation in the light of available resources might appear at
first glance, it has significantly complicated the CESCR’s monitoring of states’
compliance with economic and social rights. It became clear that this require-
ment in the end seems incapable of improving the effectiveness of these rights,
at least, that is, when taken on its own.29
5.3 PROGRESSIVE REALISATION THROUGH MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATIONS
With regard to the CESCR’s monitoring process it can be said that even with
plenty of data available it would remain hard to determine what progressively
moving towards full implementation in concreto entails. After all, this require-
ment does not clarify whether it suffices for states to spend their available
resources on whatever they think is relevant for complying with the rights
enumerated in the Covenant, as long as it can be considered as a step towards
complete realisation, or whether more specific action is required. For that
reason, when the need to concretise the ICESCR’s content and actual obligations
became more pressing, the CESCR made an important effort to provide for
clarification in this regard. In this section it is shown how the idea that certain
rights and certain aspects of rights require immediate fulfilment came about
(5.3.1) and was eventually consolidated by the CESCR (5.3.2).
5.3.1 Immediate Requirements and Minimum Guarantees
In order to effectuate compliance with the ICESCR, it was recognised that there
are certain elements of the Covenant that need to be fulfilled immediately.
In 1986, a group of experts, convened by the International Commission of
Jurists, came together in the province of Limburg in the Netherlands. They
elaborated state obligations for economic and social rights, which resulted in
28 Cf. Chapman & Russell 2002, p. 5; Chapman 1996, p. 30. However, in the words of Saul
et al. 2014, p. 143, ‘[t]he questions of whom or what is to determine which resources are
available, and what is their maximum, must inevitably rely heavily, or at least initially,
on the shoulders of the state under consideration’ (see also p. 144).
29 According to Steiner et al. 2007, p. 275, ‘the relative open-endedness of the concept of
progressive realization, particularly in the light of the availability of resources, renders
the obligation devoid of meaningful content’.
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the formulation of the Limburg Principles.30 Paragraph 8 of these Limburg
Principles reads as follows: ‘Although the full realization of the rights recog-
nized in the Covenant is to be attained progressively, the application of some
rights can be made justiciable immediately while other rights can become
justiciable over time.’31 Thus, a distinction was made between duties that
have to be satisfied instantaneously, and requirements that – should the
available resources not allow for their immediate satisfaction – could be
fulfilled at a later point. Some of the immediate duties could be inferred
directly from the text of the ICESCR. Article 2(2) of the Covenant, for example,
holds that
‘[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’32
It was considered that this non-discrimination requirement is of such import-
ance that rather than progressively, it has to be realised immediately.33
Next to pinpointing certain ICESCR provisions that need to be complied
with no matter what a state’s programme of working towards full realisation
exactly entails, a second way of identifying the immediate obligations arising
out of the Covenant was proposed that consisted of marking certain aspects
of rights as being more important than others. In 1987, Philip Alston, then
Rapporteur of the Committee, wrote about the Committee’s endeavours to
clarify the normative content of the ICESCR-rights.34 He stated that ‘each right
must … give rise to a minimum entitlement, in the absence of which a state
party is in violation of its obligations’.35 In other words, Alston propelled
30 These principles have also been called the ‘best guide available to state obligations under
the CESCR’ (Eide 2001, p. 25). Consider however the right-specific General Comments,
see, infra, S. 5.4.
31 Limburg Principles, p. 124, para. 8.
32 Article 2(2) ICESCR. See also General Comment No. 3, para. 1. For further references to
the principle of non-discrimination see also the later General Comments (infra, S. 5.4). See,
for an elaborate discussion on this requirement, Saul et al. 2014, Ch. 4.
33 E.g. Chapmann & Russell 2002, p. 6. The non-discrimination requirement is further emphas-
ised in Article 3 ICESCR: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure
the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural
rights set forth in the present Covenant’. See also the Limburg Principles, p. 125, paras.
22 and 35.
34 Alston 1987, p. 352 ff. This was necessary because, ‘even a state that is deeply committed
to achieving the fullest possible implementation of the Covenant will be hard pressed to
determine for itself exactly what the Covenant requires of it with respect to a given right’
(p. 352).
35 Alston 1987, p. 353. Cf. also the Limburg Principles, p. 126, para. 25: ‘States parties are
obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum
subsistence rights for all.’ Cf. also para. 28.
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the idea that not only a provision like the right to non-discrimination could
give rise to an immediate obligation, but that in fact every economic and social
right contains specific (substantive) elements that should be fulfilled forthwith.
One may consider, for example, the right to health (Article 12(1) ICESCR36),
to social security (Article 9 ICESCR37), or to education (Article 13(1) ICESCR38).
These rights are phrased in relatively vague terms like ‘the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health’, which in principle allows for a very
broad interpretation and for the acceptance of potentially very costly and far-
reaching obligations. Alston in this regard admitted that in most cases it is
impossible to fulfil these rights immediately in their entirety.39 Nevertheless,
he argued that this did not mean that there are no aspects of these rights that
can and should be fulfilled first and foremost. Pointing out the ‘core elements’
of these norms thereby could help make them more workable and effective.
As Bilchitz later put it: ‘The notion of progressive realisation must thus be
read to include as a base-line the provision of minimum essential levels of
a right which the state is then required to build upon’.40
5.3.2 General Comment No. 3
Three years after Alston’s article was published, the CESCR explicitly adopted
the notion of ‘core elements’. To avoid that states would deprive the ICESCR
rights of their content completely, it issued its third General Comment, entitled
The Nature of States Parties Obligations, in which it embraced the idea of ‘mini-
mum core obligations’.41 Paragraph 10 of General Comment No. 3 states that:
‘On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by
the body that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States
36 Art. 12(1) ICESCR reads: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.’
37 Art. 9 ICESCR reads: ‘The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to social security, including social insurance.’
38 Art. 13(1) ICESCR reads: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development
of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable
all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance
and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.’
39 Arguably, indeed, this is even impossible per se because of a lack of a concrete definition
of what this ‘full’ compliance would entail. Cf. Alston 1987, p. 352.
40 Bilchitz 2003, p. 12. Or, in the words of Fredman 2008, p. 84: ‘One way of responding to
the charges of both indeterminacy and lack of immediacy is to specify a core obligation
which is determinate and requires immediate fulfilment.’
41 CESCR, General Comment No. 3.
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parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is
incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.
If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum
core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être. By the same token,
it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its
minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying
within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each State party to take the
necessary steps "to the maximum of its available resources". In order for a State
party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations
to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made
to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of
priority, those minimum obligations.’42
This is followed in paragraph 12 by the following considerations:
‘Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of severe resources
constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or
by other factors the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be pro-
tected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programs. In support of this
approach the Committee takes note of the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled
“Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth,
the analysis by UNDP in its Human Development Report 1990 and the analysis by
the World Bank in the World Development Report 1990.’43
These paragraphs make clear that the Committee differentiates between guar-
anteeing the core elements of a right and ensuring full compliance of the right
as a whole. Even though the Comment signals that account can still be had
to possible resource constraints,44 such constraints do not relieve states of
their duty to guarantee the minimum core of a right.45 If a minimum core
obligation has not been complied with, it is up to the state to demonstrate
42 Ibid., para. 10 [emphasis added].
43 Ibid., para. 12.
44 This is evidenced by the point that a state will not, prima facie, comply with its obligations
under the Covenant when core rights are not guaranteed (ibid., para. 10). As also follows
from the last sentence of this Comment, the burden of proof then however lies on the state.
45 In the words of Saul et al. 2014, p. 145: ‘[T]he Committee has adopted a baseline perspective
to try to establish “minimum” or “core” standards of rights protection, beneath which no
state can be permitted to fall. Thus, even when economic times are most straitened – indeed,
especially then – no state can rightfully claim that the poorest and most vulnerable must
suffer (further) diminution of their enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.’ (On
the importance of socio-economic rights especially in times of crisis see also Bilchitz 2014a.)
Cf. also, already, Limburg Principles, para. 25; Robertson 1994, p. 702; Maastricht Guidelines,
p. 695, para. 10.
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that every effort has been made to use its limited resources in order to meet
the most basic requirements of the Covenant.46 Implicit herein is the obligation
that even when there are not many resources, the distribution of these should
be adjusted in such a way as to enable fulfilment of at least the minimum
essential levels of the ICESCR rights, i.e., those aspects that are considered to
belong to these rights’ core.
As discussed previously, the practical reality that for many states it is
impossible to guarantee the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined
in the ICESCR immediately and to their full extent, constituted the main reason
for the formulation of a requirement of progressive realisation. Now, with
General Comment No. 3, the idea of minimum cores was introduced to clarify
that there is nevertheless an area that leaves no room for ‘delayed’ compliance.
The minimum core, defined as a an obligation to guarantee in any case the
minimum essential level of the different rights, can thereby be said to narrow
down the problematically wide scope of the economic and social rights of the
ICESCR. As Alston explained, ‘[t]he fact that there must exist such a core (which
to a limited extent might nevertheless be potentially subject to derogation or
limitations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Covenant) would
seem to be a logical implication of the use of the terminology of rights’.47
The guarantees enumerated in the Covenant are ‘rights’, which implies that
their normative content cannot be so indeterminate as to give a rightsholder
‘no particular entitlement to anything’.48 When no further differentiation
within the potential reach of socio-economic rights is made the result may
be that any thinkable claim can become a trivial one.49 With the help of
minimum cores, the rather vague notion of what these rights could potentially
entail and what they de facto require is replaced by the clear-cut expectation
that at least their core must be respected. Put differently, by defining the
minimum core, the concrete entitlement becomes apparent.
Indeed, the requirement of core rights protection is one states as well as
monitoring bodies can more readily deal with than the requirement of pro-
46 See also Fredman 2008, p. 85: ‘[T]he State is not required to do more than is possible given
its resources; but it must be able to show that it could not do more than it has done, given
its resources.’
47 Alston 1987, p. 352,
48 Ibid., p. 353. Cf. also Fredman 2008, p. 70ff, on the supposed indeterminacy and incom-
mensurability of positive duties. Mentioning several caveats, however, she concludes that
‘[n]one of these … deprive the [positive] duty of all normative content – if they did, no
decisions could be reached on anything’ (p. 72). Cf. also Scott and Alston 2000, p. 227: ‘To
read the principle of progressive realisation as incompatible with immediate duties to ensure
key protections would be, in effect, to conceptualise duties to ensure positive rights as never
capable of being violated, as constantly receding into the future.’
49 Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 9: ‘[T]he fact that realization over time, or in
other words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted
as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content.’
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gressive realisation. The notion of the minimum core guides the way in which
a state should move towards full realisation by pointing out what should be
done first, namely securing the essential aspects of a right. In turn, this makes
it easier to monitor their achievements, and it may prevent states from using
the argument that scarce resources were used for other purposes as a means
towards the fulfilment of ICESCR rights.
A possible point of criticism, however, is that working with minimum core
obligations creates the danger that expectations as well as possible achieve-
ments will not raise above the minimum level set. It might hence threaten the
broader goals of protecting economic and social rights.50 Yet at the same time,
it can also be argued that opting for a less inclusive definition of rights by
identifying minimum core obligations may enhance the potential of their
workability as well as their effectiveness. According to Koch,
‘[i]t reflects a “minimalist” rights strategy, which implies that maximum gains are
made by minimizing goals. It also trades rights-inflation for rights ambition,
channeling the attention of advocates towards the severest cases of material depriva-
tion and treating these as violations by states towards their own citizens or even
to those outside their territorial reach.’51
In other words, constricting the potential reach of economic and social rights
norms could, at least in theoretically speaking, further the effectiveness of,
and compliance with these rights and/or their core aspects. The mere require-
ment of progressive realisation provides states with an argument as to why
certain aims could not have been achieved, while at the same time it fails to
provide an answer to the problem that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
control whether all means were at least spent on furthering the increase of
the standard of protection of socio-economic rights in the first place. Minimum
cores, by contrast, prevent states from using their limited resources in the way
they see fit. Not only can the recognition of core obligations ensure that
something actually is being done, it can also guarantee that attention is de-
dicated foremost to the fulfilment of certain, very basic guarantees, i.e., to the
fulfilment of the most important aspects of rights. When these are not complied
with, there is a prima facie breach of the Covenant, and it is then up to the state
50 See, for this point and other points of criticism (with further references), Fredman 2008,
p. 84ff.; Young 2012, pp. 69-71.Young refers, for example, to the supposed indeterminacy
of minimum cores (see further, infra, S. 5.4 and 5.5 and Ch. 6, S. 6.4.3.2), the fact that these
direct the attention to developing states, and rank different claimants of rights.
51 Young 2008, pp. 113-114 [footnote omitted]. Speaking of minimising goals, Young calls
this a ‘variation on the perspective of Michael Ignatieff’, who defines minimalism as
something capable of addressing the fact that ‘people from different cultures may continue
to disagree about what is good, but nevertheless agree about what is insufferably, unargu-
ably wrong’ (Ignatieff 2001, p. 56). See also Young 2012, p. 66, fn. 3.
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to adduce evidence for the fact that it could not allocate its (scarce) resources
so that at least the minimum core would be guaranteed. This indeed seems
to be a way of effectuating actual compliance, and thereby of ‘maximising’,
rather than ‘minimising’ socio-economic rights protection. Moreover, in the
light of the requirement of progressive realisation, it must be kept in mind
that fulfilling the minimum core is and must be seen as the starting point.
Whenever extra resources are or become available, these should hence always
be directed at providing further guarantees.52
5.4 THE CONTENT OF THE MINIMUM CORE
The fact that minimum cores direct the attention to the fulfilment of the most
important, basic aspects of a right begs the question what, then, these aspects
exactly are. As explained, in theory, the notion of the minimum core has the
advantage of narrowing down the often overbroad and vague contours of
economic and social rights and creates more workable requirements. The
question that has not been answered thus far is, however, how these minimum
cores can then actually be defined. What are the ‘minimum essential levels’
a state has to start with realising first, i.e., what obligations exactly fall within
the scope of the core content of the rights enumerated in the ICESCR?
When a closer look is had at General Comment No. 3, it becomes clear
that besides introducing the idea of minimum core obligations the Comment
does not delve deeply into the content of these obligations. The Comment states
a few examples; it mentions that a state will not, prima facie, comply with its
obligations under the Covenant when ‘any significant number of individuals
is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic
shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education’.53 These
examples, however, are still quite vague. About the rights other than those
concerning food, health, housing and education, moreover, General Comment
No. 3 remains completely silent.
Only some years after the adoption of General Comment No. 3, the CESCR
started giving some more clarity in this regard. Starting with General Comment
No. 4 on the right to housing, in the 1990’s the CESCR commenced the adoption
of several Comments that deal with separate Covenant rights. Together these
Comments have provided the building blocks for a more precise and workable
picture of the minimum core obligations belonging to the Covenant.
52 Cf. Bilchitz 2007, p. 193
53 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 10.
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In the following, several minimum core obligations enumerated in the
different Comments will be presented.54 The examples given will provide
a rich overview of what is regarded to be the more concrete content of the
minimum cores of the different ICESCR rights. Because later on in this book
the discussion will turn to the protection by the ECtHR of the right to housing,
the right to health, and the right to social security, the minimum cores belong-
ing to these ICESCR rights first and foremost will be given attention (5.4.1, 5.4.2,
and 5.4.3, respectively). After that, some other minimum cores that may also
prove relevant for a better understanding of what this notion entails are
presented (5.4.4).
5.4.1 The Right to Adequate Housing
The first General Comment that exclusively deals with a particular ICESCR right
is the 1991 Comment on the right to adequate housing contained in Article
11(1) ICESCR.55 In General Comment No. 4, the Committee does not explicitly
list a number of minimum core obligations, as it does in subsequent general
comments. However, this Comment, as well as later General Comment No. 7
that specifically concerns the issue of forced evictions, has been of vital
importance in defining the scope and content of the right to housing.56 It is
therefore worth mentioning some issues the CESCR seems to consider essential
in this regard.
The right to housing is ranked amongst the most important of the rights
enumerated in the ICESCR. This is the case partly because housing is intimately
linked to the enjoyment of many other rights, as was confirmed in General
Comment No. 4 where the Committee underlined the right’s importance ‘for
54 But see, for an extensive discussion on the different core obligations under the various
Covenant rights, e.g., Chapman and Russell 2002 (as well as Brand and Russell 2002). In
this volume, different contributions are dedicated to outlining and clarifying the obligations
under the various individual rights. On some of the rights, however, the Committee only
adopted a Comment indicating core obligations after this book had been published. See,
therefore, for a more up-to-date overview of the obligations stemming from the ICESCR,
Saul et al. 2014.
55 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant), 13 December 1991,
E/1992/23 No. 4 (General Comment No. 4). Art. 11(1) ICESCR reads: ‘The States Parties
to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps
to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance
of international co-operation based on free consent.’
56 E.g., Saul et al. 2014, p. 928.
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the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights’.57 Its significance
is moreover reflected in the fact that before Comment No. 4 was adopted the
CESCR had already been able to ‘accumulate a large amount of information
pertaining to this right’.58 With the help of this information, stemming from
state reports as well as international materials, it could now provide for
clarification on what the right to housing exactly entails.
In particular, the CESCR has made clear that ‘the right to housing should
not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with, for
example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one’s head or
views shelter exclusively as a commodity’.59 Also, it established ‘seven factors’
that illuminate what constitutes adequate housing. Fist of all, there must be
legal security of tenure, i.e., legal protection against forced eviction, harassment
and other threats.60 Moreover, a house must contain certain facilities like
access to natural and common resources, energy for cooking, sanitation, etc.,
and it should be affordable, habitable, accessible and ‘culturally adequate’.61
Finally, the requirement of ‘location’ entails that ‘adequate housing must be
in a location which allows access to employment options, health-care services,
schools, child care centres and other social facilities’.62 It was further stressed
that ‘there are certain steps that must be taken immediately’. Importantly,
‘[a]s recognized in the Global Strategy for Shelter and in other international
analyses, many of the measures required to promote the right to housing would
only require the abstention by the Government from certain practices and a commit-
ment to facilitating “self-help” by affected groups.’63
57 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 1. Very obviously, however, the right to housing
is also linked to the right to privacy, which is, indeed, a ‘civil and political’ right. See further,
Craven 1995, p. 330.
58 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 2. More concretely, it was stated that ‘[s]ince 1979,
the Committee and its predecessors have examined 75 reports dealing with the right to
adequate housing. The Committee has also devoted a day of general discussion to the issue
at each of its third and fourth sessions. In addition, the Committee has taken careful note
of information generated by the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (1987)
including the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 adopted by the General Assembly
in its resolution 42/191 of 11 December 1987. The Committee has also reviewed relevant
reports and other documentation of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities’. Cf. also, infra, S.
5.5.2.2.
59 Ibid., para. 7.
60 Ibid., para. 8(a).
61 Ibid., para. 8(b, c, d, e, and g). ‘Cultural adequacy’ means that ‘[t]he way housing is con-
structed, the building materials used and the policies supporting these must appropriately
enable the expression of cultural identity and diversity of housing’.
62 Ibid., para. 8(f).
63 Ibid., para. 10.
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Moreover, the Committee clarified that due priority must be given to those
social groups living in unfavourable conditions,64 that a national housing
strategy needs to be adopted,65 and that the housing situation in a state needs
to be monitored.66
As already indicated, the seven ‘adequacy factors’, as well as the immediate
duties and other concrete demands, were not explicitly presented as the
‘minimum core’ of the right to housing. However, they do serve to narrow
down and concretise the potentially very broad scope of this right.67 In this
regard it becomes clear, as Saul et al. note, that the right to housing apparently
must not be considered to mean that it is the task of the state to ensure the
provision of housing.68 Moreover, the immediate obligations, i.e., the ‘negative’
obligation to abstain from certain practices and the duty to commit to facilitat-
ing self-help, can indeed be understood as providing a baseline from which
further, progressive realisation can be achieved.
Reflecting the importance of legal security of tenure, in 1997 another General
Comment related to the right to housing was adopted.69 This comment speci-
fically concerned forced evictions and stated at the outset that
‘having considered a significant number of reports of forced evictions in recent
years, including instances in which it has determined that the obligations of States
parties were being violated, the Committee is now in a position to seek to provide
further clarification as to the implications of such practices in terms of the obliga-
tions contained in the Covenant.’70
Basing itself on various statements by international organisations on the matter,
the CESCR then stated, amongst other things, that ‘legislation against forced
evictions is an essential basis upon which to build a system of effective pro-
tection’.71 More precisely, this should include ‘measures which (a) provide
the greatest possible security of tenure to occupiers of houses and land, (b)
conform to the Covenant and (c) are designed to control strictly the circum-
stances under which evictions may be carried out’.72 The Committee indeed
64 Ibid., para. 11.
65 Ibid., para. 12.
66 Ibid., para. 13.
67 In the words of Saul et al. 2014, p. 931: ‘The seven factors set, and remain, the benchmark
for realization of the right to housing’.
68 Ibid., p. 931.
69 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art.11(1)): forced evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22
(General Comment No. 7).
70 Ibid., para. 1.
71 Ibid., para. 9.
72 Ibid.
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recognised that there are situations in which forced evictions can be justified,73
but emphasised that in that case these should always take place in compliance
with certain important conditions. For example, measures must be taken ‘to
ensure that no form of discrimination is involved’.74 Moreover, a number
of ‘procedural’ guarantees must be in place, including the provision of legal
remedies,75 and the eviction should be carried out ‘in accordance with general
principles of reasonableness and proportionality’.76 According to the CESCR,
‘[a]ppropriate procedural protection and due process are essential aspects of all human rights
but are especially pertinent in relation to a matter such as forced evictions which directly
invokes a large number of the rights recognized in both the International Covenants on
Human Rights. The Committee considers that the procedural protections which
should be applied in relation to forced evictions include: (a) an opportunity for
genuine consultation with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for
all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the
proposed evictions, and, where applicable, on the alternative purpose for which
the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable time to all
those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, government
officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons
carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; (f) evictions not to take place
in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected persons consent other-
wise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where possible, of legal
aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.’77
And finally and importantly,
‘Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable
to the violation of other human rights. Where those affected are unable to provide
for themselves, the State party must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum
of its available resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement
or access to productive land, as the case may be, is available.’78
73 E.g., ‘in the case of persistent non-payment of rent or of damage to rented property without
any reasonable cause’ (ibid., para. 11).
74 Ibid., para. 10.
75 Ibid., para. 13.
76 Ibid., para. 14: ‘In this regard it is especially pertinent to recall general comment No. 16
of the Human Rights Committee, relating to article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states that interference with a person’s home can only
take place “in cases envisaged by the law”. The Committee observed that the law “should
be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be,
in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances”. The Committee also indicated
that “relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such
interferences may be permitted”.’
77 Ibid., para. 15.
78 Ibid., para. 16.
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Also the requirements related to forced evictions are not explicitly phrased
as ‘core obligations’. They are, in fact, rather encompassing and may for that
reason be considered as entailing more than just a minimum level of protection.
However, the requirements do create a specific focus, and with the help of
General Comment No. 7, the Committee has been able to make clear that
especially procedural protection and protection against discrimination are of
crucial importance. Moreover, the fact that an entire Comment is dedicated
to the topic of forced evictions – as an important aspect of security of tenancy,
which in turn is an important aspect of the right to adequate housing – can
be seen to imply that generally, appropriate guarantees in relation to this
particular topic must be considered of essential importance for compliance
with Article 11(1) ICESCR.
5.4.2 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
The right to the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ as it is taken up in
Article 12 ICESCR79 is notoriously hard to define.80 The full realisation of this
right encompasses a lot and requires extensive measures and costly provisions
in various fields. In General Comment No. 14, adopted in 2000, the CESCR
underlined that the right to health is interpreted as
‘an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but
also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable
water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and
housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-
related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health.
A further important aspect is the participation of the population in all health-related
decision-making at the community, national and international levels.’81
Given all these various aspects, however, Comment No. 14 also indicates which
guarantees must be considered of the utmost importance by explicitly referring
to the core obligations that stem from the right to health. The announcement
79 Art. 12 ICESCR reads: ‘1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the
reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of
the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c)
The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other
diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention in the event of sickness.’
80 Cf. Chapman 2002, pp. 187-190, and more generally, Toebes 1999, pp. 16-26. This became
clear already at the time of drafting this right, see, e.g., Saul et al. 2014, pp. 979-981.
81 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 11.
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of these minimum cores is preceded by various references to other international
legal documents.82 The Comment mentions the Programme of Action of the
International Conference on Population and Development and the Alma-Ata
Declaration as ‘providing compelling guidance on the core obligations arising
from article 12’.83 With the help from these authoritative documents the
Committee rather precisely defined various core obligations as well as a few
‘obligations of comparative priority’. The former include the following:
‘(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups;
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate
and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone;
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply
of safe and potable water;
(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action
Programme on Essential Drugs;
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services;
(f) To adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action,
on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the
whole population; the strategy and plan of action shall be devised, and periodically
reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and transparent process; they shall include
methods, such as right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress
can be closely monitored; the process by which the strategy and plan of action are
devised, as well as their content, shall give particular attention to all vulnerable
or marginalized groups.’84
What the Committee considered to be of ‘comparative priority’, then, is this:
‘(a) To ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child
health care;
(b) To provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring in
the community;
(c) To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases;
(d) To provide education and access to information concerning the main health
problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling them;
(e) To provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on
health and human rights.’85
It has been argued that the core obligations recognised under the right to
health are somewhat problematic as it is potentially unreasonable to oblige
82 See, generally, on the dialogue between the CESCR and specialised agencies and other
international organs, the Limburg Principles, para. 94.
83 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43.
84 Ibid., para. 43.
85 Ibid., para. 44.
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poor countries to comply with them.86 As Saul et al. argue, they require ‘an
activist, committed state party, with a carefully honed set of public policies
related to the right to health’, including a national public health strategy and
plan for action, yet only few countries can be said to live up to this image.87
Regardless of this issue, however, the minimum cores recognised signal some
interesting points. First of all, not only is reference made to international
documents and expert guidelines at the outset of the General Comment, the
CESCR also mentions one such document in listing the core obligations, namely
the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs. It thereby explicitly relies
on ‘external expertise’ for determining one of the essential aspects of the right
to health.88 Secondly, just like in the context of the right to housing particular
attention must be had to discrimination and to ‘vulnerable and marginalised
groups’. Interesting is moreover that the cores of the right to health, according
to the Comment, clearly show some ‘overlap’. Amongst them, for example,
a right to ‘minimum essential food’ and ‘basic shelter, housing and sanitation’
can be found, which emphasises the interrelatedness of the different economic
and social rights.89 More particularly, this seems to show that economic and
social rights do not only overlap with respect to their more peripheral aspects,
but in fact also when it comes to the very core of these rights, at least as these
are explicated by the CESCR.
5.4.3 The Right to Social Security
No matter how briefly it is phrased (‘The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognise the right of everyone to social security, including social assistance’),
Article 9 ICESCR can be understood to cover a great variety of things.90 In 2008
General Comment No. 19 was adopted, in which the Committee aimed to
clarify the normative content and obligations related to this right.91 It started
out by stating that ‘[t]he right to social security is of central importance in
guaranteeing human dignity for all persons when they are faced with circum-
stances that deprive them of their capacity to fully realize their Covenant
86 Chapman 2002, p. 205. Perhaps therefore, Chapman seems to argue, the language used
is carefully chosen, or left unspecific, like in case of the words ‘to provide’.
87 Ibid..
88 See, further on this point, infra, S. 5.5.2.2.
89 See, with regard to the right to health in particular Toebes 1999, pp. 259-272. See also, infra,
S. 5.5.1.
90 What it intends to mean, though, can at least to some extent be clarified by reference to
ILO standards on this topic, which can arguably be seen as the right’s lex specialis. See Saul
et al. 2014, p. 618.
91 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), 4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19
(General Comment No. 19).
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rights’.92 This was followed by recognition of the fact that ‘[s]ocial security,
through its redistributive character, plays an important role in poverty re-
duction and alleviation, preventing social exclusion and promoting social
inclusion’.93 Having stated these purposes, the Committee continued by
outlining certain elements that apply to all aspects of the right, namely, avail-
ability, (the coverage of) social risks and contingencies, (i.e., health care, sick-
ness, old age, unemployment, employment injury, family and child support,
and maternity), adequacy and accessibility.94 It also underlined the importance
of the relation between the right to social security and other rights.95
Coming to the obligations that follow from the right to social security, the
CESCR stated that ‘States parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated
in the Covenant’. In the case of social security, this requires a state:
‘(a) To ensure access to a social security scheme that provides a minimum essential
level of benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire
at least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation,
foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education. If a State party cannot provide
this minimum level for all risks and contingencies within its maximum available
resources, the Committee recommends that the State party, after a wide process
of consultation, select a core group of social risks and contingencies;
(b) To ensure the right of access to social security systems or schemes on a non-dis-
criminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and
groups;
(c) To respect existing social security schemes and protect them from unreasonable
interference;
(d) To adopt and implement a national social security strategy and plan of action;
(e) To take targeted steps to implement social security schemes, particularly those
that protect disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups;
(f) To monitor the extent of the realization of the right to social security.’96
Evident from obligation (a) is once more that what the Committee considers
to be the most important requirement following from a specific right, does
not stand on its own but is intimately connected to the realisation of the other
(core) rights contained in the Covenant.97 Again, also, the importance of non-
discrimination and the targeting of especially disadvantaged and marginalised
92 Ibid., para. 1.
93 Ibid., para. 3.
94 Ibid., paras. 10-27.
95 Ibid., para. 28.
96 Ibid., para. 59 [footnotes omitted].
97 See, e.g., also the discussion of the right to health, supra, S. 5.4.2.
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individuals and groups are emphasised.98 Interesting is further the ‘negative’
core obligation to ‘respect’ social security schemes that are in place and protect
them from unreasonable interferences.99 This signals that authorities need
not necessarily ‘do much’ to ensure basic guarantees.100 However, according
to Saul et al.,
‘[t]he core obligations … identified nevertheless remain slippery. On the
one hand, the CESCR requires states to provide the benefits necessary to
guarantee basic subsistence rights (at paragraph 59(a) above), but in the
next sentence allows for states which cannot provide a “minimum essential
level of benefits” to “select a core group of social risks and contingencies”
after consulting widely. There is thus an ill-defined lower minimum within
a better defined higher minimum – even though the higher minimum itself
is pegged at a very low level, namely the provision of subsistence rights
(plus basic education).’101
Indeed, it can be considered problematic to first recognise a core obligation,
and then trivialise it. It remains unclear whether the selection to be made by
the state that is short of resources is bound by certain requirements, or whether
respect for Article 9 ICESCR demands that at least some specific risks or con-
tingencies are taken into account. Saul et al. rightly note that the selection the
CESCR allows for can moreover result in a conflict with the non-discrimination
requirement, which is indeed of an immediate nature.102 What these problems
with core obligation (a) thereby underline is that, when, within a range of
possibilities for fulfilment, the choice is left to the authorities, the provision
of the most important, basic guarantees is not necessarily guaranteed. Indeed,
this mirrors the ‘progressive realisation problem’ this chapter started out with,
and thereby the sensible role core obligations can play.
5.4.4 Other Minimum Core Obligations
As indicated previously, for reasons related to the setup of this book, most
attention is given here to the content of the minimum core of particular socio-
98 See, on the important requirement of non-discrimination, also CESCR, General Comment
No. 19, paras. 29-30. This is also considered to be an ‘obligation of immediate effect’, see
para. 40, just like ensuring equal rights of men and women. For an extensive discussion
on the right to social security and non-discrimination, see Saul et al. 2014, pp. 654-694.
99 See further, infra, S. 5.5.1.
100 Which is not to say, however, that refraining from disproportionally interfering with existing
social security rights is not a ‘costly’ obligation. Indeed, this would be an example of a
negative right having obvious budgetary consequences.
101 Saul et al. 2014, p. 645.
102 Ibid.
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economic rights. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting a few more examples,
because they bring to the table some new illustrations of what can be con-
sidered a right’s most essential aspects, or instead resemble – regardless of
the different character of the rights – the minimum cores identified with regard
to housing, health and social security.
Some years after General Comments Nos. 4 and 7 on the right to housing
were adopted, the first explicit references to what were introduced as core
obligations in General Comment No. 3 were made. In General Comment No.
12 (1999) on the right to adequate food (Article 11 ICESCR), the Committee stated
that ‘[t]he right to adequate food will have to be realized progressively. How-
ever, states have a core obligation to take the necessary action to mitigate and
alleviate hunger as provided for in paragraph 2 of article 11, even in times
of natural or other disasters’.103 Under the heading of ‘Adequacy and sustain-
ability of food availability and access’ the Comment points states at the core
content of the right to food, which implies:
‘The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary
needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given
culture;
The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere
with the enjoyment of other human rights.’104
Besides this, already in General Comment No. 3 it was noted that ‘a State party
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential food-
stuffs … is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Coven-
ant’.105 This means that the Committee sees ‘access to essential foodstuffs’
as belonging to the minimum core content. According to Künnemann, ‘[t]his
coincides with the extraordinary emphasis placed on “the fundamental right
to freedom from hunger” in Article 11 of the Covenant, showing that the core
content of the human right to adequate food includes freedom from hunger
as its baseline and minimum core content’.106
With regard to the right to education (Article 13 of the Covenant) the Com-
mittee has provided a number of very concrete minimum requirements. In
General Comment No. 13 it emphasised a state’s core obligations
103 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 1999 (General
Comment No. 12), para. 6.
104 Ibid., para. 8.
105 Ibid., para. 10.
106 Künnemann 2002, p. 171. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 14: ‘Every State
is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum essential
food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from
hunger.’
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‘to ensure the right of access to public educational institutions and programmes
on a non-discriminatory basis; … to provide primary education for all in accordance
with article 13(2)(a); to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which
includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; and to ensure
free choice of education without interference from the State or third parties, subject
to conformity with “minimum educational standards” (art. 13 (3) and (4)).’107
It is in line with the immediate character of Article 2(2) of the ICESCR that non-
discrimination is regarded a core obligation. To explain the content of the core
obligation to ‘provide primary education for all’, the CESCR further had regard
to Article 13(2)(a) that clarifies that this education should be ‘compulsory’ and
‘free’.108 The free choice of education in this light could be characterised as
a negative core element of the right to education, as it requires the state to
refrain from interfering with the choice parents make in terms of education
for their children. In regard to this obligation, however, making reference to
international human rights law and views of the Human Rights Committee,
Coomans has stated that it does not seem to include an obligation for the state
to financially support private education and ensure that parents really have
a choice.109 At the same time, when states provide for assistance to private
schools, this should be done in a non-discriminatory manner.
Another core obligation the CESCR mentioned in Comment No. 13 is the
duty to ‘ensure that education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13
(1)’.110 In this article it is stated that education must be directed towards ‘the
full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity’ and
strengthening ‘the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
Moreover, education should ensure effective participation in a free society
and ‘promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and
all racial ethnic or religious groups’.111 These agreed-upon aims can form
the starting point for determining what the educational programmes required
by the Covenant should look like.112
107 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 57. With regard to the core obligation to provide
free primary education for all it can be held that this ‘core’ already follows from the wording
of Article 13 where it holds that ‘[p]rimary education shall be compulsory and available
free to all’, which according to Coomans means that this is not subject to progressive
realisation (Coomans 2002, p. 222).
108 Moreover, guidance as to the meaning of ‘primary education’ can be found within, for
example, the UNESCO framework. See Coomans 2002, p. 226.
109 Ibid., p. 230.
110 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 57.
111 Art. 13(1) ICESCR.
112 The right to education can thus be characterised as an ‘empowerment right’ which means
that it ‘enables a person to experience the benefit of other rights’, see Coomans 2002, p.
219, referring to Donnelly and Howard 1988, p. 215.
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Finally, General Comment No. 18 (2005) can be noted, which concentrates
on the right to work of Article 6 ICESCR.113 The core obligations belonging to
this right read as follows:
‘(a) To ensure the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and groups, permitting them to live a life of dignity;
(b) To avoid any measure that results in discrimination and unequal treatment in
the private and public sectors of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and
groups or in weakening mechanisms for the protection of such individuals and
groups;
(c) To adopt and implement a national employment strategy and plan of action
based on and addressing the concerns of all workers on the basis of a participatory
and transparent process that includes employers’ and workers’ organizations. Such
an employment strategy and plan of action should target disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and groups in particular and include indicators and
benchmarks by which progress in relation to the right to work can be measured
and periodically reviewed.’114
Indeed, regardless of the different nature of this right, these core obligations
are similar to those recognised in relation to the other fields of socio-economic
rights protection. In the following section, the various similarities of the differ-
ent ‘cores’ are more closely analysed.
5.5 INSIGHTS CONCERNING THE MINIMUM CORE
The idea of the minimum core enables the clarification of socio-economic rights’
most important content. Alternatively, one could say that it allows for ‘narrow-
ing down’ the problematic, ill-defined scope of ‘full’ economic and social rights.
It is not easy, however, to determine the minimum core belonging to a right.
Nevertheless, the CESCR has succeeded in listing the minimum core obligations
that follow from the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. Moving beyond what was
outlined in General Comment No. 3, it has spelled out tasks and aims that
need to be fulfilled as a matter of priority.
Although some hints were already given in this regard, the present section
aims at distilling some more general insights from the various General Com-
ments. It does so, first, by making some remarks on the kinds of minimum
core obligations that have been identified (5.5.1). The cores that were
illuminated above can be grouped into different categories and as such provide
113 See for the view that the right to work has, also after the adoption of General Comment
No. 18 in 2005, remained underdeveloped, Sarkin and Koenig 2011. Cf. also Mundlak 2007.
114 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 18: The Right to Work (Art. 6 of the Covenant), 6 February 2006, E/C.12/GC/18
(General Comment No. 18), para. 31.
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valuable information on the types of things that are considered to belong to
the core aspects of socio-economic rights. Secondly, information can be
gathered from the various Comments on how cores can be identified (5.5.2).
Also ‘methodologically’ speaking, the Comments present some relevant points
related to the sources that can be used for determining core aspects.
5.5.1 Categories of Minimum Cores
Having introduced a great range of minimum core obligations that form the
essential content of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, it is interesting to see
whether some general conclusions can be reached on what are the kind of
issues that are deemed important enough to be included in this core. It must
thereby be kept in mind that the ICESCR is a particular document, containing
a distinct type of rights norms, and that the minimum core obligations ident-
ified are specifically tailored to this context. However, the relative similarity
of socio-economic rights issues regardless of the specific legal context, as well
as the significant overlap shown by the various minimum cores, suggests that
this information can be relevant elsewhere, too.
Before further going into the overlap of the different minimum cores, it
must be remarked that they also show particular differences. At least, that
is, in terms of the famous ‘trichotomy’ of duties, namely to ‘respect’, ‘protect’
and ‘fulfil’ socio-economic rights. This tripartite typology was introduced by
Eide in 1987, who spoke of different levels of obligations.115 At the primary
level, states must ‘respect the freedom of individuals to take the necessary
actions and use the necessary resources’.116 At the secondary and tertiary
level states need to protect ‘the freedom of action and the use of resources
as against other, more assertive or aggressive subjects’, and fulfil the
expectations of all with regard to the enjoyment of their rights, respectively.117
This ‘levels perspective’ could give the impression that first of all, it is the
obligation to respect that needs to be fulfilled.118 In line with this, it could
be expected that minimum core obligations are generally of the ‘respect’ kind.
On the other hand, rights to health, housing, social security etc. have not been
recognised merely to protect existing freedoms, but rather to contribute to the
improvement of the status quo with regard to the fulfilment of socio-economic
115 See, e.g., the final report on The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right by Eide as
Special Rapporteur E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 7 July 1987; Eide 1989. Over the years Eide
has developed his approach and added the obligation to facilitate, see Eide 2000, p. 111;
Eide 2001.
116 Eide 1989, p. 39.
117 Ibid., p. 40.
118 Cf. Bilchitz 2007, p. 195. Although this is not undisputed, obligations to respect are generally
perceived as being less costly and easier to comply with than the other obligations are.
See, e.g., Künnemann 2002, p. 177.
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needs.119 For this reason, it would make sense if socio-economic core rights
mainly concern obligations to fulfil socio-economic needs, or at least to protect
them.
However, as the examples just given have shown, the minimum cores of
the ICESCR rights comprise obligations of all three kinds. Indeed, they concern
active duties: to take (targeted) steps, to ensure, to provide, to adopt and
implement, and to monitor.120 At the same time, some of the minimum cores
mentioned are of a ‘negative’ kind. The state must show ‘respect’ when it
comes to the duty to abstain from certain practices in relation to housing,121
when it comes to the social security schemes that are in place,122 and in
regard to the free choice of education.123 This goes to show, first, that the
tripartite typology – although it can be helpful in analysing the different
obligations – cannot be used to determine the content of core rights, and
second, that, regardless of the ‘typically’ positive character of socio-economic
rights, ensuring negative obligations in this field can be considered of core
importance just as well as ensuring positive guarantees.
Turning to the overlap of core obligations, then, it can be said that this takes
two forms: First, there is actual overlap in the sense that the core obligations
recognised under one right, sometimes resemble or are covered by what was
identified as a core aspect of another right. For example, the right to social
security demands access to social security schemes in order to be enable
individuals to afford essential health care,124 while the right to health requires
access to health facilities, goods and services.125 The right to health, in turn,
requires as a core obligation access to minimum essential food to ensure
freedom from hunger,126 while the right to food, unsurprisingly, also comes
with a core obligation to mitigate and alleviate hunger.127 As already briefly
noted before, this signals that not only socio-economic rights, but in fact also
their essential aspects coincide in important ways.
119 See Künnemann 2002, p. 172: ‘The difference between the versions of Article 2 in the two
Covenants is not a difference in the rights themselves, but rather, a difference in emphasis.
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights puts more emphasis on the obligations to respect,
whereas the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights puts more weight on
obligations to fulfil. However, civil and political rights must be fulfilled also, and economic,
social and cultural rights must be respected.’
120 See, supra, S. 5.4: the core obligations of the different rights generally cover at least four
of these different kinds of obligations.
121 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 10.
122 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(c).
123 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 57.
124 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(a).
125 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(a).
126 Ibid., para. 43(b).
127 CESCR, General Comment No. 12, para. 6.
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Second, besides in content, the different minimum core obligations resemble
each other in kind. At least five ‘categories’ of minimum cores can in this
regard be identified. First of all, there is the category of non-discrimination.
Whatever exactly states do, or provide for in terms of socio-economic rights,
they must do so in a non-discriminatory manner. This is considered to be an
essential aspect of the various rights. The requirement of non-discrimination,
which was recognised as an immediate obligation per se, echoes in the various
core obligations in the form of determining where in particular a state should
prevent unequal treatment or access.128 Whether it comes to access to social
security, or foodstuffs, or protection against forced evictions, the state should
always and foremost ensure that rights are conferred on individuals in a way
that prevents discrimination.
The second group of core obligations is inherently linked to the first. It
concerns the emphasis placed on disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and
groups.129 Together with the various minimum cores’ recognition of ‘basic
guarantees’, in terms of food, health care, etc., this focal point allows for the
conclusion that minimum core obligations generally aim at achieving a basic
standard of living conditions for all persons alike.130 De facto this means that
the state should focus its attention and resources on those vulnerable indi-
viduals and groups that cannot assure such a living standard by themselves.
Without this kind of core obligations, ‘progressive realisation’ could result
in using the available resources to the benefit of the less marginalised and
disadvantaged, thereby neglecting this important goal.
Thirdly, there are the minimum core obligations one could call strategic.
In the different socio-economic fields states are at the very least required to
adopt and implement a strategy and plan of action, to implement schemes
and to monitor the extent of the realisation of the right.131 It can be said that
his group of core obligations thereby indicates means that are needed in order
to fulfil the more material aims that follow from the various minimum cores
and the ICESCR rights in general.
128 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 57; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para.
43(a); United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Com-
ment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003, E/
C.12/2002/11 (General Comment No. 15), para. 37(b); CESCR, General Comment No. 18,
para. 31(b); CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(b). See, on the requirement of non-
discrimination, also United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art.
2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 July
2009, E/C.12/GC/20 (General Comment No. 20), especially para. 7.
129 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(a); CESCR, General Comment No. 18, para.
31(a); CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(b).
130 Cf. also the right to an Existenzminimum, which was discussed in, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.
131 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(f); CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para.
37(f)(g)(h); CESCR, General Comment No. 18, para. 31(c); CESCR, General Comment No.
19, para. 59(d)(e)(f).
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Fourthly, mention can be made of procedural requirements. These are most
obviously highlighted in General Comment No. 7,132 concerning forced
evictions, where, although the CESCR does not explicitly speak about ‘minimum
core obligations’, the emphasis placed on the topic allows for the conclusion
that procedural safeguards in this field are considered of essential importance.
Procedural obligations not so much require a certain end-result, but as with
the strategic duties, they are meant to form the means for ensuring equitable,
fair outcomes. Indeed, by ensuring a fair procedure to those confronted with
interferences with their socio-economic rights, discrimination can be prevented
and the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups are more likely to be
heard.
Finally, as a kind of ‘wrap-up’ category, it can be noted that what many
core obligations boil down to is the provision of minimum essential levels of
the various rights, and hence in fact to requiring a subsistence minimum.133
This remains a relatively vague requirement, for it is a matter of discussion
what this exactly entails. However, it does point out something important,
namely, that the ICESCR rights are there to foremost ensure an adequate,
minimum standard of living for everyone, and that this is what a state’s efforts
should be directed at.
Thus, regardless of the broad range of obligations the CESCR has recognised,
the minimum cores tell a relatively coherent story. This is a story of equality,
of minimum guarantees, and of the means for achieving these as well as
(eventually) the full realisation of socio-economic rights. Read in that light,
the notion of minimum core obligations is likely to be transferable, at least
to some degree, to other legal contexts.134
5.5.2 Methods of Determining the Minimum Core
The practice of the CESCR differs significantly from that of a court like the
ECtHR. Rather than reaching binding conclusions on concrete individual applica-
tions, the CESCR in its monitoring capacity deals with more general circum-
stances in a given state.135 This might indeed change to some extent once
132 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para. 15.
133 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(b)(c); CESCR, General Comment No. 15,
para. 37(a); CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(a).
134 See further, infra, Ch. 7.
135 Although the minimum core obligations identified in the various General Comments have
made a recurrent appearance in this CESCR’s Concluding Observations on the reports by
States Parties, the way the CESCR ‘applies’ the various core obligations will therefore not
be discussed here. The Concluding Observations concern complex, intertwined, and general
country-specific circumstances, i.e., circumstances that do not concern individual applications
and individual situations, and are therefore not directly relevant for the current research.
Indeed, the insights that could be gained from studying the CESCR’s Concluding Observa-
tions would not form the kind of inspiration that is sought for.
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a practice of considering individual communications has been established on
the basis of the Optional Protocol,136 but for now, there is no ‘case law’ to
look at. For that reason, rather than discussing the CESCR’s ‘application’ of the
various minimum cores, it is instead worth highlighting one more aspect
related to the different cores’ content, which is the way in which the CESCR
apparently determines the different minimum cores.
Hereafter, the focus will be on a distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extern-
ally inspired’ minimum cores, i.e., between cores determined by looking at
the content of the right itself, and cores determined on the basis of ‘external’
sources such as expert statements or agreement amongst states.137 In fact
these two possibilities can already be read in General Comment No. 3. Speak-
ing of minimum core obligations, the Committee there refers to both the raison
d’être of the Covenant as well as to states’ reports, which could be considered
a first indication of the different approaches that can be taken to determining
the minimum core.138 In further exploring these two types of sources,
attention is also had to some theoretical and conceptual arguments either
supporting or criticising the different ways to go about, so as to present a fair
image of their appropriateness and use.
5.5.2.1 Intrinsic Cores
First, the minimum core of a right can be determined by looking at the right
itself. The question then is what is the most ‘essential’ part, or indeed the ‘core’
of this right. In other words, this approach searches for what Coomans calls
136 Interesting in this regard is the following document: United Nations Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to take Steps to the
‘Maximum of Available Resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, 10 May
2007, E/C.12/2007/1. In this document it is stated that in considering communications
the CESCR will have regard to whether the minimum core content of rights has been
guaranteed also in the particular situation (paras. 8 and 10). This implies that under the
Optional Protocol, the CESCR might further develop the core content of the relevant rights,
by applying it to concrete communications.
137 On the one hand, this distinction can be used as an analytical tool that can be helpful in
grouping the different minimum core obligations. More important here, however, is that
it shows that there are various, (more or less) workable ways of identifying the minimum
core of socio-economic rights. Cf. however Bilchitz 2007, p. 185, who presents the two aspects
as reasons for determining the minimum core, yet does not find them convincing in this
regard.
138 More precisely, it firstly refers to the experience gained through the examining of States
Parties’ reports. This seems to indicate that what the Committee has learned from examining
the reports is relevant for what it considers to be the minimum core obligations inherent
in the Covenant. A second aspect is the Committee’s remark that the Covenant would lose
its raison d’être if no minimum cores could be established. This can be understood as
suggesting that by closely looking at the ICESCR and the respective rights and their purpose,
it must be possible to identify those obligations that are essential to the Covenant and thus
belong to the minimum core. See, CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 10 (supra, S. 5.2.3).
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‘the intrinsic value of each human right’, or, the elements ‘essential for the
very existence of that right as a human right’.139 Using the same term as the
CESCR, Örücü in this regard speaks of the ‘unrelinquishable nucleus [that] is
the raison d’être of the basic legal norm, essential to its definition, and sur-
rounded by the less securely guarded elements’.140
It is true that it is often argued that rights do not have such an intrinsic
core.141 Cores of rights are not ‘out there’ in the sense that when looking
closely enough at a particular right, an incontestable essence can be found.
It has been argued, however, that attempts at delineating a right’s most im-
portant aspects can be made with the help of a normative starting point that
provides for the necessary focus. Young has explained, for example, that the
recognition of a normative core can proceed from a foundational norm or idea
on the basis of which certain aspects are considered more important than
others. Thus, foundational principles such as survival (‘needs’), freedom or
dignity (‘values’) can help pinpoint core elements and at the same time justify
why these elements should be given higher priority.142 The advantage of
grounding core obligations explicitly on such principles and ideas is that the
minimum core becomes less arbitrary, as a moral reason is directly provided
in justification of the weight of the minimum core. The normativity of this
approach can thereby form a compelling reason for compliance with core
elements.
At the same time, Young points out that the ‘normative essence’ approach,
and accordingly the ‘intrinsic core’, brings along certain risks. Grounding a
core on a particular normative foundation, she argues, can prevent broad
acceptance by a great variety of states, other actors, and individuals.143 By
relying on specific background-reasons, the support from those who do not
agree on the importance of these reasons is not guaranteed. To substantiate
this, Young explains that
‘the Essence Approach mimics the structure of foundational linear arguments
common to rights, which move from the deepest or most basic propositions for
the interests underlying rights, through a series of derivative concerns, each one
supported by and more concrete than the last. The ‘core’ of the right is thus its
most basic feature, which relies on no other foundations for justification.’144
139 Coomans 2002a, pp. 166-167.
140 Örücü 1986, p. 52 [emphasis added].
141 Cf. the German debate on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie and for example the position of Kauf-
mann taken therein (supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.2). See also, in the context of the South African
debate, infra, Ch. 6, S. 6.4.2.3.
142 Young 2008, p. 126ff.
143 Ibid., p. 127, pp. 138-139.
144 Ibid., p. 126 [footnote omitted].
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However,
‘the resemblance between justificatory reasoning and the Essence approach is a
strained one, because the implication of the a ‘minimum’ core can narrow the range
of foundations, rather than enlarge them. And it is precisely this minimalism that
upsets the foundational support, so that the base point of the right is also its
narrowest. This puts into question the ability of the core to accommodate
contrasting normative foundations.’145
Indeed, the minimum core is a ‘narrow’ concept, which is said to decrease its
chances of being acceptable from different normative perspectives. Young
exemplifies this by presenting the case of a core derived from the idea that
economic and social rights should first and foremost promote survival, and
of a core that is grounded on the value of human flourishing. These two
accounts would ‘lead in very different directions, thwarting efforts at giving
a certain, determinate meaning to the minimum core’.146 Whereas the former
justification would focus on the right to life and the provision of basic needs
as belonging to the essence of socio-economic rights, the latter would stress
such notions as dignity, equality and freedom. Of course, a dignity-based
approach seems to demand something else than ‘minimum nutritional require-
ments’, or some basic form of shelter in order to be protected against the
elements. Being entirely dependent on (minimum) state support arguably does
not correspond with living a dignified life in freedom. However, it can be
asked whether the different underlying justifications truly point in ‘very
different directions’, or that, rather than in kind, the different cores they
suggest in fact merely differ in degree.147 The hardest thing about identifying
a normative minimum core, it can be argued, is deciding on ‘how far’ it should
go. Most likely those who think a minimum core must be based on the idea
of biological survival, as well as those who consider living a human life to
be the guiding value, will reason that the core of a right to housing includes
that nobody has to sleep on the streets. However, from the perspective of
biological survival a roof that protects against the elements might suffice,
whereas ‘living a human life’ might call for facilities such as sewage and
electricity to also be included in what should minimally be arranged for. Does
the minimum core of the right to food only entail the provision of a package
145 Ibid., p. 127.
146 Ibid., p. 127. And further: ‘Although only two theories are suggested here, it follows that
the “core” of the right, defined according to other political theories – from liberalism to
communitarianism to market socialism – proliferates in content and scope.’ Cf. also, pp.
138-139.
147 Interestingly, in later work Young holds that ‘interpreting the minimum of economic and
social rights is compatible with ethical pluralism’ (Young 2012, p. 66). Quoting Ignatieff
(2001, p. 56), she states that ‘people from different cultures may continue to disagree about
what is good, but nevertheless agree about what is insufferably, unarguably wrong’. This
seems to suggest that she nevertheless sees possibilities for overlapping, normative cores.
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of calories, or does it require more, for example the possibility to independently
grow or buy food not just for immediate but also for long terms purposes?
Indeed, what the understanding of the ‘intrinsic core’ of rights reveals is that
such cores are prone to point in the same direction, but that there will be a
difference of degree in their inclusiveness.
To agree, then, on a particular level of inclusiveness, what might be needed
is some kind of ‘incompletely theorised agreement’. This idea of Sunstein holds
that even when people cannot agree on theories, they can still agree on
practices, or outcomes.148 When (disputes on) the underlying normative
theories are left for what they are, i.e., without necessarily abandoning these
theoretical starting points, a particular answer to the question what can be
considered the intrinsic essence of a socio-economic right might be broadly
accepted. Alternatively, this acceptance could concern the practice of a body
like the CESCR, when it responds to the need of clarifying the content of ICESCR
rights by giving a particular definition of their core aspects.149
Coming back to the CESCR, indeed, it becomes apparent that what it considers
the raison d’être of the Covenant, is related to the provision of ‘essential
foodstuffs, … essential primary health care, … basic shelter and housing, …
[and] the most basic forms of education’.150 In the General Comments related
to the particular rights it moreover often emphasises that there must be access
to, e.g., a minimum essential level of benefits, minimum essential food, and
basic shelter, housing, and sanitation.151 Indeed, these core elements, which
seemingly are distilled from the different rights themselves, seem to comply
with a ‘basic needs’ paradigm,152 albeit their ‘degree of inclusiveness’ is
arguably relatively high as they demand more than what is needed for mere
survival. Important, however, is that the CESCR does not provide a specific
normative justification for these core obligations. Nevertheless, or perhaps
because of that, the focus on basic, minimum provisions in the context of socio-
148 See, e.g., Sunstein 1995; Sunstein 2007.
149 According to Sunstein, ‘[w]hen the convergence on particular outcomes is incompletely
theorized, it is because the relevant actors are clear on the result without being clear, either
in their own minds or on paper, on the most general theory that accounts for it’ (1995, p.
1737).
150 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 10.
151 E.g., CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(a)(b)(c); CESCR, General Comment No.
15, para. 37(a); CESCR, General Comment No. 19, para. 59(a).
152 See, however, the Comment on the right to work, where it is stated that there is a minimum
core obligation to ‘ensure the right of access to employment, especially for disadvantaged
and marginalized individuals and groups, permitting them to live a life of dignity’ (CESCR,
General Comment No. 18, para. 31(a)). This can however be explained by the particular
nature of the right to work.
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economic rights seems defensible.153 Indeed, from whatever theoretical start-
ing point one looks at it, the fact that intrinsically these rights must entail at
least – and that is what minimum core protection is about – the basics men-
tioned, can hardly be contested.154
5.5.2.2 Externally Inspired Cores
A second approach to determining minimum core obligations that can be
inferred from the CESCR’s General Comments does not merely rely on the
intrinsic characteristics of the right itself. Rather, what according to this
approach is considered important for deciding on a right’s essential elements
are ‘external’ sources. One such external source could for example be consensus
amongst States Parties on the socio-economic guarantees that should at mini-
mum be provided, or an expert organisation’s determination of certain basic
standards.
A clear example is provided by the Committee’s Comment on the right
to the highest attainable standard of health. There, it is stated that that the
core obligations related to this right include the obligation ‘[t]o provide
essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Pro-
gramme on Essential Drugs’.155 Indeed, by referring to this WHO standard,
the CESCR laid down a concrete core obligation based on external information.
Also in other Comments, references can be found to international standards
as well as state practice. The mention that is made of States Parties reports
in General Comment No. 3 in this regard only is a first example.156 Also in
clarifying the right to adequate housing, the CESCR noted that it has been able
to accumulate a large amount of data on this topic. More particularly, it is
held that
153 Different from civil and political rights (where it is hard to say that one needs at least ‘some’
freedom of religion or freedom of speech), it can be argued that for most socio-economic
rights there is a ‘minimum’ that can be provided (e.g., some (enough) food, some shelter
or housing, and some basic form of health care, education and social security). Cf. Bilchitz
2007, p. 187ff. (distinguishing two thresholds of interests). See also Fredman 2008, p. 86,
who states that ‘[t]he minimum core refers to the duty to do everything possible to optimize
the basic right of survival of the most destitute and advanced in society, because there is
very little that can take priority over the basic right of survival’.
154 Cf. also the German example of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, which is grounded upon the idea
that even if there are limitations, it cannot be the case that nothing of a right remains. See,
supra, Ch. 4, and especially S. 4.2.1.
155 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(d). Note however that this core obligation can
also be regarded an intrinsic one (‘provide essential drugs’) that is further determined with
reference to an authoritative standard. This shows that the different approaches can indeed
complement one another.
156 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: ‘On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade
of examining States parties’ reports …’ (para. 10).
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‘the Committee and its predecessors have examined 75 reports dealing with the
right to adequate housing. The Committee has also devoted a day of general
discussion to the issue at each of its third and fourth sessions. In addition, the
Committee has taken careful note of information generated by the International
Year of Shelter for the Homeless (1987) including the Global Strategy for Shelter
to the Year 2000 adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/191 of 11 De-
cember 1987. The Committee has also reviewed relevant reports and other docu-
mentation of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.’157
Also, before enumerating the core obligations related to the right to health,
the CESCR explicitly referred to the Programme of Action of the International
Conference on Population and Development and the Alma-Ata Declaration.158
Many more of such examples can be given,159 and it can thus be held that
either more directly (in the wording of the core obligation) or more indirectly,
the CESCR places great weight upon external sources.
In her illuminating article on the minimum core, Young speaks of a similar
approach that is characterised by broad agreement. According to this ‘mini-
mum consensus’ approach, emphasis is placed on consensus that already has
been established.160 Looking from this perspective, she holds that ‘[t]he
minimum core content is the right’s agreed-upon nucleus, whereas elements
outside core translate to the plurality of meanings and disagreement surround-
ing the right’.161 Minimum consensus is presented as a ‘wider agreement’,162
a ‘synthesis of jurisprudence’,163 or as that what states have been doing so
far.164 In this way questions of normative content can be avoided. In the
words of Young,
‘the Consensus Approach … explicitly addresses two central challenges to the
Essence Approach: that resolving disagreement by an abstract, overlapping con-
157 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 2 [footnotes omitted]. Cf. also Leckie 2001, p. 155.
158 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para 43.
159 Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 12, where the CESCR holds that its approach
is supported by the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled ‘Adjustment with a human face:
protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth’, the analysis by UNDP in its Human
Development Report 1990, and the analysis by the World Bank in the World Development Report
1990.
160 Young 2008, p. 140ff.
161 Ibid., p. 140. Cf. Hart’s distinction between ‘a core of certainty and a penumbera of doubt’
(Hart 1994, p. 123).
162 Ibid., referring to Russell 2002, p. 11 (‘There now exists wider agreement on the core
elements of these rights’).
163 Leckie 2001, p. 155.
164 See again CESCR General Comment No. 3, para. 10, where the Committee refers to the
extensive experience it gained and the examining of States parties’ reports in relation to
the recognition of minimum cores.
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sensus of reasonable political theories does not resolve the problems of representa-
tion and voice, and that even broad ethical agreements may not resonate enough
with social facts to constitute law.’165
Two things are made clear here: First, an agreed-upon understanding of the
minimum core allows for the ‘voice’ of the various (state) actors to be included.
This is of great importance especially in a complex political and international
setting like that of the ICESCR. It also allies well with what Alston wrote in
the 1990s on the definition of the various economic and social rights norms,
namely that: ‘[t]he approaches adopted by States themselves in their internal
arrangements … will shed light upon the norms, while the dialogue between
the State and the Committee will contribute further to deepening the under-
standing’.166 An approach to the minimum core that explicitly takes notice
of internal arrangements can also mitigate concerns about too much inter-
national interference with states’ socio-economic policies. For that reason, at
least in a context like that of the ICESCR, it might be preferred over a purely
normatively determined core. Secondly, the inclusion of social facts resonates
the ‘positivist’ character of the consensus-based minimum core. Factual
situations are looked at, with a special eye to legal facts in the form of constitu-
tions, laws, and case law: ‘Through comparative analysis of sociolegal equival-
ents, a converging set of principles regarding socioeconomic protection is
empirically “uncovered” rather than deductively “discovered”.’167
All this, however, does not mean that a ‘consensus’ minimum core
approach is not normative at all. Consensus itself is a value that can be debated
or put into question, just like the value of freedom or equality, for example.168
Although the concept of consensus fits in nicely with international legal
thinking, there also exists a tension with the very idea of fundamental rights.
As was explicated in Chapter 3, where the distinction between the interpreta-
tion and application of rights was discussed, fundamental rights serve to
protect minorities and they should therefore not be made dependent on what
‘the majority’ considers to belong to a right in the first place.169 A counter-
argument to this could be that, especially in a multi-level legal context, the
interpretation of economic and social rights may in fact, to some extent, take
state concerns into account.170 Particularly when the question is concerned
of what should be done first, i.e., where the emphasis should be placed and
165 Young 2008, p. 141 [footnote omitted].
166 Alston 1992, p. 491.
167 Young 2008, p. 142.
168 Ibid., p. 144.
169 See, supra, Ch. 3, especially S. 3.3.3. Cf. also the debate on the use of a consensus interpreta-
tion in the context of the ECtHR (supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.3.3 and Ch. 3, S. 3.3.1. and 3.3.3), and
see for a critical stance therein, e.g., Benvenisti 1999, pp. 850-853.
170 See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.3, where it is argued that interpretation of especially socio-economic
and positive duties cannot always be entirely independent of state concerns.
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the budget should be spent on, paying some degree of ‘deference’ to what
is being considered as important by the States Parties may seem sensible.
Even when this fundamental point is sufficiently addressed, however, there
are still some more practical concerns. For example: whose consensus exactly
should be relied on? Consensus can be looked for in the judicial realm, or in
the various states’ laws or (legal) practices, all options having their pros and
cons.171 If different sources are used, what weight should be attached to either
of these? It can also be asked whether consensus really should mean ‘100
percent agreement’. Especially in an international setting this often is hard
to achieve. If an agreed-upon solution is found such agreement is often
informed by compromise rather than reason.172 Indeed, also when account
is had to (international) expert bodies statements or standards, the state support
underlying these is often of an indirect and ‘incomplete’ character.
Because of these difficulties with the concept of ‘consensus’ in determining
minimum cores, it might also be an option to stick to the idea of ‘external
inspiration’. Indeed, as was shown by the examples given from the CESCR’s
practice, what this body looks at is not so much the extent to which all relevant
stakeholders are actually in agreement. Rather, it draws inspiration from their
practices as indicated in their reports as a means for coming to an appropriate
definition of core obligations. Importantly, moreover, not only state practices
but also the standards set by expert bodies and institutions form a major
source. From time to time these can indeed be said to reflect democratic
preferences States Parties have agreed upon, sometimes they are also nothing
more than, indeed, expert opinions. However, especially when technical socio-
economic topics (like housing and education) are concerned, expertise might
be more than welcome.
Finally, then, one more point of criticism of an externally inspired (or
‘consensus’) approach must be considered. The danger of an approach to
determining the minimum core that relies on what is ‘already there’ can be
that it only legitimates the ‘lowest common denominator’. Young notes that
this is a problem especially in the field of economic and social fundamental
rights, as these still need further development. Such development is likely to
be obstructed by relying on consensus because in many countries a decent
socio-economic standard is still lacking.173 First of all, however, especially
when use is also made of expert opinions rather than (just) state concerns,
chances that the essential content of a right turns out too little ambitious are
relatively small. After all, standards set by expert bodies may entail desirable
171 Young 2008, p. 148. Judicial consensus might for example be more reasoned, whereas
national lawmakers generally outline a more democratically legitimate outlook. Consensus
among experts might be of great value, but lacks the democratic component.
172 Ibid., p. 149.
173 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
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aims rather than (low) realist expectations. At the same time, in the light of
what was already said on the relation between international instruments and
national decision-making, some ‘modesty’ will not harm the furtherance of
economic and social protection at the supranational level.
In conclusion, it can be said that combined with a sense of justice and a
degree of common sense and political sensitivity,174 ‘external inspiration’
can be of great importance in identifying adequate minimum cores that are
grounded in existing practice and authoritative statements.
5.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has introduced the notion of minimum core obligations. It has
done so by means of a discussion of the ICESCR and the General Comments
of the CESCR. What has become clear is that the CESCR has recognised that the
various rights enumerated in the ICESCR imply a number of core obligations,
i.e., there are certain aspects of these rights that need to be guaranteed as a
matter of priority.
It is important to recall that the development of the notion of the minimum
core can be traced back to a particular problem. Besides the general vagueness
of economic and social rights norms, the difficulty that arose in the context
of the ICESCR rights was that the requirement of ‘progressive realisation’ in
the light of the available resources (Article 2(1) ICESCR) hindered the
conceptualisation as well as the monitoring of the ICESCR rights. States could
claim a lack of resources for failing to comply with a particular aspect of an
ICESCR right, which could make the requirement of progressive realisation a
merely empty one. In order to address this problem, in General Comment
No. 3 it was recognised that there are not only certain immediate obligations
following from the Covenant, but that every right in fact entails certain mini-
mum core obligations. At least minimum essential levels of the various socio-
economic rights need to be provided, and if a state fails to do so, it prima facie
violates the Covenant.
It was argued in this chapter that these minimum core obligations in fact
narrow down the problematically wide scope of economic and social rights.
They point out those aspects that need to be complied with in any case, thereby
prioritising certain concrete aims and allowing for meaningful monitoring on
the basis of the ICESCR.
Attention was also had to the content of the minimum cores. Although
it is generally considered hard to determine a right’s essence, the CESCR has
nevertheless defined a long list of minimum core obligations belonging to,
e.g., the right to adequate housing, the right to the highest attainable standard
174 One can then speak of a ‘reflective equilibrium between natural and positive law’, see ibid.,
p. 147, referring to Waldron 2006a, p. 136.
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of health, and the right to social security. By analysing these, this chapter has
made clear that the different minimum cores overlap to a significant extent.
They generally require non-discrimination and focus on disadvantaged and
marginalised individuals and groups. Moreover, they require strategies, plans
of action and monitoring, as well as procedural safeguards. Together the
different minimum cores tell a relatively coherent story of providing for
minimum socio-economic guarantees for all, and they offer a strategic means
for working towards full realisation of socio-economic rights.
Besides these insights into the content of the minimum core, what also can
be gained from the example set by the CESCR are insights into how minimum
cores can be determined. What can be inferred from the Committee’s practice
and from the relevant scholarly commentaries is that there are (at least) two
ways in which this difficult task can be approached. First, one can look for
the intrinsic essence of a right, or its ‘raison d’être’, whether or not with the
help of a particular normative starting point like the importance of ‘survival’
or ‘basic needs’. Secondly, inspiration can be found in other sources than the
right itself – for determining the core of a right account can be taken of states’
experiences as well as expert opinions on what is considered of the utmost
importance for improving the socio-economic standard.
Altogether, thus, this chapter has shown how the idea of core rights can
be used not only to ensure that limitations of a right leave intact a right’s
essence, but also to determine the concrete (essential) scope of rights’ guar-
antees in the first place. As a way of giving meaningful content to broadly
stated economic and social rights, the recognition of minimum cores thereby
forms an interesting feature of this particular field of fundamental rights
protection. Moreover, also the insights presented on the concrete content of
and the methods for determining the minimum core can form a source of
inspiration for other legal contexts that deal with economic and social rights
issues, too.
6 Minimum Cores and Economic and Social
Rights Adjudication in South Africa
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of the minimum core as it has been introduced and developed
by the CESCR and as it has been analysed in Chapter 5 plays a role not only
in the context of the ICESCR. The South African experience with economic and
social rights protection provides an additional example of the (potential) use
of the minimum core. This example does not merely corroborate what was
said in the previous chapter, but adds to this in some interesting respects. In
the context of the ICESCR, the minimum cores that have been defined do not
provide for concrete information on individual legal positions. This has to do
with the fact that, although this might change with the Optional Protocol,1
besides the Concluding Observations of the CESCR there is no such thing as
an elaborate body of case law in which the implications of minimum core
obligations have been carefully fleshed out. Hence, the example of the ICESCR
leaves open the question what exactly the effect of the minimum core can be
in terms of subjective entitlements, and fails to provide information on the
role of courts and case-based adjudication in relation to the notion of core
rights protection.2 The South African example makes up for this. The constitu-
tion of South Africa is famous for enumerating individual socio-economic
rights that have been rendered explicitly justiciable. Courts are given ‘the
power to interpret these rights and to resolve disputes on their basis’.3 Because
of this, and because the development of this competence has gone hand in
hand with a lively debate on the use of minimum core rights, the South African
experience is particularly valuable for the purposes of this study.
1 See, United Nations General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly,
5 March 2009, A/RES/63/117, which entered into force in May 2013, as well as United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obliga-
tion to take Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ under an Optional Protocol
to the Covenant, 10 May 2007, E/C.12/2007/1 (indicating the potential role of the minimum
core once communications are considered under the new complaints procedure).
2 Some insights on the role of courts with regard to the provision of minimum, ‘core’ guar-
antees have however already been presented in, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.2.2.
3 Brand 2006, p. 208; see S. 167, 169, and 172 of the South African Constitution. See also S.
38: ‘Anyone listed in this Section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. …’
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In order to explore the debate on core rights protection, including the stance
South Africa’s Constitutional Court in this regard has taken, this chapter will
first introduce the 1996 constitution of South Africa and its so-called
transformative potential (Section 6.2). After that, in Section 6.3 a closer look
is had at the adjudication of economic and social rights cases and the
approaches used therein. This section will pay particular attention to some
early landmark cases and the Constitutional Court’s dilemma of having to
choose between reasonableness review and core rights adjudication. Section
6.4 more concretely deals with the (academic) debate that has followed from
this. It presents the arguments for and against the use of minimum core rights
protection in the adjudication of socio-economic rights. Thereby, attention will
also be given to overlapping debates concerning the role of the judiciary in
vindicating economic and social rights and related topics. Section 6.5 delves
deeper into some proposals made for how the Constitutional Court should
(better) deal with the adjudication of socio-economic Interestingly, these shed
light on how to overcome the dichotomy between reasonableness review and
core rights protection, and thereby on the potential that lies in a ‘less rigid’
minimum core approach. In Section 6.6 some conclusions are presented.
6.2 THE ‘TRANSFORMATIVE’ CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA
In the context of a transition from a system of parliamentary sovereignty
– through which the apartheid system had been enacted – to a constitutional
democracy, in 1993 an interim constitution was adopted in post-apartheid South
Africa that formed the basis for the first democratic elections to be held in
1994.4 The newly elected houses of parliament gathered in a Constitutional
Assembly to draft the 1996 Constitution of South Africa (Constitution), which
eventually entered into force on 4 February 1997.5
During the negotiations on the drafting of the Constitution, a vigorous
debate took place on whether or not economic and social rights had to be
included.6 The aim of the Constitution was to facilitate the ‘transformation’
of South African society, including ‘the dismantling of racist and sexist laws
and institutions, redressing their legacy, healing the divisions of the past and
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act no. 200, 1993).
5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act no. 108, 1996).
6 See, e.g., Haysom 1992 (arguing that that a constitutional democracy requires both civil
and political and socio-economic rights as a condition for its existence and survival);
Mureinik 1992 (emphasising that there is no difference between first and second generation
rights that forecloses constitutional review of the latter, proposing a specific mode of review
for ‘sincerity’ and ‘rationality’); Davis 1992 (who later became a defender of socio-economic
rights but here held that ‘[t]o overemphasize the importance of rights by introducing a
battery of specific social and economic demands in a constitution is to place far too much
power in the hands of the judiciary’ (p. 489)).
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building an new society committed to social justice and the improvement in
the quality of people’s lives’.7 In the light of this aim, considerable support
was given to the idea of including at least some socio-economic rights. Most
political parties agreed on this idea and civil society organisations were clearly
in favour of incorporating fully justiciable economic and social rights norms,
too.8 It was because of the unique situation the country found itself in that
many considered ‘the argument for socio-economic rights irresistible, in large
part because [they] seemed an indispensable way of expressing a commitment
to overcome the legacy of apartheid’.9 Nevertheless, objections were raised
as well. It was held in particular that the inclusion of socio-economic rights
was in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers and the budgetary and
policymaking freedoms of the non-judicial branches, and also that these rights
were essentially non-justiciable.10
In the interim constitution, 34 principles were enumerated with which the
Constitution had to be in compliance in order to be validly enacted. The
Constitutional Court had to certify that this was the case, and when it was
asked to judge on the first draft of the new Constitution, it explicitly responded
to the concerns related to the inclusion of socio-economic rights. It held with
regard to the separation of powers objection that ‘[i]t cannot be said that by
including socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon
the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of
rights that it results in a breach of the separation of powers’.11 With regard
to the second matter, the Constitutional Court noted that economic and social
rights were ‘at least to some extent, justiciable’,12 leaving nothing standing
in the way of their incorporation, which was what eventually happened.13
It is interesting to see what economic and social rights exactly were taken up
in the 1996 Constitution. Section 26, first of all, covers the right to ‘access to
adequate housing’ and reads as follows:
7 Liebenberg 2008, p. 76 [footnote omitted].
8 Ibid. For example, ‘[w]omen’s rights advocates … supported the constitutional protection
of socio-economic rights on the basis that it would advance substantial gender equality
in South Africa’. Cf. Liebenberg 1995, pp. 79-96.
9 Sunstein 2001, p. 224.
10 See, e.g., Liebenberg 2008, p. 77; O’Connell 2012, pp. 50-51.
11 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa 1996 (First Certification judgment) 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), para. 77.
12 Ibid., para 78.
13 After having been sent back to the General Assembly once, the Constitutional Court
subsequently approved of the revised Constitution, see Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitu-
tional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (Second Certification judgment) 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC).
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‘1. Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
3. No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legis-
lation may permit arbitrary evictions.’
Section 27 deals with health care, food, water and social security:
‘1. Everyone has the right to have access to
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their
dependants, appropriate social assistance.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.’
Important to note is that both provisions contain ‘internal limitations’.14 The
second paragraphs of the respective sections indicate that the different rights
should be realised progressively, while taking account of the available
resources. In this way, it was acknowledged that complete, immediate fulfil-
ment could not be expected.15
Next to the Sections 26 and 27, Sections 28,16 29,17 and 35(2)(e)18 can
14 Cf. De Vos 1997, p. 92ff.
15 Note that rather than the general limitation clause of Article 2(1) ICESCR, the qualifying
clauses here are linked to particular (and not all) rights. According to De Vos (1997, p. 95)
‘the nature and scope of the internal limitations clause will be of utmost importance in
litigation surrounding the qualified social and economic rights’. He points at the Limburg
Principles and General Comment No. 3 (infra, Ch. 5) as being of particular assistance in
understanding the meaning of the qualifying clause.
16 S. 28 (Children) of the Constitution reads as follows: ‘1. Every child has the right (a) to
a name and a nationality from birth; (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when removed from the family environment; (c) to basic nutrition, shelter,
basic health care services and social services; (d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect,
abuse or degradation; (e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; (f), not to be
required or permitted to perform work or provide services that (i) are inappropriate for
a person of that child’s age; or (ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical
or mental health or spiritual, moral or social development; (g) not to be detained except
as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under
sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of
time, and has the right to (i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of l S years;
and (ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child’s age;
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in
civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict.
2. A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
3. In this S. “child” means a person under the age of 18 years.’
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be mentioned, covering children’s rights, educational rights, and the socio-eco-
nomic rights of detained prisoners, respectively.19 The right to education
contains, amongst other things, ‘the right … to further education, which the
state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and
accessible’.20 Except for this clause, however, these rights do not contain
internal limitations. However, Section 36 of the Constitution provides for what
can be called a ‘general limitation clause’.21 This section reads as follows:
‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors, including
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitu-
tion, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’
In part because of the inclusion of explicit economic and social rights norms
the South African Constitution is considered the world’s leading example of
a ‘transformative constitution’, i.e., a constitution that actively contributes to
bringing about changes in society.22 As already follows from the Preamble,
17 S. 29 (Education) of the Constitution reads as follows: ‘l. Everyone has the right (a) to a
basic education, including adult basic education; and (b) to further education, which the
state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible. 2.
Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their
choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable.
In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must
consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking
into account (a) equity; (b) practicability; and (c) the need to redress the results of past
racially discriminatory laws and practices. 3. Everyone has the right to establish and
maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions that (a) do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race; (b) are registered with the state; and (c) maintain standards that
are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational institutions. 4. Subsection
3. does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions.’
18 S. 35(2)(e) holds that ‘[e]veryone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has
the right … to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including
at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition,
reading material and medical treatment’.
19 Moreover, in S. 24 rights related to the environment are taken up.
20 S. 29(1)(b).
21 See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
22 Sunstein 2001, p. 224. In the words of Davis (1992, p. 196) ‘the text [of the Constitution]
should be read as a social democratic narrative in which, in the words of the preamble,
the Constitution seeks to heal the divisions of our past and lay the foundations for a
democratic and open society’. See also Klare 1998; Sunstein 2001a, p. 125; Liebenberg 2008,
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the focus of the Constitution lies on social justice and human rights. It explicitly
refers to ‘the injustices of our past’ and acknowledges that the Constitution
aims to improve ‘the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each
person’.23 The transformative character of the Constitution places a particular
onus on the judiciary, vesting in it the power to adjudicate (socio-economic)
fundamental rights matters and thereby contribute to the country’s develop-
ment.24 In the following, attention is given to some of South Africa’s most
famous socio-economic rights cases, in order to show whether and in what
way the Constitutional Court has used this transformative potential.
6.3 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION UNDER THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
Although not all of the economic and social rights enshrined in the South
African Constitution are subject to the requirement of progressive realisation,
the different rights can generally be limited. Moreover, their exact interpreta-
tion and the role of the courts therein must be understood in the light of the
unfortunate socio-economic situation of many South Africans and the
transformative nature of this Constitution. For the purposes of this chapter
it is important to illustrate how the South African Constitutional Court has
perceived its task of reviewing economic and social rights. This section does
so by presenting some of the first landmark cases (6.3.1) and by introducing
the dilemma of core rights protection versus reasonableness review (6.2.3).
6.3.1 Some First Landmark Cases
Shortly after the enactment of the new constitution the South African Constitu-
tional Court had to decide on the case of Soobramoney v. Minister of Health,
KwaZula-Natal.25 The applicant, Mr Soobramoney, suffered from irreversible
kidney failure but was not admitted to a dialysis programme as he did not
qualify under the terms of the hospital’s policy. Lacking the money he needed
pp. 75-76. But see Roux 2002, pp. 41-44 (referring to Sunstein’s distinction between ‘preserv-
ative’ and ‘transformative’ constitutions, arguing that these rather form opposite ends of
a continuum and showing some pitfalls of this characterisation).
23 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
24 O’Connell 2012, p. 54. See also Moseneke (2002, p. 316, who notes that the ‘constitutional
design of conferring vast powers of judicial review to the courts becomes optimal only
if the courts are true to the constitutional mandate … in their work, courts should search
for substantive justice which is to be inferred from the foundational values of the Constitu-
tion. After all, that is the injunction of the Constitution – transformation’. Cf. also Langa
2003, p. 671-672; Budlender 2007, p. 9; Scott 1999a, p. 4; Liebenberg 2010, Ch. 2.
25 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZula-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (Soobramoney).
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to go to a private clinic, the refusal of treatment in a public hospital meant
that he was going to die. The applicant relied on Section 11 (right to life) and
Section 27(3) (the right to emergency medical treatment) of the South African
Constitution, seeking a positive order to provide him with ongoing treatment
and admit him to the renal unit of the hospital. The Constitutional Court
however did not grant him such order. If it would decide in favour of Soobra-
money and thereby in favour of numerous others in a similar position, so the
Court argued, this would have unbearable consequences for the health budget.
It would be to the detriment of other people’s care and other needs in gen-
eral.26 Overall, the Court applied a deferential method of review in this case,
stating that ‘a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in
good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility
it is to deal with such matters’.27
Since hopes had risen high with regard to the Constitutional Court’s new,
transformative role in the context of economic and social rights protection,
legal scholars initially received the Soobramoney judgment as an anti-climax.28
However, as Scott and Alston noted, the judgment in Soobramoney turned out
to be a first careful step into this new field rather than a predictor of a forever
reluctant approach to socio-economic matters.29 In the following landmark
case the Court did find a violation of a socio-economic right. In Government
of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Others30 the question was
whether the state’s housing program was in accordance with Section 26 of
the Constitution, which guarantees the right to access to adequate housing.
Mrs Grootboom and the other applicants had for a long time lived in shacks
on a recognised settlement called Wallecedence.31 The living conditions were
26 Ibid., para. 28. Cf. Fuller 1978, p. 371ff., who describes the problem of ‘polycentricity in
adjudication’ of which this is a typical example. See also Davis 1992, pp. 477-478. As Scott
and Alston 2000, pp. 252-253, note with regard to the Soobramoney judgment: ‘The individual
is quickly sacrificed to an amorphous general good on this kind of reasoning which, if taken
all the way, would preclude virtually any adjudication of a claim to resources as enjoying
a constitutional priority over other claims’.
27 Soobramoney, para. 29. See, e.g., Moellendorf 1998, pp. 327-333; Fredman 2008, p. 116 (char-
acterising the Court’s test as a ‘rationality test’); Mantouvalou, in Gearty and Mantouvalou
2011, pp. 144-145 (referring to the Court’s review as reasonableness review with regard
to the allocation of resources).
28 See, e.g., O’Connell 2012, p. 56, stating that ‘the Court in Soobramoney appeared to back-pedal
somewhat from the robust role it intimated the courts could play with respect to resource
allocation in socio-economic rights cases [referring to the First Certification judgment], to
a more restrained and deferential approach’. See also Moellendorf 1998, p. 327, pointing
at the ‘available resources’ criterion and emphasising that if applied as in this case the future
of socio-economic rights seems problematic.
29 Scott and Alston 2000, p. 241.
30 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)
(Grootboom).
31 Ibid., para. 55.
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‘intolerable’32 since there was no water or sewage, and hardly any electric-
ity.33 Some applicants had applied for subsidised low cost housing, but they
had been on a waiting list for seven years.34 The unbearable conditions finally
made the applicants leave Wallecedence and move to private land, which they
occupied unlawfully and from which they were subsequently evicted for that
reason.35 Because they had nowhere else to go they asked the Constitutional
Court for an order that would direct the state to provide them with ‘adequate
basic temporary shelter or housing … pending their obtaining permanent
accommodation’.36 The Court did not grant such an order because Section
26 did not entitle the applicants to immediate housing or shelter,37 but it did
find that the state’s housing program was unconstitutional. The reason for
this was that the program did not sufficiently accommodate any short-term
housing needs of vulnerable groups. According to the Court ‘[a] program that
excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable’.38
In Grootboom, ‘the Court laid the foundations for its future adjudication
of socio-economic rights’.39 Compared to Soobramoney, the Court articulated
a more nuanced approach characterised by ‘reasonableness review’.40 It asked
‘whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right afforded by section
26 are reasonable’.41 Yet while some applauded the outcome of Grooboom,42
as well as the promise of the ‘administrative law approach’ it signalled,43
others regretted the fact that the Court had opted for a reasonableness test.44
Instead of this test, the latter favoured an alternative approach that had been
suggested to the Constitutional Court, namely a stricter standard inspired by
the minimum core approach of the CESCR.
32 Ibid., para. 53.
33 Ibid., para. 55.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., para. 53.
36 Ibid., para. 57.
37 Ibid., para. 86.
38 Ibid., para. 43.
39 Wesson 2004, p. 285.
40 See, e.g., O’Connell 2012, p. 57.
41 Grootboom, para. 33. Cf. also para. 41.
42 Cf. Liebenberg 2001; De Vos 2001.
43 Sunstein 2001a, p. 123, pp. 130-132, who holds that in Grootboom, the Court avoided two
unappealing courses, namely, full enforceability and nonjusticiability, by opting for the
‘only alternative’, namely, ‘an approach to public law that is generally unfamiliar in
constitutional law that is the ordinary material of administrative law, governing judicial
control of administrative agencies: a requirement of reasoned judgment, including reasonable
priority-setting’ (p. 130). See for a direct response to Sunstein Roux 2002.
44 See, e.g., Bilchitz 2007, p. 139ff.; Pieterse 2006, p.475; Roux 2002.
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6.3.2 A Minimum Core Approach or Reasonableness Review?
In Grootboom, amici curiae had invited the Court to give content to the right
at stake by identifying the ‘core’ of the obligations it imposed on the state.45
Under the heading ‘The content of the positive obligations imposed by social
and economic rights’ they suggested that the Court, in line with the CESCR,
determine and make explicit a concrete, immediate entitlement:
‘The “core” provides a level of minimum compliance, to which resources have to
be devoted as a matter of priority. This duty clearly has to be balanced with the
obligation to put into operation programmes aimed at full realisation of the right,
and to move progressively towards full realisation.’46
The amici contended that this did not imply that only the ‘core’ could be
enforced before a court.47 Rather, they wanted to convince the Constitutional
Court that in order to provide genuine protection, there had to be an obligation
‘to provide for the core of immediate absolutely basic human needs – which
will result in special attention being given to the most vulnerable and those
living in most unfavourable conditions’.48
However, the Court was not willing to come up with a ‘minimum core’
definition of what Article 26 requires. It held that such a definition would be
problematic, as needs and opportunities of different individuals may vary
significantly.49 Whereas ‘[t]he committee [the CESCR] developed the concept
of minimum core over many years of examining reports by reporting states’,
the South African Constitutional Court claimed it did not have sufficient
information to do the same.50 Explaining why reasonableness review was
the preferred way of approaching socio-economic rights claims, Justice Yacoob
noted that
‘[t]he precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily
a matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that
the measures they adopt are reasonable. In any challenge based on section 26(2),
the question will be whether the legislative and other measures taken by the state
are reasonable. A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other
more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public
money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the measures
that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range
45 Grootboom, Heads of the argument on behalf of the amici curiae.
46 Ibid., para. 27.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., para. 29. According to Liebenberg ‘[t]he amici thus located the minimum core obliga-
tion at one end of a continuum of positive obligations imposed on the State …’. See Lieben-
berg 2010, p. 149.
49 Grootboom, para. 33.
50 Ibid., para. 32.
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of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many
of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the
measures do so, this requirement is met.’51
This statement suggests that it is relatively easy for the government to convince
the Court with the argument that it decided in favour of other priorities or
simply had no sufficient resources (left). Indeed, reasonableness review on
its face leaves prioritisation to the state;52 after all, it does not ask what better
choices could have been made, but merely if the government policy is reason-
able.53 In Grootboom, the government was directed to making ‘reasonable
provision within its available resources for people … with no access to land,
no roof over their heads, and who were living in intolerable situations’.54
The Constitutional Court did not require it, however, to make provision for
these groups as a matter of priority, before spending its resources elsewhere.
Hence, any ‘reasonable’ inclusion of these groups would seemingly be in
compliance with the Constitution, whether or not this would be effective.55
That the Constitutional Court shows quite some deference to government
spending also follows from Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action
Campaign & Others (TAC), in which it consolidated its reasonableness
approach.56 It held there that ‘determinations of reasonableness may in fact
have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging
budgets’.57 The case concerned the government’s refusal to provide Nevirapine
to HIV positive pregnant women.58 Because the efficacy and possible side
effects of the drug were being carefully monitored, Nevirapine was only
51 Ibid., para. 41.
52 But see Sunstein 2001a, p. 127, writing about Grootboom that ‘[w]hat is most striking about
this ruling is the distinctive and novel approach to socio-economic rights, requiring not
shelter for everyone, but sensible priority-setting, with particular attention to the plight
of those with the greatest need’. However, Roux seems to indicate correctly that this
statement relies on a very broad understanding of priority (dealing with ‘the relative
importance that the state accords to competing social needs’) rather than ‘priority’ more
narrowly understood (‘the temporal order in which government chooses to meet competing
social needs’). He shows that what the Court does in Grootboom, is merely pointing out
that certain interests and groups deserve special attention, but not necessarily priority in
time. This means that the government, as long as it at least is devoting some special
attention to vulnerable groups, will usually pass the test, even when the interests of these
groups are thereby not really effectively protected (pp. 46-47).
53 See, e.g., Liebenberg 2008, pp. 83-87; Liebenberg 2010, pp. 151-157.
54 Grootboom, para. 99.
55 Cf. Roux 2002, p. 47.
56 Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2001 (5) SA 721 (CC)
(TAC).
57 Ibid., para. 38.
58 Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug of which a tablet has to be given to mothers at the
onset of labour, and a few drops to a just-born baby, in order to prevent mother-child
transmission of HIV.
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available at designated test sites. This limitation was held to be unreasonable
and for that reason unconstitutional. In the Court’s view, the cost implications
of providing the drug were negligible and there was no serious doubt about
the safety of Nevirapine. The Court therefore ordered to remove any re-
strictions on the availability of Nevirapine and instructed the government to
dispense it.59
Notwithstanding the fact that, just like in Grootboom, the Court’s approach
did allow for finding a violation, the TAC judgment has been criticised for
not giving content to what it was in fact all about, namely the right to health
care enshrined in Article 27(1)(a).60 Again amici curiae had argued in favour
of the identification of a minimum core, but the Court expressly rejected this
suggestion, holding that ‘it is impossible to give everyone access even to a
core service immediately. All that is possible and all that can be expected of
the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights
… on a progressive basis’.61 In line with this, it reasoned that
‘[i]t should be borne in mind that in dealing with such matters the courts are not
institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries
necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards call for … The Consti-
tution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely
to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to
subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.’62
In the years after Soobramoney, Grootboom, and TAC, the Court has shown that,
from time to time, it is willing to take a less distant stance towards the govern-
ment. In Khosa and Mahlaule v. Minister for Social Development, for example,
the Court rejected the government’s ‘resource defense’ regarding the exclusion
of social welfare grants to non-South African citizens and linked the overarch-
ing concepts of dignity and equality to the socio-economic rights at stake.63
However, in doing so it did not alter its earlier conclusion that there was no
reason to determine minimum cores. Rather than communicating clear, basic
59 TAC, para. 135.
60 According to Bilchitz 2003, p. 8: ‘No doubt the task of specifying the content of this right
is a difficult matter, and the Court should not attempt to provide in one case a final and
exhaustive definition of what is included therein. What could have been expected, however,
was some further specification of the obligations imposed by the right in relation to this
particular case.’ In this context, Bilchitz explicitly refers to the ICESCR and the General
Comments of the CESCR.
61 TAC, para. 35.
62 Ibid., paras. 37-38.
63 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). Cf. also Rail commuters
Action Group v. Transnet Ltd., 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC) (where the Court held that ‘an organ
of state will not be held to have reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis of a bald
assertion of resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the resource constraints,
whether human or financial, in the context of the overall resourcing of the organ of state
will need to be provided’ (para. 88)). See O’Connell 2012, p. 62ff.
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obligations, thereby aiming at the transformation of state conduct, the reason-
ableness standard remained and still is the hallmark of its overall restrained
review.64
6.4 THE DEBATE ON THE USE OF THE MINIMUM CORE
Against the backdrop of the expectations regarding the transformative Consti-
tution and the Constitutional Court’s role, it is not surprising that the first
landmark cases and the stance the Constitutional Court has taken therein have
been the source of considerable debate. The different judgments have been
analysed thoroughly in numerous articles and publications.65 It is clear from
these that some commentators were and are still unwilling to agree with the
fundamental choices the Court has made. Indeed, one vigorous point of
discussion has remained whether the Constitutional Court should have opted
for a minimum core approach rather than for reasonableness review. In this
section, the various arguments for and against the definition of minimum cores
will be presented, starting with the arguments in favour of a minimum core
approach, and then moving to those positions that signal a more sceptical
outlook.
6.4.1 The Case for the Minimum Core
The Court’s explicit choice for reasonableness has been criticised for various
reasons. Several scholars have thereby tried to show the usefulness or even
the necessity of a minimum core approach. Their arguments are both structural
and content-oriented, i.e., the critics deal with more technical aspects as well
as try to make a convincing case that the rejection of core obligations fails to
64 See, e.g., O’Connell 2012, pp. 76-77. Cf. also the comment made by Fredman 2008, p. 114,
on the way the Court perceives its ‘transformative task’: ‘While [the Court’s] … mandate
to adjudicate on positive duties is more explicit than most courts, its political positioning
has had an important impact on its self-perception. Specially constituted to constitute a
complete break with the abuses of the past, the Court at its inception was composed of
judges who were committed to the transformational agenda. It is wrong, however, to assume
that these are necessarily the ingredients of an activist court.’ Also the case of Mazibuko
and others v. City of Johannesburg, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) is often mentioned as a prominent,
more recent example of the Court’s reasonableness approach (and the shortcomings thereof).
According to Bilchitz 2014a, p. 727, it exemplifies the fact that ‘[t]he underlying rationale
behind the reasonableness approach appears to be that it requires the government to provide
justifications for its actions’. It was held in this case that ‘social and economic rights enable
citizens to hold government to account for the manner in which it seeks to pursue the
achievement of social and economic rights’ (para. 59). In doing so, however, the Court failed
to identify a (minimum core) standard, as it did not clarify what the right to ‘sufficient
water’ entails. See for this point, e.g., Bilchitz 2011, p. 554; infra, S. 6.4.1.2.
65 See, for a thorough analysis of several of the most important cases, Bilchitz 2007, Ch. 6.
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do justice to the primary interests of the needy. Three (interrelated) aspects
of their position will be highlighted here: the argument that reasonableness
review does not align with the bifurcated structure of rights, the alleged need
to give content to a right in order to have a standard to test against, and the
statement that some socio-economic guarantees have more relative importance
than others.
6.4.1.1 The ‘Two-Stage’ Argument
First, authors who see the benefits of recognising a minimum core argue that
the Constitutional Court’s reasonableness review places too strong an emphasis
on the conduct or omissions an applicant complains about. They argue that
it is problematic that, before even having elaborated upon what exactly is
protected by Sections 26(1) and 27(1), the Court’s attention immediately shifts
to Sections 26(2) and 27(2) and the measures taken or not taken by the govern-
ment. The Court hence does not respect the traditional two-stage approach
to fundamental rights adjudication.66 In Chapter 3 it was explained why, from
a theoretical as well as a practical perspective, such a distinction between the
interpretation of a right and its application is worth making.67 This not only
helps to clarify whether or not a court has jurisdiction over a case, it also
allows for determining the meaning of a right at least to some extent inde-
pendent from state concerns and ‘majoritarian’ considerations. It shows what
a right prima facie entails and thereby when it is interfered with. Speaking of
the South African case law, Liebenberg in this regard holds that
‘[t]he two-stage approach entails an initial principled focus on the nature and scope
of the relevant right and whether the impugned legislation or conduct infringes
the right. Thereafter the burden is placed on the respondent to establish that
limitations to the right are reasonable and justifiable according to the stringent
requirements of the general limitations clause (s 36).’68
Since the ‘initial principled focus’ is lacking, what is left, in Liebenberg’s view,
is a disproportionate focus on the state’s justificatory arguments.69 She regards
this as problematic, because it fails to show that, given the individual interest
at stake, the burden of proof may have needed to be shifted to the govern-
ment.70 Indeed, proponents of a minimum core strategy in the South African
66 Liebenberg 2010, p. 141.
67 Cf., supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
68 Liebenberg 2010, p. 141.
69 Ibid., p. 146.
70 Moreover, Liebenberg speaks of the Constitutional Court’s reasoning as having a ‘distinctive-
ly utilitarian flavour’ where it states that ‘[t]he State has to manage its limited resources
in order to address all these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt a
holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs
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case law argue that the Court’s reasonableness approach fails to have sufficient
regard to the actual right at stake.71 Bilchitz, for example, who is one of the
most prominent defenders of the minimum core, remarks with regard to the
Court’s approach in the TAC case that ‘[t]his approach is guilty of failing to
integrate ss 27(2) and 27(1): it focuses the whole enquiry on s 27(2) without
providing a role for s 27(1)’.72 By doing so, it ‘deflects the focus of constitu-
tional enquiry from the urgent interests at stake … and allows these to be over-
shadowed by a general balancing of multiple considerations’.73
Thus, in the view of the Court’s critics, a more appropriate approach would
involve making sure that the attention is not only focused on the justification-
side, but also on what (essential) interests, principles and obligations are
actually at stake. This entails that, rather than relying on the broadly phrased
socio-economic rights norm the full fulfilment of which is subject to the re-
quirement of progressive realisation, the Court should clarify what concrete
right is at stake and how important this right is. Doing so could ensure that
proper weight is given to the interests of the applicant(s), rather than only
to the arguments made by the government, which indeed can often rely on
resource constraints as a reason for not meeting certain needs.74
6.4.1.2 The Standard Setting Argument
Having stressed the importance of the content of the right at stake, Bilchitz
continues to explain the role that could be attributed to the minimum core
in this regard. He does not agree with the first and second amici in TAC that
what the Court had done wrong in the prior cases was ignoring that two
causes of action could follow from Section 27.75 They held that the first para-
graph (stating a right to access to health care services, sufficient food and water
and social security) stated a free-standing individual right that contained a
minimum core that could be requested immediately. The second paragraph,
of particular individuals within society’ (Soobramoney, para. 31). This makes that it does
not do justice to the right at stake.
71 See, e.g., Liebenberg 2010, p. 139. With regard to Soobramoney (paras. 21-33) Liebenberg
there notes that ‘after having determined that the appellant’s claim falls to be decided in
terms of ss 27(1) and (2), the court proceeds immediately to discuss the budgetary limitations
and polycentric implications of the appellant’s claim’.
72 Bilchitz 2003, p. 9; Bilchitz 2007, p. 159.
73 Bilchitz 2007, p. 176. According to Pieterse 2004, pp. 410-411, ‘[w]hen [a reasonableness
analysis is] used simultaneously to indicate the content of socio-economic obligations and
to determine compliance with these obligations, the reasonableness standards will arguably
be unable to balance the needs for vigilance and deference’.
74 Liebenberg (2010), in her proposal for improving the reasonableness test, seems to attach
a lot of importance to this. Nevertheless, although she thinks content should be given to
socio-economic rights, she would avoid determining rigid minimum cores. See, further,
infra, S. 6.5.1.
75 Bilchitz 2003, pp. 5-6; Bilchitz 2007, p. 156.
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holding that reasonable legislative and other measures must be taken to
progressively achieve these rights, within the available resources, would,
according to the amici, have to be read as separately conferring positive obliga-
tions on the state.76 The Court was right, according to Bilchitz, to hold that
rather than being independent from one another, both paragraphs of the rights’
norm are intrinsically linked. However, claiming that the obligations in the
second paragraph of Sections 26 and 27 are related to the rights in 26(1) and
27(1) implies that measures the state adopts must be assessed in the light of
these rights.77 In order for a court to do so, it cannot suffice to merely take
as a starting point the rights norms as they are stated. Further content necessar-
ily has to be given to the different norms, because the requirement of progress-
ive realisation implies that they do not need to be fulfilled to their fullest extent
immediately. Thus, for they do not provide clarity as to what a socio-economic
right at a given point in time in fact requires, the rights as they are laid down
in 26(1) and 27(1) as such cannot provide a standard against which the reason-
ableness of the measures taken by the government can be tested.78
The only way to have an end in mind against which the measures taken
under the second paragraph can be reviewed is, according to Bilchitz, the
recognition of certain aspects of socio-economic rights as containing immediate,
core obligations.79 Whether it was reasonable for the government to refrain
from enacting a housing program for those most in need, for example, would
be difficult to evaluate if it is unclear whether this aspect of the right to hous-
ing is something that should reasonably be required as a matter of priority
or whether it is something that can just as well be done ‘progressively’, i.e.,
later. Lacking clarity on the core and non-core content of a right would make
reasonableness ‘stand in for whatever the Court regards as desirable features
of state policy’.80 Moreover, it would leave the other branches of government
with an amorphous standard with which to judge their own conduct.81
76 Amicus Brief TAC, para. 14.
77 Bilchitz 2003, p. 10. See also Bilchitz 2007, pp. 156-157.
78 Cf. also Sunstein 2001a, p. 132. Although Sunstein applauds the reasonableness approach
of the Court in the case of Grootboom, he does admit that it ‘leaves many issues unresolved.
Suppose that the government ensured a certain level of funding for a program of emergency
relief; suppose too that the specified level is challenged as insufficient. The Court’s decision
suggests that whatever amount allocated must be shown to be “reasonable”; but what are
the standards to be used in resolving a dispute about that issue?’.
79 See, on Bilchitz’ account, further, infra, S. 6.5.2.
80 Bilchitz 2003, p. 10: ‘The problem with this approach is that it lacks a principled basis upon
which to found decisions in socio-economic rights cases.’ Or at least, a reasonableness
approach is deficient as ‘it deflects the focus of the constitutional enquiry from the interest
at stake … and allows these to be overshadowed by a general balancing of multiple
considerations’. Instead, ‘[t]he contextual nature of a determination of reasonableness
requires certain a-contextual standards or principles to determine how it is to be applied
in particular cases’ (Bilchitz 2007, p. 161).
81 Bilchitz 2003, p. 10; Bilchitz 2007, p. 162.
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Indeed, these points, which relate to the inability of judging state conduct or
a lack thereof, very much resemble the reasons for why the minimum core
was introduced in the context of the ICESCR.82
The Court left open the possibility of regarding the minimum core as
possibly being relevant to its reasonableness review.83 According to Bilchitz,
however, the minimum core should not be viewed as a mere consideration
related to this test. Rather, in his view it provides for the necessary standard
with the help of which reasonableness review becomes possible in the first
place. It provides clarity for states as well as individuals, but, no less im-
portant, also helps a court to ‘provide clear reasons for its involvement in these
cases, and a clear statement of the important interests involved which would
demarcate the scope of its own decision-making powers’.84 A clear standard
bounds the leeway of the courts, ensuring they do not overstep their legitimate
role.
6.4.1.3 The Urgency Argument
Next to the argument that a minimum core approach would provide essential
information about concrete entitlements and obligations, thereby defining an
indispensable touchstone for the Court, there is more that legal scholars have
asserted in favour of the minimum core. A definition of the core of a right
does not merely highlight certain aspects of a right that can be considered
concrete entitlements – it emphasises the most important aspects. A minimum
core approach recognises that certain interests related to socio-economic goods
are more urgent than others, and hence require to be prioritised.85 Therefore
there seems to be good reason for using a core rights-based approach ‘when
there are interests protected by a right that differ in their degree of importance
for human beings’.86 In the words of Liebenberg
‘the meeting of minimum core obligations should enjoy prioritized consideration
in social policymaking and in the judicial enforcement of these rights, due to the
urgency of the interests they protect. Without the meeting of the minimum essential
82 See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.2.2 and 5.3 in particular.
83 TAC, para. 34.
84 Bilchitz 2003, p. 10. But see, for the argument that the minimum core instead confers too
much power on the courts, infra, S. 6.4.2.
85 Bilchitz 2003, pp. 11-12: referring to the approach developed by the CESCR he notes that
‘the recognition of a minimum core of social and economic rights that must be realized
without delay attempts to take account of the fact that certain interests are of greater relative
importance and require a higher degree of protection than other interests’. Cf. Bilchitz 2007,
p. 187ff., on ‘two thresholds of interests’. See further, infra, S. 6.5.2. Cf. also Scott and Alston
2000, pp. 250-251.
86 Bilchitz 2003, p. 14; Bilchitz 2007, p.190.
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needs which people require to survive, the State’s obligation to progressively
achieve the full realization of the rights becomes meaningless.’87
The Court held in TAC that Section 27(1) ‘does not give rise to a self-standing
and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations
mentioned in section 27(2)’.88 According to Bilchitz, this does however not
necessarily imply a rejection of a minimum core approach, as the minimum
core ‘merely requires an understanding that one right can involve different
levels of provision; the state can be obligated to provide a minimum threshold
of a right whilst having to increase its level of provision progressively over
time’.89 It is hence the different degrees of importance that aspects of a right
entail, that makes differentiation amongst these and singling out core aspects
an important task. In the view of its proponents, a minimum core approach
can direct resources to where they are most needed, based on the purpose
behind the protection of socio-economic rights. Thereby, it ensures that the
notion of progressive realisation does not exempt the state from immediately
– or at least as a matter of priority – protecting its population’s most basic
interests.90
Altogether, the points raised in favour of the minimum core approach suggest
that the South African Constitutional Court, by failing to recognise a minimum
core, is not using to the fullest extent possible the Constitution’s (transformat-
ive) potential for the realisation of socio-economic rights. It fails to give (more
precise) content to the rights enshrined in the Constitution, thereby attributing
insufficient attention to the interests at stake and instead overly focusing on
the reasons and interests put forward by the government. Also, in the view
of the proponents of a core rights approach, the Court’s avoidance of the core
content question leaves its reasonableness test rather subjective and makes
that it does not sufficiently recognise the relative importance of some (urgent)
aspects of socio-economic rights over others.
87 Liebenberg 2010, p. 164 [emphasis added].
88 TAC, para. 39.
89 Bilchitz 2003, p. 13.
90 Ibid., p. 12; Bilchitz 2007, pp. 193-194, giving the example of the progressive realisation of
the right to housing as involving two components: ‘[T]he first component is a “minimum
core obligation” to realize the levels of housing required to meet the minimal interest …
; the second component is a duty on the state to take steps to improve the adequacy of
the housing in accordance with the standards … developed. In other words, progressive
realization means the movement from the realization of the minimal interest in housing
to the maximal interest. … It does not mean that some receive housing now, and others
receive it later; rather, it means that each is entitled as a matter of priority to basic housing
provision, which the government is required to improve gradually over time. Such an
interpretation makes sense of the idea that the socio-economic rights enshrined in the
Constitution have an aspirational dimension but, like other rights, provide strong protection
for certain urgent interests.’
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6.4.2 Arguments Against the Minimum Core
Regardless of the arguments made by the proponents of core rights, and more
particularly by the amici curiae, the South African Constitutional Court has
consciously and expressly rejected the minimum core doctrine. It did do so
because, in its view, needs are too diverse to establish a fixed core.91 More-
over, it considered that it lacks the necessary information to define such a
core,92 and that Sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution do not give rights to
self-standing obligations.93 To this list of arguments against a core rights
approach can be added the Court’s pragmatic objection that minimum cores
would impose unrealistic demands upon governments since it is ‘impossible
to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ service immediately’.94
Various academics have tuned in with this criticism, often (implicitly)
arguing for the Court’s alternative, reasonableness-based approach.95 The
arguments they thereby make can be roughly divided into three groups. The
first and second sets of criticism are closely linked: they cover ‘institutionalist’
arguments focusing on the separation of powers and (constitutional) dialogue,
respectively. The third group of arguments deal with the overarching problem
of the impossibility of determining the content of the minimum core.
6.4.2.1 The Separation of Powers Argument
The criticism related to the idea of separation of powers suggests that by
identifying a minimum core, a court can easily transgress the boundaries of
its legitimate task. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s deferential mode
of review, Kende argues that ‘the Court’s circumspection avoids an escalation
of separation of powers and other tensions’.96 Would the Court engage in
defining and enforcing core rights, his argument continues, it might usurp
the policy-making tasks of the government.97 Courts are thought to be institu-
tionally ill-equipped to make the enquiries necessary for determining enforce-
able minimum standards. Instead, they should merely check for reasonableness,
as doing so enables the ‘judicial, legislative and executive functions [to] achieve
appropriate constitutional balance’.98 Especially in South Africa this ‘constitu-
tional balance’ is considered a contentious issue, as the country’s institutions
91 Grootboom, paras. 32-22.
92 Ibid., para. 31.
93 Ibid., para. 95; TAC, para. 32.
94 TAC, para. 35.
95 See, e.g., Sachs 2003; Nolette 2003, pp. 116-118; Kende 2003, p. 153; Kende 2004; Wesson
2004; Porter 2005, pp. 48-55; Steinberg 2006; Lehmann 2006.
96 Kende 2004, p. 618.
97 See on this argument Liebenberg 2010, p. 165.
98 TAC, para. 38.
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of constitutionalism and judicial review are still quite young.99 The Court’s
authority and the acceptance of its judgments is rooted ‘as much in its ability
to insinuate itself institutionally in conflicts over the separation and distribution
of powers as it does in its defence of rights’.100 Judicial activism in this regard
should be avoided and, rather than defining minimum guarantees and thereby
determining strict and general standards, mere review of the reasonableness
of an act or omission and case-based review of individual circumstances would
seem the proper way of going about.101 Indeed, this is true especially because
it is socio-economic, positive requirements that are at stake. In the field of
social policy, it is necessary to make complicated, multi-faceted decisions.
Generally, it is for the democratically elected bodies to make an informed
choice on what is to be done (first), and where to spend the money available,
rather than for a court.
6.4.2.2 The Dialogue Argument
The second, related branch of ‘institutionalist’ criticism must be viewed in the
light of the debate on the virtues of institutional dialogue.102 Whereas the
separation of powers argument focuses on a meaningful separation between
the tasks of the different powers, this argument concerns the ideal of coopera-
tion between them. The idea of constitutional dialogue has become well known
in particular in the Anglo-Saxon scholarly legal debate, yet also in the field
of socio-economic rights it has received some attention.103 Dixon, for example,
has recognised the important role of courts in helping to improve socio-eco-
nomic rights by pointing out ‘blind spots’ and omissions to the legislature.104
In her view, it is for the legislature to respond to such findings.
In the dialogue argument, the minimum core idea represents an ‘intrusive
rule-based’ approach.105 It aims at defining an essence for economic and social
rights that is incontestable, and as such it blocks any form of conversation
between the legislator and the judiciary. Dixon’s account of dialogue also
highlights the inherent ‘risk of reverse burdens of inertia that that can arise
when courts assume too strong a role’.106 In fact she thereby raises the ques-
tion what is left of a ‘dialogue’ when a court determines an inflexible minimum
99 See, e.g., Steinberg 2006, p. 274; Fredman 2008, p. 114 (arguing that the Court has been
‘acutely aware of its position relative to the newly democratic State’ and that its ‘transform-
ative task’ not automatically led to activism).
100 Klug 1997, p. 206.
101 Cf. Kende 2004. See also O’Connell 2012, for a broader discussion on socio-economic rights
and the separation of powers argument.
102 See in particular Dixon 2007; Steinberg 2006. Cf. also Liebenberg, as discussed in, infra, S.
6.5.1.
103 See, e.g., Scott 1999; Steinberg 2006; Dixon 2007.
104 Dixon 2007, pp. 404-405.
105 Steinberg 2006, p. 274.
106 Dixon 2007, p. 407.
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core. When it decides that a right to housing first and foremost requires that
immediate housing be provided to vulnerable groups lacking appropriate
shelter, there is no longer or only very little room left for the government to
decide on how it can best work towards full realisation of this right. It may
for example have preferred to focus on long-term programmes it considers
more structurally relevant to this goal than dedicating its budget to immediate
relief for specific groups, yet the definition of core rights then prevents it from
doing so.
Thus, according to its opponents, the minimum core approach tends to pro-
mote closure in the broader process of developing the content of socio-eco-
nomic rights.107 It gives the final say to the courts, whilst a continuing dis-
cussion could provide for better outcomes, both in terms of institutional
cooperation and effective protection. However, it is interesting to note the
distinction Dixon makes between ‘relying on a truly cosmopolitan, or inter-
national understanding of the minimum core’, and ‘borrowing the conceptual
apparatus of the minimum core as an independent basis for interpreting
sections 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution at the domestic level’.108
The former approach according to Dixon would mean making use of the
minimum cores identified by the CESCR that are said to be based on an over-
lapping consensus among states.109 From a dialogic perspective, she holds,
such an approach does not create many difficulties. Indeed, because of the
CESCR’s openness to what states apparently consider to be important, it signals
cooperation rather than that it forecloses it. Also in the South African context
it could hence be justified if the Court would presumptively respect the ‘cosmo-
politan’ understanding of the minimum core as identified by the CESCR.
In fact, it is only the second type of approach that according to Dixon
would cause problems. This would mean that the South African Constitutional
Court would use the abstract concept of the minimum core merely to give
content to this core in a subjective manner. In that way it would unilaterally
develop a domesticated understanding of the most important aspects inherent
in economic and social rights, creating obligations that presumably have to
be enforced in every thinkable case.110 According to Dixon, for the Constitu-
tional Court to develop such an understanding tailored to the South-African
context, it would necessarily have to ignore the scope of existing (or future)
disagreement.111 Thereby it would curtail broader social dialogue about the
107 See, e.g., Liebenberg 2010, pp. 167-168. Cf. also Young 2008, pp. 138-140 (speaking of the
‘normative essence approach’), see, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.1.
108 Dixon 2007, pp. 415-416.
109 See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2 (‘externally inspired cores’).
110 Dixon 2007, p. 416.
111 Ibid., p. 417.
Minimum Cores and Economic and Social Rights Adjudication in South Africa 243
nature and prioritisation of, as well as the values underpinning socio-economic
rights.
Thus, from this line of reasoning it follows that it is not necessarily the
identification of core aspects as such that makes that dialogic scholars are
sceptical towards the minimum core. Only when this is done unilaterally by
a court, without having regard to consensus and disagreement, and with the
effect of pinning down inflexible minimum standards, problems arise.
6.4.2.3 The Indeterminable Content Argument
For many scholars, what lies behind their argument that it is not for the
Constitutional Court to subjectively define a minimum core, is the assumption
that it is difficult, if not impossible to define such a core.112 Indeed, most
opponents of a minimum core approach are supporters of the ‘indeterminable
content’ argument, which seems to start from the idea that in the South African
context, it would be the Court that would unilaterally determine what mini-
mum cores entail.113 The thread that runs through this argument is that courts
have no ‘objective’, ‘external’ sources that can help them determine an appro-
priate minimum core. Especially in the field of socio-economic rights the
judicial leeway that results from this is considered undesirable – if subjective
socio-economic ‘policy choices’ are to be made, this should rather be done
by the other branches.114 Courts should refrain from determining what they
cannot determine, and avoid the minimum core.
In Chapters 4 and 5, it already became clear that it is indeed difficult to
find the ‘unrelinquishable nucleus [that] is the raison d’être of the basic legal
norm, essential to its definition, and surrounded by the less securely guarded
elements’.115 Often, a normative approach towards defining the minimum
core is based on a single metric. This can be the idea of basic needs or bio-
logical survival, the notion of freedom or that of the inviolability/sanctity of
human life. Liebenberg notes that this type of principle unavoidably leads to
the definition of minimum cores that are either over-, or underinclusive.116
It can be argued, for example, that the most essential aspect of the right to
access to housing is fulfilled once someone is not sleeping on the streets. Yet
in some contexts this may be unnecessarily minimalistic as it is feasible to
demand more. On the other hand, for example in the case of the right to health,
112 As Lehmann 2006, p. 185, asks: ‘But on what basis are interests to be ranked? How should
“urgent” interests be distinguished from less-urgent interests?’
113 See, e.g., Dixon 2007, p. 416.
114 Cf. also Fredman 2008, p. 71: ‘The claim that positive duties are indeterminate is generally
used to support the argument that judicial resolution is inappropriate. … Judges, on this
view, have no greater capacity for resolving disputes based on indeterminate standards
than anyone else.’
115 Örücü 1986, p. 52. See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2.
116 Liebenberg 2010, p. 168.
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a survival-based core might require the provision of expensive, tertiary health
care, even where this is – also for budgetary reasons – impossible. Moreover,
no matter what definition of a minimum core is decided upon, it necessarily
will overlook other needs and interests.117 Guaranteeing a minimum core
can be to the detriment of rights of others that might seem less crucial if looked
at in isolation or from a single point of view, but that can in fact be just as
important.118 If a minimum core doctrine would be relied upon at all, there-
fore, the core should be determined having regard to the particular context,
i.e., in a case-by-case fashion.119
In conclusion, the arguments put forward by the opponents of the use of a
minimum core approach signal the concern that this would entail too conclus-
ive a role for the courts. Especially also because it is considered impossible
to objectively identify the minimum core of a right, it would be undesirable
to expect courts to engage in this task. Reasonableness review, the arguments
seem to suggest, instead confers upon the courts a more suitable exercise of
power, that allows for enough context-sensitivity while leaving a greater role
for the other branches.
6.5 MOVING BEYOND A REASONABLENESS/MINIMUM CORE DICHOTOMY
The arguments set out in the previous section confirm that a reasonableness
test is generally perceived of as a more flexible instrument compared to a
minimum core approach. However, those who are attracted to the idea of the
minimum core refer to the risk that this flexibility is used in a way that leaves
prioritisation to the government and in fact hardly allows room for reviewing
budgetary preferences. Reasonableness review is considered to focus almost
entirely on the arguments advanced by the government, giving them a priori
validity, and reducing the task of the court to rejecting what is ‘manifestly
unreasonable’. Opponents of the minimum core, on the other hand, usually
start from the idea that a normative core is rigid and everlasting, that not
complying with it would automatically result in a violation of the Constitution,
and that establishing the core of rights is problematic as this can only be done
in a subjective and non-dialogic manner. In particular, identifying a minimum
core would mean that every individual obtains an immediately enforceable
117 Ibid., pp. 169-170. Cf. also Liebenberg and Goldblatt 2007, pp. 339-341 (addressing the
interrelatedness between socio-economic deprivation and status-based forms of discrimina-
tion).
118 Liebenberg 2010, p. 170, gives the following example: ‘[T]he provision of various forms
of specially adapted housing and social services to people with disabilities may not be
necessary for their survival, but is nonetheless crucial for their ability to participate as equals
in society.’
119 Cf. Brand 2002, p. 101ff. See also Liebenberg 2010, infra, S. 6.5.2.
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claim against the government to obtain without delay his or her core rights,
e.g., basic health care, shelter, etc. Understood in this way, the minimum core
is seen to confer too much power on the courts, blocking a pluralistic, ongoing
socio-economic rights debate. Moreover, the obligations following from the
recognition of core rights would most likely be impossible to comply with.
It has become clear that the South African discussion on the adjudication
of economic and social rights is everything but limited to technical contro-
versies over abstract notions such as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘minimum cores’.
The arguments made relate to broader discussions and ideas on the separation
of powers and the legitimate role of courts. However, the debate in South
Africa is also a pragmatic one, in which the aim of creating meaningful pro-
tection in the post-apartheid era forms an important starting point. Whereas
those who argue in favour of the use of a minimum core mostly do so out
of unease with the deference currently shown in the case law of the South
African Constitutional Court, those who do not wish the Court to turn to
definitions of the minimum core equally perceive the problem of a Court that
often does not succeed in fulfilling its transformative promise. In the light of
the shared aim of improving South Africa’s socio-economic standard, it may
be expected that not all minimum core supporters necessarily are against (any
form of) reasonableness review. At the same time, those who believe reason-
ableness is the most appropriate approach may see some room for a notion
of core rights protection, as long as it improves this approach.
This final section aims to move beyond the separate arguments and
presents two relatively recent, more comprehensive outlooks on what the role
of the South-African courts in adjudicating socio-economic norms should look
like. What these interestingly underline, is that the reasonableness versus core
rights dilemma that has featured in this context need not be perceived as a
matter of either/or. By approaching both reasonableness review and core rights
protection from a slightly different angle, i.e., by moving beyond narrow
perceptions of overly flexible or rather absolute and strict tests, it becomes
clear that there are in fact some intermediate options that are worth exploring.
After illuminating Liebenberg’s proposal to take reasonableness to a different
level, Bilchitz’ response to her account, as well as his own preferred view of
a less rigid minimum core approach, will be discussed.
6.5.2 Liebenberg: Substantive Reasonableness Review
Over the years, Liebenberg has been one of the most active contributors to
the debate on the development of South Africa’s socio-economic rights pro-
tection, and the case law in particular. In her 2010 book Socio-Economic Rights.
Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution she provides a full account
of her understanding of socio-economic rights in South Africa and the ways
these should be dealt with. As the title shows, her account explicitly takes as
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a starting point the transformative nature and potential of the constitution.
However, she does not primarily rely on the role of courts in analysing the
possibilities for realising this potential. Rather, one of the main ideas under-
lying her preferred approach is that of ‘democratic deliberation in the ongoing
processes of transforming the current status quo’.120 For the judicial role she
envisages this implies that ‘closure’, in the sense of bringing an end to this
deliberation, must be avoided. In other words, even when judicial conclusions
are reached, some room for dialogue should always remain.
Liebenberg’s proposal for improving socio-economic rights adjudication
in South Africa takes as the starting point the Constitutional Court’s ‘flexible’
reasonableness test.121 In Liebenberg’s view, this test is an appropriate one
as it places on the government the burden to explain that the measures it has
taken were reasonable. As a result, it ‘avoids closure and creates the ongoing
possibility of challenging various forms of socio-economic deprivations in a
wide range of different contexts’.122 Nevertheless, Liebenberg admits that
reasonableness review can be problematic, too, namely when it ‘conflates the
two-stage approach to constitutional analysis’.123 The test as applied by the
South African Constitutional Court tends to focus solely on the possible
justifications for the infringement and fails to give clear content to the right
at stake. In her view, ‘until some understanding is developed of the content
of the right, the assessment of whether the measures adopted by the state are
reasonably capable of facilitating its realization takes place in a normative
vacuum’.124
According to Liebenberg, however, the solution to this problem lies not
so much in encouraging the Court to define minimum core obligations. Aiming
at preserving openness, she asks how the model of reasonableness review ‘can
be developed so as to ensure a more substantive engagement with the purposes
and underlying values of socio-economic rights’.125 In her opinion, courts
should more generally be required ‘to make a conscious effort to develop the
normative content of the various socio-economic rights’.126 This engagement
with content would preserve the two-stage approach and prevent reasonable-
ness review from degenerating into an overly marginal or unprincipled method
of review.127
120 Liebenberg 2010, p. 29.
121 Cf. Brand 2006, p. 227, who holds that ‘the Court varies the intensity of its review and the
intrusiveness of its remedies from case to case based on its perception of how acutely or
not its institutional capacity and democratic illegitimacy constrain it’.
122 Liebenberg 2010, pp. 173-174.
123 Ibid., p. 175. See, supra, S. 6.4.1.1 and 6.4.1.2.
124 Liebenberg 2010, p. 176, referring to Bilchitz 2007, p. 143.
125 Ibid., p. 179.
126 Ibid., p. 180.
127 Ibid., p. 183.
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In line with this, Liebenberg rejects a strict minimum core approach not
only because it might lead to ‘closure’, but also because it is inappropriately
based on a single metric128 and cannot respond to the facts of the case at
hand.129 Next to the importance of dialogue, underlying her approach is the
importance of context as well as value pluralism. The task of developing the
normative content of rights, in her view, ‘should be approached by considering
the purposes and values which the rights seek to promote in the light of their
historical and current socio-economic content’.130 Nevertheless, Liebenberg
sees a small role for the minimum core doctrine in determining the burden
of justification that lies on the state, as well as in its potential of directing
priority attention to people’s basic needs.131 Thus, she seems to argue in
favour of a minimum core that cannot be equalled to the content of a right,
thereby forming a standard capable of determining the outcome of a case, but
rather is one of the factors that colours the reasonableness test.132 The fact
that a ‘core right’ is at stake should be one of the considerations relevant in
determining whether the governments’ conduct was reasonable, rather than
a decisive standard that, when failed to comply with, results in a finding of
a violation. Important is that this minimum core in her view should not be
determined on the basis of a single normative starting point. Instead, the
enquiry of what it entails
‘should be primarily guided by a context-sensitive assessment of the impact of the
deprivation on the particular group. In assessing the severity of the impact, the
courts should consider the implications of the lack of access to the resource or
service in question for other intersecting rights and values such as the rights to
life, freedom and security of the person, equality and human dignity. This accords
with an interpretive approach which embraces the interdependence between various
constitutional rights and values.’133
Thus, as long there is no conclusive prioritisation of some aspects of a right
over others, and the minimum core is grounded on a variety of important
128 See, supra, S. 6.4.2.3.
129 See, for her various critical points, Liebenberg 2010, pp. 163-173.
130 Ibid., p. 180.
131 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
132 Ibid., p. 173: ‘[T]he minimum core concept need not be located within a rigid, two-tier
approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights but can (…) play an important role
in the evaluation of the reasonableness of the State’s measures in realising socio-economic
rights.’ And at p. 184: ‘The valuable contribution of the concept of minimum core obligations
… should be incorporated in the reasonableness analysis by placing a particularly heavy
burden of justification on the State in circumstances where a person or group lacks access
to a basic socio-economic service or resource corresponding to the rights in ss 26 and 27.’
133 Ibid., p. 185. Cf. also p. 173.
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values, thereby being somewhat ‘relative’134 or at least context-sensitive,
Liebenberg does not completely oppose the idea of the minimum core. A
reviewer of her book has held in this regard that
‘Liebenberg’s advocacy of having a more substantive minimum interpretation that
will actually address the socio-economic situation of the most marginalized seems
at odds with her opposition to attempts to define progressively and expansively
the minimum core for many of the substantive rights. As jurisprudence continues
to develop both domestically and internationally (the imminent coming into force
of the complaints mechanism to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights could make a significant difference to our understanding of
the minimum core) one senses that the anti-minimum core arguments will be less
persuasive over time.’135
Indeed, Liebenberg’s cautious ‘inclusion’ of the minimum core in ‘substantive
reasonableness review’ can be seen as clearing the way for a more comprehens-
ive role for this notion in giving content to the right at stake, albeit in a
different manner than envisaged by many proponents of the minimum core
approach.
6.5.3 Bilchitz: Necessary but Less Rigid Minimum Cores
Although Liebenberg’s reasonableness approach already comes close to an
invitation to the Court to recognise a minimum core of the substantive rights
laid down in the Constitution, acknowledging that such a core can play a part
in reasonableness review is still something else than supporting the acceptance
of minimum cores as a self-standing instrument for defining the content of
the right at the first stage of fundamental rights review. Bilchitz is supporting
the latter idea, but his ‘more fully developed’ minimum core approach is more
nuanced than the understanding which opponents of the concept – including
the South African Constitutional Court – generally rely on, and is therefore
worth having a closer look at.
Before doing so, however, a remark may be made with regard to Bilchitz’
response to the approach proposed by Liebenberg. In brief, what Bilchitz holds
against Liebenberg’s approach is that ‘one cannot have it both ways’: in his
view Liebenberg wants substantive content and flexibility, but he argues that
‘the more content that is given to a right by a court, the less it remains open
for contestation and determination in the future; the more open it remains,
the less content it has and the less it provides individuals and communities
134 Cf. the ‘relative’ understanding of the Wesensgehaltgarantie, which implies that a core can
only be determined in the light of the circumstances of a specific case. See, supra, Ch. 4,
S. 4.3.2.2.
135 Byrne 2012, p. 185.
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with the concrete entitlements to enforce in the future’.136 Fixed content,
according to Bilchitz, is not something one should worry about. Rather, ‘it
is the very stuff of law that makes rights meaningful’.137
Indeed, Bilchitz’ own proposal for an adjudicatory approach, as most
elaborately laid out in his Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007), does not shy away from fixed
content. What he tries to show, moreover, is that a robust statement on what
the content of a right is, in the form of the recognition of a minimum core,
is indispensible for the proper adjudication of the socio-economic rights
enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution. It was already indicated that Bilchitz
criticises the Court’s failure to give content to the rights the Constitution
protects by focusing on the requirement of reasonableness in the light of the
constitutionally mandated ends.138 These ends, in his view, ‘cannot them-
selves be determined by the reasonableness enquiry and, thus, the approach
on its own fails to generate any useful conclusions’.139 Rather than reasoning
purely on a case-by-case basis, moreover, ‘it will be necessary for … [a court]
to provide a certain amount of general content to a right that will enable it
to reach the decision it does in that case. For it may be questioned how de-
cisions are to be made in a particular context without some general principles
to guide the decision-making’.140
In determining the general, principled content of rights, Bilchitz considers
it important to take account of the ‘different levels of individual need’.141
More concretely, he distinguishes two thresholds of interests. Referring also
to the CESCR’s approach, the first is said to be
‘the most urgent interest in being free from general threats to one’s survival. This
interest is of greatest urgency, as the inability to survive wipes out all possibility
for realizing the sources of value in the life of a being. I shall refer to this in what
follows as the first threshold of provision or the minimum core. In this context, the
threshold would amount to having at least minimal shelter from the elements such
that one’s health and thus one’s ability to survive are not compromised.’142
136 Bilchitz 2011, p. 549.
137 Ibid., p. 550.
138 See, supra, S. 6.4.1.2.
139 Bilchitz 2007, p. 160.
140 Ibid. Indeed, even a contextual determination of reasonableness presupposes some a-
contextual standards. Moreover, this clarifies the scope of a court’s decision-making powers
as well as the state’s obligations (pp. 161-162).
141 Ibid., Ch. 1, but see also p. 180: ‘The theory I have proposed distinguishes between interests
with differing levels of urgency and provides a principled understanding of how to de-
termine two different thresholds of need. As such, the process of determining the content
of these rights can be sensitive to the differing positions of individuals in a society, and
the obligations of the state can vary accordingly’.
142 Ibid., p. 187 [emphasis added].
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This is however not all that is protected by the relevant rights. As the aim
of the South African Constitution is to ‘[i]mprove the quality of life for all
citizens and free the potential of each person’,143 the eventual goal is to meet
also the second threshold, which is to allow people to not only survive but
to flourish and achieve their goals.144 Importantly, ‘[w]hilst the realization
of the maximal second interest is a medium- to long-term goal, the urgency
of the first interest strongly justifies an unconditional obligation to realize it
as a matter of priority’.145 Indeed, it cannot make sense to hold that there
is an obligation to meet the second threshold, but not the first, as in order to
reach the second level the realisation of the first is presupposed.146
The determination of a core rights standard through these two thresholds
in Bilchitz’ view is helpful in the context of ‘progressive realisation’, i.e., when
there is a lack of a general standard or full compliance with such a standard
cannot be expected immediately. By addressing urgent matters first, the right
to progressively achieve certain bigger aims can actually become a right of
‘everyone’.147
In his book, Bilchitz engages with many of the critics of the minimum core
rights approach. He for example explaines that the minimum core is not so
context-dependent as is often argued, as the ‘common human interests’ that
exist in different situations are, indeed, the same.148 Most interestingly, how-
ever, in response to (possible) criticism Bilchitz underlines that the minimum
core need not be rigid and absolutist.149 Indeed, this rigidity and absoluteness
is often seen as one of the most problematic features of cores of rights, as it
simply is ‘impossible to given everyone access even to a “core” service imme-
diately’.150 Bilchitz rebuts this criticism by stating, firstly, that ‘priority’ in
his account does not mean ‘lexical priority’ in the sense that all efforts and
sources must be spent on complying with minimum core rights, before
attention can be had to further realisation: ‘Such a policy would be short-
sighted and fail to invest in any long-term solutions for the situations that
143 See the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
144 Bilchitz 2007, p. 188. In the context of housing, for example, this implies that more is
provided than basic shelter, or protection against the elements.
145 Ibid., p. 189.
146 Ibid. When basic needs are not met, some people will not survive and their right to a more
inclusive level of protection will then be meaningless.
147 Ibid., p. 193.
148 Ibid., pp. 200-202, responding to Brand 2002. Although the exact obligations and measures
needed to fulfil these interests might differ from situation to situation, this is not the same
for the aim to, for example, ensure that someone has access to a minimum essential level
of food.
149 As the determination of the core is a matter of ‘content’, the role of the available resources
also applies to the core. Lacking this internal limitation, it can be said that ‘the general
limitations clause (S. 36(1)) could also be used for this purpose’ (Bilchitz 2007, p. 214).
150 TAC, para. 35.
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people find themselves in’.151 Rather, cores should obtain ‘weighed priority’,
which relates to the fact that ‘those interests which have priority are those
which we have particularly strong reasons to value and which require strong
countervailing considerations to outweigh them’.152 A justification for not
realising the minimum core could for example be that such realisation would
be impossible in the light of the scarcity of resources. Also when this requires
a disproportionately vast amount of resources, does not leave at least some
room for reaching the higher threshold that allows individuals to ‘realize their
aims and achieve positive experiences’, or prevents the realisation of other
rights’ cores, not meeting core obligations can be jusitified.153
To those who are not convinced that it makes sense to define as individual
rights standards that simply cannot always be met, Bilchitz responds that,
rather than including resource and other considerations in the determination
of the content of constitutional rights – which would be the alternative – it
is important to state conditional rights. ‘Independent’ minimum core rights must
be recognised, Bilchitz argues, for otherwise ‘the failure to meet basic needs
under conditions of scarcity does not violate any claim people have’.154 In
other words, ‘[p]eople have rights by virtue of being creatures of a certain
type with certain interests and not by virtue of having control over a certain
quantity of resources’.155 Indeed, the identification of minimum core entitle-
ments can steer government behaviour in the desired direction,156 while it
does not imply that as soon as a minimum threshold is not yet reached, there
is a breach of the Constitution. As Bilchitz already noted in 2003, the minimum
core should be rigid in one respect only: It should be strict to the extent that
it recognises that ‘it is simply unacceptable for any human being to live with-
out sufficient resources to maintain their survival’.157 Otherwise, it can indeed
be said to be a heavy-weighing, yet prima facie requirement.
In conclusion, it can be said that both Liebenberg and Bilchitz try to bridge
the gap between reasonableness and minimum core protection. Whereas
Liebenberg starts from the former, yet includes a small role for the minimum
core, Bilchitz gives content to socio-economic rights with the help of the
minimum core, while sometimes allowing for justifiable interferences due to
considerations of resources or, indeed, reasonableness. Using terms that have
come up earlier in this book, Liebenberg’s core rights notion can be described
as somewhat ‘relative’, in that it takes into account the specific context of a
151 Bilchitz 2007, p. 210.
152 Ibid., p. 211
153 Ibid., p. 212.
154 Ibid., p. 217; Bilchitz 2003, pp. 19-20, and p. 22: ‘Scarcity thus conditions the extent to which
the right can be realised but does not qualify the actual content of the right itself’.
155 Bilchitz 2003, p. 20.
156 Ibid., p. 219.
157 Ibid., p. 15.
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case, whereas in Bilchitz’ view only the protection offered by the core (rather
than the core itself)158 is relative, as it allows for some exceptions. In pointing
out the possibility of ‘less rigid’ cores, which are still necessary for they
recognise basic individual needs, Bilchitz has shown an important alternative.
His minimum core approach is capable indeed of providing for something
to hold on to, without becoming too rigid. It thus can ensure the development
of socio-economic fundamental rights protection and guide courts in dealing
with these rights, while recognising that even core obligations cannot always
be fulfilled immediately.159
6.4 CONCLUSION
Having ended this chapter with a discussion of the potential of the idea of
a less strict minimum core, it is worth summarising some of the main findings.
What did a discussion of the South African debate on the advantages and
disadvantages of the use of a minimum core add to the insights gained in the
previous chapter?
Presenting the idea of the minimum core as developed by the CESCR, the
focus of the previous chapter lay on the monitoring of economic and social
rights developments. It there became clear that when broad socio-economic
rights that have to be realised progressively form the starting point for examin-
ing state compliance, the identification of minimum cores can work in a ‘scope-
limiting’ way. It can ensure that (too) broad demands that cannot immediately
be fulfilled entirely are turned into more clear-cut expectations. The South
African debate presented in the current chapter focuses on the issue of the
minimum core in a different manner. Economic and social rights are explicitly
laid down in the South African Constitution and the South African Constitu-
tional Court has the power to review the issues raised in regard to these rights.
It was shown that over the years it has decided several landmark cases on
housing, health care, etc. However, from the outset the Court’s approach has
been a quite deferential one that, according at least to some critics, is not
capable of fulfilling the Court’s transformative potential. As an alternative,
scholars have suggested the Court should use a minimum core approach,
inspired by the CESCR. Up until today, the Court has been unwilling to do so
and even has expressly rejected such an approach. It has indicated that it lacks
the information necessary for defining core rights, and moreover it has
158 Indeed, the core itself is ‘absolute’ because it is determined apart from the circumstances
of a specific case.
159 According to Bilchitz himself: ‘[T]he modified minimum core approach that I advocate
offers a well-motivated, robust, and useful analytical framework for interpreting socio-
economic rights. Most importantly, it can also serve to realize the important ethical purposes
that lie behind the recognition of such rights: ensuring that each person is able to have
access to the necessary prerequisites for living a life of value’ (2007, p. 179).
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emphasised that that even minimum core obligations cannot be met immediate-
ly. This express rejection of core rights has sparked a highly interesting
(scholarly) debate on the minimum core and its possibilities and limitations
in the context of the fundamental rights adjudication.
Several arguments were presented in this chapter that have been brought
to the fore in the debate taking place between those favouring a reasonableness
test – including, indeed, the South African constitutional Court –, and those
who believe in the added value of a minimum core approach. Supporters of
the minimum core hold that only the identification of such a core will ensure
that enough weight is given to the right at stake as opposed to the govern-
ment’s justifications. Before reviewing these, they argue, it is important to look
at the individual interest at stake. Only when doing so a standard can be
identified against which the action or omission of the government can be tested
for its reasonableness. Also, identifying the most important aspects of socio-
economic rights recognises the fact that some things – e.g., the fulfilment of
basic needs – are more important than others, and can thereby increase the
protection of those most seriously in need.
Opponents of the idea of the minimum core claim that when a court
identifies such a core, this interferes with the separation of powers. They stress
that identifying immediate and strict obligations would give too much power
to the courts. In addition, this would have a ‘blocking’ effect as after the
identification of a minimum core, no room would be left for a further dis-
cussion of a right’s content and development. Especially in light of the fact
that a minimum core is in fact ‘indeterminable’ and necessarily subjective,
this would not be desirable.
It also has become clear, however, that the reasonableness versus core rights
controversy in fact needs not be an either/or debate. It can be said that the
arguments that are generally put forward are based on a ‘too flexible’ under-
standing of reasonableness, and a ‘too strict’ understanding of the minimum
core. When letting go of the different assumptions, several middle ways
become apparent. Liebenberg, for example, has suggested improving the
Court’s reasonableness review with the help of the substantive content of
rights. She argues that, although a context-sensitive core of rights should not
be a decisive factor in socio-economic rights adjudication, it can play the
valuable role of attaching weight to the right at stake. Bilchitz, on the other
hand, submits that a core of a right should be understood as a clear priority-
setting standard, based on the fact that there are basic urgent needs, next to
a second ‘threshold of interests’. He also recognises, however, that there may
be valid reasons and resource constraints that bar the government from ful-
filling core rights immediately. Nevertheless, even when minimum cores cannot
be guaranteed instantaneously, their recognition can further the development
of socio-economic rights standards because they make clear what deserves
priority, and in case resources becomes available, what these should be used
for. Bilchitz’ account thus forms an argument for determining independent,
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prima facie core rights, that underline the importance of the interests of those
most in need, yet do not require overly rigid or absolute protection. Regardless
of South Africa’s distinct history and problems, this argument, indeed, may
be of relevance to the protection of socio-economic rights more generally.
PART III
Core Rights and the ECtHR

7 Developing a Core Rights Perspective for
the ECtHR
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, different core rights doctrines have been introduced
and discussed. First, the discussion has focussed on the German Wesensgehalts-
garantie, a classic example of the idea of core rights protection as placing a
limit on limitations in order to ensure that fundamental rights guarantees
cannot run empty.1 After that, core rights debates were introduced that more
specifically related to the field of socio-economic rights protection. Attention
was given to the rights laid down in the International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the recognition by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) of minimum core obligations
on the basis thereof.2 Finally, the debate on the appropriate role of the concept
of core rights in the adjudication of economic and social rights under the South
African Constitution was analysed.3
The different chapters by no means have given an exhaustive overview
of today’s theory and practice related to the notion of core rights.4 They have,
however, served to capture the most significant features thereof. When it comes
to the idea of core rights as an instrument for narrowing down the room for
limitations of fundamental rights, the German doctrine provides an especially
elaborate example. Regardless of its limited practical meaning, Article 19(2)
GG has encouraged numerous legal writers to reflect on the Wesen of
fundamental rights and the different roles this concept can or should play in
the adjudicative process. Moreover, apart from the Wesensgehaltsgarantie, in
Chapter 4 the example of the constitutional right to an Existenzminimum has
provided valuable insights into the protection of absolute minimum guarantees
that can be valid beyond the German context, too.
1 See, supra, Ch. 4.
2 See, supra, Ch. 5.
3 See, supra, Ch. 6.
4 In various modern constitutions a reference to ‘core rights protection’ can be found. A few
examples are the Constitution of Colombia of 1991, Art. 334 (‘ … In no case shall the
essential core of a right be affected.’), the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, Art. 24(2)(c) (‘…
a provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom … shall not limit the
right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or essential content.’),
and the Constitution of Angola of 2011, Art. 236(b) (‘Alterations to the Constitution must
respect … [e]ssential core rights, freedoms, and guarantees.’).
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The concept of minimum cores or minimum core obligations at the UN
level, in relation to the ICESCR, has also proven interesting. In Chapter 5, the
genesis of the idea of core rights in the context of fundamental economic and
social rights was introduced. This chapter presented various reflections on
the use of cores for making broad rights norms more concrete and approach-
able, by focusing on the most urgent guarantees. At the same time it has
highlighted some building blocks for identifying the content of such cores
related to both their concrete substance and the ways in which core rights can
be determined. The outline of the South African debate in Chapter 6
concretised in more technical terms the potential and pitfalls of socio-economic
core rights for the judicial process. From the desirability of a reasonableness
test to the perceived need for a clear determination of the content of the
different socio-economic rights, the intriguing debate on the potential role of
core rights in relation to the ‘transformative’ task of South Africa’s Constitu-
tional Court offered various arguments for and against embracing such a role.
Indeed, regardless of the fact that other core rights doctrines could have
(additionally) been presented, the ones illuminated in the previous chapters
serve well to demonstrate what the idea of core rights protection is, or at least
what it can be about.
As such, the doctrines discussed have presented the starting points for
eventually transposing the concept of core rights to the Strasbourg context.
While aiming at doing so, this chapter moves beyond the contextualised,
separate doctrines in two respects. First, it merges the various insights in order
to create an overall picture of the diverse possibilities of core rights protection.
In presenting this overview, the insights derived from Chapters 4 to 6 will
be confronted with what has been said in Chapter 3 on the stages of funda-
mental rights adjudication. Besides presenting a ‘catalogue’ of core rights
options, one of the main topics that will be addressed is how the idea of core
rights protection can be relevant at the different stages that have been identi-
fied. Secondly, this chapter moves away from the German, international, and
South African debates in the sense that it is directed towards providing con-
crete starting points for the ECHR context. In keeping with the aim of this book,
the outlook that follows concerns the possibilities of core rights protection that
are relevant for the ECtHR, and more particularly for the protection of economic
and social interests under the ‘classic’ norms enshrined in the Convention.
It was explained in Chapter 2 of this book that offering such protection is
important, though not entirely uncontroversial. The Court’s reasoning in cases
related to health, housing, social benefits, etc. has been criticised for being
unprincipled and hence inadequate for fulfilling this court’s complex task of
providing effective individual protection, showing appropriate deference to
state authorities, and providing sufficient guidance as to what the ECHR rights
standards entail. It is against the backdrop of the Court’s need to deal with
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this complex task in a better way that the current chapter aims at developing
a ‘core rights perspective’ tailored to the ECtHR.
The chapter consists of three main parts. First, in Section 7.2 some general
insights are distilled from the different core rights doctrines. The depiction
of various ‘facts and fables’ related to core rights protection aims at creating
a more sophisticated and workable image of this notion in theory and in
practice. Secondly, the various insights on core rights will be linked to the
ECtHR and its delicate task of providing effective and transparent fundamental
rights protection while leaving room for the (democratic) decisions of the
Member States (Section 7.3). Attention is given to the preferred type of core
rights protection for the Strasbourg context as well as to the ways in which
the ECtHR could determine core aspects. Finally, in Section 7.4, an outline is
provided of a concrete (minimum) core rights approach for the ECtHR. Adding
the notion of core rights to the ideas of effectiveness and indivisibility that
were presented in Chapter 2, a perspective is presented that may improve
the Court’s reasoning and allow for moving towards a more principled
approach to the protection of socio-economic interests.
7.2 FACTS AND FABLES: GENERAL INSIGHTS INTO THE NOTION OF CORE RIGHTS
Several persistent perceptions of core rights, minimum cores, and minimum
core obligations determine the dominant image of core rights protection. One
of the most important of these is the idea that core rights are absolute. Cores
are often thought of as being decisive for the outcome of a case in the sense
that interfering with a core automatically results in a breach of the relevant
fundamental right. Also, it is often assumed that core rights need to be deter-
mined in the abstract and are everlasting. Partly because of these presumptions,
determining core rights is perceived as an extremely difficult or even imposs-
ible task. When left to a court, moreover, the determination of core rights may
be said to confer too much power on the judiciary. Combined with a perception
that core rights protection generally directs the focus towards a restricted
number of important guarantees, thereby ignoring other potential areas of
protection, this easily leads to the conclusion that the use of a core rights
approach can better be avoided.
However, the different assumptions and perceptions mostly only partly
coincide with reality or at least lack depth or nuance. Of course, the German
doctrine shows that core rights can be considered to serve as a ‘Schranken-
Schranke’ (‘limit to limitations’) in an absolute way.5 Moreover, generally
applicable core rights have been determined by, for example, the UN Committee
5 See, for this depiction of the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie, Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Vorb.,
no. 144, Art. 19 II, no. 7; Stern 1994, Bd. III/2, p. 865.
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comments.6 Yet this
means neither that the cores that are identified necessarily present unassailable
truths with regard to the meaning and importance of specific rights, nor that
exceptions or alterations over time are always precluded. Similarly, the fact
that it may be up to a court (or other non-democratic body) to identify and
apply core rights, does not in itself justify the conclusion that it thereby
necessarily oversteps the boundaries of its competences.
If the insights gained from the doctrines presented in the previous chapters
are combined, it appears that the ‘truth’ with regard to core rights protection
is more refined, and perhaps also more promising, than is often thought. Some
deeply ingrained ideas on the concept of core rights turn out to be mere
fictions, while other perceptions can be confronted with alternative understand-
ings that seem less inherently problematic. If one is willing to move beyond
a narrow understanding of what rights’ cores are and what they can be used
for, a richer picture emerges that enables for actual and informed deliberation
on the possible added value of this notion for legal contexts like that of the
ECtHR.
This section therefore aims to describe and contest various common under-
standings of core rights that can potentially stand in the way of a meaningful
development of this concept for the Strasbourg context. More precisely, it
addresses the idea that core rights are fixed and absolutely protected (7.2.1),
that the notion of cores can only be helpful at the application stage (7.2.2),
that cores are indeterminable (7.2.3), that they minimise rights’ potential (7.2.4),
and that they confer too much power on the courts (7.2.5). Finally, referring
back to the previous chapters and the insights presented there, it is emphasised
that the notion of core rights is inherent in the idea of fundamental rights
protection (7.2.6), and thereby the path is cleared for incorporating this notion
in a more concrete way in the Strasbourg practice.
7.2.1 From Absolute-Absolute to Relative-Relative Core Rights
Statements about core rights are often regarded as absolute, situation-inde-
pendent statements as to what is and what is not allowed in terms of limitation
of fundamental rights. Once the ‘core’ or ‘essence’ of a fundamental right is
interfered with, this interference is perceived as incompatible with the constitu-
tion or treaty enshrining the right.7 It makes sense, at least at first glance, to
treat requirements that are considered ‘essential’ as absolutes that leave no
6 See the General Comments on the various ICESCR rights, in which cores are stated that
are applicable to all States Parties. Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.4.
7 Cf. the example of Art. 19(2) GG (Wesensgehaltsgarantie): when the Wesen of a right is
interfered with the law or act concerned is unconstitutional, and must be regarded as null
and void (e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 19).
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room for reasonable or proportional exceptions, because their importance so
requires.
If there is one reason for jettisoning the concept of the minimum core,
however, then it is the perception of cores of rights as being, by definition,
absolutes. When understood as inflexible rules predetermining the outcome
of fundamental rights cases in which a core has been interfered with, a core
rights approach can indeed be problematic. First, there is the issue of conflict-
ing core rights. It is difficult to conceive of absolute core rights protection when
it is considered that core aspects of one right can come into conflict with the
core of another right. If both these cores are absolute, obviously no rational
solution to such a conflict can be found. Secondly, the absolute protection of
essential aspects of rights seems unrealistic when practical possibilities are
considered. This holds true especially in the context of positive and/or socio-
economic obligations. After all, it is fair to say that resources and means will
not always suffice to guarantee even individuals’ most basic needs and rights.
And thirdly, underlying the distrust of absolute cores is the fact that it is
profoundly difficult to identify the core of a right. This seems especially
problematic when this core is considered absolute, because this implies that
it will prevail over any thinkable and future conflicting interest. Indeed, the
difficulties inherent in determining core rights tend to become more obvious
when the impact thereof is so decisive yet also unpredictable.
The problems related to absolute cores can be reason for avoiding the idea
of core rights protection altogether. This is what the opponents of core rights
protection in the South African debate, as well as the South African Constitu-
tional Court itself, have generally favoured.8 In the German context, however,
this solution less easily can be opted for, since a norm protecting the core (das
Wesen) of a right has explicitly been taken up in Article 19(2) of the Grund-
gesetz. This provision cannot simply be ignored, and for that reason in German
constitutional law alternative understandings of core rights protection have
been suggested. On the one hand, there are those who have proposed an ‘ob-
jective’ reading of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie. Such a reading, rather than
guaranteeing subjective, individual guarantees, implies that Article 19(2)
ensures that the core of every fundamental right is preserved for society in
general.9 This means that whereas in an individual case a right can be limited
8 In the case of Grootboom (Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom &
Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.), the South African Constitutional Court amongst other
things held that it lacks the necessary information to determine minimum cores and that
needs diverge to such extent that no core entitlements follow from the Constitution (paras.
32-22). In TAC (Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2001
(5) SA 721 (CC)) it held that it is ‘impossible to give everyone access even to a ‘core’ service
immediately’ (para. 35). According to Young, the concept of the core is being jettisoned
even by those who are otherwise committed to the economic and social rights framework
(Young 2008, pp. 115-116).
9 Cf. Drews 2005, pp. 77-82, and see, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.1.1.
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to such extent that nothing remains, for example in the case of a conflict with
other very important interests, the norm as such always needs to remain
meaningful beyond the subjective situation. On the other hand, an option has
been suggested that avoids the complexities of absolute cores in a more funda-
mental manner, namely an understanding of rights’ cores that is ‘relative’ in
the sense that what belongs to the Wesen of a right can only follow from the
particularities of a specific case.10 According to this understanding, the core
of a right can become visible only by means of the outcome of a balancing
test – when it turns out that a measure was proportional, the core of the right
at stake was not interfered with.
It can be asked, however, whether it is necessary to either ignore the idea of
core rights entirely, or resort to an objective or purely circumstantial under-
standing of rights’ cores in order to overcome the downsides of absolute core
protection.11 It is contended here, on the basis of the insights gained from
the doctrines presented in the previous chapters, that this is not the case.12
When listing the different core rights approaches that were discussed, it
becomes clear that there are more options than the strictly absolute and the
‘case-dependent’ relative one. In fact, what becomes apparent is that there are
two kinds of absolute cores, as well as two kinds of relative ones, that together
result in a ‘catalogue’ of understandings of core rights containing no less than
four different possibilities.13
In order to clarify this, it must be understood that ‘absolute’ can refer to
absoluteness as regards the content of the core, i.e., to the definition of a core
that is independent from the circumstances of a particular case, as well as
absoluteness of the protection that is being offered, which implies that when
the core of a right is touched upon, this automatically means that the relevant
rights norm is violated. ‘Relative’ core rights protection, in turn, can mean
either that the core itself is relative, because it can only be determined in the
context of the specific case at hand, or that it is protected in a relative manner,
meaning that there is some room for justifying an interference with the core
of a right.
10 Cf. ibid., pp. 66-75. Amongst the supporters of this theory are Häberle (1983), Alexy (2002)
and Borowski (2007). See, for the various ‘relative theories’, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.2.
11 Cf. Young’s discussion on cores as being either ‘rules’ or ‘standards’. This distinction is
very insightful, yet it does suggest that one should choose between either a very strict,
absolute core, or, instead, a ‘moveable, changeable, core’, dependent on balancing (Young
2012, pp. 86-87).
12 With regard to the German example, however, things are more complicated as the ‘absolute’
phrasing of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie precludes certain alternative core rights understandings.
13 Cf. also Drews 2005, who comes up with an even greater number of core rights options.
However, these are specifically tailored to the German debate on the Wesensgehaltsgarantie
and the issues highlighted therein (e.g., objective v. subjective protection, absolute v. relative
protection). Supra, Ch. 4, especially S. 4.3.
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The four options for a core rights approach that follow from these dis-
tinctions can be illustrated by the different core rights doctrines presented in
the previous chapters, or more precisely, by the different preferred understand-
ings of core rights protection that have featured therein. The absolute-absolute
and absolute-relative understandings, as well as the relative-absolute and the
relative-relative ones, all have appeared somewhere in the discussion of the
German, international and South African examples. Thus, the study of core
rights options conducted in the previous part of this book, can lead to the
following classification:
Protection



















1.a: The absolute-absolute understanding of the concept of the core is the
conception that is most commonly adhered to. It is the idea that cores of rights
are determined independently from the particular facts of a case while being
absolutely protected. This understanding is apparent in the German debate
on Article 19(2) GG (the Wesensgehaltsgarantie). Because this norm states that
‘In no case may the core content of a constitutional right be infringed’, relative
protection seems precluded. Those who moreover consider the content of cores
to be something absolute, start from the idea that there are certain, case-inde-
pendent aspects of fundamental rights that are so important that they cannot
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be interfered with.14 The concrete definition of these aspects, also in the
German debate, is however often left open.15
The German right to an Existenzminimum (subsistence minimum) also may
be considered a kind of absolute-absolute core right. The Bundesverfassungs-
gericht has indicated what this minimum guarantee at all times should amount
to, whereas – because it is inferred from the absolute protection of human
dignity – not living up to this automatically results in a violation of the Ger-
man Constitution.16 Finally, in the debate on economic and social rights
protection in South Africa, most authors who argue against the incorporation
of minimum cores in the South African courts’ adjudicative practice, use
arguments against absolute-absolute cores – holding that these cannot be
objectively determined and moreover cannot be met in practice.17 Also the
Constitutional Court in South Africa has concluded against using core rights,
on the basis of what seems to be the same ‘strict’ understanding.18
1.b: Absolute-relative cores may appear to be not that different from their
absolute-absolute counterparts. Nevertheless, the difference between both types
is of great importance. ‘Absolute-relative’ means that the content of a core is
something absolute, or general. What belongs to this core is determined on
the basis of the rights norm itself, or with the help of consensus or expert
interpretations of what belongs to the most essential aspects of the right
concerned. In any case, the core content is independent from the circumstances
that characterise a specific case or issue. The protection of this core, instead,
is to some extent dependent on these circumstances, which means that in
certain instances an interference with an essential aspect of a right can be
justified. This option thereby acknowledges that resource constraints or other
very weighty considerations can stand in the way of securing even the very
core of a right, without this implying that the content of the core itself cannot
be determined except for in the light of these constraints.
A first example from the previous chapters is the minimum core approach
as it has been developed by the CESCR in relation to economic and social
rights.19 Although minimum cores are introduced in the various General
14 See, on the absolute theory, Drews 2005, pp. 62-66, and, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.1.
15 Some suggestions for determining absolute cores, however, were made by Herbert (1985),
who amongst other things referred to the character and function of fundamental rights,
human dignity and comparative insights. Also interesting in this regard is the ‘absolute-
dynamic’ understanding of core rights in Germany. According to this understanding, there
is room for alteration of the core over time. Arguably, this mitigates that problem of
determining ‘absolute’ core content (supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.1.).
16 Cf. the absolute guarantee of the Menschenwürde of Art. 1(1) GG (in combination with the
Sozialstaatsprinzip of Art. 20(1) GG). See, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.1.
17 Supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.4.2.
18 Indeed, it has held that recognising minimum cores would be unrealistic as it is ‘impossible
to give everyone access even to a “core” service immediately’ (TAC, para. 35).
19 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.3.2 and 5.4.
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Comments as very important guarantees states should do all they can to
comply with, in the end the CESCR has accepted that non-compliance with a
minimum core ‘only’ results in a prima facie violation of the ICESCR. It implies
a heavy burden of justification, and it is up to the state to prove that all
resources have in fact been spent on at least meeting minimum core obliga-
tions. Yet it is not imperative that a failure to fulfil core rights leads to a breach
of the ICESCR.20
Bilchitz’ contribution to the South African debate can also be placed in
the ‘absolute-relative’ category.21 He argues for a ‘less rigid’ minimum core
that allows for limited exceptions.22 According to Bilchitz, the minimum core
should be rigid in one respect only, namely to the extent that ‘it is simply
unacceptable for any human being to live without sufficient resources to
maintain their survival’.23 It is important to state core rights independent
from resource and other state concerns, because otherwise ‘the failure to meet
basic needs under conditions of scarcity does not violate any claim people
have’.24 Core rights claims are thus a matter of content per se, while counter-
vailing concerns can constrict their eventual manifestation. The advantage of
recognising such absolute-relative cores in this view is that it offers clarity
on what should be strived for in terms of rights protection. Absolute-relative
cores provide for norms that guide the adjudicational practice, indicating rights
that should obtain weighed priority and are thus more difficult to be out-
balanced by other interests.
2.a: A relative-absolute understanding of rights’ cores at first glance appears
to be impossible. How can something the content of which is not clearly
determined on forehand, be absolutely protected? Indeed, it is the gist of the
relative-absolute perception of core rights that what exactly these rights entail
cannot be determined a priori and in an absolute manner. Instead, the content
of core rights needs to be defined in a contextual manner. At the same time,
the protection afforded is absolute in the sense that interferences with the core
20 According to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 3, ‘a State party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care,
of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing
to discharge its obligations under the Covenant … In order for a State party to be able to
attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available
resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that
are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obliga-
tions’ (para. 10).
21 E.g., Bilchitz 2003; Bilchitz 2007. See, supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.5.2.
22 Bilchitz 2007, p. 212. These exceptions relate to scarcity of resources, but also recognise
that when the fulfilment of a core requires a disproportionally vast amount of resources,
or blocks or leaves no room for the realisation of other rights and aims, not meeting core
obligations can be justified.
23 Bilchitz 2003, p. 15.
24 Bilchitz 2007, p. 217.
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of a right are intolerable. In order to make this work, it needs to be accepted
that the core of a right can only become apparent by looking at a concrete
interference. When an interference is considered to be justified, given the
circumstances of a case, this means that the core has not been interfered with.
In turn, when a violation is found, this could imply that the absolutely pro-
tected core has been touched upon.
The clearest example of this understanding is the protection offered by
the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie as explained by those who support the
‘relative theory’.25 Supporters of this theory hold that in fact the core of a
right is determined on the basis of a proportionality analysis, or balancing
test, allowing for taking into account specific facts and circumstances. This
approach is in keeping with Alexy’s optimisation thesis, which holds that it
is necessary to conduct a balancing test for outlining the optimal manifestation
of rights given the concrete legal and factual possibilities.26 Indeed, according
to some ‘relativists’, core rights can only appear when prima facie rights are
turned into eventual entitlements.27 Others, however, do not seem to dis-
tinguish between the right in itself and the right as limited, but hold that rights
– just like their cores – are always carved out (by the government) in the light
of all relevant factors.28
Next to the Wesensgehaltsgarantie the right to an Existenzminimum could,
instead of as an absolute-absolute guarantee, also be understood as a relative-
absolute one, albeit in a somewhat different way. Since the right to a sub-
sistence minimum as it has been formulated by the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
namely in a qualitative manner,29 leaves room for further (quantitative)
interpretation by the legislator, it has been held that this right is ‘seiner Natur
nach relativ’ (‘by nature relative’).30 Nevertheless, it is clear that once the
Bundesverfassungsgericht holds that the right has not been complied with, this
means that the Constitution has been violated. However, the idea that the
content of the minimum subsistence requirement is relative may be considered
25 Supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.2. It was already indicated that relative protection is not an option when
it comes to Art. 19(2) GG, because this provision ‘in keinem Falle’ (‘in no case’) allows for
an interference with the core of a right.
26 Alexy 2002.
27 E.g., ibid.; Borowski 2007.
28 E.g., Häberle 1983. This understanding, indeed, conflicts with the idea that a distinction
must be made between the stages of interpretation and application (see, supra, Ch. 3, S.
3.2.1).
29 See BVerfGE 125, 175, 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 February 2010 (Hartz IV) and BVerfGE 132, 134,
1 BvL 10/10, of 18 July 2012 (Asylum Seekers Benefits). This right ‘guarantees the whole
subsistence minimum by a uniform fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses both
the physical existence of the individual, that is food, clothing, household goods, housing,
heating, hygiene and health …, and ensuring the possibility to maintain inter-human
relationships and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and political life’ (Hartz
IV, para. 135).
30 Seiler 2011, p. 504. Cf., supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.2.
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not entirely convincing. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has after all set important
parameters for what it entails,31 and it moreover seems natural that rights
statements leave some room for further interpretation. Thereby, however, the
example of the right to an Existenzminimum shows that somewhat abstract core
standards that are not defined in detail can have a ‘guiding’ role in the sense
of providing a concrete starting point for the adjudication of specific cases.
2.b: Finally, there is an understanding of core rights that can be termed ‘relat-
ive-relative’. Looking at this term, it can be asked what is left of the more
pronounced protection when both the content and the protection of core rights
are not absolute. It is true that when the content of a core can only follow from
the circumstances of a case, and this core moreover allows for justifiable
interferences, the notion of core rights protection de facto becomes meaningless.
However, Liebenberg’s proposal for improving the reasonableness test of
the South African Constitutional Court signals that understanding core rights
in a relative-relative way can have some added value in structuring a court’s
test, albeit this added value is admittedly limited.32 Liebenberg seemingly
argues that minimum cores could play a role in reasonableness review, though
not as a general standard determining the content of a right that ought to be
protected.33 Instead, what constitutes the core of a right needs to be deter-
mined on the basis of the multiplicity of ‘intersectional’ aspects that together
determine the individual interest concerned.34 Because these aspects differ
from case to case, so must cores, which means they are relative in nature.
Furthermore, since cores alone cannot be decisive for whether an interference
or omission was reasonable or not, but rather constitute one amongst various
factors that need to be taken into account, ‘individualised’ cores cannot be
said to be absolutely protected. They do, however, play a role in the test that
is applied and they may influence its outcome. It can be said that Liebenberg’s
view, thereby, aims at distinguishing levels of interferences and omissions,
on the basis of which certain choices in the adjudicational process can be made.
This can be helpful, indeed, to ascertain a more transparent test, yet it does
not provide for a standard that can be applied in other cases as well.
Thus, core rights need not necessarily be indicators of clearly and independent-
ly outlined areas in which limitations are under no conditions allowed. Next
to what is here termed the ‘absolute-absolute’ understanding of core rights,
31 These parameters take the shape of ‘procedural’ requirements, rather than quantitative
ones, thereby acknowledging the fact that it is not for the courts to determine the eventual
subsistence minimum, whereas they can nevertheless phrase clear requirements (supra,
Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.2).
32 See, supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.5.1. Since Liebenberg does not want to give ‘fixed content’ to rights,
her approach arguably fails to provide a more general standard. Cf. Bilchitz 2011.
33 Liebenberg 2010, pp. 184-185.
34 Ibid., p. 185.
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at least three alternative conceptualisations can be identified. These are less
fully absolute in the sense that the content of cores and/or the protection they
offer is relative, i.e., either their definition is case-dependent or they may leave
room for justifications, or both. In Section 7.3.1 it will be further elaborated
what these different possibilities mean for the practice of the ECtHR and import-
antly, which core rights option appears most promising given the aims of the
inquiry that is central to this book.
7.2.2 Core Rights and the Stages of Fundamental Rights Adjudication
In Chapter 3 of this book, a distinction was made between the stage of inter-
pretation and the stage of application, i.e., between determining the scope of
a right and reviewing the limitation of a right.35 Also a third task was out-
lined, namely the determination of the intensity of review (or margin of
appreciation).36 A second ‘fable’ that needs to be discussed here is the idea
that core rights are primarily, or even exclusively relevant at the application
stage. Viewing the process of rights adjudication as being framed by the stages
distinguished in chapter 3, it is frequently assumed that the main function
of core rights is to help determine whether the reasons adduced suffice for
justifying an interference with a particular right.
Most clearly, this view is expressed by the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie.
The genesis of Article 19(2) GG, which holds that the Wesen of a right cannot
be interfered with, signals that the original aim of this provision is to prevent
rights from being limited by the legislator to the extent that practically nothing
would remain.37 In line with this, the Wesensgehaltsgarantie is generally termed
a ‘Schranken-Schranke’, a ‘limit to limitations’. At least according to the absolute
theory (more precisely, the ‘absolute-absolute’ understanding of the Wesen
of rights), this works as follows. First, there is the prima facie right, which is
being limited. In order to review whether a particular limitation is justified
under the Constitution, one of the relevant questions is then whether or not
the core of the right (its Wesen) has been interfered with. In other words, in
applying the right, the core or non-core character of the interest at stake
becomes important.38 If it is the core that is interfered with, it follows that
the interfering act or law is null and void.
As was explained in Chapter 3, and especially in Section 3.4.2, at the
application stage ad hoc balancing of competing interests as well as more
principled or ‘categorical’ rights review is thinkable. Generally, using a notion
35 See, in particular, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
36 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.2 and 3.5.
37 Supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.2.1.
38 If it is concluded that a core right is at stake, the requirement of proportionality does not
apply. See, e.g., Dreier, in Dreier 2013, Art. 19 II, no. 16.
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of core rights for reviewing the justification that has been adduced implies
a more rule-based form of review.39 When the interest to which a claim
pertains falls within the category of (case-independent) core rights, it will
probably be dealt with differently than when it is of a non-core kind. For
example, if the core of a right is at stake, the different sub-tests of proportion-
ality review – like the requirements of a legitimate aim or ‘necessity’ – may
be harder to pass.40 According to the absolute theory, as soon as a limitation
touches upon a core, the case is thereby even decided, since a balancing act
is then prevented.41
The question is nevertheless whether core rights, however understood, can
only be important for or helpful in the stage of application. Indeed, it can be
argued that a function can be envisaged for core rights also when the deter-
mination of the scope and the determination of the intensity of review are
concerned. At least with regard to the task of determining the intensity of the
test, such a claim can easily be made. After all, as was explained in Chapter 3,
rather than forming a separate stage, this task in fact concerns a sub-part of
the application stage.42 It was established previously that the intensity of the
review can be determined either in a more categorical way, relying on distinct
‘levels’ of scrutiny, or in a more flexible and gradual manner.43 Moreover,
this can be done either by taking into account all relevant factors of the case,
or with a particular focus on the seriousness of the interference with the
individual interest at stake.44 In any case, though arguably mostly in the
context of a more categorical or individual interest-based approach,45 core
rights notions can play an important role in this determination.
Looking at the different core rights approaches discussed, Liebenberg’s
hints for including a core rights notion in the South African courts’ reasonable-
ness test can serve as a good example of how this notion could affect the
strictness of the test.46 Even though she does not see cores as general stand-
ards providing for absolute protection, her ‘relative-relative’ understanding
can be said to add to the review process in the sense that, when a core of a
right is at stake, this may have particular consequences for the intensity of
the review. More particularly, the core rights notion ‘can be incorporated in
39 Cf. Von Bernstorff 2014, pp. 83-84.
40 Cf. Barak 2012, p. 531ff., who holds that the preferred approach should be dependent on
the distinction between ‘fundamental’ or ‘high level’ rights and other rights.
41 Indeed, this understanding of core rights protection is the most ‘categorical’ as regardless
of the (other) interests involved, limiting a predetermined core equals a violation.
42 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.2.
43 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.5.1.
44 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.5.2.
45 I.e., when the core character of the individual interest concerned is decisive for the intensity
of review.
46 Supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.5.1. See Liebenberg 2010, and in particular pp. 184-185.
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the reasonableness analysis by placing a particularly heavy burden of justifica-
tion on the state in circumstances where a person or group lacks access to a
basic socio-economic service or resource corresponding to the rights in ss 26
and 27’.47 Such a core rights approach to determining the strictness of the
test seems to be a relatively ‘categorical’ one. It relies on clearer levels of intens-
ity, or, at least, on a clearly stricter level as soon as the core of a right is at
stake. Indeed, rather than varying ‘according to the circumstances, subject
matter and background’,48 relying on core rights for deciding on the intensity
of the review implies that it is the individual interest that is taken as the start-
ing point.
Besides in helping to determine the intensity of the test, the notion of core
rights may also play a role at the interpretation stage. At this stage the scope
of the relevant right is determined by asking whether the individual interest
complained about is covered by the fundamental rights norm that is invoked.
Only when this is the case a court will proceed to reviewing the limitation
in the light of the relevant fundamental right.49 It was indicated in Chapter 3
that the determination of scope is foremost a matter of interpretation: with
the help of interpretative methods and principles a court develops the prima
facie content of the right.50 Moreover, what can play a role in interpreting
a right is a preference for either a wide scope or rather a narrow one. The latter
may bar certain matters from being reviewed by a fundamental rights adjudi-
cator like the Strasbourg Court, while the former may lead to the proliferation
of the category of ‘fundamental rights’ and, concomitantly, enlarge the ‘playing
field’ or jurisdiction of a court.51
What is meant by the use of core rights at this stage of interpretation is
not so much that after an individual interest has been considered to fall within
the scope of a right the core or non-core character of this interest is determined.
Especially when general, absolutely defined cores are considered, the question
whether in the case at hand the core of a right is concerned, may be perceived
as an obvious part of the interpretation of the relevant right. However, what
follows from the core rights doctrines presented in the previous chapters is
that cores can also be used for determining the scope of a right, i.e., for deter-
mining whether (for adjudicational purposes) a particular interest is covered
47 Liebenberg 2010, p. 184 [footnote omitted].
48 Which is the generally considered to be the case with the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation,
see, e.g., Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1990, appl. no. 20458/92, para. 38. See also,
supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.5.2.
49 See, on this stage, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.
50 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.1.
51 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.2.
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by a rights norm in the first place.52 It has become clear that the idea of core
rights, or, the idea that within the potential reach of a right different aspects
can be distinguished some of which are weightier than others, can lead to a
clearer definition of justiciable rights.
In this regard the practice of the CESCR should be recalled. Tasked with
monitoring state compliance with the rights enshrined in the ICESCR, this
Committee was confronted with a lack of a clear definition of these rights.
First of all, the ICESCR contains broadly stated economic and social rights that,
secondly, need not be complied with in their entirety immediately, but accord-
ing to the requirement of progressive realisation. The rights norms as they
are stated in the Covenant, thus, turned out to provide insufficient starting
points for supervising states’ compliance. To concretise the requirements
stemming from the Covenant, the CESCR recognised that it contains certain
immediate obligations, and, moreover, that ‘minimum essential levels’ of the
different socio-economic rights need to be provided in order for states to
comply with their duties under the ICESCR.53 These minimum cores, as was
explained in Chapter 5, thereby more or less ‘narrow down’ the problematic
(potential) scope of broad socio-economic rights that need not be complied
with entirely in the first place.54 Thus, the idea that rights have core aspects
– that are more important than other, ‘peripheral’ issues that could be covered
by the same right – has been used to clarify the scope of ICESCR rights and
obligations. Although the objective of the ICESCR still is that states guarantee
each right to its full extent, which means that also the non-core aspects remain
of great importance, with the definition of core obligations it has become clear
for states where they need to focus on first. In line with this, as Young argues,
minimum cores can be used as ‘the appropriate vehicle for courts’ to help set
certain priorities and delineate the states’ obligations.55 This has been con-
firmed by the Committee where it suggests that incorporation of the ICESCR
in national legal orders ‘enables courts to adjudicate violations of the right
52 See, e.g., Koch 2009, p. 288, speaking of ‘a minimum core approach to justiciability’. Accord-
ing to Porter 2005, p. 52, ‘a minimum core approach to justiciability tends to divorce rights
claims from individual circumstances and unique interests that may be at stake. It shifts
the focus of a claim from the particular relationship between a rights claiming community
and government to a more abstract debate about quantifiable universal entitlements and
minimum obligations of governments to all citizens, in which a court is understandably
reluctant to engage’. However, it was already indicated that a core rights notion (also at
the interpretation stage) need not be understood as absolute and strict. Moreover, as is
further argued in, infra, S. 7.3 and 7.4, when the protection of socio-economic rights under
classic rights norms is concerned, there may nevertheless be reason to draw clear lines.
53 On the immediate requirements and core obligations following from the ICESCR see, supra,
Ch. 5, S. 5.3 and 5.4.
54 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.3.2.
55 Young 2012, p. 79.
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to health [or housing, or social security], or at least its core obligations, by direct
reference to the Covenant’.56
Bilchitz’ proposal for core rights protection can be seen in a similar light.57
He distinguishes between two thresholds of interests, the first being the most
urgent and covering basic needs, and the second focussing on the possibility
to achieve one’s goals and on individual flourishing.58 Given this distinction,
he holds that priority should be given to meeting basic needs, which can be
achieved by identifying minimum core rights. Entitlements to basic rights make
for a strong case in court, since these are what the economic and social rights
enshrined in the South African Constitution are first and foremost about. When
it is asked whether someone has a justiciable claim under these rights, i.e.,
whether his interest falls within the scope of the relevant right(s), the fact that
his interest is a ‘core’ one will trigger an affirmative answer. In this way, the
concept of core rights can help to shape the scope of economic and social
rights, before reviewing whether or not the Constitution has been violated.
The ‘core scope’ of a right, i.e., the scope that has been determined on the
basis of the idea of core rights, arguably is a ‘narrow’ one.59 It can marginalise
or even block other claims that involve less urgent matters. It thereby
circumscribes the jurisdiction of a court: rather than reviewing every omission
or interference with a socio-economic interest, a scope that is inspired by the
idea of core rights directs a court’s efforts towards essential issues, leaving
other issues to be determined by the other branches. As such, indeed, the use
of core rights can also be perceived as a recognition of the fact that in
distributing rights and freedoms, the role of the judiciary necessarily is a
limited one.
In sum, it is clear from the comparative chapters that the notion of core rights
can do more than just informing the application stage by placing a limit on
limitations. Looking closely at the different understandings of core rights as
they were summed up in Section 7.2.1, it has been demonstrated that cores
can also be important for determining the intensity of review as well as for
determining the scope of a fundamental right. Especially this latter point leads
to valuable insights, in the sense that when a court has to demarcate the scope
of broadly phrased rights, the notion of core rights could be helpful in fulfilling
this task.
56 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 60 [emphasis added].
57 E.g. Bilchitz 2007, Ch. 6.
58 Ibid., p. 180, 187ff.
59 Supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.2.
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7.2.3 ‘Indeterminable’ but workable
Sceptical attitudes towards the idea of core rights protection are often grounded
on the belief that the core of a right is indeterminable. German legal writers,
for example, have eloquently argued that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie really adds
nothing to the requirement of proportionality. They find that the Wesen of a
right, at least when seen apart from the specific circumstances of a fundamental
rights issue, is empty or non-existing.60 In the South African debate, the
argument that minimum cores are indeterminable also plays a prominent role.
It is argued that fundamental rights do not have a core that is ‘out there’, in
the sense that there is no essential element that can be distilled from a right
that cannot somehow be contested or repudiated. Cores, then, only exist by
virtue of subjective interpretations, and hence it is better not to identify them
in the first place.61
It must be admitted that, largely, the critics are right. It seems impossible
to know or find out what the essence of a fundamental right really is. This
is true, in particular, when what is sought after is an unassailable, irrefutable
truth, since clearly there appear to be no objective cores that are immune to
contestation.62 In the same vein, it is obvious that completely objective criteria
for identifying the essential aspects of a right cannot be found either. Moreover,
what can be added to this is that there does not always seem to be a concrete
need for identifying core rights. It can be inferred from the discussion
presented in Chapter 4 that, at least in Germany, the well-structured pro-
portionality test used there is generally assumed to ensure that fundamental
rights cases are dealt with in an appropriate manner.63 The idea of core rights
is perceived as being merely declaratory,64 and there does not actually appear
to be a want for determining the Wesen of each and every right so that it can
function as an actual substantive rule guiding the judicial process. Thus, given
the difficulties related to the very determination of rights’ cores and especially
when their added value is perceived as limited or even non-existent, it can
be argued that using a core rights doctrine does not make much sense.
It is submitted here, however, that not in all legal contexts the ‘indeter-
minacy’ of core rights is reason for jettisoning the concept altogether. First
of all, when the content of core rights or the protection they offer is understood
in a relative manner, the issue of the determination of the core becomes some-
what less critical. When the actual content of a core can be altered or developed
60 E.g. Kaufmann 1984, who holds that the search for a substantive Wesensgehalt is ‘sinnlos’
(p. 391). When it comes to a limitation of a right, there is nothing left that is a ‘measurable’
Wesen of a right (p. 392).
61 Supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.4.3.2.
62 Cf. Von Bernstorff 2014, p. 83.
63 See, in particular, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.1. However, especially lately, the (‘balancing’) practice
of the Court has also been criticised. See, e.g., Jestaedt et al. 2011.
64 Cf. Häberle 1983, p. 234.
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over time, when the acceptance of a core right does not have any consequences
beyond the case at hand, or when an interference with a core of a right does
not automatically lead to finding a breach of this right, it may be less problem-
atic that there is an element of subjectivity involved in the determination of
such a core.
For concluding that determining flexible and/or non-decisive cores is to
be preferred over not making use of core rights protection at all, however,
something more seems needed. Arguably, regardless of its setbacks, it can be
worth using the concept of core rights in practice when the advantages thereof
outweigh the possible downsides. The potential value of the notion can be
derived in particular from the practice of the CESCR. In the context of the
ICESCR, the notion of minimum cores – besides being grounded on a theoretical
understanding of rights as containing essential elements – evolved from the
need to solve a concrete practical problem. Where the requirement of progress-
ive realisation of the economic and social fundamental rights laid down in
the ICESCR leaves unanswered the question of what needs to be achieved with
priority, the notion of core rights was introduced as the missing piece of the
puzzle.65 It served the practical purpose of enabling the CESCR to monitor
whether states used their available resources on progressively realising the
rights enshrined in the ICESCR, by concentrating on certain very important
guarantees.66 Thus, even though the cores that where identified in the context
of international economic and social rights norms are perhaps not unassailable,
they, at the least, serve the aim of clarifying the immediate content of these
broadly stated rights, thereby increasing their workability and thus having
added value.
Moreover, besides the fact that the use of core rights can serve practical
purposes, it is also true that the (potential) disagreement on their content must
not be overstated. Learning from Sunstein’s ‘incompletely theorized agree-
ments’67 and the notion of overlapping consensus,68 there is no a priori reason
to exaggerate the extent to which people are likely to disagree on cores of
rights. It can be said that ‘people from different cultures may continue to
disagree about what is good, but nevertheless agree about what is insufferably,
unarguably wrong’.69 Hence, that what people think should minimally be
protected by fundamental rights norms can be the same, regardless of the
65 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.3.
66 Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 10, and the other General Comments dealing
with particular economic and social rights (supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.4).
67 E.g. Sunstein 1995, Sunstein 2007.
68 Rawls 1971 (1999); Rawls 1993.
69 Ignatieff 2001, p. 56. See also Young 2012, p. 66.
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different, subjective points of view that may have informed this opinion.70
For example, the necessity of a roof over one’s head as well as access to basic
social assistance will be understood by a majority as very important, if not
the most essential aspects of the right to housing and the right to social secur-
ity, respectively. This holds true regardless of the different possible arguments
and reasons people would adduce as grounds for finding these rights im-
portant.
When courts are tasked with determining what belongs to the core aspects
of a right, it is likely that this existing ‘consensus’ is explicitly taken into
account.71 It is true, however, that there can then still be doubt as regards
the exact degree of protection a minimum core should entail. Whereas the focus
of the core might be relatively unequivocal, in other words, it can still be a
matter of controversy what ‘basic’ housing or social security precisely entails
and how inclusive this notion should be. An example of how to deal with this
issue may be the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s interpretation of the right to an
Existenzminimum.72 Phrasing this ‘minimum right’ in relatively abstract, non-
quantifiable terms, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has left some room for the
legislator to determine the exact and concrete content of the subsistence mini-
mum and the way in which it is provided. It moreover concretised the right
to an Existenzminimum with the help of more or less neutral, procedural
guarantees, and has thereby found an acceptable way of pronouncing an
important right that would otherwise not be taken as serious.73
Thus, when this can help in generating the necessary content of rights and
enables courts to ensure that rights are at least ‘minimally’ complied with,
the identification of core rights might be beneficial even given their ‘indeter-
minable’ character. Be it for their relative features, or because of the room they
leave for further interpretation, the previous chapters have shown that an
approach to core rights protection can be identified that works, without being
constantly contested.
70 Indeed, especially in the context of socio-economic guarantees it can be possible to determine
‘minimum levels’ thereof; whereas it is hard to give someone some, or ‘enough’, or ‘the
necessary’, freedom of speech, this is different for rights to food or shelter – in the context
of which it can be said that some basics need to be provided.
71 See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2. Also in the context of the ECtHR, it can be said that comparative
interpretation forms a hallmark of this Court’s practice. See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.3.3, and
Ch. 3, S. 3.3.1.
72 Supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.
73 Supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.2.
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7.2.4 The Maximising Potential of the ‘Minimum’ Core
Not in the least because of the terminology employed in the field of economic
and social fundamental rights, the use of core rights is frequently perceived
as constricting the protection these rights can provide. It has become clear in
Chapters 5 and 6 that especially when socio-economic norms are concerned,
core rights protection is related to the provision of a minimum standard.
However, also in a more classic rights context where core protection aims at
restricting interferences with fundamental freedoms, only particularly funda-
mental aspects of a right obtain ‘extra’ protection. It is no wonder, then, that
the recognition of cores is sometimes conceived of as limiting the potential
of fundamental rights. By identifying and emphasising certain basic guarantees
there can be a risk of lowering expectations, and perhaps even of lowering
efforts. When core guarantees are for example defined on the basis of con-
sensus amongst states with regard to what should be regarded as essential
in terms of (economic and social) rights, they may seem to entail nothing more
than a ‘lowest common denominator’. And when attention for the core casts
a shadow over the more peripheral aspects of a right, minimum core protection
may end up being all that can be expected.74
There is, however, a brighter side to minimal nature of the core. As Young
argues,
‘the interpretation of minima is not addressed to the great aspirations of an ideal
system of justice, but rather to the most basic interests common to the experience
of being human, and how they might be expressed as rights. By paying attention
to such constraints, a ‘minimalist’ rights strategy implies that maximum gain to
rights is sometimes achieved by minimizing goals.’75
Thus, a focus on, and extra protection for certain aspects of rights can have
the effect that efforts are being directed to where they are needed most. The
examples presented illustrate this: the aims of the minimum core obligations
inferred from the ICESCR and the core rights suggested in the context of the
South African Constitution, as well as the reasons for introducing a Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie in the German Grundgesetz of 1949, signal that ‘minimising’
protection was far from what was desired. Instead, what forms the reason for
74 See for this point and related criticisms (with further references), e.g., Young 2012, pp. 69-71.
For the argument that the core directs the attention only to the performance of developing
states, see, Craven 1995, pp. 143-144, p. 152.
75 Young 2012, p. 66. According to Young, ‘the concept of the minimum core seeks to avoid
deontological excess. The focus on a minimum core trades rights inflation for rights am-
bition, channelling the attention of advocates towards the severest cases of material de-
privation and treating these as violations by states towards their own citizens or even to
those individuals outside their territorial reach’ (pp. 67-68).
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opting for core rights protection is the risk that authorities ‘empty out’ funda-
mental rights by either interfering with them to such extent that nothing
remains, or failing to actively guarantee at least their most basic elements. The
idea is that by focusing on core elements, this risk can be overcome.
In fact, whereas phrasing a great variety of interests in terms of funda-
mental rights can give the impression of an adequate system of rights pro-
tection, core rights terminology may express that actual compliance with these
rights requires a great deal more. It has been said that minimum core pro-
tection ‘trades rights inflation for rights ambition’.76 Rather than aiming high
by offering prima facie protection to a great variety of interests that might be
only tentatively connected to the rights norm concerned, channelling the
attention towards more specific guarantees does not only fit a more limited
understanding of the role of courts in the socio-economic area,77 but can also
ensure meaningful, actual protection.
7.2.5 Demarcating the Judicial Task
It is often suggested that by pinpointing cores, a court may easily transgress
the boundaries of its adjudicative task. By determining essential elements that
are meaningful beyond the contours of a single case, courts can seemingly
engage in decisions on the general distribution of (social) rights and freedoms,
which can be considered problematic from the perspective of separation of
powers. Especially because many fundamental rights cases involve political
choices, the identification of core aspects can be perceived to allow courts to
usurp policymaking tasks belonging to the realm of the government. Indeed,
this can be considered problematic especially when positive and/or socio-
economic rights are concerned. Although it cannot be said that only these
rights bring along costly obligations, choices in the field of economic and social
policy are generally politically and ideologically laden and are dependent on
budgetary constraints. One may think here of fields like housing, health care
or social security, where the means that can be spent on costly measures are
scarce. In this context, the judiciary’s determination of ‘core issues’ that deserve
priority will easily circumscribe the (democratic) ‘Spielraum’ of the other
branches.
It is not just the traditional understanding of the separation of powers as
such, however, that creates unease with the idea of a court determining (posit-
ive and/or socio-economic) cores of rights. Equally important is the concern
that judges lack the expertise to make choices amongst the different policy
76 Young 2012, p. 67.
77 This also relates to the idea of ‘fundamental rights inflation’ – when almost every conflict
can be phrased in terms of fundamental rights, it could be argued that a court should
foremost stick to the protection of the core of such rights. See further, infra, S. 7.2.6.
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and budgetary options.78 Does the immediate requirement to grant access
to low cost housing to marginalised groups serve the desired goals better than
any long term housing policy directed at the population more generally? And
would a core requirement in the field of health care not impede the achieve-
ment of health aims more generally, or leave too little room for improvement
in the field of housing? It seems plausible to argue that courts do not have
the necessary data required to ‘calculate’ what works best towards the
realisation of broader socio-economic rights. What they can do is ask whether
a given policy was reasonable, or the measures taken proportional, but they
lack the capabilities and competences needed for setting policy priorities. For
this reason, too, it is often argued that defining core rights by the judiciary
is undesirable.
The problem of courts exercising too much power when they resort to a core
rights approach arguably takes different shapes according to the particular
type of core rights that is opted for. It was already indicated that a choice for
a relative definition of (the protection of) core rights might mitigate the prob-
lematic features of this concept. Once cores are determined that are guiding,
rather than determinative for the outcome of a rights dispute, they will have
a less far-reaching effect on the leeway left for the other branches, and
consequently, they will be less contentious. The same goes for defining cores
in a rather more malleable or flexible manner, which suggests that reasonable
alterations can be made to their scope (also) on the basis of a dialogue with
the legislator and the executive.79 Finally, when the cores that are identified
are truly minimum cores, focussing on the most basic guarantees and on societal
consensus, it seems more difficult to argue that their definition involves a
purely subjective choice that could have just as well turned out differently.
When the concrete measures that are to be taken are thereby left to the non-
judicial actors to decide upon, ‘usurpation of powers’ may seem to be an
overstatement.
Besides, it can also be asked whether it is actually the case that the identifi-
cation of core guarantees by definition enlarges the power of courts as opposed
to the other branches. It is true that the definition and application of cores
is generally something to be accomplished by courts in their capacity as
fundamental rights adjudicators, which by definition confers on them an
78 The South African Constitutional Court, for example, has held in the case of Grootboom
(para. 33) that it could only determine minimum cores when ‘sufficient information is placed
before a court to enable it to determine the minimum core in any given context’. This it
considered not to be the case.
79 Cf. Liebenberg 2010, p. 167, who holds that ‘[t]he minimum core concept seeks to establish
a normative essence for socio-economic rights which is beyond contestation and debate’.
The use of core rights she proposes, instead, ‘need not be guided by a single overarching
standard such as biological survival. The inquiry should be primarily guided by a context-
sensitive assessment of the impact of the deprivation on the particular group’ (p. 185).
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important and difficult task. Yet, whether they thereby actually obtain more
– or indeed too much – power, can be questioned. After all, rather than merely
increasing its power, a core rights approach in fact also limits and structures
a court’s competences. First of all, by using a ‘core rights perspective’ for
determining the scope of a right, a court consciously restricts the range of
issues it can have the final say on. In the words of Bilchitz, minimum cores
could help a court to ‘provide clear reasons for its involvement in … [socio-
economic] cases, and a clear statement of the important interests involved
which would demarcate the scope of its own decision-making powers’.80
Importantly, indeed, the courts’ review in fundamental rights cases sub-
sequently will be guided by this core, which means that once it is held that
a core right is at stake, the argumentative leeway of the court will be
confined.81 This is most obviously so when a core is considered to be absolute-
absolute, i.e., when it is considered to form a predetermined, substantive limit
to government interference or a demand that allows for no exceptions. When
there is no room for justified limitations once the core is touched upon, courts
have no choice but to conclude that there has been a violation. As such, the
‘core rule’ binds the court, while simultaneously enhancing the predictability
of its case law. But also when cores are perceived as guiding standards rather
than as absolute rule-like guarantees, the case remains that a court has to take
into account the fact that a core aspect was interfered with and act accordingly.
Perceived in an absolute-relative or even in a relative-relative way, an
interference with a core can imply that the onus of proof shifts to the state,
or, for example, that the justificatory reasons given must be particularly
compelling. Although this still leaves room for different outcomes, it can be
argued that compared to, for example, a very open balancing test the room
for reaching a ‘subjective’ conclusion is thereby clearly reduced.
It is true that reasonableness or proportionality review also can be con-
ducted in a very structured manner. The main point made here, however, is
not so much that no other instruments can be envisaged that play a ‘structur-
ing’ role, but rather that a core rights approach can be useful in demarcating
and guiding the judicial task. In fact, it can be with the help of core rights that
a proportionality or reasonableness test is being structured, namely by adding
a component that affects the – generally very ad hoc – way these tests are being
conducted.82
80 Bilchitz 2003, p. 10.
81 Of course, this does not hold true for core rights protection according to the German
‘relative theory’. According to this theory, the notion of cores does not have a guiding
function. Since it also implies, however, that cores are not (pre)determined, the problem
of ‘too much power’ for the courts does not occur in the first place.
82 E.g. Von Bernstorff 2014, especially pp. 83-84. Cf. also Liebenberg 2010, pp. 184-185.
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Altogether, thus, the use of core rights ensures that a court cannot be overly
flexible or activist in the sense that it can review any socio-economic issue
without providing reasons for this and bring in and accord weight to interests
the way it sees fit. With a guiding core as the starting point, a court’s task
is channelled in a particular direction. This can be perceived as a disadvantage,
as flexibility may after all create room for tailor-made, individual protection.
It does mean, however, that it cannot simply be said that a core rights
approach only enlarges a court’s power, rather than having the possibility
to direct and even constrain it, too.
7.2.6 Core Rights as a Notion Inherent in Fundamental Rights Protection
Finally, it is important to stress that guaranteeing core rights can be seen as
inherent to the idea of (judicial) fundamental rights protection. Be it in the
context of civil and political, or economic and social fundamental rights, the
essential aspects of these rights underline what fundamental rights protection
is all about.
The picture that has emerged thus far might be somewhat misleading in
this regard. Especially in the context of the South African Constitution, but
also when it comes to the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie, much attention has
been devoted to the pros and cons of using core rights as a ‘tool’ or ‘in-
strument’ for improving fundamental rights protection.83 Also in the context
of the ICESCR, minimum cores seem to have been ‘created’ for the purpose of
enhancing compliance with socio-economic rights.84 Depending on the pre-
dominant opinion on the viability and feasibility of core rights, these are
sometimes taken ‘on board’, but can seemingly just as well be left out of the
picture entirely. Cores of rights can be perceived as ‘überflüssig’ and as having
nothing to add, and accordingly, they should give way to other more appropri-
ate ways of dealing with fundamental rights.
However, the genesis of both the Wesensgehaltsgarantie and the minimum
cores recognised by the CESCR also may suggest a different line of reasoning.
At the heart of the Wesensgehaltsgarantie lies that idea that it should simply
not be possible to empty out fundamental rights entirely. Experience with a
legislature that had fundamental rights placed at its free disposal had made
clear that this was in fact at odds with the idea of fundamental rights as
such.85 At least certain aspects of constitutional rights have to be inviolable
in order to render these rights meaningful. In aiming at the actual protection
of the economic and social rights laid down in the ICESCR, moreover, minimum
cores have been created not just because it was thought that the focus should
83 See, especially, supra, Ch. 6, S. 6.4.
84 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.3.
85 Supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.2.1.
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be on a few, more tangible guarantees in this field, but also because of the
fundamental understanding that several particular aspects of socio-economic
rights are especially urgent and important.86 The idea that fundamental rights
not necessarily trump other interests and can often be limited in a justifiable
manner may be generally accepted, but so is the idea that this does not mean
that every aspect of these rights can be as easily sacrificed. The government
cannot get away with everything when striking a balance between individual
and general interests, and simply fade out rights more or less entirely.
Thus, regardless of whether a system of rights protection explicitly features
core rights, or ‘opts’ for or against this notion, the idea of the importance of
protecting especially the most essential aspects of rights is generally embraced
and even may be seen to lie at the very heart of all systems of fundamental
rights protection. From this perspective, core rights protection does not merely
form an instrument that can either be used or not, but is in fact something
that is woven into the fabric of fundamental rights protection. It entails that
some aspects of rights are so important that they deserve more, or even
(almost) absolute protection, and for offering this protection a particular core
rights norm, i.e., a provision explicitly stating that the core of a right needs
to be protected, indeed does not seem necessary.87
There is more to substantiate the point that the protection of core rights must
be seen as inherent to the idea of fundamental rights. As was discussed in
Chapter 3, various authors proclaim that a broad understanding of funda-
mental rights should be preferred over a narrow one. They claim that a priori,
a great number of interests deserve to be qualified as fundamental rights, as
this creates a forum for justification.88 Whether these interests deserve
eventual protection then depends on the conflicting interests at issue.89 In
this context, in the debate on fundamental or human rights one regularly comes
across the term ‘proliferation of rights’.90 This term captures the idea that
fundamental rights seem to cover an increasing number of interests, which
in the view of some can lead to the ‘judicialisation’ or ‘constitutionalisation’
86 Cf. CESCR, General Comment No. 3, para. 10, stating that ‘[i]f the Covenant were to be
read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely
deprived of its raison d’être’.
87 Cf. Häberle 1983, p.234, who holds that the Wesensgehaltsgarantie as enshrined in Art. 19(2)
GG ‘ist die deklaratorische Sanktion, die zusätzliche und überflüssige Sicherung von
Prinzipien, die bereits in der Verfassung zum Ausdruck gelangt sind. Seine Bedeutung
erschöpft sich darin, die Prinzipien in spezifischer Weise in einer Formel zusammenzufassen.
Auch ohne ausdrückliche Wesensgehaltsgarantie ist der für jedes Grundrecht gesondert
zu ermittelnde “Wesensgehalt” von der Verfassung gewährleistet’.
88 See, e.g., Alexy 2002; Kumm 2004; Barak 2012; Möller 2012. See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.3.2.
89 Cf. Alexy 2002, pp. 178-179.
90 In Möller’s theory (2012), this is an important element of the ‘global model of constitutional
rights’. See, in relation to the ECtHR, Gerards 2008, p. 659ff. (cf. also Gerards 2012, on the
‘prism character of fundamental rights’).
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of great parts of society.91 Indeed, the expansion of rights has been described
in a somewhat condemnatory way as resulting in ‘rights inflation’.92 Irrespect-
ive of what one holds of the development of rights’ proliferation, however,
what it makes clear is that both in theory and in practice fundamental rights
are not, or no longer, guarantees applying only to a limited array of narrowly
circumscribed individual freedoms. They can be found in virtually every
conflict involving individual interests, and this underlines the possibility of
– or even the serious need for – differentiating between one rights claim and
the other. In other words, where not all ‘fundamental’ rights claims can be
considered equally important, it makes sense to concentrate on protecting core
rights.
7.3 CORE RIGHTS AND THE ECTHR
Chapter 2 of this book has provided an introduction to the role and position
of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as some insights into its socio-
economic case law and the problematic features thereof. It was explained there
that the Court needs to be mindful of the multiple roles it is required to play,
especially when entering the sphere of socio-economic rights – which was not
traditionally covered by the Convention. Next to fulfilling the important task
of ensuring effective individual fundamental rights protection, as a supra-
national court the ECtHR is required to show deference to Member States’
choices and policies, interfering only there where its subsidiary role requires
it to do so. Moreover, the Court also needs to provide for some kind of ‘consti-
tutional justice’, i.e., it needs to provide well-reasoned and transparent judg-
ments laying down the necessary standards with the help of which Member
States can aim at ensuring compliance with the Convention on their own.93
Having discussed the different stages of fundamental rights adjudication
(Chapter 3) as well as the various core rights doctrines (Chapters 4, 5, and 6),
the focus will now shift back to the Strasbourg Court and its particular, multi-
dimensional task. Taking the more general lessons that were presented in the
previous section as the starting point, the remainder of this chapter aims at
linking the potential and possibilities of core rights to the socio-economic
protection offered by the Court. This section first elaborates on the different
types of core rights that were identified in Section 7.2.1 in order to make an
argument as to which particular form(s) of core rights protection would best
91 For the argument that constitutional law has constantly grown over recent decades, see
Möller 2012, Ch. 1 (see also p. 107).
92 Cf. Möller 2012, p. 3, who holds that ‘[e]specially in Europe a development has been
observed which is sometimes pejoratively called “rights inflation”’. He however uses this
term ‘in a neutral sense as referring to the increasing protection of relatively trivial interests
as (prima facie) rights’.
93 See, on these different roles, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.3.
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fit the practice of the ECtHR (7.3.1). After that, some attention will be given
as to how the Court could determine the cores that could be of use in the
Strasbourg context (7.3.2).
7.3.1 Guiding Cores and Meaningful Protection
In Section 7.2.1 it was demonstrated that core rights do not have to be
‘absolute’. Rather than merely underlining that there are relative understand-
ings as well, this section has shown that there is in fact a matrix of core rights
understandings, revealing at least four different options. Looking first at their
content and then at the way in which this content is protected, absolute-abso-
lute, absolute-relative, relative-absolute, and relative-relative cores can be
distinguished. Coming to the ECtHR, the question is whether all of these under-
standings or rather one or a few of them, would actually fit the practice of
this Court.
The kind of core rights approach that is sought after here is an approach
that can potentially aid the ECtHR in providing the necessary socio-economic
rights while not overstepping the boundaries of its supranational judicial task.
In this regard it was argued that it is important for the Court to provide clear
guidelines: to distinguish between interpretation and application as well as
between individual and general interests, thereby providing information that
is useful also beyond the contours of the specific case.94 When investigating
whether and what type of core rights protection would be interesting for the
ECtHR, this should be taken as the starting point.
It will be argued in this section that one of the options presented in Section
7.2.1 seems particularly promising for the Strasbourg socio-economic rights
protection, namely the idea of absolute-relative core rights. Before explaining
why this is the case, it will first be explicated why the other options would
be less well-suited or at least less feasible.
First, the relative-absolute understanding of core rights, which is ex-
emplified by the ‘relative theory’ related to the German Wesensgehaltsgarantie,
would not add much to the Strasbourg practice. This theory suggests that the
requirement that ‘in no case may the core content of a right be infringed’
cannot but protect ‘relative’ cores that can only become visible once a
proportionality analysis has taken place.95 It holds that cores cannot be de-
termined a priori, but instead depend on all the circumstances of the case.
Perceived in this way, cores have hardly any ‘guiding’ function at all, neither
94 See, for an overview of the criticism on the Court’s reasoning in socio-economic cases, supra,
Ch. 2, S. 2.6.2.
95 See, on this theory, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.2.
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for the case law more generally, nor in the particular case at hand.96 For that
reason, they would not add anything to the Court’s adjudicational process
in terms of making it more insightful or providing for some general Conven-
tion standard. In fact, one could even argue that the ECtHR already, automatic-
ally works with what could be called relative-absolute cores. What this requires
after all seems to be nothing more than using proportionality review and
balancing the various (individual and general) interests. When an interference
is considered proportional, then apparently the core of the right invoked was
not interfered with. When there has been a breach of the Convention, this
might instead imply that the absolutely protected essence of the right was
touched upon, although it can be said that the area of ‘disproportionality’
encompasses more than this ‘essence’.97 Thus, adopting a relative-absolute
core rights approach would not require changes in the Court’s reasoning, let
alone would it lead to better standard setting or more principled balancing
or reasoning in general.
A relative-relative core rights approach is characterised by similar defects.
The case-dependent character of this type of core rights makes that it can be
used in an overly flexible way. Core rights, or rather, the question whether
in a given case a core right is at stake, can be determined according to the
specific context of a fundamental rights complaint, while also the eventual
protection accorded to a core right can vary on a case-by-case basis. For
example, where the right to respect for private and family life is concerned
the Court can decide whether a specific housing-related complaint involves
a core or a non-core individual interest. When the interest is held to be of core
importance, this is likely to result in a stricter test, although there still is room
for the Court to conclude that there are countervailing reasons which are more
weighty and therefore preclude the finding of a violation. This kind of core
rights protection is hence ‘custom-made’ regarding both the content and the
protection that is being offered.98 At the same time, it has little, if any,
predictive value and does not develop in more general terms what the Conven-
tion does and does not require. Rather than guiding the adjudicative practice,
moreover, the use of relative-relative cores can become a mere rhetorical tool
whenever the Court is looking for strong reasons for a finding of a breach
of the Convention.
Therefore, where the aim is to increase transparency and limit the ad hoc
character of the Court’s case law, core rights the content of which is absolute
96 According to Alexy 2002, p. 196, ‘the guarantee of an essential core contained in article
19(2) Basic Law does not contain any further control on the limitability of constitutional
rights beyond that already contained in the principle of proportionality’.
97 I.e. not every disproportional interference or omission necessarily can be said to have
touched upon the core of a right.
98 Cf. Liebenberg 2010, pp. 184-185.
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and does not depend on the circumstances of the case are more likely to have
added value. Absolute-absolute cores, for example, concern general statements
on an interference-free sphere or on a minimum level of protection that needs
to be provided. However, their absolute protection lays down hard rules to
which no exceptions are thinkable, and combined with their ‘inflexible’ content
this is what often makes them be perceived as problematic. For how exactly
can it be determined which aspects of rights should always prevail and who
are judges to have the final say on this? Transposed to the Strasbourg context,
the problematic features of an absolute-absolute core rights approach are not
getting any less significant, and this holds especially true in relation to the
Court’s protection of economic and social rights. Would it be feasible for the
Court to identify general socio-economic cores as falling within the scope of
ECHR rights, to then also provide absolute protection to these core aspects?
Starting from the effectiveness and indivisibility paradigms that were intro-
duced in Chapter 2,99 there may be room for stating in explicit terms the link
between Convention norms and certain socio-economic minimum require-
ments.100 Even when this implies that only these core socio-economic guar-
antees are prima facie covered, however, providing absolute protection to these
cores could be perceived as too activist a manifestation of the Court’s (limited)
powers as opposed to those of the national authorities.101
Altogether, the option with the most potential for the practice of the Court
would be the idea of absolute-relative core rights protection. This understand-
ing entails that (minimum) core guarantees are identified that cannot change
on a case-to-case basis. At the same time, although absolute-relative cores can
be considered very weighty in the sense that interferences and omissions are
hard to justify, this understanding allows some room for limitations. More
concretely, the ‘absolute content’ part of this core rights notion ensures that
clarity is provided to individuals and Member States as to what their rights
and duties are, respectively. It ensures that fundamental guarantees are defined
(in a general manner), so that they can form the starting point for assessing
the proportionality of an interference. At the same time, the ‘relative protection’
aspect guarantees the flexibility necessary for a Court like the ECtHR to some-
times step back, even if a weighty economic or social guarantee is at stake.
Consequently, starting from potentially very broad ECHR rights that may
or may not include a broad range of socio-economic guarantees, it may make
sense for the ECtHR to expressly include (only) socio-economic core rights even
99 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
100 This will be further explained in, infra, S. 7.4.1 (and 7.4.2).
101 It is true that this may be different when the rights norm under which a core socio-economic
guarantee is recognised, is an absolute norm like Article 3 ECHR. In that case, indeed, the
mere recognition of a core socio-economic aspect as falling within the reach of Article 3
would suggest that it is absolutely protected.
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when these are merely ‘relatively’ protected, because this creates clarity about
prima facie rights.102 This would be in line with the importance of a distinction
between the scope of a right and its application,103 and of ensuring that there
is an identifiable standard against which the proportionality of an act or
omission can be judged.104 Focusing on core rights would result in a clear,
limited, and thereby somewhat ‘narrow’ interpretation of the scope of ECHR
rights, at least where it concerns the socio-economic dimension thereof. This
seems defensible given the restricted role and task of the Court in the context
of socio-economic rights and is in keeping with the idea that the ECtHR should
not become the final arbiter in every issue concerning individual socio-eco-
nomic interests regardless of whether or not it is of a ‘fundamental’ kind. As
was explained in more detail in Chapter 2, the room for the Court to engage
in socio-economic rights protection does not seem unlimited, and criticism
has arisen especially as regards cases where applicants attempt to link more
peripheral socio-economic claims to the provisions of the Convention. Applying
the Convention to such issues would eventually demand choices to be made
that a supranational judicial body – and in particular one that has not been
explicitly charged with the task to adjudicate social rights complaints – is not
well placed to make. Indeed, this seems to be different if the Court would
expressly restrict its review to cases concerning essential, ‘core’ interests.
When it comes to the review stage, an absolute-relative approach also has
added value, since it has the advantage of offering solid protection and sound
judicial review. After all, the very fact that it is core socio-economic interests
that are interfered with ensures that justifications will be carefully scrutinised.
Although some restrictions are accepted under the absolute-relative approach,
these important individual interests thereby obtain the attention they deserve.
The approach suggests that rather than focusing on their sensitive, socio-
economic nature, and therefore opting for very deferential review, their
essential character ensures that they actually stand a chance against counter-
vailing considerations.
The possibilities of using an absolute-relative approach for improving the socio-
economic reasoning of the ECtHR will be further explored in Section 7.4. For
now, having in mind the aim of providing more principled and well-
structured, but also effective socio-economic rights protection suited to the
sensitive task of the Court, it suffices to underline that an ‘absolute’ under-
standing of core (socio-economic) content, rather than an ad hoc one, provides
102 Cf. Bilchitz 2003; Bilchitz 2007. It is important to state the content of core rights as this is
what their importance demands. Even if this implies that core rights are ‘conditional’, this
at least ensures that the basic claims people have are determined apart from budgetary
and other concerns.
103 See, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1.
104 Bilchitz 2007, especially Ch. 6; Bilchitz 2014a (2014b).
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most added value. This is especially true when this understanding is combined
with strong, yet relative protection that leaves some room for Member States
and their interests and decisions at the review stage. Having considered the
alternatives available, it seems that this approach would seem the most promis-
ing in terms of the definition of clear guiding standards in combination with
meaningful socio-economic rights protection.
7.3.2 Determining Cores
When an argument is made for the potential use of (absolute-relative) socio-
economic cores in the Strasbourg adjudicative practice, the question of how
to determine the core content of rights cannot be circumvented. After all, the
use of a core rights perspective depends on the feasibility of the definition
of core rights as well as the possibilities for the Court for taking on this
definitional task. In Section 7.4, a core rights strategy for the ECtHR will be
outlined including concrete suggestions as to the content of the core. However,
in order to understand the way in which this content is interpreted there, it
is worth bringing back to mind a few approaches as to how core rights can
be determined, and translate these to the Strasbourg context.
In Chapters 5 and 6, and most explicitly in Section 5.5.2, roughly two ways
were identified of determining what belongs to the core or essence of a parti-
cular right.105 Starting from the question of how the minimum core obliga-
tions recognised by the CESCR in its different General Comments have come
about, it was argued that they seem either to be inferred from the right itself
or from consensus amongst States Parties or other ‘external’ sources.106 The
former option looks for intrinsic cores, for the raison d’être of rights, or for
their ‘unrelinquishable nucleus’, without which one could no longer speak
of that right.107 Whereas this is indeed a difficult exercise, at least in the
context of socio-economic rights it generally has led to a focus on minimum
essential levels of these rights. For example, a right to housing at minimum
requires individuals to be protected against the elements by means of basic
shelter. A more inclusive minimum would entail access to basic housing,
including adequate facilities like sanitation, energy for cooking, etc. In regard
to the right to social security, it can be said that the raison d’être of such a
right is to ensure at least a subsistence minimum, i.e., the means necessary
for acquiring essential health care, food, education etc. Although the inclusive-
ness of the minimum core can be a matter of discussion, the direction in which
105 See however also, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.3.2.1, where it was considered that the content of the
Wesen of a right can also follow from the right itself or rather from ‘comparative’ insights.
106 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2, respectively.
107 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.1.
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it points is clear – basic provisions form the very essence of socio-economic
rights while without these there is nothing to build a higher level of socio-
economic protection upon.108
‘Comparative’ or ‘external’ information, on the other hand, comes into play
when the right itself does not pinpoint a certain minimum, or when other
insights and experiences are considered relevant for the definition of (addi-
tional) cores.109 External inspiration clearly played a role in the definition
of minimum core obligations under the ICESCR, both more generally and in
a very concrete manner.110 Interesting in this regard, moreover, was the dis-
cussion on the pros and cons of including a core rights notion in the adjudica-
tion of economic and social rights under the South African Constitution.
Opponents of this idea seemed to be somewhat less hesitant when the cores
to be recognised would be defined on the basis of consensus. Arguing that
it would be impossible for the Constitutional Court to determine minimum
cores tailored to the South African situation – as this would be a very
subjective exercise that would exclude the other branches from (further)
elaborating on the meaning of socio-economic rights – reliance on the cores
recognised by the CESCR would be less inherently problematic.111 This would
include, so to say, a kind of broader agreement also amongst non-judicial
bodies and branches.
‘Consensus’ must not be taken too literally in this context. Indeed, complete
agreement by all stakeholders on detailed core obligations seems practically
impossible. Rather, general agreement on core issues as it can be inferred from
state practices but also from authoritative documents might be a more feasible
source of inspiration. Next to that, especially in the context of socio-economic
protection, an important source can be expert information. Specialised bodies
with extensive knowledge that is supported by statistical data on for example
health care and educational issues may be able to provide for hints as to where
the core of a right can be located.
For the ECtHR, it is difficult to say which of the two approaches should be
favoured. Just like in other legal contexts, both have their less attractive sides
and neither seems ideal in the sense of pinpointing cores that are entirely
beyond contestation. In fact, however, there is no reason why an actual choice
must be made, as, seen in combination, both the intrinsic approach as well
108 Cf. Bilchitz 2007, p. 187, who refers to different levels of individual need, the first of which
is said to be ‘the most urgent interest in being free form general threats to one’s survival.
This interest is of greatest urgency, as the inability to survive wipes out all possibility for
realizing the sources of value in the life of a being’. See also p. 189.
109 Supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2.
110 See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.2. In various General Comments, the CESCR explicitly refers to
the inspiration found in international standards and state practices. For a concrete example,
see CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(d).
111 Cf. Dixon 2007, pp. 415-416 (and see, supra, Ch. 5, S. 6.4.2.2).
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as the consensus approach may provide helpful starting points. First, looking
for the raison d’être of fundamental rights means that it is asked why a parti-
cular rights norm is there and what is required to ensure that this right is
meaningful for those who can rely on it. This implies a kind of teleological
approach to interpretation that takes into account a right’s objective and
purpose and ‘the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument designed
to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.112
In applying such an approach, the ECtHR would look at the rights norms
enshrined in the ECHR, and more particularly at the aims and intrinsic values
of the different ‘civil and political’ provisions.113 When understood, as is the
case, as encompassing positive obligations as well, this would for example
allow for linking the right to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR) to the
importance of having a place to stay and to find shelter, to have some privacy
without constantly being interrupted by others. Another example is the right
to life (Article 2 ECHR), which prima facie can be said to entail, at minimum,
a right not to die in extremely distressed circumstances and hence the provision
of at least some basic (medical) help. Nuancing the ‘active’ connotation of the
term ‘treatment’ moreover, the prohibition of ‘inhuman and degrading treat-
ment’ as laid down in Article 3 ECHR may be linked to the provision of some
basic means of subsistence needed for living a human life. Indeed, rather than
being one of many aspects that could potentially be protected by this norm,
some subsistence minimum can actually be said to form an essential aspect
thereof. In this regard it is also worth recalling what was said about the
‘effectiveness thesis’ in Chapter 2 of this book.114 Combining the idea of
effectuating ECHR rights with a search for what this essentially demands, it
appears to be the case that some socio-economic guarantees are crucial, because
without those one cannot even start ensuring the further realisation of the
respective rights.115
Secondly, also ‘consensus’ or ‘external’ cores can provide a valuable starting
point for adjudication by the ECtHR. In fact, this approach to determining
minimum core rights allows for looking further than the norms enshrined in
the Convention itself. The Court could well refer to the essential socio-economic
guarantees that have been agreed upon at the national as well as at the inter-
national level, and in particular to the core obligations that have been
recognised by the CESCR. After all, the ICESCR has been broadly ratified, and
regardless of the lack of binding judgments on the basis of the rights it
enumerates, these bring along obligations for states, including the States Parties
to the ECHR. These are already bound by the core requirements following from
112 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, ECtHR 7 December 1976, appl. nos. 5095/71,
5920/72 and 5926/72, para. 53.
113 Cf. Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.1.
114 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.
115 Cf. Bilchitz 2007, p. 189.
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the Covenant, and it hence seems unproblematic for the ECtHR to at least give
these core requirements some consideration in dealing with cases under the
Convention. Such ‘consensus interpretation’, as was argued already in Chap-
ter 2, fits the interpretative practice of the Strasbourg Court as well as the
Court’s acknowledgment of the indivisibility of civil and political and economic
and social rights.116 What the idea of ‘externally inspired cores’ adds to this
is that rather than taking into account ‘everything’ that has been agreed upon
in relation to economic and social rights, the Court’s attention is directed
towards the core aspects thereof. It suggests a take on indivisibility, thus, that
instead of merely finding broad general inspiration for the interpretation and
application of the rights enshrined in the Convention, entails a more limited
focus on minimum essential levels and other core requirements, while incor-
porating these in a more transparent and robust manner.
Thus, while aiming at outlining the content of the socio-economic core rights
that could play a role in the context of the Convention, the Court can look
at the rights enshrined in the Convention and what these are about, as well
as at ‘external’ norms and core guarantees that can serve as a source of inspira-
tion for what minimum of protection could be provided under the ECHR. It
will be shown in the next section that on the basis of this, it seems possible
indeed to come up with a core strategy that provides for clarity on what prima
facie socio-economic rights the Convention can guarantee.
7.4 EFFECTIVENESS, INDIVISIBILITY, AND CORE RIGHTS PROTECTION
It was argued that especially the idea of absolute-relative core rights protection
could aid the Court in fulfilling its different tasks when protecting socio-
economic interests under the Convention. Besides that, several methods of
determining core rights that could be applied by the ECtHR were outlined. It
can be said that with the help of the ideas of intrinsic and externally inspired
cores it is eventually up to the Court, as the final interpreter of the Convention
and the body in charge of applying the ECHR rights to the cases that come to
Strasbourg, to determine what exactly socio-economic core rights protection
should entail. At the same time, on the basis of the inspiration drawn from
the different core rights doctrines, in combination with what was argued in
regard to the Strasbourg adjudicative context, a more detailed picture of a ‘core
rights perspective’ for the ECtHR already may be provided. This section takes
the analysis presented thus far one step further by providing some more clarity
116 Indeed, the ‘indivisibility thesis’ as it was outlined in, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.3, in fact starts
from the idea of ‘consensus’, or at least, ‘external inspiration’. It was said to be related to
the Court’s ‘comparative’, ‘common ground’, or ‘consensus method of interpretation’ (S.
2.5.3.3).
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on the content of the core socio-economic rights that seem feasible in the
Strasbourg context, as well as by explaining the role these cores could play
at the different adjudicative stages. The aim thereby is to outline an actual,
workable strategy for the ECtHR that not only does do justice to the idea that
certain core aspects of rights can be considered more important than others
and therefore require extra protection, but also fits the multidimensional task
of this Court and the traditionally civil and political character of the rights
it is protecting.
An important starting point for the strategy presented here is formed by
the ideas of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’ that were introduced in Chap-
ter 2.117 There, it was argued that the economic and social dimension of the
ECHR can be explained by the aim of effectuating the rights enumerated in
the ECHR, as well as by the idea of the indivisibility of fundamental rights,
which implies that socio-economic rights are expressly taken into account in
interpreting other fundamental rights norms. It was also held there that where-
as both theses not only explain but also justify the Court’s engagement with
socio-economic issues, they fail to provide sufficient guidance for dealing with
cases of this kind.118 However, taking ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’ as
the starting point, while adding the idea of core rights protection as it was
elaborated in the previous sections, a possible course of reasoning might
emerge that could help to improve the Court’s practice. The strategy outlined
in this section hence aims at combining the two different rationales with core
rights-inspired ways to go about. By doing so, a more principled approach
to complex socio-economic matters may be shown to be within the Court’s
reach.
In the following, it is first argued that core socio-economic rights, or, more
precisely, minimum essential levels of these rights, can add to the interpretation
of the Convention in the sense that these aspects of socio-economic rights can
be reasonably included in the scope of several ECHR rights (7.4.1). Thereafter,
it is contended that although this provides for a clear and delineated approach,
guaranteeing such ‘minimum essential levels’ does not provide for a sufficient
level of prima facie protection of socio-economic interests under the Convention.
Rather, it is desirable to supplement the idea of minimum levels with several
further ‘core indicators’, i.e., indicators of when – even if a case does not
concern minimum socio-economic levels – a socio-economic complaint can
be considered important enough to be reviewed under the Convention (7.4.2).
Arguably, this can be the case when a complaint concerns discrimination or
when vulnerable individuals or groups are involved. Finally, attention is given
to the way in which the (core) socio-economic interests that should prima facie
be covered by the ECHR eventually can be protected, taking into account the
‘absolute-relative’ approach to core rights protection that has been advocated
117 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, respectively.
118 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.6.
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here (7.4.3). It is argued that this can be done, for example, with the help of
procedural standards, and it is shown what role is thereby left for the margin
of appreciation.
7.4.1 A Right to Minimum Essential Levels of Socio-Economic Rights under
the ECHR
The notion of ‘absolute-relative’ core rights, which was considered to be the
most promising of the different core rights approaches for the protection of
socio-economic interests under the Convention, demands foremost that the
adjudicative process is guided by ‘case-independent’ cores. In this regard, it
can be argued that in interpreting the Convention rights, core rights to mini-
mum essential levels of economic and social rights can be considered to form
the starting point for deciding whether or not socio-economic complaints
should be dealt with under the Convention. After all, it was held that while
it is not easy to provide a definition of ‘indeterminable’ cores, at least in the
context of socio-economic protection it seems clear that the provision of mini-
mum levels of socio-economic rights should be included therein. In line with
this, although it is hard to draw a line around the prima facie socio-economic
protection of the Convention, the idea of minimum levels can pinpoint where
the legitimate role of the ECtHR in this field starts, and where it might end.
In this regard it must be kept in mind that of course socio-economic issues
such as those concerning ‘fair trial’ (Article 6) or the respect for the home
(Article 8) may naturally be covered by the Convention. Besides that, however,
the fulfilment of minimum essential levels of food, health care, housing, social
security, and education can be considered a prerequisite for the (further)
enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the ECHR. When such minimum levels
are absent, many of these rights become meaningless. For example, for the
enjoyment of private or family life, but also for using one’s freedom of speech
or right to vote, basic levels of nutrition, shelter and education are required.119
More concretely, being devoid of food or basic health care can amount to
inhuman treatment (Article 3) or have a serious impact on someone’s private
life (Article 8), while a revocation of basic social assistance (minimum means
of subsistence) may (also) be seen to concern proprietary interests protected
under Article 1 P1.
With regard to the core guarantee of ‘essential levels’ under the Convention,
it is notable, first, that this guarantee not only provides negative protection
by allowing for review of deprivations of ‘existing’ basic provisions, but also
ensures positive protection by recognising a prima facie right to be provided
with essential levels of socio-economic rights. Indeed, the right to have the
119 Cf., e.g., Sen 1987, p. 36ff.; Sen 2009, p. 253ff.; Nussbaum 2000, p. 5; Nussbaum 2011;
Fredman 2008.
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very core of one’s socio-economic rights protected is mirrored by the obligation
of states to actively engage in ensuring a subsistence minimum by making
the necessary budgetary choices and designing the required legislative frame-
work and policy measures.120 Secondly, especially where it concerns the posit-
ive component, it should be stressed that this core requirement is a minimum
requirement, which means that although states may surely provide for more
socio-economic arrangements, this can generally not be required under the
Convention. Indeed, although a higher level of provision may be considered
desirable in practical terms, given the genesis of the Convention, the wording
of the rights it contains, and the competences of the ECtHR, the recognition
of positive socio-economic guarantees is everything but self-evident and should
thus be limited. What is more, even though the inclusiveness of the minimum
to be provided may be a point of discussion,121 merely stating that ‘minimum
levels’ are required as such would already form an important recognition of
the fact that while not every social claim can be reviewed under the Conven-
tion this is different when basic needs are concerned.122 Thirdly, it may be
asked why it is suggested here that the Court should start from the idea of
minimum socio-economic rights rather than, for example, from the general
notion of ‘human dignity’. A reason for this could be that, different from
human dignity, the notion of ‘minimum essential levels of socio-economic
rights’ allows for clarifying in an explicit manner that (some) guarantees of
a socio-economic character deserve protection under the Convention. Moreover,
although human dignity is considered to be one of the basic principles under-
lying the Convention, in terms of socio-economic protection it is not an entirely
unequivocal requirement. It is difficult to establish what it actually means to
speak of a life in dignity, and it is equally difficult to establish to what extent
subjective interpretations of a dignified life should thereby be taken into
account. Some would consider that living off the state means a not so dignified
existence, and would prefer doing with very little as long as they can be self-
sufficient and remain independent. Others might however consider that a
relatively high standard in terms of food, housing and health care is needed
120 Of course, the exact means by which a subsistence minimum is guaranteed need not be
prescribed by the Court.
121 One could argue that given the comparatively high standard of socio-economic protection
throughout most European countries, the minimum level the Court could recognise is quite
high (see, on the idea of a ‘relative minimum threshold’, Bilchitz 2014a). However, it is
important to recognise that it remains imperative that the standard it sets is truly minimal.
This not because nothing ‘more’ would be possible, but because of the limited role of the
supranational Strasbourg court in determining and demanding positive socio-economic
state action under the Convention. Indeed, the much encompassing ‘minimum standard’
set by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, including for example household goods, but
also ‘the possibility to maintain inter-human relationships and a minimum of participation
in social, cultural and political life’, seems to be too demanding for an international context
like the ECtHR’s.
122 Cf. the German right to an Existenzminimum, discussed in, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.
294 Chapter 7
for living a dignified life, while caring less about whether they provide this
standard by themselves or not. Whereas dignity thus points in different
directions, this is less so for the requirement of minimum essential levels.123
After all, such a requirement directs the focus to the basics, i.e., to a minimum
standard of particular rights that individuals can build upon, and hence can
be defined more objectively.
It can be concluded from this that an exclusive focus on cases concerning
‘minimum essential levels’124 would result in a meaningful, though fairly
limited application of the ECHR in the socio-economic field. It must be asked,
therefore, whether the recognition of minimum rights does not only provide
a feasible, but also a sufficient starting point for defining the prima facie socio-
economic protection under the Convention. It will be argued next that this
is not the case, and that besides the ‘minimum essential levels’ requirement,
additional ‘indicators’ should be used for determining in what (other) circum-
stances the aims of effective and indivisible rights protection call for reviewing
a socio-economic case under the Convention.
7.4.2 Additionally: Core Indicators
When answering the scope question, i.e., when deciding whether a socio-
economic complaint is covered by the scope of the Convention, the Court
should establish whether the issue at stake concerns core socio-economic rights,
by examining if there is an interference with minimum essential levels of these
rights or if there is a lack of provision of such levels. If this question is
answered in the affirmative, there is room for review under the Convention.
However, although the minimum essential levels criterion can be said to allow
for ‘effective’ and ‘indivisible’ protection under the Convention, especially
since it also includes positive guarantees, at the same time it would bar the
review of a great number of complaints that concern rather peripheral eco-
nomic and social interests, but might nevertheless require fundamental rights
review, too. Arguably, also these cases must be included in the scope of the
Convention in a transparent, comprehensible manner that moreover fits the
subsidiary position of the Court.
123 Cf., however, Young 2008, who holds that a dignity-based core points in a different direction
than a basic needs core. Arguably, however, it can be said that whereas dignity can entail
many things, it in any case incorporates the minimum level requirements that seem to be
demanded according to a basic needs approach. See, supra, Ch. 5, S. 5.5.2.1. See also the
example of the right to an Existenzminimum, which is based on the requirement of human
dignity and indeed includes the possibility to maintain relationships and participate in
society, yet not without also referring to food, clothing, housing, etc. (supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.1).
124 Besides, indeed, the ‘traditional’, negative protection of the Convention under for example
Art. 6 or Art. 8 ECHR.
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It is submitted here that also in this regard, the notion of socio-economic
core rights provides a helpful point of departure. Especially from Chapter 5,
which discussed the ICESCR and the Committee’s recognition of minimum core
obligations in order to make more workable the monitoring of states’ compli-
ance with the Covenant, it followed that socio-economic core rights not
necessarily only concern substantive guarantees of (minimum) socio-economic
provisions, but instead also entail additional requirements. In particular, in
the various General Comments presented in Chapter 5 it has been underlined
that states, at minimum, should ensure non-discrimination in the socio-eco-
nomic field as well as focus their attention on disadvantaged and marginalised
individuals and groups. In line with this, also in Strasbourg the fact that a
complaint concerns such matters can signal that there is a ‘core issue’ at stake
that should obtain prima facie Convention protection, even if the case does not
of itself concern a minimum essential level of a socio-economic right. Discuss-
ing these ‘core indicators’ – i.e., ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘vulnerable indi-
viduals and groups’ – this will be explained in more detail in the following
subsections.
7.4.2.1 Non-Discrimination
The prohibition of discrimination forms a crucial guarantee, both in the context
of civil rights as well as in relation to social rights. In line with this, the fact
that a socio-economic complaint concerns alleged discrimination should be
reason to conclude on the applicability of the Convention. In other words,
whereas – besides a basic level thereof – broad socio-economic arrangements
cannot generally be demanded under the Convention, what always can be
requested is that the entitlements a state creates comply with the principle
of non-discrimination.
To illustrate this, it is worth recalling the practice of the CESCR. Besides
holding that the Covenant’s non-discrimination provision is an immediate
requirement,125 the Committee has highlighted with regard to the different
economic and social rights that the non-discriminatory provision thereof is
a core obligation of states. For example, the Committee has held that states
must, as a matter of priority, ‘ensure the right of access to health facilities,
goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis’,126 as well as ‘the right
of access to public educational institutions and programmes on a non-discrim-
inatory basis’.127 Accordingly, as soon as health schemes or public education
are available, at least discrimination-free access to such facilities needs to be
125 Cf. the Limburg Principles, paras. 22 and 35 (‘Article 2 (2) [non-discrimination] calls for
immediate application and involves an explicit guarantee on behalf of the States parties.
It should, therefore, be made subject to judicial review and other recourse procedures.’).
126 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(a).
127 CESCR, General Comment No. 13, para. 57.
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provided. The core requirement of non-discrimination allows for some variation
amongst states: given that they do not all have the means for providing a
similar (high) level of socio-economic arrangements, and cannot be required
to provide for certain facilities right away, it ‘adjusts’ to the possibilities in
a given country. Yet not only for this reason it is a feasible core requirement.
At least as important is that to be treated in a non-discriminatory fashion as
such is an essential right, deserving prioritised attention. It is not an ‘easy’
requirement though, because it is one of the hallmarks of social measures that
a distinction is made between different categories of persons who may receive
different levels of assistance in accordance with criteria such as need. Also
conditions related to someone’s place of residence, immigration status, or age
can be reason for granting less, or even no assistance at all, but it cannot be
said that such differentiation in treatment always amounts to discrimination.
Moreover, the non-discriminatory provision of certain entitlements could
require that they be extended to groups that would otherwise be excluded,
which means that the non-discrimination requirement may demand positive,
but also very costly action to be taken.
These objections notwithstanding, protection against discrimination pro-
vides a fitting example of what core socio-economic protection under the
Convention should entail. It seems to provide a reasonable answer to the need
for the Court to respect diversity and subsidiarity, as it remains up to the states
to (democratically) decide what kind and what exact level of socio-economic
guarantees they want to provide for. At the same time, it ensures a focus on
those cases that relate to what lies at the heart of the ECHR, namely the effort
to ban discrimination throughout the different areas of society.128 Thus, even
when they do not concern ‘minimum essential levels’, socio-economic com-
plaints that involve alleged discrimination in principle should allow for review
under the Convention.
7.4.2.2 Vulnerable Individuals and Groups
Another indicator suggesting that an essential socio-economic issue is con-
cerned that calls for Convention review is the fact that a complaint concerns
the interests of vulnerable individuals or groups. On top of the protection of
minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights for all, it can be justified
for the Court to have an extra eye for the needs of vulnerable persons. After
all, the Convention is there to protect especially the interests of those that
cannot stand up for themselves just as well as others. Vulnerable individuals
and groups are the most likely ones to lack access to basic goods and a mini-
mum standard of the various socio-economic rights, as well as the possibility
to improve their socio-economic situation on their own. Effectuating the
128 Cf. the central role of Art. 14 ECHR and the development concerning Protocol No. 12. See,
supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.2.2 and 2.6.1.
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Convention rights in conformity with the rationales of effectiveness and
indivisibility may therefore require that cases brought by these persons are
assessed by the Court and given particular concern, even when they do not
concern ‘minimum’ economic and social needs.
Again, the practice of the CESCR may serve as a source of inspiration here.
In many of its General Comments, the Committee has recognised that for
working towards full compliance and ensuring a higher level of socio-economic
protection, it is important to start with those whose situation is most in need
of improvement and/or who lack the capacity to alter their dire circumstances
singlehandedly. Already in the 1991 Comment on the right to housing, the
Committee has stated that ‘States parties must give due priority to those social
groups living in unfavourable conditions by giving them particular considera-
tion’.129 Moreover, it has held that especially for ‘disadvantaged and
marginalised individuals and groups’, access to social security systems and
schemes and health care facilities needs to be guaranteed.130 When defining
such disadvantaged and marginalised, vulnerable individuals and groups,
one could for example think of religious or ethnic minorities, i.e., of groups
whose interests do not correspond with the prevalent status quo and who
(therefore) need to be protected against majorities.131 Especially in the socio-
economic context, moreover, ‘vulnerable’ are those whose well-being, including
their enjoyment of fundamental rights, to a large extent depends on the state.
Asylum seekers lacking any means to facilitate their self-support, or severely
disabled persons that have to rely on state arrangements, can be counted
amongst those that deserve extra attention, and the same may go for children
and the elderly. Thus, core socio-economic rights protection under the Conven-
tion could include protection of the economic and social interests of vulnerable
individuals and groups. This fits the aims of effectuating the norms enshrined
in the Convention and ensuring ‘indivisible’ protection, while it also allows
for a principled focus.
7.4.3 Core Protection
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 primarily dealt with the interpretation of the Conven-
tion in relation to socio-economic complaints. It was argued that when a case
concerns basic means of subsistence or ‘minimum essential levels’ of socio-
economic rights, there is a sufficient link with the rights norms laid down in
the Convention to allow for review of interferences or omissions of the state.
129 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 10.
130 CESCR, General Comment No. 18, para 31(a), and CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para.
43(a), respectively.
131 See, for the concept of vulnerability (and the groups identified as such) in relation to the
ECtHR, Peroni and Timmer 2013.
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Moreover, since exclusively focusing on minimum levels may fail to ensure
effective and indivisible fundamental rights protection, several ‘core indicators’
were mentioned that show when additional Convention guarantees may come
into play. Just as important as the interpretation of the ECHR, however, is the
way in which the Court eventually deals with the socio-economic complaints
it holds admissible and reviews on their merits.
According to the absolute-relative core rights understanding that is taken
as the starting point here, after the Court has determined that the Convention
applies to a particular complaint, the eventual protection it provides is of a
meaningful yet ‘relative’ kind. This suggests that there is some room for
justification of interferences or for omissions to protect core rights to the fullest
degree possible. Nevertheless, the core character of the issues concerned clearly
demands such a justification to be very weighty and the Court’s review accord-
ingly may be of a strict kind. Whereas adding the notion of core rights to the
ideas of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’ resulted in a somewhat limited, or
‘narrow’ interpretation, at the stage of application it ensures that socio-eco-
nomic interests are taken seriously, also when adjudicated under the ‘classic’
ECHR.
In terms of the implications of a core rights perspective in particular for
the review stage, however, this conclusion does not suffice. After all, a main
concern expressed in Chapter 2 was that the Court’s reasoning currently is
often opaque and of a casuistic, unprincipled kind. In the light of this, it is
argued here that the notion of core rights can more concretely help to enhance
the Court’s proportionality review, even when being mindful of the impossibil-
ity of prescribing policies and deliberating on choices only a legislator seems
capable of making. In this regard, it is suggested in this final section that, next
to ensuring a more principled proportionality test, procedural requirements
may be set by the Court in order to guarantee core socio-economic aspects
of the Convention rights. The discussion of a ‘core rights perspective’ for the
ECtHR is concluded with some remarks on the margin of appreciation.
7.4.3.1 Proportionality, Procedural Requirements, and the Margin of Appreciation
When a case concerning a core socio-economic interest – be it an individual’s
minimum means of subsistence, the housing needs of a disabled person, or
unequal treatment in the provision of health care – is reviewed by the ECtHR,
how can the Court approach this task? As was set out in Chapter 3, under
most articles of the Convention, it will proceed by means of a proportionality
test. At least in theory, such a test entails an examination of whether the
interference served a legitimate aim, whether it was suitable and necessary,
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and whether it was proportional stricto sensu.132 The emphasis in conducting
this test is generally – and in particular when positive protection is
demanded133 – placed on the last aspect, namely on whether there was a
‘fair balance’ between the rights of the individual and the other interests
concerned. It has been shown that this test is often confused and blurry, as
‘balancing’ the various interests at stake is an ad hoc exercise and it is often
not clear how much weight is given to an individual right, or why one case
has a different outcome compared to another (similar) one.
In this regard, there may be value in differentiating between core and non-
core issues. This distinction can form a workable point of departure for review-
ing a case in the sense that when a core right or interest is concerned, this
offers a normative justification for according particular ‘weight’ to the position
of the individual. This holds true especially when the interference with a core
interest is a serious one, i.e., when rather than a temporary and/or limited
reduction the provision of minimum means of subsistence is stopped more
or less entirely, or when a case concerns minimum needs and unequal treat-
ment or particularly vulnerable individuals. Indeed, there may be cases in
which the protection or provision of essential guarantees is ‘evidently insuffi-
cient’.134 In any case, when there is a serious interference or when aggravating
factors are involved, there may be a presumption in favour of the individual,
which not only means that the individual’s interests are more difficult to be
‘outbalanced’, but also that the Court can opt for a stricter review of the
legitimacy of the aim pursued and the suitability and necessity of the means
chosen to realise this aim. Whereas it might be inclined to conduct these tests
only in a marginal manner when (costly) socio-economic matters are at stake,
core rights protection suggests that in cases where the socio-economic core
of rights actually is at stake, there is good reason to be stricter in this regard.
In addition, as follows from the examples presented in the previous chap-
ters, it is possible to concretise relatively abstract minimum socio-economic
rights by means of what were called ‘neutral’ requirements. A more principled
approach to the review of socio-economic interests can be considered desirable,
yet it seems inappropriate for the Court to come up with concrete policy
demands or general, quantified requirements. However, what it can do in order
to provide more content to a prima facie requirement of ‘minimum essential
levels’, is formulating procedural demands that national authorities have to
comply with in order for measures taken to be in compliance with the Conven-
tion. The issue of whether a specific measure (or the lack thereof) was dis-
proportionate then may dissolve into the question of whether the procedural
132 See, on (the different sub-tests of) the proportionality test, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.4.2. For an
extensive discussion, see Barak 2012.
133 Cf. Möller 2012, pp. 179-180.
134 Cf. the standard developed by the Bundesverfassungericht for the protection of a subsistence
minimum (supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.2.).
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safeguards available to the applicant were sufficient. Such safeguards may
include duties of consultation or (timely) information, but also the actual taking
into account in the initial decision-making or judicial procedure of (the essential
character of) the interest at stake for the individual. An example would be
the emphasis placed by the CESCR in the context of evictions on ‘appropriate
procedural protection and due process’. This entails amongst other things ‘an
opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected’, adequate and
reasonable notice, information, provision of legal remedies, and where possible
of legal aid.135 Another, slightly different example would be the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’s recognition of ‘procedural’ demands in order to be able to
determine whether the right to a subsistence minimum is complied with.136
It would be suitable also for the supranational ECtHR, that needs to respect
the prerogatives of the Member States while setting standards in regard to
the (civil and political) norms of the Convention, to first and foremost demand
procedural protection.137 Procedural review, which indeed need not be
substantively ‘empty’,138 is in line with the sensitive position of the Court
– especially in the socio-economic field – and with the idea of separation of
powers more generally.139
Altogether, ‘core rights protection’ according to the perspective outlined
here does not suggest that the Court should no longer look at the particular
circumstances of a case and rely instead on categorical reasoning only. Neither
does it imply that it should prescribe legislative requirements for guaranteeing
minimum essential levels of economic and social rights. Rather, it proposes
an individual-oriented test that rather than being characterised by an opaque
balancing of interests is guided by the core character of the socio-economic
interest at stake. For example when translated into procedural requirements,
the core importance of the issue concerned allows for concluding in a more
transparent manner on when and why a Convention right has been violated.
It can form the standard in the light of which the proportionality of an inter-
ference or omission can be judged, thereby leading to a more principled
approach.
Finally, with regard to the margin of appreciation it follows that in the
approach suggested here, the role of this doctrine is a distinctly limited one.
Since at the interpretation stage the room for Strasbourg review of socio-
economic issues is limited to cases concerning (the provision of) minimum
essential levels and those involving alleged discrimination and/or vulnerable
individuals and groups, generally granting a wide margin of appreciation does
135 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para. 15.
136 See, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2.2.
137 Gerards 2012. Cf. also Brems 2014.
138 By requiring that the individual situation of the person affected be considered in the
decision-making process, the potential social content of this requirement becomes visible.
139 Cf. Gerards 2012, p. 197.
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not seem appropriate. Instead, regardless of their politically and budgetary
sensitive socio-economic character, the core importance of the issues concerned
should obtain a prominent role in determining whether a right has been
violated. Especially when serious interferences or omissions in the provision
of minimum essential levels are concerned, the margin of appreciation left
to the state should arguably be non-existent, although in line with the example
of the right to an Existenzminimum some leeway may be granted to the state
in determining what exactly such a minimum in quantified terms entails and
how it is provided for. Also when an issue concerns discrimination or vulner-
able individuals and the provision of minimum socio-economic guarantees,
it cannot be left to the state whether or not such minima are provided for or
not. In the case of the provision of additional guarantees to vulnerable groups
and individuals, or unequal treatment in regard to such guarantees, however,
the state may be granted a margin in deciding on what is provided or on how
a distinction is made between certain groups of (potential) recipients. Thus,
whereas an approach to fundamental rights adjudication characterised by a
very broad, or vague, interpretation of rights may demand reliance on a
doctrine like the margin of appreciation in many instances, the focus on
fundamental, core rights proposed here makes this far less necessary.
7.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has, first, summarised the insights that could be gained from the
previous chapter on the various core rights doctrines. It was shown that certain
persistent perceptions of core rights generally prevent the occurrence of a fair
picture of what core rights protection can actually be about. More precisely,
cores are often thought to be absolutely guaranteed, impossible to determine
and directing efforts towards nothing more than a very minimal level of
protection. Moreover, it is often considered that the identification of cores
confers too much power on courts, allowing them to decide, in a necessarily
subjective manner, on what (socio-economic) guarantees deserve absolute
protection at the expense of others. Unsurprisingly, on the basis of these
perceptions it is often considered that core rights should not deserve a place
in legal reasoning, and that courts can better rely on other instruments for
resolving conflicts between general and individual interests. However, the
combined insights from the core rights debates outlined in Part II of this book
present a different image. In fact the concept of core rights can play a much
more nuanced role in legal reasoning than is often considered. Core rights
need not be inflexible: both their content as well as the protection they offer
can also be of a relative kind. Moreover, cores can play a role not only at the
application stage generally, but also in determining the intensity of review
and even in demarcating the scope of prima facie rights. Rather than merely
enhancing the power of courts, core rights also have the potential of structuring
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a court’s efforts at providing an appropriate answer to rights conflicts involving
a great variety of relevant factors. Focussing on the protection of minimum,
essential guarantees in fact seems crucial for living up to the promise of
(supranational) fundamental rights protection.
After presenting this broader, more nuanced image of core rights protection,
an effort was made to develop a ‘core rights perspective’ tailored to the pro-
tection of socio-economic interests by the ECtHR. In order to do so the various
lessons that could be learned from Chapters 4-6 (Part II) were combined with
what was said in Chapters 2 and 3 (Part I). In particular, attention was given
to the role and position of the Court, and the need for principled, effective,
and indivisible protection under the Convention that does not encroach on
the powers of the state to a too great extent. Against this background it was
argued that the Court’s practice is likely to benefit most from the notion of
‘absolute-relative’ core rights. Such core rights are absolute in the sense that
they are generally applicable and can guide the adjudication of a particular
case, while providing for robust, but ‘relative’ protection that allows some
room for justifications for interferences or omissions on the part of the state.
Additionally, it was considered that the ECtHR may determine the content of
core rights by making use of a combination of two approaches for doing so,
namely an ‘intrinsic approach’ that looks at what a particular rights norms
is essentially about and a consensus approach that pays attention to ‘external’
information in the form of ‘consensus’ or expert views on minimum guarantees.
Although it must be admitted that even with the help of these methods,
determining what are the essential aspects of rights that have to be complied
with first and foremost is not an easy task, it was submitted that in the socio-
economic sphere core protection aims at the very least at ‘minimum’ levels
of socio-economic provision. In this context, in other words, the direction in
which the core points seems relatively unequivocal.
In Section 7.4 then, a concrete, workable outline was presented of how
‘absolute-relative’ (minimum) cores can be incorporated in the Strasbourg
practice at the various stages of adjudication. Given the need for a principled
approach and clarity on what the Convention requires in terms of socio-eco-
nomic protection, the core rights perspective that was developed first of all
suggests that in answering the scope question the Court asks whether a case
concerns ‘minimum essential levels’ of socio-economic rights. If this is the case,
but also when a socio-economic complaint concerns alleged discrimination
and/or the socio-economic needs of vulnerable individuals, it can legitimately
be reviewed under the Convention. Indeed, these ‘core’ economic and social
rights issues explicitly deserve the prima facie protection of the ECHR as they
are intimately connected to what the Convention is about as well as can
legitimately be decided upon by the ECtHR. Having determined the prima facie
scope of the Convention in the socio-economic field, then, the core character
of the issues that are being reviewed can form the starting point for guiding
the Court’s application of the relevant Convention rights. It was proposed that
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minimum socio-economic guarantees could be concretised at the application
stage by requiring that certain ‘procedural’ requirements be met. When an
issue concerns ‘minimum essential levels’, moreover, its socio-economic
character should not stand in the way of strict review and only leaves a very
limited role for the margin of appreciation. Especially in cases that concern
non-discrimination and/or the protection of vulnerable individuals, but not
the provision of or interferences with minimum levels, some deference should
still be granted to the national authorities and the way they want to spend
the available budget. However, overall a core rights perspective for the pro-
tection of socio-economic interests under the ECHR demands meaningful review
of issues that are not trivial and deserve supranational fundamental rights
protection.
In order to see how this core rights approach would fit into and could
actually improve the Court’s current reasoning in socio-economic cases, Part
IV of this book turns to a closer examination of the Court’s dealing with
housing, health and health care, and social security issues thus far.

PART IV





In the previous part of this book a ‘core rights perspective’ has been outlined
for the protection of socio-economic interests under the ECHR. This perspective
evolved from insights on the notion of core rights protection in combination
with what was said on the role and position of the Court (Chapter 2) and the
structure of fundamental rights adjudication (Chapter 3). It presented concrete
suggestions for how the Court could deal with complaints related to economic
and social rights in a more principled manner. Yet in order to conclude that
the notion of core rights would actually have added value, it is necessary to
have a closer look at the case law as it stands today. In this part of the book
an overview is given of the Court’s practice in relation to cases concerning
housing, health and health care, and social security. The aim thereby is to see
whether the ECtHR provides ‘effective’ as well as ‘indivisible’ protection in the
respective fields, while not losing sight of its supranational role and providing
the necessary guidance by means of transparent and consistent reasoning.
Importantly, moreover, it will be seen whether the Court already makes use
of the notion of core rights, or whether there would be room for doing so.
This first case law chapter concerns the Court’s protection in the field of
housing. Housing issues come before the Court in many varieties, and concern
for example evictions or the demolition or restitution of houses. Other cases
deal with the need for adequate housing, while there are also examples con-
cerning rent levels and conflicts between landlords and tenants. On the one
hand, it is natural that the Convention is engaged in the area of housing.
Especially in the context of state interferences with an individual’s home or
house the link with the right to respect for the home (Article 8) or property
protection (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) is readily apparent. On the other hand,
the relation with the Convention is less obvious when positive claims to
housing are made. When an individual demands adequate housing meeting
his specific needs, or alternative housing when he is evicted, the social di-
mension of the Strasbourg housing case law becomes visible.
For the purposes of this chapter, especially this positive, social dimension
is important. It is asked here to what extent the ECtHR offers protection to social
housing needs, i.e., to the interests of those not owning a house or lacking the
means or possibilities for finding a (suitable or alternative) place to live. It
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is in the context of these kinds of issues that the tension between effective and
indivisible fundamental rights protection and the necessary leeway to the
budgetary and planning policies of the states is most evident. It will be
assessed how the Court handles this tension and confronts – or instead tries
to avert – the social questions presented to it. In particular, this case law
analysis aims to discover if the Court has developed a principled approach
to social housing complaints that provides the guidance Member States need
in order to deal with this issue in a way that is in compliance with the Conven-
tion. In this regard, it is not only the overtly social housing complaints that
deserve attention. In addition, it is worthwhile to highlight some more classical
housing cases, as also these may provide for insights on how a state, according
to the Court’s interpretation of the Convention, is required to deal with hous-
ing needs.
Thus, Chapter 8 aims at presenting an overview of the case law of the Court
that either directly or more indirectly involves social housing issues. Section
8.2 starts from the different Convention norms and shows the way(s) in which
these link up with the issue of housing. It illustrates the natural connection
between for example Article 8 and Article 1 P1 and (negative) housing con-
cerns, but especially also focuses on the more unexpected, social aspects of
the Court’s protection. Questions to be addressed in this section are: What
does effective protection of ‘respect for the home’ and ‘private life’ entail? To
what extent do property rights protect more than just the interests of those
who actually own a place? How can the non-discrimination provision of Article
14 ensure social protection and what has the Court said on housing rights in
relation to Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment? It will be examined whether the Court provides for a transparent
interpretation of what is and what is not (prima facie) protected, and whether
it has reviewed the different housing issues in an unambiguous manner. In
doing so it also will be analysed whether the ECtHR provides for a certain
‘minimum level’ of social protection, or whether it would be possible for it
to do so.
Subsequently, Section 8.3 zooms in on the issue of Roma housing. Cases
concerning this topic have come up regularly in Strasbourg and provide for
a fitting example of how the Court has to navigate between precarious social
realities and costly policy preferences. What is more, together the Roma
housing cases provide an interesting case study of the Court’s social role and
the development thereof, including the remaining shortcomings. This section
in particular aims to illustrate how the Court pays explicit attention to the
housing needs of vulnerable groups and does so by recognising procedural
requirements. Section 8.4 concludes with some final remarks.
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8.2 (SOCIAL) HOUSING INTERESTS AND THE ECHR
In order to illuminate the social dimension of the Court’s case law on issues
related to housing, this section addresses several developments related to the
different Convention articles relevant in this context. It shows the ways in
which the different ECHR-provisions allow for a move from more classical,
negative protection in the field of housing, to more positive and social pro-
tection. First, attention is given to Article 8 and the different aspects thereof
(8.2.1). Especially the ‘respect for the home’ limb of this provision is clearly
connected to the topic of housing. Yet whereas the Court could have insisted
on limited prima facie protection on the basis of this provision, its interpretation
of ‘home’ explicitly creates room for more indivisible Convention protection.
Moreover, also the right to respect for private and family life has proven
increasingly relevant in the (social) housing sphere. It will be illustrated that
there lies great ‘social potential’ in the Court’s recognition of positive obliga-
tions in relation to private and family life, even though thus far it has refrained
from clarifying what exactly these positive duties entail. Turning to Article 1
P1, it will be shown that this provision mainly protects the interests of those
who own a home, yet also here social housing concerns seem to be increasingly
taken into account (8.2.2). Also the protection against discrimination deserves
attention, and it will be explicated how Article 14 can bring about social effects
by demanding that housing assistance is provided in a non-discriminatory
manner (8.2.3). Finally, it is worth paying attention to the prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention
(8.2.4). Although the absolute protection offered by this provision at first glance
seems to have little to do with social housing concerns, there is interesting
case law on the link between both. In fact, it appears that Article 3 provides
a kind of minimum protection in the field of housing, although the Court
refrains from clearly indicating so.
8.2.1 Article 8 ECHR: Private and Family Life, Home and Housing
In Chapman v. the United Kingdom, in 2001, the Grand Chamber held that
‘Article 8 does not in terms recognise a right to be provided with a home. Nor does
any of the jurisprudence of the Court acknowledge such a right. While it is clearly
desirable that every human being have a place where he or she can live in dignity
and which he or she can call home, there are unfortunately in the Contracting States
310 Chapter 8
many persons who have no home. Whether the State provides funds to enable
everyone a home is a matter for political not judicial decision.’1
Indeed, according to the wording of Article 8 ECHR, this provision grants on
the individual only ‘a right to respect for his home’. To benefit from this right,
thus, it appears that one already needs to have a home. When this is the case,
protection will be granted against unjustified interferences by the state. Never-
theless, the Convention, and Article 8 in particular, protects more than just
the classical, negative aspects of individual housing interests. In this regard
it is worth illuminating, first, that the Court has interpreted ‘respect for the
home’ in a broad manner. Second, the recognition of possible positive obliga-
tions in relation to the ‘private and family life’ limb of Article 8 underlines
that the social potential of this article is everything but exhausted.
8.2.1.1 Interpreting ‘Home’ as a Question of Fact
The right to respect for the home (Article 8) would be seriously limited if the
Court would only understand as ‘home’ a legally owned house or apartment
that is permanently occupied. Instead of a narrow interpretation, however,
the Court has opted for a rather broad reading of this term. The 1986 case of
Gillow v. the United Kingdom has been important in this regard.2 The case
concerned a family that had built a house on the island of Guernsey. They
had lived there for two years until Mr Gillow in 1960 took up employment
overseas. When they wanted to return in 1978 they were notified that they
could only do so once a license had been granted under the applicable housing
law. Eventually, the Gillow family returned to Guernsey in 1979, hoping to
1 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 99. This case
will be further discussed in, infra, S. 8.3. Similar phrasing has been used in many more
(recent) cases. Cf., e.g., Codona v. the UK, 7 February 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 485/05 (where
the complaint of a Roma person who was offered bricks and mortar accommodation instead
of another site for her caravan was held inadmissible, see, infra, Sections 9.2.2 and 9.3.1
as well); Bleyova v. Slovakia, ECtHR 17 October 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 69353/01 (complaint
about the temporary character of the applicant’s legal stay in a flat held inadmissible; Makuc
a. O. v. Slovenia, ECtHR 31 May 2007 (dec.), appl. no. 26828/06, para. 171 (complaint about
not having a home held inadmissible); Velizhanina v. Ukraine, ECtHR 27 January 2009 (dec.),
appl. no. 18639/03 (complaint concerning deprivation of specially protected tenancy held
inadmissible); Yordanova a.O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, para.
130 (yet, ‘an obligation to secure shelter to particularly vulnerable individuals may flow
from Article 8 of the Convention in exceptional cases’, see further, infra, S. 8.3); Dukic v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR 19 June 2012, appl. no. 4543/09, para. 40 (complaint about
not having been allocated a replacement flat inadmissible; according to the Court, ‘[t]he
interests protected by the notion of a “home” within the meaning of Article 8 include the
peaceful enjoyment of one’s existing residence’); and Lazarenko a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 11
December 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 27427/02, para. 60 (complaint about losing right to occupy
a flat after it was not occupied for six months held inadmissible).
2 Gillow v. the UK, ECtHR 24 November 1986, appl. no. 9063/80.
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receive a long-term license, but their application was rejected. Could ‘White-
knights’, as their house was called, be considered their ‘home’ for the purposes
of Article 8 of the Convention? In answering this question, the Court stressed
that the applicants
‘had retained ownership of the house, to which they always intended to return,
and had kept their furniture in it … [I]n 1956 the applicants had sold their former
home in Lancashire and moved with their family and furniture to Guernsey …
Furthermore, the Court is satisfied that they had not established any other home
elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Although the applicants had been absent from
Guernsey for almost nineteen years, they had in the circumstances retained suffi-
cient continuing links with ‘Whiteknights’ for it to be considered their “home”,
for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention, at the time of the disputed
measures.’3
The applicants had lost their residence qualifications and due to alterations
in the legislation were now required to obtain a license. This, as well as the
refusal of the license combined with the eventual institution of criminal pro-
ceedings for unlawful occupation, the conviction of Mr Gillow and the im-
position of a fine, constituted an interference with the applicants’ right to
respect for their home.4
The Gillow reasoning makes clear that for determining the scope of the
right to respect for the home the Court takes into account different aspects
of the applicants’ situation. And although the circumstances in Gillow were
very particular, it has referred to its interpretation in this case in many of its
housing judgments.5 Noteworthy in this regard is that in Gillow, the Court
seemingly also attached weight to the legal situation by stressing that the
applicants still owned the house and had sold the one they owned before
moving to Guernsey.6 However, this legal component – which arguably
underlines the ‘classic’ character of the issue at stake in Gillow – has not turned
out to be decisive, in the sense that it has become clear that even when there
is no legal link whatsoever, the respect for the home limb of Article 8 can be
engaged.
Indeed, in the 2008 case of McCann v. the United Kingdom the Court defined
the notion of ‘home’ in explicitly factual terms.7 Mr McCann and his wife had
been joint and secure tenants until they divorced and the applicants’ ex-wife
eventually gave up the tenancy. Mr McCann had continued living in the house
although he was no longer legally entitled to do so. The Court stressed that
3 Ibid., para. 46.
4 Ibid., para. 47.
5 See, for some recent examples, Zrilic v. Croatia, ECtHR 3 October 2013, appl. no. 46726/11,
para. 57; Škrtic v. Croatia, ECtHR 5 December 2013, appl. no. 61982/12, para. 21.
6 Gillow v. the UK, ECtHR 24 November 1986, appl. no. 9063/80, para. 46.
7 McCann v. the UK, ECtHR 13 May 2008, appl. no. 19009/04, para. 46.
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‘whether a property is to be classified as a “home” is a question of fact and does
not depend on the lawfulness of the occupation under domestic law’.8 This
can also be seen in different Roma housing cases. In most of these cases the
applicants had resided on a plot of land or site for a significant period of time
– and with the intention to stay permanently – without initially establishing
their home in a legal manner. Generally, this does not prevent the conclusion
that the right to respect for the home is engaged.9
What is decisive in the end is the ‘the existence of sufficient and continuous
links with a specific place’.10 This link may be met in case of ‘temporary stays’
or ‘frequent absence’,11 or indeed in case of unlawful occupation. When a
stay is interrupted and illegal, however, it is less likely that the Court neverthe-
less accepts that the ‘sufficient and continuous link’ requirement is met.12
The question that remains is: what if one does not have a place to stay
in the first place? In a case concerning the allocation of a replacement flat in
lieu of one that had been destroyed during the war, the Court’s answer was
that ‘[t]he interests protected by the notion of a “home” within the meaning
of Article 8 include the peaceful enjoyment of one’s existing residence’.13 The
complaint was declared inadmissible ratione materiae,14 thereby showing that
there are limits to the application of Article 8. The Court apparently sticks
8 Ibid. [emphasis added]. Therefore, ‘the local-authority house which the applicant formerly
occupied as a former tenant with his wife and where he lived on his own from November
2001 continued to be his “home”, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1, despite the fact that
following service by his wife of notice to quit he had no right under domestic law to
continue in occupation’.
9 See, for the Court’s interpretation of Art. 8 in Roma housing cases, infra, S. 8.3.1.
10 Cf., for a recent example, Lazarenko a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 11 December 2012 (dec.), appl.
no. 27427/02, para. 53, referring to Propkopovich v. Russia, ECtHR 18 November 2004, appl.
no. 58255/00, para. 36.
11 The Court has held that ‘the length of temporary or permanent stays …, frequent absence
… or … use on a temporary basis, for the purposes of short-term stays or even keeping
belongings in it, do not preclude retention of sufficient continuing links with a particular
residential place, which can still be considered ‘home’ for the purposes of Article 8 of the
Convention’. See Lazarenko a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 11 December 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 27427/
02, para. 53, referring to McKay-Kopecka v. Poland, ECtHR 19 September 2006 (dec.), appl.
no. 45320/99.
12 Cf. Yordanova a.O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06 (discussed in, infra,
S. 8.3.1), where it was argued that some applicants had resided elsewhere for a while. The
Court emphasised that they had eventually returned and thus Art. 8 applied. But had they
not, or had the period of absence been significant, it is likely that the Court would have
concluded differently.
13 Dukic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, ECtHR 19 June 2012, appl. no. 4543/09, para. 40 [emphasis
added].
14 Cf. also Loizidou v. Turkey, ECtHR 18 December 1996, appl. no. 15318/89, para. 66, where
the Court held that ‘it would strain the meaning of the notion of “home” in Article 8 (art.
8) to extend it to comprise property on which it is planned to build a house for residential
purposes. Nor can that term be interpreted to cover an area of a State where one has grown
up and where the family has its roots but where one no longer lives’.
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to a predominantly negative interpretation of this Convention right, at least
where it concerns the ‘home’ aspect.15
Regardless of the provision’s limits, however, the fact that the Court looks
at a combination of the relevant factors for concluding whether something
is to be considered a ‘home’ has at least created some prima facie room for
review of social housing issues. As a result the right to respect for the home
does not only provide prima facie protection to homeowners, or those legally
residing in a house or a flat: a ‘home’ can also be the place where someone
has been living for some time and where he wants to stay, not seldom because
of a lack of alternatives.
Whether the interests of the individuals concerned obtain eventual pro-
tection depends on whether there was a ‘pressing social need’ and in particular
on the proportionality of the interference.16 In Gillow, for example, this meant
that
‘the economic well-being of Guernsey must be balanced against the applicants’
right to respect for their “home”, a right which is pertinent to their own personal
security and well-being. The importance of such a right to the individual must
be taken into account in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation
allowed to the Government.’17
Eventually, in this case the Court concluded that the decision to refuse the
applicants permanent and temporary licences to occupy ‘Whiteknights’, as
well as the conviction and the fining of Mr Gillow, constituted disproportionate
interferences with the applicants’ right to respect for their home.18
The fact that respect for the home is considered an important right relating
to someone’s ‘personal security’ and ‘well-being’, however, does not mean
that this right will (almost) always prevail. A recent example of where the
opposite conclusion was reached is the case of Berger-Krall and Others v. Slove-
nia.19 This case concerned the privatisation of social dwellings and more
particularly the Slovenian Housing Act, which had replaced specially-protected
tenancies – which had allowed for lifelong use of the flats concerned against
the payment of a fee covering maintenance costs and depreciation – with
normal lease contracts. Former holders of these tenancies could continue to
occupy their flats for a non-profit rent or buy the place against favourable
conditions. For those whose dwellings had been expropriated after the Second
World War the new system meant that they could only buy the flats when
15 Yet see, e.g., the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, ECtHR 18 December 1996, appl. no. 15318/89,
where the applicant could instead of on Art. 8 rely on Art. 1 P1.
16 E.g., Gillow v. the UK, ECtHR 24 November 1986, appl. no. 9063/80, para. 55.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., para. 58.
19 Berger-Krall a.O. v. Slovenia, ECtHR 12 June 2014, appl. no. 14717/04.
314 Chapter 8
the previous owners would agree within a year from the moment restitution
had taken place. Three of the applicants could be considered ‘victims’ of an
alleged violation with their right to respect for their homes under Article 8,
because as a result of the changes in the system they eventually had to leave
their homes involuntarily.20 Reviewing the proportionality of the interference,
however, the Court eventually concluded that their rights had not been vi-
olated. In doing so it had regard to the fact that the new rents were significant-
ly lower than free-market rents. Moreover, as to the new grounds for eviction,
as well the exclusion of the possibility to transmit the right to a lease for a
non-profit rent mortis causa, the Court held that this ‘was aimed at ensuring
a fair balance between the protection of the rights of the tenants on the one
hand and those of the “previous owners” on the other’.21
Compared to Gillow, the Article 8 issue in Berger-Krall was of a more clearly
social kind. It concerned the sensitive housing position of those who had
formerly held specially-protected tenancies, while the countervailing interests
related to the rights and needs of the persons who had previously owned the
premises concerned. Yet even though the Court’s reasoning suggests that it
is willing to take the (potential) social hardship of the applicants into
account,22 in cases like this it is likely that the balance struck by the national
authorities is left intact. However, in an effort to ensure effective protection,
also when the issue concerned is of a precarious, social kind, the Court has
held that in any case, the procedural safeguards provided to the individual(s)
concerned must be adequate.23 This also implies that
‘a person at risk of losing his or her home should in principle be able to have the
proportionality and reasonableness of the measure determined by an independent
tribunal in the light of the relevant principles under Article 8 of the Convention,
notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his or her right of occupation had come
to an end.’24
20 I.e., the first was evicted, while against the second an eviction order was issued. The third
applicant that could be considered a ‘victim’ for the purposes of Art. 8, decided to vacate
his flat after a judgment of the Supreme Court from which it followed that het was not
entitled to continue the lease contract signed by his late father and thus had no title to
occupy the premises. See, ibid., para. 256.
21 Ibid., para. 274.
22 In this regard it noted that ‘none of the applicants has shown that the level of the non-profit
rent was excessive in relation to his or her income’, suggesting that this could be a relevant
consideration. Ibid., para. 208. Moreover, it considered relevant that rent subsidies were
available for persons in financial difficulties (para. 210).
23 Cf. Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 85 (see also, infra, S.
8.3.2).
24 Berger-Krall a. O. v. Slovenia, ECtHR 12 June 2014, appl. no. 14717/04, para. 270, referring
to Cosic v. Croatia, ECtHR 15 January 2009, appl. no. 28261/06, paras. 21-23. See also, e.g.,
McCann v. the UK, ECtHR 13 May 2008, appl. no. 19009/04, para. 50.
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In the case of McCann, for example, the Court did not so much conclude that
the measure McCann was confronted with as such was disproportional. Rather,
it found a violation of the Convention because in reaching the decision to evict
him the national authorities had failed to consider his needs.
Altogether, it can be said that by means of a broad interpretation of the right
to respect for the home the Court has opted for a certain degree of indivisible
protection. At the same time, when assessing the proportionality of sensitive
housing complaints involving multiple social interests, the position of the Court
generally demands that leeway is granted to the decisions made by the national
authorities. The point that in such cases procedural requirements can be a
feasible means for ensuring that basic needs are protected is further illustrated
in Section 8.3, where the various Roma housing cases are discussed.
8.2.1.2 Private Life and Positive Obligations
Next to the right to respect for the home also the other aspects of Article 8
are relevant in the housing sphere. In this regard it is especially worth noting
that the Court has recognised that also when it comes to housing issues the
protection of ‘private and family life’ entails more than just negative obliga-
tions. Of particular importance in this regard is the case of Marzari v. Italy,
which concerned a severely disabled person’s request for adequate accommoda-
tion.25 The applicant suffered from a rare illness of metabolic myopathy, was
often forced to use a wheelchair and recognised as 100% disabled. After the
building in which he lived had been expropriated, he had moved to another
accommodation that in his view was inadequate to meet his special needs.
He stopped paying his rent, which led to an eviction order. Eventually Mr
Marzari lived in a camper for a while and was then hospitalised, but he
refused to accept another apartment that was allocated to him. Marzari com-
plained before the Court about the authorities’ failure to provide him with
adequate accommodation, notwithstanding a local law-based obligation to
do so. The Court held that
‘although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one’s housing problem
solved by the authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this respect
to an individual suffering from a severe disease might in certain circumstances raise an
issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such refusal on the private
life of the individual. The Court recalls in this respect that, while the essential object
of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public
authorities, this provision does not merely compel the State to abstain from such
25 As will become apparent in the sections to follow, Article 8’s private and family life limb
as well as Article 3 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 have provided alternative routes towards
protection under the Convention. See, e.g., Marzari v. Italy, ECtHR 4 May 1999 (dec.), appl.
no. 36448/97.
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interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obliga-
tions inherent in effective respect for private life. A State has obligations of this
type where there is a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by
an applicant and the latter’s private life.’26
Nevertheless, in the case of Marzari the Court concluded that the complaint
was inadmissible. It stressed that it is not for the Court to review the decisions
taken by the local authorities with regard to (the adequateness of) the housing
that had become available. In this regard ‘no positive obligation for the local
authorities can be inferred from Article 8 to provide the applicant with a
specific apartment’.27
It may be inferred from Marzari that while the right to respect for the home
demands that there is an existing home,28 respect for private life may demand
positive state action even if – or especially when – someone does not have
a place to live.29 For this to be the case it is required that there is a ‘direct
and immediate link’ between the latter provision and the housing measures
an applicant demands.30 However, the Court’s conclusion in Marzari that the
refusal of housing assistance to persons suffering from a severe disease may
raise an issue under Article 8 does not provide much guidance as to what this
more concretely entails. It fails to provide content to the positive obligations
that apparently follow from this article by not explaining what should at
minimum be done or guaranteed. The Court’s final conclusion that in Marzari
there is no obligation to provide the applicant with a specific apartment is
not very helpful either.31 One might cautiously infer from the Court’s decision
that instead of a specific apartment, at least some – according to the authorities
26 Ibid. [emphasis added], referring to Botta v. Italy, ECtHR 24 February 1998, appl. no. 21439/
93, paras. 33-34. Botta concerned disabled persons who, during their vacation, could not
access the sea. The Court also there made mention of possible positive obligations in this
sphere once there is a direct link with someone’s private life, but concluded that the case
was inadmissible. According to the Court, the case ‘concerns interpersonal relations of such
broad and indeterminate scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the
measures the state was urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the private
bathing establishments and the applicant’s private life’ (para. 35).
27 Marzari v. Italy, ECtHR 4 May 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 36448/97.
28 Indeed, as was noted above, ‘home’ refers to an existing home, see Dukic v. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, ECtHR 19 June 2012, appl. no. 4543/09, para. 40.
29 Even though in Marzari there existed an obligation under provincial law to offer adequate
accommodation to persons recognised as 100% disabled, the Court’s wording does not
suggest that this was material in recognising the possibility of a positive obligation. It
explicitly stated that an issue may be raised ‘under Article 8 of the Convention’, without
referring to the provincial statute. See, Marzari v. Italy, ECtHR 4 May 1999 (dec.), appl. no.
36448/97.
30 Botta v. Italy, ECtHR 24 February 1998, appl. no. 21439/93, paras. 33-34.
31 Cf. Frohwerk 2012, p. 134, who notes that the negative determination of the Court – that
the state had fulfilled its positive obligations – does not further clarify the applicable
requirements and criteria.
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appropriate – housing should be offered. Yet as the Court is not explicit, this
merely remains a matter of guessing.
Also the case of O’Rourke v. the United Kingdom signals the potential of
Article 8 for positive, indivisible protection, although the conclusion again
was that the case was inadmissible.32 After having been released from prison,
O’Rourke had applied for accommodation. Due to his health condition he had
a priority need and accommodation was offered in a hotel, until O’Rourke
was evicted after complaints had been made about his behaviour. Several other
(bed-sit and temporary) accommodations were suggested, but the applicant
refused the offers and became homeless. With regard to Article 3 ECHR, the
Court stated that the applicant’s situation had not attained the requisite level
of severity to engage this article.33 Moreover, even if this had been the case,
the applicant was ‘largely responsible for his own deterioration following his
eviction’.34 The Court repeated, however, that an issue under Article 8 might
arise when housing assistance to an individual suffering from a serious disease
is refused, because of the impact of such refusal on his private life. In this
context it was considered important that Article 8 does not lay down a right
to be provided with a home, and that therefore ‘the scope of any positive
obligation to house the homeless must be limited’.35 In O’Rourke,
‘to the extent that there was any positive obligation to accommodate the applicant
when he first contacted CLBC [the Camden London Borough Council] in early 1991,
this was discharged by the provision of temporary hotel accommodation to the
applicant pending the statutory inquiries into whether or not he was homeless,
and thus entitled to permanent accommodation.’36
Like Marzari, O’Rourke suggests that states have a (limited) duty to do at least
‘something’ in case a seriously ill person is in need of a home.37 Again, how-
ever, this must read between the lines of the decision, let alone that it becomes
clear when exactly this obligation is triggered and what it more concretely
entails.
32 O’Rourke v. the UK, ECtHR 26 June 2001 (dec.), appl. no. 39022/97.
33 See, for some examples of where the protection of Art. 3 was triggered, infra, S. 8.2.4.
34 O’Rourke v. the UK, ECtHR 26 June 2001 (dec.), appl. no. 39022/97. Homelessness as such,
it can be argued, does not reach the level of severity needed in order to trigger the applica-
tion of the prohibition of inhuman treatment.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. Cf. Frohwerk 2012, p. 132: ‘Der Fall ermöglicht mit der Anknüpfung an den individu-
ellen Gesundheitszustand des Beschwerdeführers eine Konkretisierung des Anspruchs auf
eine Wohnung: Im Vordergrund der Entscheidung steht kein “Recht auf Wohnung”, sondern
eine konventionsrechtliche Bewertung des staatlichen Verhaltens im Umgang mit der
konkreten Situation. Diese bewusst offen und unbestimmt formulierte Entscheidung
präzisiert jedoch erneut keine Anforderungen an einen konventionsrechtlich geforderten
Umgang mit sozialen Notlagen.’
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The recognition of potential positive requirements under Article 8 in the
housing sphere is not limited to situations involving persons who are suffering
from a serious disease. Further potential positive obligations might for example
be found in cases concerning restitution issues.38 Moreover, also for the pro-
tection of other vulnerable individuals and groups the doctrine of positive
obligations has proven relevant. For example, in Codona v. the UK39 the Court
stated that it ‘does not rule out that, in principle, Article 8 could impose a
positive obligation on the authorities to provide accommodation for a homeless
gypsy which is such that it facilitates their “gypsy way of life”’.40 As will
be further illustrated in Section 8.3, however, also in cases concerning Roma
it can be seen that the Court generally does not say more than that a positive
obligation might arise, to then jump to the specific circumstances of the case
in order to decide whether these do or do not amount to a breach of Article 8.
Altogether, thus, it appears that the Court does not treat the issue of
positive obligations as a matter of interpretation (or standard-setting) in the
sense that it has clarified what the Convention prima facie demands, to then
see whether an omission by the state (in the light of this standard) was jus-
tified. Instead, it determines the admissibility of a case with the help of a
relatively amorphous ‘threshold requirement’, namely the requirement of a
‘direct and immediate link’. However, it can be asked whether this require-
ment, together with a vague notion of positive obligations, can form a sufficient
starting point for reviewing the proportionality of the broad variety of cases
it potentially brings within the scope of the Convention.
8.2.2 Homeowners, Leaseholders, Landlords, and Article 1 P1 ECHR
A great bulk of the ECtHR’s case law concerning housing relates to Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 ECHR, which contains the right to protection of property.
However, in this chapter this article is given only limited attention as most
of the issues concerned involve negative protection and ‘naturally’ fall within
the scope of the Convention.41 ‘Classical’ interferences with the rights of house
owners generally fail to illustrate the type of tension this chapter – or in fact
this entire book – is about, namely the tension between the limited role of the
38 Cf. Cvijetic v. Croatia, ECtHR 26 February 2004, appl. no. 71549/04. However, this positive
obligation was of a rather different, less ‘social’ kind, as it concerned the obligation to
execute court judgments in this context. See also Buyse 2008, p. 60ff. See also Pibernik v.
Croatia, ECtHR 4 March 2004, appl. no. 75139/01.
39 Codona v. the UK, 7 February 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 485/05.
40 Ibid. (where the complaint of a Roma person who was offered bricks and mortar accom-
modation instead of another site for her caravan was held inadmissible).
41 After all, it the case of homeowners interferences with their property rights will be reviewed
qua interferences with their property rights (and not housing interests) under Art. 1 P1
of the Convention.
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Court and the need for effective and indivisible, but also principled social
protection. This notwithstanding, it is interesting to highlight a few property
rights cases that, although in a more indirect manner, leave some room for
social housing concerns. First of all, the Court in some instances has been
willing to review the cases of lessees and of formerly protected tenants, rather
than only those of house owners. Second, social interests can be said to play
a background role in determining whether a fair balance has been struck
between the rights of the individual and the general interest.
What can be considered a ‘possession’ for the purposes of Article 1 P1 of the
Convention is explained by the Court in an autonomous matter. As will be
elaborately discussed in Chapter 10, this has the important effect that also
social benefits, regardless of whether these are based on prior payments, are
covered by the scope of this article.42 In the context of housing, whereas
normally only those who own a house or flat appear to profit from the pro-
tection of article 1 P1, the broad interpretation of the Court has also created
some possibilities for those who do not own such rights. The case of Stretch
v. the United Kingdom, for example, concerned a lessee who had contracted
to lease 22 years ago and had erected a number of buildings on the land
concerned.43 When he was deprived of the benefit of a renewal option on
his lease it was not his ownership of the land, but rather the fact that he had
‘at least a legitimate expectation of exercising the option to renew’ that made
that the protection of property applied.44
A more interesting example regarding the applicability of Article 1 P1,
however, is the recent case of Berger-Krall and Others v. Slovenia, which has
also been mentioned in discussing the relevance of Article 8 of the Convention
in the housing sphere.45 In this case the applicants complained that in the
process of the privatisation of social dwellings they had been deprived of their
specially protected tenancy without receiving adequate compensation. The
question was hence whether this tenancy – allowing for lifelong use of the
flats concerned against the payment of a fee covering maintenance costs and
depreciation, and which also entailed possibilities for transferring the right
to lease inter vivos and mortis causa – could be considered a possession obtain-
ing prima facie protection under Article 1 P1. In this regard the government
stated, amongst other things, that ‘[e]ven though it might be difficult to com-
pare anachronistic concepts of socially-owned property with traditional proper-
ty in a democratic society, it was clear that the occupancy right was, mutatis
mutandis, more akin to a tenancy’.46 Nevertheless, the Court refrained from
42 Infra, Ch. 10, and especially S. 10.3.1 and 10.4.1.
43 Stretch v. the UK, ECtHR 24 June 2003, appl. no. 44277/98.
44 Ibid., para. 35.
45 Berger-Krall a.O. v. Slovenia, ECtHR 12 June 2014, appl. no. 14717/04. See, supra, S. 8.2.1.1.
46 Ibid., para. 121.
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answering the interpretation question and held that it ‘does not consider it
necessary to examine the government’s objection of incompatibility ratione
materiae since it has come to the conclusion that, even assuming Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to be applicable, the requirements of this provision were not
violated’.47 What then followed was a discussion of the interference with the
applicants’ interests, although it was not clear whether these were in fact
protected under the Convention and accordingly allowed for such review in
the first place.
The two judges who wrote a separate opinion in Berger-Krall (one con-
curring and one dissenting) consider the approach taken by the Court far from
ideal. At least, this is what can be inferred from the fact that both make a
serious effort to answer the ‘possessions question’. In brief, Judge Yudkivska
distils from previous case law the rule that a special tenancy constitutes a
property right as long as it entails a reasonably practical possibility of acquiring
an apartment.48 As such a possibility did not exist in Berger-Krall, there had
not been a reason for the Court to review the issue. On the other hand, Judge
Zupancic argued that when considering the situation as a whole, i.e., by
combining the different (factual) elements of the case at hand, the Court should
have held that Article 1 P1 applied.49 Arguably, the latter option is the more
social one, allowing the Court to take into account the severity of the appli-
cant’s loss for deciding whether a tenancy was protected qua property right
under the Convention. Judge Yudkivska’s approach, however, would be the
more principled one, in the sense that it lays down a general rule allowing
for a more transparent decision on whether or not a property right is con-
cerned. Arguably, indeed, for determining what amounts to ‘property’ – and
this may be different when the interpretation of ‘home’ or ‘private life’ is
concerned – not all considerations related to situation of the applicants seem
to be relevant. In any case, it seems important that the Court provides some
more clarity on this matter.
Next to its interpretation, it can be asked whether also the Court’s review of
cases under Article 1 P1 in any way signals protection of housing needs. When
the Court reviews an issue concerning an interference with the rights of a
landowner or homeowner, or the expropriation of a house, the question it asks
is whether a fair balance has been struck between the different interests con-
cerned. When property rights are interfered with by means of social housing
legislation that for example sets a ceiling on rent levels, the state will in prin-
47 Ibid., para. 135.
48 Ibid., concurring opinion of Judge Yudkivska.
49 Ibid., dissenting opinion of Zupancic.
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ciple be granted a wide margin of appreciation.50 Indeed, the paradoxical
effect of this is that the housing needs of those who benefit from this legislation
thereby obtain (indirect) Strasbourg protection. Sometimes, however, the Court
is willing to let the rights of landowners and homeowners prevail. This can
be the case when they only receive a very low level of rent, which can po-
tentially be said to cause financial hardship.51 Also when house owners need
their property for housing themselves and their families, but are prevented
from evicting their tenants, their needs may play an indirect role in assessing
the proportionality of the interference with Article 1 P1.52
A final example that can be given of the social housing dimension of the
right to protection of property is the case of Gladysheva v. Russia.53 This case
concerned an applicant whose title to her flat was invalidated because of fraud
in the procedures in which the flat was privatised by a third party, following
the discovery of forged documents. In discussing the proportionality of this
interference, the Court had regard to the fact that ‘the applicant has been
stripped of ownership without compensation, and that she has no prospect
of receiving replacement housing from the State’.54 Besides the errors made
by the state, this played a role in finding a violation of her right to respect
for her property. However, by discussing the social effects of the interference
in Gladysheva primarily in relation to the applicant’s complaint under Article
8,55 the Court’s reasoning in this case also confirms that that is in fact the
most appropriate place for dealing with housing needs. Altogether, thus, as
the focus logically lies on property rights review, there is little reason for
applicants concerned about their housing situation, to (only) rely on Article 1
P1 of the Convention.
50 Cf. James a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 21 February 1986, appl. no. 8793/79, para. 46. Also, the
Court held that ‘[t]he margin of appreciation is wide enough to cover legislation aimed
at securing greater social justice in the sphere of people’s homes, even where such legislation
interferes with existing contractual relations between private parties and confers no direct
benefit on the State or the community at large’ (para. 47). Cf. also Mellacher a. O. v. Austria,
ECtHR 19 December 1989, appl. nos. 10522/83, 11011/84 and 11070/84, and Nobel a. O.
v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 2 July 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 27126/11, 28084/12, 81046/12 and
81049/12.
51 See Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, ECtHR (GC) 19 July 2006, appl. no. 35014/97; Lindheim a. O.
v. Norway, ECtHR 12 June 2012, appl. nos. 13221/08 and 2139/10.
52 Cf. Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, ECtHR 21 November 1995, appl. no. 18072/91 (concerning
an applicant who had inherited property he wanted to use to house his family); Scollo v.
Italy, ECtHR 28 September 1995, appl. no. 19133/91 (In this case the applicant was jobless
and 71% disabled, and wanted to evict his tenant so that he could use his property for
himself. In this case the Court found a violation of Article 1 P1, although the reason for
this was in fact that although there had been a ‘declaration of necessity’, the authorities
had taken no action to evict the tenant.).
53 Gladysheva v. Russia, ECtHR 6 December 2011, appl. no. 7097/10.
54 Ibid., para. 80.
55 Ibid., paras. 90-97.
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8.2.3 Social Protection Through Article 14 ECHR
Besides the Court’s interpretation of ‘home’ and the (other) developments
under Articles 8 and 1 P1 there is more that illustrates the ‘socialisation’ of
the Convention in relation to housing issues. What cannot go unnoticed here
is the role of Article 14 ECHR. As was explained in Chapter 2, this article
provides for non-self-standing protection against discrimination, i.e., it can
only be invoked together with another substantive article of the Convention.56
However, it does go further than these substantive articles, in the sense that
even when a complaint does not fall within the ‘scope’ of for example the right
to respect for private life, it might still fall within its broader ‘ambit’ and
thereby trigger the applicability of Article 14. This allows for the recognition
of ‘social’ Convention requirements in the housing sphere: even when there
is no obligation under Article 8 or Article 1 P1 to provide for certain housing
arrangements, once such arrangements have been created they must be pro-
vided in a non-discriminatory fashion.57
A clear example of how this ‘socialisation’ via the non-discrimination
principle works is the 1999 Grand Chamber judgment in Larkos v. Greece.58
The issue at stake concerned a civil servant who was a tenant of the state.
When he retired, Mr Larkos’ tenancy agreement was terminated and his
eviction was ordered. He complained that he had been confronted with unjusti-
fied discrimination in the enjoyment of his right to respect for his home as
he did not obtain the protection of the Rent Control Law 1983 that ‘private’
tenants received. Although the Convention does not require such protection,
the Court held that the issue fell within the ambit of Article 8 and that there-
fore, Article 14 applied. It concluded that the applicant was in a similar situ-
ation to that of private tenants.59 His tenancy agreement resembled a normal
landlord and tenant agreement; it had not been argued that he paid less than
the market rate and the state had rented out the property in a private law
capacity.60 The agreement moreover did not mention that it was dependent
on Mr Larkos’ capacity as a civil servant or that his retirement would mean
the end of his lease. Discussing the possible justification for the difference in
treatment made, the Court noted that ‘the Government have not provided any
convincing explanation of how the general interest will be served by evicting
the applicant’.61 Regardless of the margin of appreciation in the area of the
56 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.2.2.
57 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 1051; Arnardóttir 2014.
58 Larkos v. Greece, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 1999, appl. no. 29515/95.
59 Ibid., para. 30.
60 Ibid. Cf., in contrast, J.L.S. v. Spain, ECtHR 27 April 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 41917/98.
61 Larkos v. Greece, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 1999, appl. no. 29515/95, para. 31.
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control of property, it found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 8.62
Another interesting case that illustrates the socialising potential of Article
14 is Karner v. Austria.63 In Austria, under certain conditions a ‘life companion’
was entitled to succeed the tenancy after the death of his partner. However,
the Austrian Constitutional Court had found that this possibility did not apply
in the case of same-sex partnerships, because at the time the Rent Act was
enacted, the legislator’s intention was not to include homosexuals. The third
parties intervening in this case, the non-governmental organisations ILGA-
Europe, Liberty and Stonewall, had submitted that a strong justification was
required when the ground for a distinction was sex or sexual orientation. The
Court went along with this argument and held that even when the aim could
be understood to be the protection of the family, no arguments had been
advanced that excluding homosexuals was necessary to achieve that aim.64
For complying with the Convention, thus, entitlements to succession had to
be extended to this group.
Both Larkos and Karner show that protection against discrimination on the
basis of Article 14 can be important when it comes to the fragile position of
(certain groups of) tenants. Koch has noted, however, that Larkos and Karner
also have in common that they both concern situations in which the applicants
were already living in the flats in question.65 For this reason the cases can
be seen as merely involving ‘negative’ protection.66 At the same time, it is
obvious that there is a more positive aspect involved as well because the state
is required to extend the protection offered by the relevant laws. Although
the respective legal entitlements cannot be said as such to be required under
the Convention, their provision is demanded in order for the state to comply
with the non-discrimination requirement. Moreover, on the basis of the Court’s
reasoning it can be argued that also measures of a distinctively positive kind,
e.g., (access to) social housing or housing benefits, must meet the requirement
62 Ibid., paras. 31-32. The applicant had also invoked Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 1 P1
because according to him the protection against evictions amounted to ‘possessions’. The
government argued that there was no link with the protection of property whatsoever.
The Court, finally, concluded that because of its decision concerning Art. 14 and Art. 8
there was no need to give separate consideration to this complaint.
63 Karner v. Austria, ECtHR 24 July 2003, appl. no. 40016/98.
64 Ibid., paras. 37- 41. See also Kozak v. Poland, ECtHR 2 January 2010, appl. no. 13102/02. Cf.
also Korelc v. Slovenia, ECtHR 15 December 2009, appl. no. 28456/03. In this case the
complaint of the applicant, that for discriminatory reasons he could not succeed the tenancy
as there had not been a ‘long-lasting life community’, was held manifestly ill-founded. He
was not in a homosexual relationship with his former housemate, and the application was
not dismissed on the basis of gender, but because this relation was not characterised as
a ‘long-lasting life community’.
65 Koch 2009, p. 127.
66 Ibid.
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of non-discrimination.67 This was confirmed in the case of Bah v. the United
Kingdom, about a woman who had been denied priority treatment under the
housing legislation because of her son’s conditional immigration status.68 Here
the Court held that ‘there is no right under Article 8 of the Convention to be
provided with housing’, but if a state provides benefits, ‘it must do so in a
way that is compliant with Article 14’.69 Thereby it underlined that the po-
tential of the principle of non-discrimination in terms of social protection
cannot be overlooked.70
However, in determining whether in Bah the Convention was violated,
the ECtHR took a cautious stance. It emphasised that ‘any welfare system, to
be workable, may have to use broad categorisations to distinguish between
different groups in need’,71 and that states may justifiably ‘limit the access
of certain categories of aliens to “resource-hungry” sources’, amongst which
social housing can be counted.72 The Court held that the fact that Bah was
not granted priority need because of the presence in her household of her son,
whose leave to enter the United Kingdom was granted expressly conditional
upon his having no recourse to public funds, was not arbitrary.73 Important
was also that in case Ms Bah’s risk of becoming homeless would have
materialised, the applicable legislation would have required assistance from
the local authorities.74 Finally, because her situation in fact did not seem to
have turned out worse than in case she would have been given priority need,
the Court concluded that the interference had not been disproportionate and
that Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 had not been violated.75
What the judgment in Bah shows is that regardless of the broad applicabil-
ity of Article 14, the non-discrimination principle by no means always provides
an easy route towards eventual protection under the Convention. Phrased
differently, according to the Court unequal treatment in the field of housing
frequently does not amount to discrimination prohibited under the Convention.
This has to do with the fact that housing laws will always distinguish between
different groups of persons, and often these distinctions cannot be called
arbitrary. Especially when costly social measures are concerned, moreover,
the subsidiary role of the Court makes that it is hesitant to interfere with
decisions made at the national level. This may be different when a distinction
67 Ibid., who refers to Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, no. 156/1996/775/976, that
dealt with a right to parental leave under Art. 8 ECHR.
68 Bah v. the UK, ECtHR 27 September 2011, appl. no. 56329/07.
69 Ibid., para. 40.
70 Consider moreover also the potential of Protocol No. 12, see, supra, Ch. 2, Sections 2.4.2.2
and 2.6.1.
71 Bah v. the UK, ECtHR 27 September 2011, appl. no. 56329/07, para. 49, referring to Runkee
and White v. the UK, ECtHR 10 May 2007, appl. nos. 42949/98 and 53134/99, para. 39.
72 Bah v. the UK, ECtHR 27 September 2011, appl. no. 56329/07, para. 49.
73 Ibid., para. 50.
74 Ibid., para. 51.
75 Ibid., paras. 51-52.
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is made on a ‘suspect ground’, which requires ‘very weighty reasons’ as a
justification.76 However, as Bah shows, grounds of distinction in the field of
social policy are by no means always ‘suspect’.77 Therefore, but also because
‘the provision of housing to those in need … is predominantly socio-economic
in nature’,78 a wide margin of appreciation will generally be granted, which
in turn means that a violation is often unlikely to be found.
8.2.4 Minimum Protection Under Article 3 ECHR?
Finally, before moving to a case study of Roma housing and the role of the
Convention therein, it is useful to highight the relevance of Article 3 ECHR in
relation to housing rights. At first glance, the ‘prohibition of torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment’ has little to do with a socio-economic
issue like housing. This is because, first, the term ‘treatment’ suggests that the
state should be actively engaged in order for the protection of this article to
be triggered. Second, the terms ‘torture’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’, combined
with the absolute character of Article 3 ECHR, indicate that only a very small
subset of complaints will actually be serious enough for even coming close
to being protected. As was already indicated in Chapter 2, only when a situ-
ation reaches a ‘minimum level of severity’, protection under Article 3 can
be granted.79 Nevertheless, there are several judgments that show that this
provision in some circumstances can be relevant also when housing issues
are concerned.
Firstly, Article 3 has played a role in the housing sphere where homes were
destroyed and the state could be held responsible. In Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey
a violation of this provision was found where, as part of a security operation,
the security forces had destroyed the home and property of the applicants.80
This was done in a contemptuous manner, in the presence of the applicants,
and without having sufficient regard to their safety.81 The special circum-
stances, including the age of the applicants and the fact that they had been
living in the village all their lives, played an important role in concluding that
76 Cf. Karner v. Austria, ECtHR 24 July 2003, appl. no. 40016/98.
77 However, also in Bah the applicant had held that the distinction concerned was based on
the ground of nationality. The Court instead held that the relevant ground was ‘immigration
status’, thereby allowing for a less rigid test that could lead to the conclusion that there
had not been a violation.
78 Bah v. the UK, ECtHR 27 September 2011, appl. no. 56329/07, para. 47.
79 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.3.2 (see also, infra, Ch. 9, S. 9.2.2; Ch. 10, S. 10.2.2) (see Ireland v. the UK,
ECtHR 18 January 1978, appl. no. 5310/71, para. 162).
80 Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, ECtHR 24 April 1998, appl. nos. 23184/94 and 23185/94.
81 Ibid., para. 77.
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in this instance the minimum level of severity threshold was met and that there
had hence been a breach of Article 3.82
It must be noted that he case of Selçuk and Asker can be considered a
‘classic’ rights issue, concerning an interference – or indeed ‘treatment’ – by
the state with the personal sphere of the applicants. The truly ‘social’ housing
dimension of this case is hence negligible. Interesting is, however, that is has
become clear that not only the actual destroying of houses in cases like this
can lead to a finding of a violation of Article 3. The case of Moldovan and Others
v. Romania also involved applicants whose houses and property had been
burned.83 The result of this was that for years they had no choice but
‘to live in hen-houses, pigsties, windowless cellars, or in extremely cold and deplor-
able conditions: sixteen people in one room with no heating; seven people in one
room with a mud floor; families sleeping on mud or concrete floors without
adequate clothing, heat or blankets; fifteen people in a summer kitchen with a
concrete floor … etc.’84
Importantly, while the Court in Moldovan could not review the actual destruc-
tion of the homes, because at the time this happened Romania had not yet
ratified the Convention,85 the living conditions of the applicants formed the
reason why Article 3 had been violated.86 In other words: rather than the
actual ‘interference’ (the destruction of homes), the ‘social’ results thereof
triggered the application of ‘the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment’. Albeit in a very case-specific manner, this Article 3 case thereby clearly
shows the socialising potential of the Convention.
Also in a different context the ECtHR’s case law shows that matters concerning
living conditions and housing can raise an issue under Article 3 ECHR. It was
already briefly mentioned in Chapter 2,87 and will be further elaborated in
82 Ibid., para. 78. Cf. also the cases of Bilgin v. Turkey, ECtHR 16 November 2000, appl. no.
23819/94 and Dulas v. Turkey, ECtHR 30 January 2001, appl. no. 25801/94, both of which
dealt with similar fact patters and in which the Court also concluded on violations of Art.
3. In Orhan v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 18 June 2002, appl. no. 25656/94, para. 362, the Court
however did ‘not find … distinctive elements concerning the age or health of the applicant
or the Orhans or specific conduct of the soldiers vis-à-vis either of those persons which
could lead to a conclusion that they had suffered treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention’.
83 Moldovan a.O. v. Romania, ECtHR 12 July 2005, appl. nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01.
84 Ibid., para. 69.
85 Ibid., para. 102.
86 More precisely, ‘the Court finds that the applicants’ living conditions and the racial discrim-
ination to which they have been publicly subjected by the way in which their grievances
were dealt with by the various authorities, constitute an interference with their human
dignity which, in the special circumstances of this case, amounted to “degrading treatment”
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention’. Ibid., para. 113.
87 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.1.
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Chapter 10 on social security,88 that cases like Laroshina v. Russia, Budina v.
Russia and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece highlight that when someone is de-
pendent on state support and faces ‘serious deprivation or want incompatible
with human dignity’, a responsibility for the state could arise.89 In the case
of M.S.S., the Court concluded that although there is no general obligation
to give refugees financial assistance,90 in this case the applicant refugee was
confronted with such deplorable circumstances that Article 3 had nevertheless
been breached. After having been sent back to Greece, he had spent months
in extreme poverty, while being unable to cater for his most basic needs, like
a place to stay. What can be inferred from this is that when someone lacks
the means for providing basic shelter and the authorities are unwilling to
respond to this situation, the prohibition of inhuman treatment may be vi-
olated. Phrased differently, the Convention seemingly entails some kind of
minimum socio-economic protection – at least when vulnerable, dependent
individuals are concerned.
Recently the Court has confirmed that this line of reasoning is relevant
when in particular the right to housing or to appropriate accommodation is
concerned. In the 2014 case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court held that
returning an Afghan family to Italy without individual guarantees concerning
their accommodation would be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court repeated that the Convention does not oblige the Member States
to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home,91 and that Article 3
does not entail ‘any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance
to enable to maintain a certain standard of living’.92 At the same time it placed
particular weight upon the fact that the applicant belonged to a ‘particularly
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special pro-
tection’.93 Moreover, the requirement of special protection for asylum seekers
‘is particularly important when the persons concerned are children, in view
of their specific needs and their extreme vulnerability’.94 In line with this,
88 See, infra, Ch. 10, S. 10.2.2, respectively.
89 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 253;
Budina v. Russia, ECtHR 18 June 2009 (dec.), appl. no. 45603/05 and Laroshina v. Russia,
ECtHR 23 April 2002 (dec.), appl. no. 56869/00. On M.S.S. see, e.g., Clayton 2011 and
(critically) Bossuyt 2012.
90 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para.
249.
91 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29271/12, para. 95, referring
to Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 95.
92 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29271/12, para. 95, referring
to Müslim v. Turkey, ECtHR 26 April 2005, appl. no. 53566/99, para. 85; M.S.S. v. Belgium
and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 249.
93 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29271/12, para. 97.
94 Ibid., para. 119: ‘This applies even when, as in the present case, the children seeking asylum
are accompanied by their parents’ (cf. Popov v. France, ECtHR 19 January 2012, appl. nos.
39472/07 and 39474/07, para. 91).
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‘the reception conditions for children seeking asylum must be adapted to their age,
to ensure that those conditions do not “create … for them a situation of stress and
anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences” … Otherwise the conditions
in question would attain the threshold of severity required to come within the scope
of the prohibition under Article 3 of the Convention.’95
Switzerland did not possess sufficient assurances regarding the adequacy of
the specific facility of destination, and sending the applicant family back to
Italy would hence be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The judgment in Tarakhel has not been received with much enthusiasm.
It confirms, however, that especially when vulnerable individuals and groups
are concerned, a failure to provide an absolute minimum level of social provi-
sion seems to be contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Indeed, the Court does not say
this in so many words, and it can be asked whether more clarity in this regard
could not enhance the transparency as well as the acceptability of its reasoning.
8.3 HOUSING AND ROMA: A CASE STUDY
It is well-known that Roma form a vulnerable group in need of special pro-
tection. According to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
‘[t]he Roma people are still regularly victims of intolerance, discrimination
and rejection based on deep-seated prejudices in many Council of Europe
member states’. For that reason,
‘[t]he situation of Roma with regard to education, employment, housing, health
care and political participation is far from satisfactory. The Assembly is convinced
that effective and sustainable access to education and decent housing are the first
decisive steps towards breaking the vicious circle of discrimination in which most
of the Roma are locked.’96
The lack of housing or access thereto for Roma – whether or not caused by
discrimination – has been and remains one of the critical problems concerning
this group. Because of the precarious housing situation of great numbers of
Roma, combined with the fact that their particular way of settling is integral
to their identity, this issue is intimately linked to their fundamental rights and
dignity.
This section presents a case study of the Strasbourg cases that explicitly
deal with Roma housing. The reason why particularly this subset of the Court’s
housing case law was selected for in-depth analysis, is that it brings together
various developments discussed in the previous part of this chapter, thereby
95 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, ECtHR (GC) 4 November 2014, appl. no. 29271/12, para. 119.
96 Resolution 1740 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on ‘The
situation of Roma in Europe and relevant activities of the Council of Europe’.
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allowing a good insight in the Court’s approach as well as the shortcomings
of its reasoning. As most cases relating to housing, the Roma housing cases
generally are of a more ‘negative’ or ‘classic’ kind, involving claims to avoid
or redress evictions. Most of them, however, also contain a more ‘positive’,
or ‘social’ aspect. This is the case because what underlies the negative issue
is frequently the question whether the state should provide for (suitable)
alternative housing or other solutions when it wants to evict Roma illegally
residing on a plot of land. It will become clear that the different Roma cases
concern complex social policy and planning matters. This is one of the reasons
why the Court does not always allow the applicants’ claims, even when they
live in conditions of severe distress. At the same time, it can be noted that,
more recently, the Court seems to have started to accord more weight to the
specific interests of the vulnerable group of Roma.
Below it will be asked how the Court’s ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’
approaches play out in its dealing with Roma housing issues at the different
adjudicational stages. Article 8, protecting the right to respect for the home,
private and family life, most of the time forms the starting point for a Roma
housing complaint. How does the Court, in this context, explain this right and
does it provide for a definition of any positive aspects thereof? How does it
balance the general interests at stake against the fundamental interests of the
applicants? These questions and the issues mentioned in the introduction to
this chapter, i.e., transparency, consistency, and the room for minimum core
protection, will be central to this section. First, the question regarding the
Court’s interpretation will be answered (8.3.1). Thereafter, attention is had
to the way the Court approaches the matter of proportionality, with a parti-
cular focus on the role accorded to the social interests of the Roma people
concerned (8.3.2). Finally, the role and the scope of the margin of appreciation
in Roma housing cases will be illuminated (8.3.3).
8.3.1 Article 8 ECHR and Roma Housing
For obtaining a fair picture of the interpretation of the Convention in the
context of Roma housing cases, three issues must be noted. First, in most of
the Roma housing cases land was occupied without the individuals involved
having any legal permission to do so. This triggered the question whether the
right to ‘respect for the home’ also involves respect for an ‘unlawful’ home,
or applies when a caravan is placed on land belonging to someone else. As
was already indicated in Section 8.2.1.1, whether something can be called
‘home’ depends on the factual links a person has with his place of residence,97
and the cases discussed below indeed confirm that the legality of the occupa-
97 See, infra, S. 8.2.1.
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tion is anything but decisive. Secondly, a question has been whether also the
private and family life limb of Article 8 should apply to Roma housing cases.
This is especially relevant because next to the loss of one’s home, the removal
of Roma mostly also affects their lifestyle and frequently has the effect that
long time communities are being broken down. Finally, it appears that some-
times not just the prohibition or disproval of a (future) removal is requested,
but indirectly also the provision of alternative housing, i.e., of housing suited
to the customs and traditions of Roma. To what extent does a right to respect
for one’s home or private and family life include positive aspects concerning
the provision of ‘suitable’ Roma housing? And importantly, to what extent
is the Court clear about this at the interpretation stage, when it discusses the
prima facie content of these rights?
The first Roma housing case the Court had to deal with was the 1996 case
of Buckley v. the United Kingdom.98 This case concerned the complaint of an
applicant who was not given a planning permission and as a result was not
allowed to stay in the caravan she had stationed on a piece of land she owned.
Instead, Mrs Buckley was requested to apply for a spot at the official site
designated for Roma nearby, a site she claimed was unsuitable for a single
woman with children because of the crime and violence occurring there. The
applicant had submitted that ‘there was nothing in the wording of Article 8
or in the case law of the Court or Commission to suggest that the concept of
“home” was limited to residences which had been lawfully established’.
The Court referred to the case of Gillow v. the United Kingdom discussed
in Section 8.2.1.1. In this case it had held that the right to respect for the home
was involved, even though the applicants had not lived in their house on
Guernsey for quite a while. Important was that they had returned to live there
with a view to taking up permanent residence.99 Contrary to that of the
Gillow family, in Buckley the applicant’s home had not initially been established
legally. Regardless of this fact, however, the Court held that similar factual
considerations were relevant. As Mrs Buckley had lived on her land almost
continuously since 1988 and was not planning to move elsewhere, the right
to respect for her home was involved.100
This line of reasoning was confirmed four years later in Chapman v. the
United Kingdom. This case was one in a series of five that concerned complaints
of Roma who had bought a piece of land in a district without a Roma site,
98 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92.
99 Ibid., para. 54, referring to Gillow v. the UK, ECtHR 24 November 1986, appl. no. 9063/80,
para. 46: ‘[T]he applicants had established the property in question as their home, had
retained ownership of it intending to return there, had lived in it with a view to taking
up permanent residence, had relinquished their other home and had not established any
other in the United Kingdom. That property was therefore considered their “home” for
the purposes of Article 8.’
100 Ibid., para. 54.
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with the aim of settling there.101 Chapman was refused a planning permission
and was advised to apply for a pitch for her caravan at an official site outside
the district. In line with the Buckley judgment, the Court held that also here
the right to respect for the home applied.
In fact, it seems that after Buckley, the only Roma housing case reviewed
by the Court in which the applicability of the right to respect for the home
was slightly less clear-cut, was the 2012 case of Yordanova and Others v. Bul-
garia.102 The reason for this was that four of the applicants had had their
registered addresses elsewhere for unspecified limited periods. The government
moreover argued that some of the applicants had aimed at obtaining municipal
flats, suggesting that they were not planning to stay. However, since the Roma
who had temporarily moved out had returned, and because there had not been
any evidence adduced with regard to the government’s assertion that the
applicants had tried to obtain municipal housing, the Court sidestepped these
points. It concluded that because of the factual links the applicants’ houses
in the Batalova Vodenitsa neighbourhood could be considered their ‘homes’
for the purposes of Article 8.103
In Chapman, the Court for the first time also discussed the right to respect for
private and family life in relation to Roma housing issues.104 In this case it
stressed that ‘the applicant’s occupation of her caravan is an integral part of
her ethnic identity as a Gypsy, reflecting the long tradition of that minority
of following a travelling lifestyle’.105 Therefore,
101 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95. The other four cases
are Beard v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 24882/94; Coster v. the UK,
ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 24876/94; Lee v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January
2001, appl. no. 25289/94 and Jane Smith v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2001, appl. no.
25154/94.
102 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06. Cf. however the
admissibility decision of the Court in Codona v. the UK, 7 February 2006 (dec.), appl. no.
485/05.
103 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, paras. 102-103. The
fact that they – like the applicants in Buckley and Chapman – were not residing on land they
at least owned themselves, was not considered material in this regard. See also Buckland
v. the UK, ECtHR 18 September 2012, appl. no. 40060/08 (where the applicant had been
legally residing on a caravan site, and the Court held that even though she intended to
move anyway, the eviction order interfered with her right to respect for the home, since
she wished to have the option to stay).
104 Already in Buckley, however, the applicant, together with the Commission, had argued
that ‘since the traditional Gypsy lifestyle involved living in caravans and travelling, [her]
“private life” and “family life” were also concerned’. See Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29
September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 53. The Court however did not find it necessary
to go into this matter.
105 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC)18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 73. According
to the Court ‘[t]his is the case even though, under the pressure of development and diverse
policies or by their own choice, many Gypsies no longer live a wholly nomadic existence
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‘[m]easures affecting the applicant’s stationing of her caravans … have an impact
going beyond the right to respect for her home. They also affect her ability to
maintain her identity as a Gypsy and to lead her private and family life in accord-
ance with that tradition. The court finds, therefore, that the applicant’s right to
respect for her private life, family life and home is in issue in the present case.’106
Moreover, in Yordanova and Others, the Court held that
‘[h]aving regard to the fact that the case concerns the expulsion of the applicants
as part of a community of several hundred persons and that this measure could
have repercussions on the applicants’ lifestyle and social and family ties, it may
be considered that the interference would affect not only their “homes”, but also
their “private and family life”.’107
What can be inferred from this is that next to their particular lifestyle, also
the community ties of Roma can add to the conclusion that in case of removal
their private and family life would be affected.
In the 2013 case of Winterstein and Others v. France, the Court confirmed its
earlier findings with regard to the applicability of the Convention.108 The
case concerned 25 French nationals living as travellers in the municipality of
Herblay. After having lived there for many years the municipality had brought
an action against them, ordering them to remove all their vehicles and caravans
as well as any buildings from the site they unlawfully occupied. The judgment
granting the order had not been enforced thus far, and meanwhile studies
had been conducted with an eye to determining the situations of the persons
concerned and assessing the options for alternative accommodation. However,
no solutions had been found for the families who had requested alternative
accommodation on family sites, rather than social housing. In this case, the
Court straightforwardly held that the various aspects of Article 8 were
engaged.109
What is notable about the Court’s reasoning in Winterstein is its explicit
discussion of whether or not there had been an interference with the applicants’
rights. Whereas the government argued that this was not the case because of
the limited effects (thus far) of the removal order, the Court had regard to
fact that the eviction that was ordered concerned a community of nearly a
hundred people, ‘avec des répercussions inévitables sur leur mode de vie et
and increasingly settle for long periods in one place in order to facilitate, for example, the
education of their children’ (para. 73).
106 Ibid., paras. 73-74.
107 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, para. 105.
108 Winterstein a. O. v. France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07.
109 Ibid., paras. 141-142.
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leurs liens sociaux et familiaux’.110 This was reason to hold that there had
already been an interference with their rights. Yet what it also shows is that
the complaint – even though there was clearly a positive aspect to it as well –
was merely labelled as one concerning negative duties. The same goes for
Buckley, Chapman and Yordanova, where the Court also paid express attention
to the question of ‘whether there was an “interference” by a public author-
ity’.111 Because all of these cases involved the issue of eviction, it was not
necessary for the Court to take any firm stance on whether Article 8 involves
a prima facie right to adequate (alternative) housing for Roma as well.
This was different in the case of Codona v. the United Kingdom, which
concerned the applicant’s request for another site for her caravan instead of
the bricks and mortar accommodation that was being offered.112 Here the
Court found it ‘far from obvious that Article 8 is engaged’. In its decision it
stated that there might be a positive obligation to provide for accommodation
to homeless Roma that ‘facilitates their “gypsy way of life”’, but that such an
obligation ‘could only arise where the authorities had such accommodation
at their disposal and were making a choice between offering such accommoda-
tion or accommodation which was not “suitable” for the cultural needs of a
gypsy’.113 However, this was not so much an interpretive statement, but
rather something the Court remarked in relation to the particular circumstances
of the case and in order to conclude that because ‘there is no appearance of
a violation’ the case was manifestly ill-founded. By mixing up the two stages
and giving only one overall case-specific outcome, the Court failed to clarify
whether in general, there are any prima facie positive rights related to Roma
housing.114 Arguably, its explication of the positive (minimum) guarantees
that may fall within the scope of the Convention would result in a more
transparent starting point for determining whether a case is admissible or
whether an omission complained about is justified.115
Altogether, in its case law concerning Roma housing, the Court can be seen
to have developed a consistent approach to the applicability of Article 8.
Regardless of the illegality of a Roma settlement, and because of the Roma
identity and lifestyle, it is clear that in case of (planned) eviction or removal
the right to respect for the home and respect for private and family life are
engaged. Thereby room is created for ‘indivisible’ review of the social housing
concerns of Roma. At the same time, the Court has not dealt with the question
110 Ibid., para. 143.
111 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, paras. 56-60; Chapman
v. the UK, ECtHR (GC)18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, paras. 75-78 ; Yordanova a. O.
v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, paras. 102-106.
112 Codona v. the UK, 7 February 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 485/05.
113 Ibid.
114 See, on the importance of a ‘bifurcated’ approach, supra, Ch. 3, S. 3.2.1 and 3.3.3.
115 See also, supra, S. 8.2.2.
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of whether the different cases are also considered to fall within the scope of
Article 8 because of the positive requirements this provision brings along.
However, notwithstanding the Court’s ‘negative’ interpretation, the positive
aspects of the different complaints have clearly played a role at the application
stage.
8.3.2 Positive Obligations: Proportionality Review Demanded
The review of Roma housing issues under Article 8 ECHR takes place in a fairly
ad hoc, case-specific fashion. That is, the Court tends to pay attention to the
specific facts of the case at hand for deciding whether or not this provision
had been violated. Still, the more general insights that can be distilled from
the case law show some relevant trends.
The most interesting thread running through the Court’s Roma housing
judgments is the attention it pays to the procedural safeguards that have been
available to the applicant(s). In the earlier Roma housing cases these procedural
safeguards merely played a role in reviewing whether the ‘negative’ inter-
ference at stake was proportional. Seemingly influenced by the Court’s growing
recognition of the vulnerable position of Roma and the fact that this might
imply positive measures, however, the procedural test has been given a ‘posit-
ive twist’. In particular, procedural requirements have been linked to the issue
of whether the state was required to provide for alternative, suitable housing,
and have been concretised in such a way as to almost guarantee specific
substantive outcomes. Thus, in discussing the review of the various Roma
housing cases that were introduced in the previous section, particular attention
is given to how this development concerning procedural protection in combina-
tion with positive obligations has come about. In doing so it is analysed
whether and how this has added to the principledness of the Court’s review.
An emphasis on procedural aspects was already visible in the first Roma
housing case, Buckley v. the United Kingdom.116 After holding that the refusal
of a permit that would allow the applicant to reside on her own land was in
accordance with law and served a legitimate aim,117 the Court asked whether
116 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92.
117 Ibid., paras. 61-63. Especially the former requirement has proven easy to satisfy in all cases
presented here. This has to do with the simple fact that the refusal of a permit as well as
removal orders generally find a sufficient basis in domestic law. Also the legitimate aim
requirement is generally not hard to meet. However, in the case of Yordanova a.O. v. Bulgaria,
ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, the Court dealt more extensively with this issue.
The applicants had submitted that ordered removal of the inhabitants of Batalova Vodenitsa
was meant to benefit a private entrepreneur who wanted to develop the area, as well as
‘to satisfy racist demands to free the area of an unwanted Roma settlement’ (para. 109).
In the end, the Court underlined the fact ‘that there is a legitimate public interest in taking
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the interference had been ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In the case of
planning schemes that involve the state’s discretionary judgment ‘in the
implementation of policies adopted in the interest of the community’, the ECtHR
held that it cannot substitute the national authorities’ view as to what would
be the best planning policy or individual measures for its own.118 However,
‘[w]henever discretion capable of interfering with the enjoyment of a Convention
right such as the one in issue in the present case is conferred on national authorities,
the procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially material
in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory
framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. Indeed it is settled case-law
that, whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, the decision-
making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to
afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8.’119
The ECtHR held that in the case of Buckley, the procedural guarantees had been
sufficient and this was reason to conclude that the interference was justified.
It had been clear that the site the applicant and her children were requested
to move to was not as satisfactory as the dwelling she had illegally established,
yet according to the Court ‘Article 8 does not necessarily go so far as to allow
individuals’ preferences as to their place of residence to override the general
interest’.120 Moreover, ‘[a]lthough facts were adduced arguing in favour of
another outcome at national level’, the Court considered that the reasons given
by the national authorities ‘were relevant and sufficient … to justify the re-
sultant interference with the exercise by the applicant of her right to respect
for the home’.121
What the Court’s reasoning makes clear is that the requirement of pro-
cedural safeguards in Buckley merely served as an expression of a decidedly
measures to cope with hazards such as those that may stem from an unlawful settlement
of makeshift houses lacking sewage and sanitary facilities’ (para. 114).
118 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 75, referring to
(among other cases) Klass a. O. v. Germany, ECtHR 6 September 1978, appl. no. 5029/71,
para. 49.
119 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 76. Cf. also, on the
importance of procedural safeguards in housing review under the Convention , supra, S.
8.2.1.1. Cf. Resolution 1740 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
consideration 17: ‘As regards housing, the Assembly urges member states to … 5. take
urgent measures to prevent further forced evictions of Roma camps and settlements and
– in cases of unavoidable evictions – ensure that such evictions are carried out only when
all procedural protections required under international human rights law are in place,
including the provision of adequate alternative housing, adequate compensation for ex-
propriation and losses of moveable possessions damaged in the process of eviction; in the
absence of such procedural protections, member states should introduce legislation on
evictions, providing safeguards and remedies in accordance with international standards.’
120 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 81.
121 Ibid., para. 84.
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deferential test. Since the procedural safeguards – including ‘relevant and
sufficient’ reason-giving – were sufficient, the Court could more or less avoid
the substantive issue of whether it was actually proportional to refuse the
permit, or not.
Attached to the Buckley judgment were some quite strong dissenting
opinions.122 On the basis thereof, but also because meanwhile a number of
international materials had been adopted or entered into force underlining
the vulnerable position Roma and the need for addressing their situation in
an adequate manner,123 one could have expected the Court to take a stricter
stance in the next Roma case. In Chapman and Others v. the United Kingdom,124
the Court indeed made mention of the various international developments,
and held that it was appropriate to have regard to changing conditions in the
Member States.125 At the same time, it was still
‘not persuaded that the consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive any
guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable
in any particular situation. The framework convention [Council of Europe Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities], for example, sets out
general principles and goals but the signatory States were unable to agree on means
of implementation. This reinforces the Court’s view that the complexity and sensitiv-
ity of the issues involved in policies balancing the interests of the general popula-
tion, in particular with regard to environmental protection, and the interests of
a minority with possibly conflicting requirements renders the Court’s role a strictly
supervisory one.’126
The Court explicitly mentioned that, because of their vulnerable position,
special consideration needs to be given to the needs of Roma as well as to
their lifestyle and that ‘there is thus a positive obligation imposed on the
122 Dissenting Judge Repik noted that the Court’s assessment in Buckley was quite formal,
stressing procedural guarantees rather than the right at issue and its importance as well
as the possible consequences for the applicant. He considered that in order to have fulfilled
its supervisory role, the Court should have considered the proportionality of the issue.
Dissenter Pettiti, on the other hand, argues that the Court did in fact take a material stance,
by stating that the authority’s grounds were relevant. He stresses the ‘vicious circle’ persons
like Buckley are caught in, because of an accumulation of all kinds of administrative rules
that make it impossible to make suitable arrangements for Roma accommodation.
123 See the ‘relevant international texts’, in para. 55ff.
124 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95.
125 In the intervention by the European Roma Rights Centre, attention was drawn to a recent
OSCE-report: ‘They submitted that there had emerged a growing consensus amongst
international organisations about the need to take specific measures to address the position
of Roma, inter alia, concerning accommodation and general living conditions. Articles 8
and 14 should therefore be interpreted in the light of the clear international consensus about
the plight of Roma and the need for urgent action’ (ibid., par. 89). See also para. 93.
126 Ibid., para. 94.
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Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 to facilitate the Gypsy way of life’.127
At the same time, also in this case the Court merely paid lip service to the
interests of the individuals concerned. It considered that the refusal of per-
mitting Roma to occupy land, while there were not enough places available
on authorised sites, could not in itself constitute a violation of Article 8. What
also was considered relevant was that the home of the applicants had been
established in an unlawful manner.128 Further, the Court held that it was
in principle for the national authorities to decide whether the alternative
available to the applicants could be considered suitable.129 Now that the
applicant had not adduced any evidence regarding what would be suitable
for her, the Court could not hold that the government’s suggestion to move
to another district where there might be places available was not a feasible
one.130 It concluded that
‘[t]he humanitarian considerations which might have supported another outcome
at national level cannot be used as the basis for a finding by the Court which would
be tantamount to exempting the applicant form the implementation of the national
planning laws and obliging governments to ensure that every Gypsy family has
available for its use accommodation appropriate to its needs.’131
Indeed, this conclusion underlines that rather than looking at the needs of
the individuals concerned, the Court relied on very broad reasoning and
phrased the general interest in such weighty terms that it would seem to be
impossible to be outbalanced by countervailing (individual) considerations.132
Arguably, it thereby failed to recognise that somewhat more minimal require-
ments could have been demanded as well.133
In fact, it was already clear at the outset of the judgment that the case of
Chapman would not be decided differently from Buckley. One of the first
remarks the Grand Chamber made on the merits of the case was namely that
‘while it is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is
in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that
it should not depart without good reason, from precedents laid down in
previous cases’.134 Like in Buckley, in showing a significant degree of defer-
127 Ibid., para. 96.
128 Ibid., para. 102.
129 Ibid., para. 104.
130 Ibid., para. 112.
131 Ibid., para. 115.
132 Given that there were not enough sites available, the Court was unwilling to require states
to make available an ‘adequate number of sufficiently equipped sites’, because it was not
convinced that Article 8 implies ‘such a far-reaching positive obligation of general social
policy’ (ibid., para. 98). It thereby seemed to consider that finding a violation in this case
would confer on all states the obligation to provide all Roma with adequate housing.
133 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 86.
134 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 70.
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ence the Court in Chapman partly relied on the fact that the regulatory frame-
work contained adequate procedural safeguards.135 Also here, thus, the
requirement of procedural protection merely served as an additional ground
to avoid the social housing matter concerned.
In contrast to Buckley and Chapman, in 2004 the Court in Connors v. the United
Kingdom concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion.136 However, this case differs from Buckley and Chapman in some im-
portant respects. First, the case concerned the withdrawal of a licence of Roma
people for reasons of alleged misbehaviour. There had thus been lawful resid-
ence and what was at hand was the ‘classical’ interference as such, without
there being any underlying issue concerning the state’s responsibility for the
provision of (alternative) housing. Secondly, in this case the Court found that
the applicable procedural guarantees did not suffice. This was the case because
for reasons of flexibility in the management of Roma sites, the eviction of the
Connors family could be enforced without any proof of a breach of license.137
Noticing that ‘this case is not concerned with matters of general planning or
economic policy but with the much narrower issue of the policy of procedural
protection for a particular category of persons’,138 the Court could find a
violation of the Convention without having to move even slightly into the
direction of recognising more ‘social’ housing obligations.
In line with this, in Connors the Court explicitly narrowed the margin of
appreciation, stressing that ‘[w]here general social and economic policy con-
siderations have arisen in the context of Article 8 itself, the scope of the margin
of appreciation depends on the context of the case, with particular significance
attaching to the extent of the intrusion into the personal sphere of the
applicant’.139 If one looks at the facts of this case as well as to those of Buckley
and Chapman, however, the interests of the respective applicants do not seem
all that much different, though in the latter cases there was no room for
narrowing the leeway granted to the state.140 Arguably, therefore, it was in
fact merely due to the distinctly negative character of the claim in Connors,
rather than the individual interest at stake, that the Court was willing to
overcome its normally very deferential attitude and provide for ‘indivisible’
fundamental rights protection. It seemed more willing to find in favour of
135 Ibid., para. 114.
136 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04.
137 Cf. also Buckland v. the UK, ECtHR 18 September 2012, appl. no. 40060/08, where a violation
was found because the applicant had been unable to challenge the making of a possession
order based on her personal circumstances.
138 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 86.
139 Ibid., para. 82.
140 See, on this point, Koch 2009, p. 124.
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Connors because the implications of doing so were likely to be less far-reaching
than when a violation would have been found in Buckley or in Chapman.141
Some years after Connors, a next step in the direction of more positive (pro-
cedural) protection for Roma housing interests was taken in the judgment in
Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria.142 Again this case at first glance merely
concerned a negative interference in the form of the planned removal of
unlawfully residing Roma. Yet it seems from this judgment that the Court here
eventually fully appreciated the vulnerable position of Roma, and was willing
to ensure effective protection in the field of housing regardless of the demand-
ing obligations that might evolve from this. Like in the earlier Roma housing
cases the Court found that the impugned removal order concerning Yordanova
and other inhabitants of the Batalova Vodenista neighbourhood had a valid
legal basis. The question it had to answer was nevertheless whether the applic-
able domestic legal framework and the procedures available complied with
the Convention.143
While reviewing the proportionality of the interference with the applicants’
rights, the Court repeated that the margin of appreciation varies according
to the nature of the convention right and its importance for the individual,
as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions. It held that ‘in
this respect’ the following relevant considerations could be noted:144 1) in
spheres involving the application of social or economic policies the margin
is wide, as is the case in the planning context; but 2) the margin might be
narrower whenever what is at stake for the applicant ‘is crucial to the indi-
vidual’s effective enjoyment of key rights’. Further, 3) procedural safeguards
are ‘especially material’, so that 4) any person at risk of losing his home, which
the Court considers the most extreme form of interference with one’s right
to respect for the home,
‘should in principle be able to have the proportionality and reasonableness of the
measure determined by an independent tribunal in the light of the relevant prin-
ciples under Article 8, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, he has no right
of occupation … This means, among other things, that where relevant arguments
concerning the proportionality of the interference have been raised by the applicant
141 Indeed, obliging a state to ensure sensible procedural protection against arbitrary removal
has less (budgetary) consequences than (indirectly) recognising the obligation to offer
alternative, suitable accommodation for Roma and making sure that they do not end up
in a deplorable situation.
142 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06.
143 Ibid., paras. 107-108.
144 Ibid., para. 118.
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in domestic legal proceedings, the domestic courts should examine them in detail
and provide adequate reasons.’145
And finally, 5)
‘[w]here the national authorities, in their decisions ordering and upholding the
applicant’s eviction, have not given any explanation or put forward any arguments
demonstrating that the applicant’s eviction was necessary, the Court may draw
the inference that the State’s legitimate interest in being able to control its property
should come second to the applicant’s right to respect for his home.’146
On the basis of these general principles, the Court concluded that the prospect-
ive removal of the applicants was not justified under Article 8. Relevant was
the fact that they had been tolerated for several decades and that no alternative
solutions had been sought for the risks associated with the applicants’ housing
lacking basic sanitary and building requirements. The authorities had not
considered the risk of the applicants’ becoming homeless, even though they
had signed an agreement containing an undertaking to secure alternative
shelter.147 Moreover, they had refused to consider approaches especially
tailored to the needs of Roma, arguing that this would amount to discrimina-
tion against the majority population.148
In the end, thus, the reason for finding a violation was not so much that
the Court itself concluded that the measure was disproportional. Instead, it
considered decisive that the proportionality of this measure had not at all been
reviewed at the national level.149 At first glance, this conclusion seems to
fit in well with the procedural approach taken in the earlier Roma housing
cases, in the sense that it helped the Court to avoid the actual, sensitive matter
concerned. Yet given the substantive hints concerning what the required
145 Ibid. See, for this proportionality requirement in earlier cases, e.g., McCann v. the UK, ECtHR
13 May 2008, appl. no. 19009/04, para. 50; Kay and Others v. the UK, ECtHR 21 September
2010, appl. no. 37341/06, para. 68: ‘[T]he loss of one’s home is the most extreme form of
interference with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference
of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure
determined by an independent tribunal in light of the relevant principles under Article
8 of the Convention, notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right to occupation
has come to an end’. Also in Buckland v. the UK, ECtHR 18 September 2012, appl. no. 40060/
08, the proportionality requirement was underlined. There, the applicant had no possibility
to challenge the making of a possession order on the basis of personal circumstances.
146 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, para. 118.
147 Ibid., para. 126.
148 Ibid., para. 128.
149 See ibid., para. 144, where the ECtHR held that the enforcement of the removal order would
violate Article 8, as this order ‘was based on legislation which did not require the examina-
tion of proportionality and was issued and reviewed under a decision-making procedure
which not only did not offer safeguards against disproportionate interference but also
involved a failure to consider the question of “necessity in a democratic society”’.
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proportionality review should be about – the interests of and risks for the
individuals at stake, possible (tailor-made) alternatives, etc. – the Court’s
approach can be understood as procedural review ‘taken to another level’.
Focusing on the fact that too little, if any, attention had been given to the
individual interests at stake, as well as for example to the length of the period
the applicants had lived undisturbed in Batalova Vodenitsa,150 the require-
ment of proportionality review in fact becomes a requirement that is procedural
in nature yet also has a clearly substantive dimension. Hence, it can be derived
from the judgment the even while the complaint is presented as one concerning
a negative interference, the procedural obligation imposed is anything but
purely negative, and indeed quite social in kind.
Arguably, by phrasing its test in procedural terms, the Court was able to
ensure transparent review that leaves the decision-making to the national
authorities while guaranteeing effective social protection. What can be inferred
from the judgment is that ‘if forcibly removed persons do not have a self-
standing right to be re-housed, they nevertheless have the right to have the
state consider their risk of becoming homeless as well as their possibilities to
be re-housed, potentially with the state’s support’.151 Seen in this way, the
‘procedural breach’ found in Yordanova and Others can be viewed as a concrete
step towards actual indivisible protection of the interests of Roma under Ar-
ticle 8.
The 2013 judgment in the Roma case of Winterstein and Others v. France con-
firms this development.152 Also in this case the ECtHR highlighted certain
concrete procedural shortcomings and on the basis thereof it found a breach
of the Convention. What makes this judgment especially interesting, however,
is the conclusion that there had been another, separate violation of Article 8
in respect of the applicants who had not been provided with alternative
accommodation. Winterstein and Others concerned the proceedings brought
against a number of traveller families who had been living on the same spot
for many years. In 2005, the domestic courts had issued orders for the families’
150 Ibid., para. 122.The Court in this context found that ‘the underprivileged status of the
applicants’ group must be a weighty factor in considering approaches to dealing with their
unlawful settlement and, if their removal is necessary, in deciding on its timing, modalities
and, if possible, arrangements for alternative shelter. This has not been done in the present
case.’ (para. 33). This conclusion could not be altered by what the measures taken after
2005-2006, when the removal order was reviewed by the domestic courts. These could not
make up for the authorities’ failure to address the proportionality of the interference in
the first place. See also para. 144, where it was stated that the enforcement of the removal
order would violate Art. 8 because it ‘was based on legislation which did not require the
examination of proportionality and was issued and reviewed under a decision-making
procedure which not only did not offer safeguards against disproportionate interference
but also involved a failure to consider the question of “necessity in a democratic society”’.
151 Remiche 2012, p. 798.
152 Winterstein a. O. v. France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07.
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eviction, on pain of penalty for non-compliance, because of the lack of the
necessary permits and the resulting breach of the land-use plan. The orders
were upheld by the Court of Appeal, but had not been enforced. Instead, a
study was conducted in order to assess the situations of the individuals
involved. For those who wished to be provided with alternative accommoda-
tion on family sites, no solution had been found and these families continued
living in precarious conditions.
The Court held that the interference with the applicants’ rights under
Article 8 had been in accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim,
namely the protection of ‘des “droits d’autrui” par le biais de la défense de
l’environnement’.153 Like in Yordanova and Others, the Court under the head-
ing ‘Rappel des principes’ summed up the considerations relevant for deter-
mining the margin of appreciation and reviewing the case at hand. The lists
are very similar in both judgments, although the Court in Winterstein and Others
provided further clarification as to the specific Roma interests a proportionality
test at the national level should take into account.154 In the words of the
Court:
‘ε) Pour apprécier la proportionnalité d’une mesure d’expulsion, il y a lieu de tenir
compte en particulier des considérations suivantes: si le domicile a été établi
légalement, cela amoindrit la légitimité de toute mesure d’expulsion et à l’inverse,
s’il a été établi illégalement, la personne concernée est dans une position moins
forte; par ailleurs si aucun hébergement de rechange n’est disponible, l’ingérence
est plus grave que si un tel hébergement est disponible, son caractère adapté ou
pas s’appréciant au regard, d’une part, des besoins particuliers de l’individu et,
d’autre part, du droit de la communauté à voir protéger l’environnement …;
ζ) Enfin, la vulnérabilité des Roms et gens du voyage, du fait qu’ils constituent
une minorité, implique d’accorder une attention spéciale à leurs besoins et à leur
mode de vie propre tant dans le cadre réglementaire valable en matière d’aménage-
ment que lors de la prise de décision dans des cas particuliers … ; dans cette
mesure, l’article 8 impose donc aux États contractants l’obligation positive de
permettre aux Roms et gens du voyage de suivre leur mode de vie.’155
Moving to the facts of the case, the Court referred to Yordanova and Others
and underlined that arguments made by the parties concerning Articles 3 and 8
of the Convention had not been considered at the national level. Moreover,
the authorities had failed to provide any argument for why the removal would
be ‘necessary’.156 This was sufficient for the Court to find a first violation
of the Convention, but it did not stop here. With the help of explicit references
153 Ibid., para. 146.
154 Ibid., para. 148.
155 Ibid., para. 148.
156 Ibid., para. 157.
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to Council of Europe and other materials, the Court underlined once more
the vulnerable position of Roma and the positive obligations of the state in
this regard.157 More precisely, the vulnerable position of Roma needed to
be taken into account ‘non seulement lorsqu’elles envisagent des solutions
à l’occupation illégale des lieux, mais encore, si l’expulsion est nécessaire,
lorsqu’elles décident de sa date, de ses modalités et, si possible, d’offres de
relogement’.158 This had not been properly done by the national authorities.
After the situations of the families involved had been assessed in the study
conducted by the municipal authorities, some of them – in line with their
wishes – had obtained social housing. With regard to these individuals, the
Court held that a sufficient solution had been found.159 However, those who
had wanted to obtain alternative accommodation on family sites still found
themselves in very difficult circumstances, since either they had stayed, con-
tinuously facing the enforcement of the order under penalty, or they had left
but without finding any adequate alternative. Therefore, next to the fact that
the lack of review of the proportionality of the order of itself already consti-
tuted a breach of the Convention, Article 8 had also been violated because
in the context of the provision of alternative accommodation, the needs of the
applicants had not been sufficiently taken into account.160
The Winterstein and Others judgment thus suggests that even if the national
authorities have reviewed whether the interference (the (planned) removal)
was proportional and have thereby taken the special interests of Roma into
account, i.e., even if the procedural requirements formulated in earlier judg-
ments have been met, the Court can still conclude that their efforts in regard
of the provision of alternative accommodation were insufficient. Indeed, the
only thing that still seems lacking is the Court’s explicit recognition of a general
positive obligation for states to provide vulnerable Roma with (suitable)
alternative accommodation, at least when they would otherwise become
homeless or would have to live in very severe conditions. After all, it was
concluded that especially at the interpretation stage the Court still views the
Roma housing cases as primarily ‘negative’, and that any concrete positive
implications of Article 8 remain unnoticed. It has become clear that throughout
the years the Court has come closer to recognising the protection of vulnerable
groups against homelessness as an essential element of protection in the field
of housing. Nonetheless, for its approach to become a truly principled one,
it would be helpful for it to turn this into a transparent (minimum) standard
on the basis of which it can then conduct its case-specific (procedural) review.
157 Ibid., paras. 159-160.
158 Ibid., para. 160.
159 Ibid., para. 161.
160 Ibid., para. 167.
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Finally, a few remarks can be made on the issue of discrimination in Roma
housing cases. In all of the Roma cases just presented, the applicants also
explicitly relied on the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 ECHR). Especial-
ly given that discrimination is one of the most precarious issues when Roma
are concerned,161 it might come as a surprise that in none of these a violation
of the non-discrimination principle was found. The Court seems remarkably
hesitant to address this matter, stating in relatively brief terms that the dis-
crimination complaint was not substantiated, or that it is no longer necessary
to deal with the issue. In Buckley v. the United Kingdom, for example, the Court
held that
‘[i]t does not appear that the applicant was at any time penalised or subjected to
any detrimental treatment for attempting to follow a traditional Gypsy lifestyle.
In fact, it appears that the relevant national policy was aimed at enabling Gypsies
to cater for their own needs.’162
In Chapman v. the United Kingdom, it was considered that because the inter-
ference under Article 8 was proportionate, there was no reason to conclude
on a violation of Article 14.163 Similarly, where there was a violation of Article
8, the Court stated that ‘no separate issue’ arose with regard to non-discrimina-
tion.164
In regard to these considerations it can be concluded that, if anything, the
Court does not treat the requirement of non-discrimination as a ‘core issue’
in relation to Roma housing issues that is worth attention for reasons of its
own. Although it can be argued that sometimes the Court implicitly takes into
account equal treatment concerns in discussing the complaint under Article 8
– by stressing, in fact, that extra attention must be had to the needs of Roma –,
Article 14 hardly plays a role in these cases. Of course, it is difficult for the
Court to engage in review of often implicit or indirect unequal treatment or
discrimination. Yet stating that it is ‘no separate issue’, while finding a viola-
tion foremost on the basis of procedural shortcomings, fails to explicitly
address what the applicants probably consider is an essential aspect of their
complaints.
161 In the introduction to this section, reference was already made to a Resolution by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Resolution 1740 (2010)) that mentions
‘the vicious circle of discrimination in which most of the Roma are locked’.
162 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 88.
163 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 129: ‘Having
regard to its findings above under Article 8 of the Convention that any interference with
the applicant’s rights was proportionate to the legitimate aim of preservation of the environ-
ment, the Court concludes that there has been no discrimination contrary to Article 14 of
the Convention.’
164 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 97; Yordanova a. O. v.
Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, para. 149; Winterstein a. O. v. France,
ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07, para. 179.
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8.3.3 Narrowing the Wide Margin in Cases Concerning Planning
The Court’s use of the margin of appreciation in Roma housing cases has
already been touched upon a few times in the previous subsection. Neverthe-
less, it is worth highlighting that the cases discussed above signal a slight move
away from a wide margin of appreciation in cases concerning social and
economic policy, to one that can be narrower, or is at least determined while
explicitly having regard to the personal needs and interests of the applicants.
Originally, in Buckley v. the United Kingdom and Chapman v. the United Kingdom
the Court accorded a wide margin of appreciation to the state. In line with
other judgments dealing with socio-economic and planning matters, it there
held that ‘[in] so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local
factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the
national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation’.165
Although it also mentioned that the importance of the right at stake for the
applicant and her family had to be taken into account, it concluded that the
decision not to let the applicant reside on her own land did not exceed this
wide margin. In Chapman v. the United Kingdom the Grand Chamber similarly
held that in determining whether there has been a ‘manifest error of appreci-
ation’, the procedural safeguards available to the individual will be ‘especially
material’.166 ‘In principle’, however, the applicable margin was a wide
one.167 This approach was criticised by the dissenters in the case. These noted
that ‘a wide margin of appreciation in the choice and implementation of
planning policies … cannot apply automatically to any case which involves
the planning sphere’.168
As was discussed in the previous section, the judgment in Connors v. the
United Kingdom signalled a greater emphasis on what is at stake for the indi-
vidual. The Court’s reference in this case to the ‘generally wide’ margin in
planning cases seemed somewhat reluctant: It held that ‘in spheres involving
the application of social or economic policies, there is authority that the margin
of appreciation is wide’, yet it seemed unwilling to attach much weight to
165 Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 29 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92, para. 75.
166 Chapman v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 18 January 2001, appl. no. 27238/95, para. 92: ‘In these
circumstances, the procedural safeguards available to the individual will be especially
material in determining whether the respondent State has, when fixing the regulatory
framework, remained within its margin of appreciation. In particular, the court must
examine whether the decision-making process leading to measures of interference was fair
and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8.’
167 Ibid., para. 92.
168 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion of Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Tulkens, Strážnická,
Lorenzen, Fischbach and Casadevall, para. 3. They referred to the fact that the Convention
always needs to be interpreted and applied in the light of the current circumstances, and
to the emerging consensus regarding the special needs of minorities and the obligations
to protect them.
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this authority.169 Instead, it considered that ‘[t]he margin will tend to be
narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoy-
ment of intimate key rights’.170 Moreover, distinguishing the case at hand
from issues concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, it stated that
‘[w]here general social and economic policy considerations have arisen in the
context of Article 8 itself, the scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the
context of the case, with particular significance attaching to the extent of the
intrusion into the personal sphere of the applicant.’171
Thus, in the context of Article 8, ‘which concerns rights of central importance
to the individual’s identity, self-determination, physical and moral integrity,
maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and secure place in
the community’, the Court seemed willing to overcome a ‘generally wide
margin’ and foreground the interests of the applicant.172
However, in line with what was said before, it can be argued that the Court
in Connors opted for a stricter form of review mainly also because of the classic
character of the interference concerned. That is, it was willing to narrow the
margin having regard to the individual interest concerned, because this interest
was explicitly ‘negative’. At least, this might explain why it did not narrow
the margin in the earlier cases of Buckley and Chapman, even though all of the
applicants in fact faced similar risks.
In Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria and Winterstein and Others v. France, the
Court eventually seemed to fully acknowledge that the automatic application
of a wide margin of appreciation whenever a case concerns socio-economic
policy does not live up to the promise of effective protection under the Conven-
tion. Even though (the potential implications of) Yordanova and Winterstein
could be considered more positive in nature (than was the case in Connors),
this was no reason for determining the margin solely on the basis of the social
policy field concerned. Although the official starting point remained the wide
margin applicable to issues concerning socio-economic policy, the Court
repeated here that the margin can be narrowed when ‘intimate key rights’
are at stake or in other words ‘que le droit en cause est important pour garantir
169 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 82.
170 Ibid., referring to Dudgeon v. the UK, ECtHR 10 October 1981, appl. no. 7525/76, para. 82
and Gillow v. the UK, ECtHR 24 November 1986, appl. no. 9063/80, para. 55. The Court,
however, does not go into the matter of what are ‘intimate or key rights’, and whether
or not these were at stake in the present case.
171 Connors v. the UK, ECtHR 27 May 2004, appl. no. 66746/04, para. 82. Referring to Hatton
v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97, paras. 103 and 123.
172 Cf., infra, Ch. 10, Sections 10.3.3 and 10.4.3.
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à l’individu la jouissance effective des droits fondamentaux ou d’ordre “intime”
qui lui sont reconnus’.173
Nevertheless, the Court’s ‘indivisible’ use of the margin of appreciation
in Yordanova and Winterstein can be criticised for not being very lucid. Next
to the individual interests concerned – and the key importance thereof – the
Court in these cases holds that also the availability of procedural safeguards
and the question whether or not there had been a proportionality analysis at
the national level are relevant as factors determining the applicable margin.174
On the basis of the discussion in Section 8.3.2, however, it can be asked
whether these procedural demands were in fact not more than mere indicators
of the strictness of the test. For the clarity of the Court’s review this is a
relevant issue. Considered to be one of the factors that determine the margin,
the availability of procedural safeguards is not likely to be decisive in the
substantive review of proportionality. On the other hand, in the two judgments,
the question of whether the national authorities conducted a proportionality
test seemed to be a crucial element in the Court’s review of the reasonableness
of the national measures. The question is hence whether the issue of national
proportionality review indeed functions as a self-standing, and moreover
essential requirement not only relevant to the leeway the state should be
granted, but decisive for the outcome of the case. And if this is indeed the
case, what role is then left for the margin of appreciation? Especially now that
the Court has moved towards a more proactive and positive rights-oriented
approach to Roma housing issues, it is important that this issue be resolved.
8.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, multiple examples have been given of the Court’s protection
in the field of housing. Special emphasis was thereby placed on positive and/or
‘social’ housing issues, i.e., on the way in which the Court deals with the
interests of those not owning a house or lacking the means or possibilities for
finding a (suitable or alternative) place to live. It is in cases concerning these
issues that the tension that underlies this research, namely that between
providing effective and indivisible protection while showing deference to the
Member States and providing the necessary guidance, becomes most visible.
Discussing the various examples, the question was asked whether the Court
in cases concerning housing ‘strikes a fair balance’ between these different
demands.
Section 8.2 started from the different Convention rights that are relevant
in the housing sphere. It was shown that whereas some of these provide for
173 Yordanova a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 24 April 2012, appl. no. 25446/06, para. 118, and Winter-
stein a. O. v. France, ECtHR 17 October 2013, appl. no. 27013/07, para. 148, respectively.
174 Ibid.
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a ‘natural’ connection with this topic, due to the Court’s interpretation of
several provisions room has been created for more indivisible protection in
this field. The right to respect for the home, for example, has been explained
in a broad manner. It is sufficient when there are ‘sufficient and continuing
links’ with a specific place, and a ‘home’ can therefore also be a flat or plot
of land where someone illegally resides. In determining whether the right to
respect for the home is breached, however, the Court generally grants a wide
margin of appreciation, and is hesitant to interfere in the socio-economic and
planning policies decided upon at the national level. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant that individuals who are confronted with an interference with their
home and risk becoming homeless, are provided with adequate procedural
safeguards.
The analysis made of the respect for private and family life limb of Article 8
is relevant for purposes of this chapter mainly because it disclosed the Court’s
recognition of positive obligations in the housing sphere. At the same time,
the analysis revealed that although it regularly holds that such obligations
might exist, the Court refrains from clarifying when exactly these apply and
what they entail. That is, it deals with positive obligations in a very case-
specific fashion, and it can be asked whether its reasoning thereby provides
sufficient guidance.
Besides Article 8 also Articles 1 P1, Article 14, and Article 3 of the Conven-
tion have been shown to be (indirectly) relevant in relation to housing needs.
Article 1 P1, first, seems to allow some room for social considerations both
when it comes to the interpretation and the application of this article. However,
housing needs at most play a subordinate, indirect role, and it can be said
that Article 1 P1 is hence not the place for developing indivisible housing
protection. Article 14 provides for protection against discrimination. It was
shown that when states provide for housing assistance or other social
measures, they must do so in a non-discriminatory fashion. This does not mean
that differential treatment is not allowed for. Indeed, particularly in the social
policy sphere distinctions must be made, and it is therefore not likely that the
Court will often find a breach of the Convention in this regard. Article 3, then,
at first glance may appear to have little to do with housing. Nevertheless, in
several cases the Court has clarified that individual housing situations can
be reason for finding that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment
has been violated. Arguably, this article protects a kind of ‘minimum pro-
tection’ in this field, yet thus far the Court has failed to indicate that this is
indeed the reason for why sometimes protection is granted.
Section 8.3 concerned a case study of the Strasbourg protection offered
in cases concerning Roma housing. This topic was selected because it allows
for obtaining an interesting image of the development of the Court’s role in
relation to housing matters. The cases discussed have made clear that over
the years the Court has started to provide more indivisible protection in this
field. This appears from the fact that it by now clearly indicates that the wide
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margin in cases concerning planning can be narrowed in case ‘key’ individual
interests are concerned. Moreover, although it hardly says anything on the
positive dimension of Article 8 in cases concerning Roma at the interpretation
stage, in its review the Court pays particular attention to whether the applic-
ants’ needs were duly considered at the national level, also in regard to the
provision of alternative accommodation suitable to the needs of Roma. Phras-
ing this in terms of procedural protection, it can be said that the Court has
found a middle way that allows for providing positive, indivisible protection,
while not directly substantively interfering with the decisions made at the
national level. What could potentially still improve the Court’s approach to
housing issues concerning Roma and other vulnerable individuals and groups,
would be to distil from the various judgments some general, minimum rights
and duties, that could then serve as clear standards both in interpreting and
applying the Convention.

9 Health and Health Care
9.1 INTRODUCTION
A right to health is not contained in the Convention. Nevertheless, a vast
number of health and health care-related decisions and judgments can be found
in the ECtHR’s case law. This can be explained by the fact that there are close
links between health issues and some of the provisions enumerated in the
ECHR, such as Article 2 ECHR (the right to life) or Article 8 (the right to respect
for private and family life). One can think of highly debated themes like
abortion and euthanasia, matters like self-determination as well as the issue
of informed consent as having close links with these ECHR provisions while
also being related to health. Moreover, there is of course the plain fact that
serious deterioration of a person’s health can result in death, while health care
(including adequate food and environmental conditions) is also intimately
related to the enjoyment of one’s private life and the prevention of ‘inhuman’
circumstances (Article 3 ECHR).
These examples show that health rights issues can be very diverse.1 Before
exploring the case law of the Court, therefore, it is useful to lay out some
distinctions and clarify what kind of health cases are of primary concern here.
On the one hand, health issues bring up more ‘classic’ fundamental rights
questions. At stake is then for example to what extent a person can decide
freely whether or not he is given the treatment that medical experts hold to
be ‘best for him’. What do personal autonomy and the right to self-determina-
tion demand in terms of health care and regulations? These aspects concern
the individual sphere of the persons involved and directly involve certain
provisions featuring in the Convention, in particular the guarantees enumerated
in Article 8 (private and family life). They are ‘negative’ to the extent that they
require non-interference, rather than the provision of health care or a healthy
environment.
On the other hand, health-related complaints can also pertain to more
‘social’ fundamental rights themes. They not seldom involve claims to treat-
ment, (expensive) medication, etc. Applicants may complain about the lack
of certain medical arrangements and measures they consider themselves
1 See, generally, on health and human rights (addressing a broad variety of fundamental
health topics), Toebes et al. 2012.
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entitled to as a human being or because of their particular state of health. Such
health claims are primarily ‘positive’ ones as they demand active engagement
by the state through the creation of often costly health programmes and
entitlements. Indeed, since it is with regard to these issues that it can be asked
whether they should be protected under the ‘civil and political’ ECHR – or
rather exclusively in the sphere of economic and social fundamental rights –,
these more positive health claims are central to this chapter.2
In what follows, it will be asked to what extent the Convention covers cases
concerning the provision of health care, as well as medication and environ-
mental health issues. In particular, it will be examined if the ECtHR in its case
law clarifies when and why a case deserves prima facie protection by the
Convention. In other words: has it provided for a clear interpretation of what
the various Convention provisions in relation to health issues entail? Moreover,
the question will be addressed whether the Court’s application of these rights
norms is of a very ad hoc kind, or whether it also lays down some general
principles on the basis of which states can know what their health care-related
duties under the Convention are. Is its protection of health interests ‘effective’
and ‘indivisible’, while at the same time leaving the necessary room for de-
cision-making at the national level? It is investigated what the shortcomings
are of the Court’s reasoning in health-related cases, and where room for
improvement can be found.
The cases presented in this chapter have been selected mainly for their
relevance in relation to these particular issues. Moreover, a choice has been
made for presenting them through a discussion of certain sub-themes that fall
within the broader category of health and health care issues under the ECHR.3
In Section 9.2, first, the relation between the Articles 2, 3, and 8 ECHR and
(positive) health claims is outlined. This section shows that many complaints
concerning health or health care can be linked to the Convention, and more-
over that there is a certain overlap between the possibilities of – as well as
limits to – the protection under the different articles. Section 9.3 then discusses
the protection granted to ‘dependent’ and ‘vulnerable’ individuals. It will be
shown that especially these categories of persons can make a successful claim
for health arrangements on the basis of the ECHR. Finally, in Section 9.4,
‘environmental health’ issues will be discussed. This category of cases concerns
2 However, what is concerned here is not just cases that explicitly concern positive obligations.
Sometimes, the discontinuation of care may be concerned (see for an example, infra, S. 9.2.3),
while in other cases the question may be whether the state was justified to ‘pollute’ (or
allow for the pollution of) the applicants’ living environment (infra, S. 9.4).
3 On its website the Court presents seven Factsheets under the header ‘Health’, namely
‘Detention and mental health’; ‘Environment’; ‘Euthanasia and assisted suicide’; ‘Health’;
‘Mental Health’; ‘Persons with disabilities and the ECHR’; and ‘Prisoners Health Related
Rights’. See www.echr.coe.int (under ‘Factsheets’).
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environmental nuisances that have an impact on someone’s health.4 In this
section special attention is given to the ‘thresholds’ the Court has set for
granting protection against pollution, and what these imply for the health
guarantees that (implicitly) follow from the Convention.
9.2 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE AND THE ECHR
Next to in cases that involve distinctly ‘negative’ claims, it can be said that
also when complaints regarding the provision of health care or medication
are concerned there is frequently an obvious link with the Convention. This
has to do with the ‘indivisibility’ of civil and political and economic and social
rights. As was explained in Chapter 2, the ‘indivisiblity, interdependence and
interrelatedness’ of fundamental rights has the effect that a distinction between
the two categories of rights (norms) cannot always be made, neither in theory
nor in practice.5 In particular, with regard to health, it can be said that a
deteriorating state of health, or a lack of medication or treatment, can become
an issue of life and death and may therefore become relevant in the context
of Article 2 ECHR. Moreover, bad health conditions or inadequate (possibilities
for) treatment can have a negative impact on someone’s private life (Article 8
ECHR). Somewhat less obviously, a serious failure of the state to protect some-
one’s health even can be considered to amount to ‘inhuman treatment’ (Article
3 ECHR). However, it must be noted in this regard that the fact that there clearly
is a connection with the provisions of the ECHR does not automatically imply
that there is ample reason for the Court to review and protect positive health
claims. After all, the connection remains a complicated one, because the word-
ing of the Convention does generally not call for entitlements to health (care)
and the ‘polycentricity’ and in particular the costs of the issues involved may
form a good reason for the Court not to interfere. In outlining the possibilities
for protection under Articles 2, 3, and 8 ECHR (Sections 9.2.1, 9.2.2, and 9.2.3,
respectively), therefore, it is the aim of this section to see whether the Court
draws any clear lines as to the application of the Convention, i.e., whether
it provides for effective and indivisible, but also transparent protection.
9.2.1 Health and the Right to Life (Article 2 ECHR)
A well-known example of a case concerning the right to life in a health-related
matter is the case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey.6 This case dealt with individuals
4 As will be seen below, however, it is not always possible to isolate the health aspects from
cases concerning environmental pollution (infra, S. 9.4).
5 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.3.
6 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99.
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living in an area surrounding a rubbish tip. The government had allowed the
rubbish tip to operate in breach of certain environmental and health regula-
tions. It was aware of the risks present when in 1993 a methane explosion took
place and caused the death of thirty-nine people. In Öneryildiz the Grand
Chamber of the Court found a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2,
because the Turkish criminal justice system could not be said to have ‘secured
the full accountability of State officials or authorities for their role … and the
effective implementation of provisions of domestic law guaranteeing respect
for the right to life, in particular the deterrent function of the criminal law’.7
Moreover, although the risks of an explosion had been known to the author-
ities, they had nevertheless ignored planning regulations and had failed to
provide information and take effective measures in order to prevent an
accident from occurring. The Court therefore found that also the substantive
aspect of the right to life had been breached, which shows that in some circum-
stances the state can be required to actively protect the health of individuals.8
Next to this kind of tragic ‘environmental health’ issues,9 there are also
other types of health-related issues that have (successfully) been linked to
Article 2 of the Convention. In fact, in concluding on a violation in the case
of Öneryildiz, the Grand Chamber referred to what it had held six years earlier
in L.C.B. v. the UK.10 The issue at stake in this case concerned the applicant’s
father’s exposure to radiation during nuclear tests on Christmas Island in 1957
and 1958. The question in this regard was whether there had been an obligation
to inform the applicant’s parents or monitor her health as her leukemia was
most likely caused by this event. In L.C.B. the Court held that ‘the first sentence
of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the state not only to refrain from the intentional and
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives
of those within its jurisdiction’.11 In the end it found no violation, but that
there is at least the possibility of finding a breach of the right to life in health
care-related issues was confirmed not much later in Powell v. the United King-
dom.12 This case concerned a boy who had died allegedly because his disease
had not been timely diagnosed. The case was declared inadmissible, but the
Court emphasised that it ‘cannot be excluded that the acts and omissions of
the authorities in the field of health care policy may in certain circumstances
engage their responsibility under the positive limb of Article 2’.13
7 Ibid., para. 117.
8 Ibid., paras. 109-110.
9 See, further on this topic, infra, S. 9.4. And see, for another ‘environmental’ case that has
been dealt with under Art. 2, Budayeva a. O. v. Russia, ECtHR 20 March 2008, appl. nos.
15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 (concerning a natural disaster).
10 L.C.B. v. the UK, ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/198/1001.
11 Ibid., para. 36.
12 Powell v. the UK, ECtHR 4 May 2000 (dec.), appl. no. 45305/99.
13 Ibid.
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The positive obligations that apply in regard to medical negligence have
been further concretised in Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy.14 In this case the Court
held that the duty to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those
within its jurisdiction
‘require[s] States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or
private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives.
They also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the
cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the
public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible be made
accountable.’15
Just like when ‘dangerous activities’ are carried out, besides arranging for an
effective judicial response, the state is hence required to ensure the regulation
– via inter alia governing the licensing, operation, or monitoring – of health
care.
The 2013 case of Mehmet Senturk and Bekir Senturk v. Turkey illustrates how
disrespecting these requirements can lead to a ‘double’ violation of Article
2, not only concerning the lack of a sound investigation conducted afterwards,
but also regarding the inadequate care that was provided.16 The case con-
cerned a pregnant woman who died after a series of misjudgments and a
refusal of the hospital authorities to provide her with appropriate emergency
treatment because she was not able to pay for such treatment on the spot. The
Court found a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 because the
conviction of the responsible persons had been barred by the statute of limita-
tions, as well as due to the length of the proceedings and a failure to prosecute
the doctor.17 Moreover, in answering the question ‘si les autorités nationales
ont fait ce que l’on pouvait raisonnablement attendre d’elles et en particulier
si elles ont satisfait, de manière générale, à leur obligation de protéger l’inté-
14 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, ECtHR (GC) 17 January 2002, appl. no. 32967/96.
15 Ibid., para. 49. See also, e.g., Erikson v. Italy, ECtHR 26 October 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 37900/
97; Nitecki v. Poland, 21 March 2002, appl. no. 65653/01, para. 1. This obligation not only
extends to doctors but also to other staff, in so far as their acts may also put the life of
patients at risk. See Dodov v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 17 January 2008, appl. no. 59548/00. However,
as the Court held in Powell v. the UK, ECtHR 4 May 2000 (dec.), appl. no. 45305/99, ‘where
a Contracting State has made adequate provision for securing high professional standards
among health professionals and the protection of the lives of patients, it cannot accept that
matters such as error of judgment on the part of a health professional or negligent co-
ordination among health professionals in the treatment of a particular patient are sufficient
of themselves to call a Contracting State to account from the standpoint of its positive
obligations under Article 2 of the Convention to protect life’.
16 Mehmet Senturk and Bekir Senturk v. Turkey, ECtHR 9 April 2013, appl. no. 23423/09.
17 See for other ‘procedural’ violations of Art. 2 concerning medical malpractice, e.g., Šilih
v. Slovenia, ECtHR (GC) 9 April 2009, appl. no. 71463/01; G.N. a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 1
December 2009, appl. no. 43134/05; Eugenia Lazar v. Romania, ECtHR 16 February 2010,
appl. no. 32146/05; Oyal v. Turkey, ECtHR 23 March 2010, appl. no. 4864/05.
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grité physique de la patiente, notamment par l’administration de soins médi-
caux appropriés,’18 it concluded that also the substantive aspect of this article
had been breached.19
In other contexts than that of medical negligence, it is less clear what exactly
the positive protection of Article 2 in relation to health care entails. In 2002
the Grand Chamber decided on the case of Cyprus v. Turkey, concerning
complex questions on the situation in northern Cyprus after Turkey’s military
operations had started there in 1974.20 One of these questions involved the
provision of health care that had been available at the time. The applicant state
pointed out the restrictions on the ability of enclaved Greek Cypriots and
Maronites in northern Cyprus to receive medical treatment, and argued that
this amounted to a violation of the right to life. In response to this complaint,
the Grand Chamber held that ‘an issue may arise under Article 2 of the Con-
vention where it is shown that the authorities of a Contracting State put an
individual at risk through the denial of health care which they have undertaken
to make available to the population generally’.21 However, in the specific
circumstances of the case at hand it had not become clear that health care was
actively withheld, nor were the lives of the individuals concerned put in
danger on account of any delay in the obtaining of medical services that might
have occurred.
Moreover, with regard to the available level of health care generally, the
Court did not consider it necessary in this case to examine ‘the extent to which
Article 2 may impose an obligation on a Contracting State to make available
a certain standard of health care’.22 With Harris et al., it can be argued that
‘[i]t is reasonable to infer from the word “extent” that the Court accepts that
18 Mehmet Senturk and Bekir Senturk v. Turkey, ECtHR 9 April 2013, appl. no. 23423/09, para.
89.
19 For an example of where no violation of Art. 2 was found, see the recent case of Gray v.
Germany, ECtHR 22 May 2014, appl. no. 49278/09. This case concerned the death of a patient
in the UK as a result of medical malpractice by a German doctor. The Court held in
particular that the German trial court had sufficient evidence available to it for the doctor’s
conviction without having held a hearing. The applicant had also complained under the
substantive aspect of Art. 2, against the UK, yet this complaint was held manifestly ill-
founded because they had settled their claims for damages for a sum of compensation (Gray
v. Germany and the UK, ECtHR 18 December 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 49278/09).
20 Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 10 March 2001, appl. no. 25781/94.
21 Ibid., para. 219 (referring to L.C.B. v. the UK, ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/198/1001,
para. 36, and the fact that ‘Article 2 § 1 of the Convention enjoins the State not only to
refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps
to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’).
22 Ibid., para. 219 [emphasis added]. It concerned that in as far as there were restrictions, these
mainly had to do with the limited freedom of movement of the persons concerned. Issues
relating to health care it would more generally take along in reviewing the complaint under
Art. 8 (para. 299).
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such a general obligation exists to some undefined degree’.23 This, indeed,
implies a significant extension of the relevance of the right to life in issues
of health.24 However, the Court’s wording fails to clarify what this obligation
more concretely entails, and it may also be asked how it relates to the obliga-
tion to not put an individual at risk through the denial of health care which
has been made available to the population generally. The latter seems to be
a kind of non-discrimination requirement that at first glance does not seem
to place any demands on the level of care provided generally. However, com-
bined with the potential obligation ‘to make available a certain standard of
health care’, it may be considered that the Convention nevertheless places some
demands on what it is that a state provides. In the light of the Court’s hesitant
response to positive claims for health care,25 as well as considerations related
to resources that are inevitable in this context, it may be argued that any
general obligation would not be likely to entail more than a very minimal level.
As indicated, however, the Grand Chamber in Cyprus v. Turkey leaves open
whether this is indeed the case.
In this regard it is also worth having a look at the case of Nitecki v. Poland,
which concerned the provision of medication in relation to the protection
offered under Article 2.26 Nitecki was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS) and had requested from the health insurance fund a refund
covering the cost of the drug prescribed to him, because as a pensioner he
could not pay for this drug himself. His request was denied and it was for
the Court to see whether Article 2 could be material for Mr Nitecki. The
government submitted that this right was ‘ratione materiae hardly applicable’,
but the Court repeated that Article 2 entails positive obligations, and reiterated
what it had said in Cyprus v. Turkey regarding the denial of health care a state
has undertaken to make available to the population generally.27 The con-
clusion was however that the complaint at hand was manifestly ill-founded.
The applicant had access to a standard of health care because of the social
security contributions he had paid. Moreover, the drug was refunded for 70%
by the state, and he only had to pay the remaining 30% by himself. Thus,
23 Harris et al. 2014, p. 213.
24 In the words of Harris et al. (ibid. p. 213), this ‘would be in accord with national health
care standards in European states and indirectly provide a partial, but welcome guarantee
of the right to health, which is an established human right that is not otherwise protected
by the Convention, except through the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment in
Article 3, which has been applied to health care in a few situations’ (see, on the applicability
of Art. 3, infra, S. 9.2.2).
25 See also, infra, S. 9.2.2 and 9.2.3.
26 Nitecki v. Poland, ECtHR 21 March 2002 (dec.), appl. no. 65653/01.
27 More precisely, it repeated that ‘an issue may arise under Article 2 where it is shown that
the authorities of a Contracting State put an individual’s life at risk through the denial of
health care which they have undertaken to make available to the population generally’(ibid.,
para. 1, referring to Cyprus v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 10 March 2001, appl. no. 25781/94, para.
219).
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according to the Court ’the respondent State cannot be said, in the special
circumstances of the present case, to have failed to discharge its obligations
under Article 2’.28 Moreover, it follows from Nitecki that the positive right
not to be denied health care that has been made available generally, does not
imply that no difference in treatment can be made at all. In regard to Article
14, the Court in this case found a justification for the alleged discrimination
‘in the present health care system which makes difficult choices as to the extent
of public subsidy to ensure a fair distribution of scarce financial resources’.29
This may be seen to confirm that if there indeed follows from the Convention
a requirement to make a certain standard of care available, this will not be
more than a very minimum standard. It appears that, at least where it concerns
the provision of care on top of such a minimum level, choices may be made
and in fact have to be made by the authorities in the light of the scarcity of
resources.
Indeed, as is often the case when it comes to the protection of social rights,
in the adjudication of health issues the issue of resources cannot be avoided.30
Moreover, as no unequivocal ‘right to health’ can be found in the ECHR, it is
likely that the ECtHR is even more hesitant than national judicial bodies tasked
with the adjudication of social rights are to impose costly obligations in this
field. From this perspective it is everything but surprising that the Court is
unwilling to hold that a refund of 70% is contrary to the Convention, although
the consequences of this policy might be detrimental to individuals who are
unable to pay the remaining part.31 Nevertheless, in Panaitescu v. Romania
a failure to provide specific anti-cancerous medication for free did result in
a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.32 What seemed to form the reason
for this finding was the fact that the domestic courts actually had ordered the
authorities to provide the applicant with the medication. For this reason it
was not open for the state to cite a lack of funds or resources.33 Lacking an
argument like this it however appears unlikely that expensive medication can
be successfully claimed under the Convention.34
28 Ibid., para. 1.
29 Ibid., para. 3.
30 Cf. the South African case on a request for free treatment Soobramoney v. Minister of Health,
KwaZula-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (supra Ch. 6, S. 6.3).
31 Cf. also Sentges v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 8 July 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 27677/02 (an Article 8
case dealing with a request for a robotic arm in which the Court held that for resource
reasons and ‘as the applicant has access to the standard of health care offered to all persons
insured under the Health Insurance Act’ the application was held manifestly ill-founded),
see, infra, S. 9.2.3.
32 Panaitescu v. Romania, ECtHR 10 April 2012, appl. no. 30909/06.
33 Ibid., para. 35.
34 See, on the provision of experimental medication, also the case of Hristozov a. O. v. Bulgaria,
ECtHR 13 November 2012, appl. nos. 47039/11 and 358/12 (discussed in, infra, S. 9.2.2.
and 9.2.3).
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Altogether, thus, when it comes to health care, the positive obligation to ‘take
appropriate steps’ first of all demands the regulation of health care in such
a manner that hospitals actually will protect their patients’ lives. Further,
Article 2 requires an effective judicial system including, amongst other things,
the possibility to investigate the death of patients in the care of the medical
profession. Moreover, the Court has formulated the obligation to not put an
individual at risk through the denial of health care which the state has (volun-
tarily) undertaken to make available to the population generally. This require-
ment leaves room for making choices – in the light of the available resources –
as regards what and to whom care is provided beyond what is provided gen-
erally. Finally, it may be inferred from the Court’s reasoning that the level
of care that is generally provided must be of ‘a certain’ level. Although the
case law leaves this unclear, it can be argued that the required level can be
at most a very minimum one.
9.2.2 Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (Article 3 ECHR)?
Not seldom applicants who invoke Article 2 in a health related issue con-
currently also rely on Article 3 of the Convention. In the case of L.C.B. v. the
United Kingdom, for example, besides invoking the right to life, the applicant
also alleged that Article 3 was violated. This because she had not been warned
of the effects of her father’s alleged exposure to radiation, which prevented
monitoring that would have led to earlier diagnosis and treatment of her ill-
ness. The Court however concluded that ‘[f]or the reasons referred to in con-
nection with Article 2 … the Court does not find it established that there has
been a violation by the respondent State of Article 3’.35 Indeed, even though
it may seem very sensible for applicants to phrase their complaints under both
Article 2 and Article 3, it appears that in matters related to health and health
care, there is frequently an overlap in the reasons for the Court to (not) dismiss
the respective complaints.
In this respect, the 2012 case of Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria may be
mentioned.36 This case concerned nine terminally ill cancer patients and their
requests for the use of a certain experimental medicine. As the medicine was
not registered, their requests had been rejected on the basis of the relevant
Bulgarian law. In regard to the right to life the Court held that the applicants
had not argued that ‘generally available’ health care was denied or that they
35 L.C.B. v. the UK, ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/198/1001, para. 43. In fact, the applicant
also invoked Art. 8 ECHR (as well as Art. 13). In this regard the Court concluded that,
‘having examined this question from the standpoint of Article 2, it does not consider that
any relevant separate issue could arise under Article 8, and it therefore finds it unnecessary
to examine further this complaint’ (para. 46).
36 Hristozov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 13 November 2012, appl. nos. 47039/11 and 358/12.
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could not afford the medication they needed.37 Rather, what they claimed
was that the applicable law should be framed in a way that would entitle them,
exceptionally, to ‘an experimental and yet untested product that would be
provided free of charge by the company which developed it’.38 In this regard,
according to the Court, ‘Article 2 cannot be interpreted as requiring that access
to unauthorised medicinal products for the terminally ill be regulated in a
particular way’.39 The applicants, however, had also invoked Article 3 ECHR,
arguing that
‘they had been forced to await their deaths in spite of being aware of the existence
of an experimental product which might improve their health and prolong their
lives. Those of them who had died had had to endure pain and suffering before
their death, in the knowledge that the use of the product in other countries had
in some cases even led to complete remission from the disease.’40
The Court emphasised that Article 3 generally is relevant in circumstances
concerning intentionally inflicted treatment and thus imposes a ‘primarily
negative obligation’. However, Article 3 may be applicable when ‘suffering
which flows from a naturally occurring illness … is, or risks being, exacerbated
by treatment stemming from measures for which the authorities can be held
responsible’. However, it also held that in such situations there is a high
threshold, ‘because the alleged harm emanates not from acts or omissions of
the authorities but from the illness itself’.41
In the case at hand, it considered that the applicants did not complain about
a lack of adequate medical treatment.42 Rather, they claimed that the author-
ities’ refusal to allow them access to experimental mediation, which they held
was potentially life saving, had resulted in inhuman and degrading treatment.
Like in the context of Article 2, the Court considered that this could not
amount to a violation, as 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting
States to alleviate the disparities between the levels of health care available
in various countries.43 Thus, in this case the applicants’ efforts to also phrase
their complaint in terms of Article 3 did not make any difference, although
in other circumstances this may be different.
37 Ibid., para. 107. This in contrast to, indeed, the case of Nitecki v. Poland (ECtHR 21 March
2002 (dec.), appl. no. 65653/01). See also Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova, ECtHR
4 January 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 14462/03; Wiater v. Poland, ECtHR 15 May 2012 (dec.), appl.
no. 422990/08.
38 Hristozov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 13 November 2012, appl. nos. 47039/11 and 358/12, para.
107.
39 Ibid., para. 108. For this reason there had not been a violation of Art. 2.
40 Ibid., para. 102.
41 Ibid., para. 111 (referring to N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05).
42 Ibid., para. 112. Neither could their situation be compared to those of seriously ill persons
who upon removal to another country would be unable to obtain treatment.
43 Ibid., para. 113.
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What is in the end decisive for finding a violation of the absolute prohibition
of inhuman and degrading treatment is that a ‘minimum level of severity’
is met. This requirement, which already has been mentioned a few times
before,44 is relative and dependent on the circumstances of the case.45 How-
ever, as the Court’s remarks in Hristozov confirm, it appears generally harder
to meet this threshold when positive health measures are requested. This is
probably because, generally, in case of health issues the harm foremost
emanates from the illness a person suffers from, rather than that it is being
inflicted by the state. That this makes the requirement of a minimum level
of severity a particularly demanding one, clearly also follows from several
cases concerning expulsion of seriously ill persons. Worth noting is first of
all the case of D. v. the United Kingdom, that dealt with an AIDS patient who
was about to be expelled to St Kitts.46 The government in this case stated
that the applicant’s ‘hardship and reduced life expectancy would stem from
his terminal and incurable illness coupled with the deficiencies in the health
and the social-welfare system of a poor, developing country’, and that he
would therefore not be worse off than other AIDS victims in St Kitts.47 How-
ever, since the applicant had been physically present in, and thus within the
jurisdiction of the UK, the Court considered that it would be for this state to
secure his rights under Article 3, even after expulsion. Because of the import-
ance of Article 3, the Court held that it ‘must reserve to itself sufficient flexibil-
ity to address the application of that Article’.48 Hence, it was
‘not prevented from scrutinising an applicant’s claim under Article 3 where the
source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country stems from
factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the
public authorities of that country, or which, taken alone do not in themselves
infringe the standards of that Article. To limit the application of Article 3 in this
manner would be to undermine the absolute character of its protection.’49
Eventually, in D. the Court found a violation of Article 3. Important for reach-
ing this conclusion was that the applicant was in ‘the advanced stages of a
terminal and incurable illness’.50 His removal would not only accelerate his
44 See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.3.2; Ch. 8, S. 8.2.4.
45 Kudla v. Poland, ECtHR (GC) 26 October 2000, appl. no. 30210/96, para. 91: ‘[I]t depends
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the
manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in some
instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim’.
46 D. v. the UK, ECtHR 2 May 1997, appl. no. 30240/96.
47 Ibid., para. 42.
48 Ibid., para. 49.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., para. 51.
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death, but also subject him to ‘acute mental and physical suffering’.51 It was
known to the Court that the applicant had a cousin in St Kitts, but it was
unclear whether this cousin would be capable or willing to take care of a
terminally ill man. In view of the ‘exceptional circumstances’, and even though
the conditions in St Kitts as such did not violate the standards of Article 3,
it was likely that the applicant would soon die under most distressing circum-
stances, which would amount to inhuman treatment.52
That the judgment in D. was ‘exceptional’, has been confirmed in later
cases.53 In N. v. the United Kingdom, another leading case in this field decided
some ten years after D., the Court’s Grand Chamber emphasised that the
variation in medical standards and the socio-economic differences between
countries have the consequence that the level of treatment in the respondent
state and the country of origin may considerably differ. In this regard,
‘Article 3 does not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate
such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to
all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the con-
trary would place too great a burden on the Contracting States.’54 N. was
about to be removed to Uganda even though she was HIV-infected. She
emphasised the stark contrast between her current situation and the one she
would end up in if she became dependent on the medical treatment and
medication available and affordable for her in her country of origin. The Court
held that the fact that the United Kingdom authorities had provided her with
medical and social assistance during nine years ‘does not in itself entail a duty
on the respondent State to continue to provide for her’.55 She was not ‘at the
51 Ibid., para. 52. Moreover, ‘[a]ny medical treatment which he might hope to receive there
could not contend with the infections which he may possibly contract on account of his
lack of shelter and of a proper diet as well as exposure to the health and sanitation problems
which beset the population of St Kitts’.
52 Ibid., 96, para. 53. The Court moreover added that these considerations ‘must be seen as
wider in scope than the question whether or not the applicant is fit to travel back to St
Kitts’ (para. 53), thereby responding to the contention of the state that he would only be
removed when fit enough.
53 In a number of cases, the fact that the applicant’s illness had not ‘reached an advanced
or terminal stage’ was reason to declare the complaint inadmissible. See, e.g., Karara v.
Finland, EComHR 29 May 1998 (dec.), appl. no. 40900/98; M.M. v. Switzerland, ECtHR 14
September 1998 (dec.), appl. no. 43348/98; S.C.C. v. Sweden, ECtHR 15 February 2000 (dec.),
appl. no. 46553/99; Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 24 June 2003 (dec.), appl. no.
13669/03; Ndangoya v. Sweden, ECtHR 22 June 2004 (dec.), appl. no. 17868/03; Amegnigan
v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 25 November 2004 (dec.), appl. no. 25629/04. Although the
availability and costs of treatment and medication varied among the respective receiving
countries, ‘in principle’ such treatment was available. See, e.g., Arcial Henao v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR 24 June 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 13669/03.
54 N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05, para. 44.
55 Ibid., para. 49. More generally, the Court considered in N. that ‘aliens who are subject to
expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contract-
ing State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance
and services provided by the expelling State’ (para. 42).
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present time critically ill’ and the rapidity of the health deterioration she would
suffer from and the amount of treatment and help she would receive involved
a certain degree of speculation. For that reason, the Court held that removal
would not amount to a violation of Article 3.56
Thus, although the judgment in D. has definitely triggered a great number
of applications, chances that a violation of Article 3 is found where it concerns
the level of health care in the country to which an individual is being expelled
are particularly small.57 Indeed, while the Court in D. said that its considera-
tions concerned more than just the question of whether a person’s health
condition is such that he is fit for travel,58 de facto it seems that the protection
it offers does not amount to much more than this. When someone is not (yet)
sick enough, expulsion orders can generally be put into practice. The fact that
the level of health care in the receiving country is very poor, hardly seems
to affect this.
By setting such high thresholds in cases concerning expulsion, the Court
clearly does little justice to the health interests of the individuals concerned.59
56 Ibid., paras. 50-51. See for a critical analysis of this case Mantouvalou 2009; but see also
Bettinson and Jones 2009.
57 Cf. Samina v. Sweden, ECtHR 20 October 2011, appl. no. 55463/09; Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v.
Belgium, ECtHR 20 December 2011, appl. no. 20286/10. Indeed, this not only goes for
persons suffering from HIV: ‘[T]he same principles must apply in relation to the expulsion
of any person afflicted with any serious, naturally occurring physical or mental illness which
may cause suffering, pain and reduced life expectancy and require specialised medical
treatment which may not be so readily available in the applicant’s country of origin or
which may be available only at substantial cost’ (N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008,
appl. no. 26565/05, para. 45). In the latter group of cases the hurdle for engaging Article
3 has proven (even more) difficult to jump. Bensaid v. the UK (ECtHR 6 February 2001, appl.
no. 44599/98), for example, dealt with a schizophrenic man who had received treatment
for some years but then had to go back to his country of origin. The Court stressed the
speculative character of the effects for his health and the support he would get, and
emphasised once more that the issue was not one involving direct responsibility for the
infliction of harm (paras. 39-40). A lot of other cases concerning (mentally) ill people have
simply been held inadmissible, see, e.g., Karagoz v. France, ECtHR 15 November 2001 (dec.),
appl. no. 47531/99; Nasimi v. Sweden, ECtHR 16 March 2004 (dec.), appl. no. 38865/02; Salkic
a. O. v. Sweden, ECtHR 29 June 2004 (dec.), appl. no. 7702/04; Dragan a. O. v. Germany,
ECtHR 3 October 2004 (dec.), appl. no. 33743/03; Ramadan and Ahjredini v. the Netherlands,
ECtHR 10 November 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 35989/03; Paramsothy v. the Netherlands, ECtHR
10 November 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 14492/03; Rrustemaj a. O. v. Sweden, ECtHR 15 November
2005 (dec.), appl. no. 8628/05; Hukic v. Sweden, ECtHR 27 November 2005 (dec.), appl. no.
17416/05.
58 D. v. the UK, ECtHR 2 May 1997, appl. no. 30240/96, para. 53.
59 It is true that in the 2013 case of Aswat v. the UK, the Court did find a violation in a case
of extradition to the United States. It considered that due to the severe state of the
applicant’s mental health, placement in a so-called ‘supermax’ prison would exacerbate
his condition of paranoid schizophrenia. Here a non-terminal state of health apparently
sufficed for finding a breach of Article 3, but it cannot go unnoticed that in this case not
the ‘general health care conditions’ but the specific conditions (or even: ‘inflicted treatment’)
of detention in the US were the object of concern (Aswat v. the UK, ECtHR 16 April 2013,
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In other words, it may be said that the Court in this part of its case law does
not provide for very ‘effective’, let alone for truly ‘indivisible’ protection. This
criticism links up with the dissenting opinion that was attached to the judg-
ment in N.60 The dissenting judges Tulkens, Bonello, and Spielmann, amongst
other things, criticised the Grand Chamber’s remark that ‘[a]lthough many
of the rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the
Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political
rights’,61 thereby referring to the case of Airey v. the UK.62 The dissenters
noted that the quotation was incomplete (and thus misleading), as in Airey,
the Court had rather emphasised the necessary extension of the Convention
into the socio-economic sphere.63 Moreover, the dissenters also found
problematic the Grand Chamber’s statement that ‘inherent in the whole of
the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of
the individual’s fundamental rights’.64 They underlined the absolute character
of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, and the fact that this
does not allow for ‘balancing’ the various interests concerned.
Taking into account the costly and ‘social’ dimension of claims related to
health care, it can be said, could bar ‘effective’ protection under Article 3 of
the Convention. At the same time, the fact that the protection the Court offers
in the cases mentioned seems to amount to less than a minimum level of health
care, and at most to ‘a – not very well defined – minimum core right to treat-
ment for dying patients without anyone to take care of them’,65 also seems
understandable. After all, what is concerned is not just the imposition of
potential socio-economic duties, but in fact also certain extraterritorial require-
ments.66 This complicates any move towards the recognition of a requirement
that a certain minimum level of care must be present in the receiving state
when an ill person is expelled.
It will be shown in Section 9.3 that more (positive) protection in the field
of health care can be required under Article 3 when the responsibility of the
appl. no. 17299/12).
60 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann.
61 N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05, para. 44.
62 Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 26 (see on this case also,
supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.1). Cf. also Abdi Ibrahim v. the UK, ECtHR 18 September 2012, appl. no.
14535/10, para. 31.
63 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann, para. 6.
64 N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05, para. 44 (joint dissenting opinion
of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann, para. 7).
65 Koch 2009, p. 65. Cf. also Nasri v. France, ECtHR 15 July 1995, appl. no. 19465/92, para.
46. In this case, Art. 8 ECHR prevented the deportation to Algeria of Mr. Nasri, who was
deaf and dumb as well as illiterate. Mainly because of these handicaps and the care that
could only be provided by his parents in France, the Court concluded that his deportation
would be disproportionate.
66 Cf. also Bettinson and Jones 2009. For a more critical stance, see Bossuyt 2012.
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state is clearly established. What may be concluded from the cases just dis-
cussed, however, is that generally, and especially in cases concerning expulsion,
meeting the minimum level of severity purely by referring to the insufficient
level of care provided, is everything but easy.
9.2.3 Health Issues and Private Life (Article 8 ECHR)
It goes without saying that health issues can have a serious impact on an
individual’s private life. Unsurprisingly, thus, besides Articles 2 and 3, applic-
ants regularly also invoke Article 8 of the Convention. A good example is again
the case of Hristozov v. Bulgaria that was already discussed above. In consider-
ing the complaints concerning the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman
treatment, the Court was unwilling to interfere with the way in which Bulgaria
had regulated the provision of experimental medicine. In line with these
complaints, the applicants in regard to Article 8 held that the refusals had not
taken into account the specifics of their cases. More concretely, ‘[t]hey had
not been intended to protect the applicants’ lives, because … without recourse
to some new medicinal product, they only had a short span of life left’, and
an exception ‘might have helped them avert suffering and death’.67
In assessing this complaint, the Court started out by stating ‘that matters
of health-care policy are in principle within the margin of appreciation of the
domestic authorities, who are best placed to assess priorities, use of resources
and social needs’.68 Moreover, even though ‘the applicants’ interest in obtain-
ing medical treatment capable of mitigating their illness or of helping them
defeat it is of the highest order’,69 the Court also emphasised the general
interest. This interest concerned, first, the protection of the individuals con-
cerned in view of their vulnerable state and the lack of clarity on the potential
risks and benefits of the desired treatment. Secondly, there was an interest
in ensuring that the prohibitions related to unauthorised products are not
diluted or circumvented. Thirdly, the state wanted to prevent the development
of new medicinal products from being compromised by diminished patient
67 Hristozov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 13 November 2012, appl. nos. 47039/11 and 358/12,
para.104. It can hence be said that both issues related to their right to life, as to the prohi-
bition of inhuman treatment, were present in their Art. 8 complaint, which underlines the
overlap between the different issues.
68 Ibid., para.119. Cf. also Pentiacova and 48 Others v. Moldova (concerning cut in government
funding due to which the applicants had to start paying their medication themselves): ‘While
it is clearly desirable that everyone has access to a full range of medical treatment, including
life-saving medical procedures and drugs, the lack of resources means that there are,
unfortunately, in the Contracting States many individuals who do not enjoy them, especially
in cases of permanent and expensive treatment’ (ECtHR 4 January 2005 (dec.), appl. no.
14462/03).
69 Hristozov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 13 November 2012, appl. nos. 47039/11 and 358/12,
para.120.
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participation in clinical trials.70 In the light of this, and regardless of the fact
that there is a trend visible in the Member States to allow for exceptions in
the provision of unauthorised medicine, the Court concluded that
‘[i]t is not for an international court to determine in place of the competent national
authorities the acceptable level of risk in such circumstances. The salient question
in terms of Article 8 is not whether a different solution might have struck a fairer
balance, but whether, in striking the balance at the point at which they did, the
Bulgarian authorities exceeded the wide margin of appreciation afforded to them
… In view of the considerations set out above, the Court is unable to find that they
did.’71
Thus, for similar reasons as in the context of Articles 2 and 3,72 the Court
held that there had not been a violation of Article 8.
In Hristozov, the Court did not take a firm stance on whether the Article 8
complaint had to be treated as one concerning a negative interference or rather
positive obligations.73 Arguably, however, it does make a difference for the
clarity the Court can provide as regards the interpretation and application
of this article whether a claim is perceived as a positive one or not. A health
care-related case that was explicitly dealt with as one concerning positive
obligations was the case of Sentges v. the Netherlands.74 The issue at stake was
the authorities’ refusal to provide the applicant, who suffered from Duchenne
muscular dystrophy, with a robotic arm specifically designed to be mounted
on his electric wheelchair, which would help him obtain more autonomy in
handling objects in his environment. The Court repeated that besides refraining
from arbitrary interferences, ‘there may be positive obligations inherent in
the effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve
the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in
the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’.75 However,
there could only be a positive obligation for the state ‘where there is a direct
70 Ibid., para.122.
71 Ibid., para.125.
72 Ibid., para.122, where the Court mentions that the different relevant interests ‘[a]ll … are
related to the rights guaranteed under Articles 2, 3 and 8 the Convention’.
73 Ibid., para.118: ‘Although the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obliga-
tions under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles
are similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’.
74 Sentges v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 8 July 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 27677/02.
75 Ibid. (referring to X and Y v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 26 March 1985, appl. no. 8978/80, para.
23; Stubbings a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 22 October 1996, appl. nos. 22083/93 and 22095/93,
para. 62).
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link between the measures sought by an applicant and the latter’s private
life’.76 The Court emphasised that Article 8 cannot be applied in every
instance in which an individual’s life is disrupted, but only in exceptional cases
‘where the State’s failure to adopt measures interferes with that individual’s
right to personal development and his or her right to establish and maintain
relations with other human beings and the outside world’.77 Moreover, the
burden of proof for demonstrating the existence of such a special link lies on
the individual.
In the case of Sentges, however, the Court refrained from clearly deciding
whether it was convinced that the necessary link was present, instead holding
that
‘[e]ven assuming that such a special link indeed exists … regard must be had to
the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the indi-
vidual and of the community as a whole and to the wide margin of appreciation
enjoyed by the States in this respect in determining the steps to be taken to ensure
compliance with the Convention.’78
The Court had regard to the difficult context of the allocation of limited state
resources, and to the fact that the national authorities are better placed to assess
how to deal with an issue like this, which it considered to be a reason for an
‘even wider’ margin of appreciation. In line with its review of health care
issues under Article 2 it further noted that the applicant had access to the
standard of health care generally offered, and although it ‘by no means’ wished
to underestimate the difficulties faced by the applicant it was hence concluded
that the respondent state had not exceeded its margin of appreciation. The
case was therefore held manifestly ill-founded.
What the case of Sentges shows is that in case of (potential) positive obliga-
tions in the field of health care the Court may be hesitant to clearly indicate
whether Article 8 is involved or not. Its failure to indicate in a transparent
manner when exactly the prima facie positive protection of this provision is
triggered may be seen to imply that in fact it lacks a clear standard on the
basis of which the proportionality of the omission can be judged. In Sentges
the Court quickly proceeded to an overall balancing of the various interests
76 Ibid. Cf. Botta v. Italy, ECtHR 24 February 1998, appl. no. 21439/93, paras. 33-34. Botta
concerned disabled persons who, during their vacation, could not access the sea. The Court
also there made mention of possible positive obligations in this sphere once there is a direct
link with someone’s private life, but concluded that the case was inadmissible. According
to the Court, the case ‘concerns interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate
scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the measures the State was urged
to take in order to make good the omissions of the private bathing establishments and the
applicant’s private life’ (para. 35). See also, on similar reasoning in regard to possible
positive obligations in the field of housing, supra, Ch. 8, S. 8.2.1.2.
77 Sentges v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 8 July 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 27677/02.
78 Ibid.
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at hand, informed by not much more than a wide (or ‘even wider’) margin.
In this regard it also held that it ‘should also be mindful of the fact that …
a decision issued in an individual case will nevertheless at least to some extent
establish a precedent’.79 This may further explain its deferential stance – which
may seem necessary when it comes to choices related to costly measures in
the field of health. However, it can be asked whether the way in which it dealt
with the case of Sentges was very helpful in this regard. Indeed, besides
potentially failing to ensure that appropriate weight is given to the individual
socio-economic interest concerned, a lack of emphasis on the interpretation
question may at the same time give the impression that it is always worth
trying to have ones’ positive health claim reviewed under the Convention,
although the changes of success are indeed very limited.
That these respective problems are especially apparent in the context of
positive obligations80 seems to be confirmed by the 2014 case of McDonald
v. the United Kingdom.81 McDonald concerned a woman’s ‘positive’ claim to
night-time care because she has problems with her bladder and due to mobility
problems is unable to safely access a toilet or commode unaided. However,
as she had initially been provided with a night-time carer, the applicant was
according to the Court ‘not complaining of a lack of action but rather of the
decision of the local authority to reduce the care package that it had hitherto
been making available to her’.82 Thus, the Court addressed the issue as one
involving an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private
life, ‘without entering into the question whether or not Article 8 § 1 imposes
a positive obligation on the Contracting States to put in place a level of entitle-
ment to care equivalent to that claimed by the applicant’.83 Taking this negat-
ive starting point, then, allowed the Court to start by asking the question
whether the interference was in accordance with the law, instead of merely
taking an overall look at whether the decision not to grant night-care was
justified in the light of the (wide) margin of appreciation. For the period in
which the local authority had been in breach of its statutory duty to provide
care to the applicant in accordance with its own assessment of her need for
care, this was not the case, and there had hence been a breach of the Conven-
tion.84 In regard to the remaining period – during which there was no
79 Ibid.
80 See, e.g., also the case of Farcas v. Romania, ECtHR 14 September 2010 (dec.), appl. no. 27677/
02, where the Court also did not answer the question whether the applicant’s complaints
regarding the refusal of assistance actually fell within the ‘positive scope’ of Art. 8. Rather,
it held that ‘en l’espèce, vu le caractère général des allégations du requérant, le doute
subsiste quant à l’utilisation quotidienne de ces établissements par celui-ci et quant à
l’existence d’un lien direct et immédiat entre les mesures exigées de l’Etat et la vie privée
de l’intéressé’ (para. 68).
81 McDonald v. the UK, ECtHR 20 May 2014, appl. no. 4241/12.
82 Ibid., para. 48.
83 Ibid., para. 48.
84 Ibid., paras. 51-52.
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problem concerning the lawfulness of the interference – , the Court took
account of the fact that the proportionality of the decision to reduce the applic-
ant’s care had been duly considered by the local authorities as well as by the
domestic courts. Thus, as the Court found that the interests of the applicant
as prima facie protected under Article 8 were adequately balanced against ‘the
more general interest of the competent public authority in carrying out its
social responsibility of provision of care to the community at large’, it con-
cluded that the authorities had not ‘exceeded the margin of appreciation
afforded to them, notably in relation to the allocation of scarce resources’.85
Thus, it seems that especially when positive complaints are concerned, the
individual interests concerned run a risk of being overshadowed by a general
balancing of interests that is often informed by a (very) wide margin of appre-
ciation. This is not only the case because positive obligations (appear to) bring
along more costs, but also because the Court often leaves open the question
whether ‘a sufficient link’ exists for applying Article 8 in the first place. The
latter may hinder meaningful, effective and indivisible protection based on
a clear indication of what interests are actually protected by Article 8. Addi-
tionally, it also fails to provide the necessary guidance for the Member States
– as well as for (potential) applicants – on both the interpretation and the
application of the Convention.86
It must be concluded that the eventual protection of claims for health care
and medication under Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Convention is relatively
limited. Nevertheless, the Court has created several openings for effective and
indivisible protection in this field, by formulating positive obligations under
Article 2, reviewing cases concerning (expulsion and) health care under Article
3, and by linking this issue to the right to respect for private life. It can more-
over be inferred from the case law that the protection offered by the different
articles overlaps to a certain extent. In discussing complaints under the differ-
ent provisions, the Court often refers to the ‘standard of health care that has
been made available to the population generally’. As long as an individual
is not denied this standard, the sensitive position of the Court and the issue
of resources make it unlikely that a violation is found. It seems that the stand-
ard a state ‘voluntarily’ provides does need to be of a certain ‘minimum’ level,
although this may be different in the context of expulsion, where the extraterri-
torial dimension complicates the issues at hand. Recognising these points in
a more transparent manner would potentially aid the clarity of the Court’s
review under the Convention, not least also in cases where the question of
the (prima facie) positive protection of Article 8 is concerned.
85 Ibid., para. 57.
86 In this regard it is interesting to see how the Court deals with the interpretation and
application of Art. 8 in ‘environmental health’ cases. This will be discussed in, infra, S. 9.4.
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9.3 EXTRA CARE FOR ‘DEPENDENT AND ‘VULNERABLE’ AND INDIVIDUALS
On the basis of the cases presented in the previous section, it can be said that
the Convention does not guarantee much in terms of the provision of health
care. However, the picture presented in Section 9.2 was not entirely complete.
What can be added to the cases discussed there is the fact that in particular
‘vulnerable’ individuals, or at least those who are under the control of state
authorities, may successfully claim more-encompassing health-related pro-
tection under the Convention. Whereas what is provided to ‘the population
at large’ generally seems to be left to the state, when specific groups are
concerned, the Court has defined more concrete obligations.
Without aiming at giving an exhaustive overview of the protection offered
in this regard, this section first of all illustrates the ‘extra’ protection that may
be required when it comes to the health of detainees. Furthermore, although
the situation in which the state has deprived individuals of their liberty may
form the most prominent example of when extra (social) responsibilities are
involved, it will be shown that the requirements related to the needs of vulner-
able individuals also reach beyond the prison gates.
Frequently, issues arise under the Convention that relate to the treatment of
detainees. When the state deprives someone of his liberty for purposes of
detention, it has the responsibility to respect and protect his (other) funda-
mental rights inasmuch as possible.87 This implies that the conditions of im-
prisonment should not be contrary to the Convention. Interesting for the
purposes of this chapter is to see what this more specifically requires when
the health of detainees is concerned. This particular issue is often dealt with
under Article 3 ECHR,88 and just like in other contexts this means that the
question of whether Convention protection is triggered is a relative one that
is dependent on the (cumulative) circumstances of the case.89 In this regard
plenty of examples can be given of case-specific circumstances that did or did
87 Cf. in this regard Art. 10(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) (‘All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’) as well as the European Prison Rules,
Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to
member states on the European Prison Rules, that state: ‘1. All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with respect for their human rights’ and ‘3. Prison conditions that
infringe prisoners’ human rights are not justified by lack of resources’. Special rules on
health and health care in prisons can be found in paras. 39-48.
88 See however also the cases on the health of detainees that have been dealt with under Arts.
2 and 5 of the Convention. See, on these cases, e.g. Koch 2009, p. 83ff.
89 As the Court underlined in Dougoz v. Greece, a case that concerned the overcrowdedness
of a Greek prison (partially) lacking sanitary and sleeping facilities, hot water, fresh air
and daylight, this means that ‘account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these
conditions’ (Dougoz v. Greece, ECtHR 6 March 2001, appl. no. 40907/98, para. 46).
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not result in a finding of a breach of Article 3.90 Instead of doing so, however,
it is worth highlighting some more general remarks the Court has made in
relation to the issue of prisoners’ health, as this can aid in creating a more
general image of what the Convention demands.
In keeping with the idea that besides being deprived of their liberty,
prisoners should not be deprived of their other fundamental rights, the Court
has on a number of occasions stated that under Article 3,
‘the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible
with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution
of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding
the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical
demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by,
among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance.’91
Thus, Article 3 entails a positive obligation for the state to provide for the
‘requisite medical assistance’ to ensure prisoners’ health and well-being.
Importantly, moreover, the Court has explicitly held that certain categories
of prisoners require special conditions of detention that correspond to their
particular needs. In this regard it has referred to ‘persons suffering from a
mental disorder … or serious illness’,92 ‘the disabled’,93 ‘the elderly’,94 ‘or
drug addicts suffering from withdrawal symptoms’.95 This confirms that
especially when dependent on the state and vulnerable, detainees obtain special
care under the Convention.
Still, what this means in more concrete terms depends on the situation of
the individual and in particular on his state of health.96 Very exceptionally,
it can be held that because of a prisoner’s health condition, detention as such
is incompatible with the Convention.97 As the Court held in Khudobin v.
Russia, however, in principle
90 See especially the Court’s Factsheet on ‘Prisoners’ health-related rights’ and ‘Detention
and mental health’ (www.echr.coe.int, under ‘Factsheets’), as well as Harris et al. 2014,
pp. 265-267; Rainey et al. 2014, pp. 190-191.
91 See, e.g., Kudla v. Poland, ECtHR 26 October 2000, appl. no. 30210/96, para. 94.
92 Dybeku v. Albania, ECtHR18 December 2007, appl. no. 41135/06, para. 40, referring to Kudla
v. Poland, ECtHR 26 October 2000, appl. no. 30210/96; Keenan v. the UK, ECtHR 3 April
2001, appl. no. 27229/95.
93 Ibid., para. 40, referring to Mouisel v. France, ECtHR 14 November 2002, appl. no. 67263/01;
Matencio v. France, ECtHR 15 Januray 2004, appl. nos. 58749/00 and 58749/00; Sakkopoulos
v. Greece, ECtHR 15 January 2004, appl. no. 61828/00.
94 Ibid., referring to Price v. the UK, ECtHR 10 July 2001, appl. no. 33394/96.
95 Ibid., referring to Papon v. France, ECtHR 7 June 2001 (dec.), appl. no. 66646/01.
96 Ibid., referring to McGlinchey a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 29 April 2003, appl. no. 50390/99.
97 Cf. Mouisel v. France, ECtHR 14 November 2002, appl. no. 67263/01; Tekin Yildiz v. Turkey,
ECtHR 10 November 2005, appl. no. 22913/04.
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‘Article 3 cannot be construed as laying down a general obligation to release
detainees on health grounds. It rather imposes an obligation on the State to protect
the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty. The Court accepts that
the medical assistance available in prison hospitals may not always be at the same
level as in the best medical institutions available for the general public.’98
In Grishin v. Russia, in the same vein, the Court mentioned that it ‘is prepared
to accept that in principle the resources of medical facilities within the peniten-
tiary system are limited compared to those of civil clinics’.99 That the standard
of care that is demanded should take into account ‘the practical demands of
imprisonment’,100 should however not be seen to be in conflict with the
Court’s repeated statement that ‘resource issues’ cannot form a sufficient
justification when prison conditions are concerned.101 If what is required
is in fact an adequate (minimum) standard – rather than the best circumstances
thinkable – the Court’s statements may seem fully compatible.
Important to emphasise is that the (extra) protection offered by Articles 2 and 3
of the health needs of dependent and/or vulnerable individuals reaches beyond
the prison gates. A prominent example of the fact that the positive, social
protection demanded in this regard can indeed reach very far is the 2013 case
of Nencheva a. O. v. Bulgaria.102 This case did not concern detainees yet the
Court nevertheless recognised a broad ‘social’ responsibility of the state to
provide for the needs of the individuals concerned. Nencheva involved the
death of 15 children and young adults in a care home. Their relatives and
guardians complained under Article 2 ECHR that the authorities failure to
provide them with the necessary care was in breach of the Convention.
Material in regard to this complaint was the fact that the children had been
entrusted to the care of the state and were under the exclusive supervision
98 Khudobin v. Russia, ECtHR 26 October 2006, appl. no. 59696/00, para. 93.
99 Grishin v. Russia, ECtHR 15 November 2007, appl. no. 30983/02, para. 76; Vasyukov v. Russia,
ECtHR 5 April 2011, appl. no. 2974/05, para. 62. Contracting states are nevertheless bound
‘to provide all medical care their resources might permit’. (para. 76). See also Aleksanyan
v. Russia, ECtHR 22 December 2008, appl. no. 46468/06, paras. 139, 148-149.
100 Vasyukov v. Russia, ECtHR 5 April 2011, appl. no. 2974/05, para. 63.
101 In Khokhlich v. Ukraine, Kuznetsov v. Ukraine and Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine it was clarified that
a lack of resources does not establish a valid justification. The Court in these cases explained
that it had borne in mind ‘that Ukraine encountered serious socio-economic problems in
the course of its systemic transition and that prior to the summer of 1998 the prison
authorities were both struggling under difficult economic conditions and occupied with
the implementation of new national legislation and related regulations. However, the Court
observes that lack of resources cannot in principle justify prison conditions which are so
poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention’. See
Khokhlich v. Ukraine, ECtHR 29 April 2003, appl. no. 441707/98, para. 181; Kuznetsov v.
Ukraine, ECtHR 29 April 2003, appl. no. 39042/97, para. 128; Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, ECtHR
29 April 2003, appl. no. 38812/97, para. 148.
102 Nencheva a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 18 June 2013, appl. no. 48609/06.
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of the authorities. These had been fully aware of the extremely worrisome
circumstances in the care home that, in the harsh winter of 1997 and during
a severe economic crisis, had to cope with a lack of heating, food, medical
care and medication. There was no doctor available at the time and the nearest
hospital was 40 kilometers away. Next to the authorities’ knowledge and
responsibility, in finding that the state was responsible for the state of health
of the children, the Court particularly emphasised the vulnerability of the
persons who had died – they were children and young adults who were
suffering from severe mental and physical disabilities.103 It held that
‘concernant l’obligation des autorités de prendre des mesures de protection, de
nombreux éléments au dossier, à savoir l’absence de réaction pendant plusieurs
mois aux alertes de la directrice concernant la situation au foyer … ou l’absence
apparente d’une aide médicale prompte et appropriée … indiquent que les autorités
n’ont pas pris des mesures promptes, concrètes et suffisantes pour prévenir les
décès dénoncés, alors qu’elles avaient une connaissance précise des risques réels
et imminents pour la vie des personnes concernées.’104
Thus, as is the case when dangerous activities are concerned, the vulnerability
of the persons whose life might be in danger and for which the state has taken
responsibility, can lead to positive obligations related to health.105 However,
it is equally clear that a rather high threshold of severity must be transgressed
in order for Articles 2 and 3 to be applicable to health cases especially outside
the situation of detention.
9.4 A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
In recent years the Court has regularly dealt with ‘environmental’ issues.106
The cases concerned involve complaints about environmental pollution and
hazardous state activities, but also airport noise, etc. This category of cases
is important for this chapter, as generally the cases involved concern the health
of the applicants, which may be at risk due to the pollution that is taking place.
Even though the health aspects cannot always very clearly be singled out,107
103 Ibid., e.g., paras. 106, 119, 120, 123, 141.
104 Ibid., para. 124. Although the Court does not explicitly differentiate between the two, next
to this substantive aspect the eventual violation was also based on procedural aspects related
to the investigation into the deaths and the criminal responsibility of those involved.
105 Ibid., para. 123.
106 Cf. the Court’s Factsheet on ‘Environment-related cases in the Court’s case law’ (www.echr.
coe.int, under ‘Factsheets’).
107 And moreover, as was already said in the introduction, sometimes housing-related interests
are present as well. See, for a recent example, Bor v. Hungary, ECtHR 7 October 2013, appl.
no. 50474/08 (concerning noise disturbance caused by the operation of a railway station
that made the applicant’s home ‘virtually uninhabitable’).
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it is interesting to see what approach the Court has developed to issues of
this kind.
In this chapter the focus will be on those ‘healthy environment’ cases that
concern Article 8 ECHR. As was already seen in Section 9.2.1, sometimes the
right to life is involved as well,108 but the majority of environmental (health)
complaints are brought under Article 8.109 They sometimes deal with obvious
interferences with applicants’ private lives and living environments, but often
the relevant cases also concern omissions of the state when it comes to ensuring
compliance with regulations or providing for solutions when third parties act
in a way that is detrimental to the environment. It will be asked whether and
how the Court provides effective protection in case of severe instances of
environmental nuisances and health risks. Does it make clear when exactly
Article 8 is engaged and does it provide reasons for when it can review the
issue at hand? If a case is held admissible, how does the ECtHR decide whether
or not the Convention has been violated? In answering these questions it is
seen whether the interpretation and application by the Court offers consistent
guidance to the states, granting them sufficient leeway while at the same time
ensuring indivisible protection. This section first addresses the matter of scope
(9.4.1), followed by an analysis of the Court’s review of environmental health
cases (9.4.2). It will be concluded with a discussion of the margin of appreci-
ation (9.4.3).
108 See Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC) 30 November 2004, appl. no. 48939/99. Another
interesting example is Guerra and Others v. Italy, which concerned the release of large
quantities of toxic substances from a factory close to the homes of the applicants. In 1976
there had been a big explosion after which 150 people had to be hospitalised, but the
applicants themselves had not yet suffered from any deterioration of their health. Art. 2
was invoked, but the Court decided not to go into this complaint. This was considered
unnecessary, as a violation of Art. 8 had already been found. In a concurring opinion Judge
Jambrek nevertheless reflected upon the relation between health guarantees and Art. 2
ECHR. In his view, ‘[t]he protection of health and physical integrity is … as closely associ-
ated with the “right to life” as with the “respect for private and family life”. An analogy
may be made with the Court’s case-law on Article 3 concerning the existence of “foreseeable
consequences”; where – mutatis mutandis – substantial grounds can be shown for believing
that the person(s) concerned face a real risk of being subjected to circumstances which
endanger their health and physical integrity, and thereby put at serious risk their right
to life, protected by law. If information is withheld by a government about circumstances
which foreseeably, and on substantial grounds, present a real risk of danger to health and
physical integrity, then such a situation may also be protected by Article 2 of the Conven-
tion’. See Guerra a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 116/1996/735/932 (concurring
opinion of Judge Jambrek).
109 It is worth indicating that the different ‘environmental’ issues regularly focus on the
procedures provided and for that reason often also involve Art. 6 and/or Art. 13 of the
Convention.
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9.4.1 The Applicability of Article 8 ECHR: A Threshold Approach?
The first case in which the Court recognised that the Convention leaves room
for environmental complaints was the 1990 case of Powell and Rayner v. the
United Kingdom.110 The case dealt with noise pollution caused by air traffic,
and the Court held that ‘the quality of the applicant’s private life and the scope
for enjoying the amenities of his home have been adversely affected by the
noise generated by aircraft using Heathrow Airport … Article 8 is therefore
a material provision in relation to both Mr Powell and Mr Rayner’.111 Where-
as earlier complaints regarding the environment had not attracted the pro-
tection of the Convention,112 it thereby clarified that when individual effects
are involved, review under the Convention is possible.
What the judgment in Powell and Rayner did not make clear, however, was
whether any adverse effect on an individual’s well-being caused by environ-
mental circumstances would be deserving of review under Article 8 of the
Convention. Arguably, not every ‘nuisance’ can be reason for the Court to
embark on thorough review on the basis of this right. It can be asked to what
extent, for example, a negative impact on an individual’s health would be
necessary for generating an affirmative answer to the question of the applicabil-
ity of right to respect for private life. The Court’s first concrete efforts at further
clarifying this were merely tentative ones. In López Ostra v. Spain, the applicant
complained about noise, smells, and polluting fumes coming from a nearby
plant, from which especially her daughter was suffering.113 In discussing
the application Article 8, the Court famously stated that ‘[n]aturally, severe
environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private life adverse-
ly, without, however, seriously endangering their health’.114 Even though
this indicates that serious health dangers are no necessary prerequisite, it did
not provide any information on what other limits there might be to the applic-
ability of Article 8. The same can be said of Guerra and Others v. Italy.115 In
this case the Court emphasised that after an escape of several tonnes of potas-
110 Powell and Rayner v. the UK, ECtHR 21 February 1990, appl. no. 9310/81.
111 Ibid., para. 40.
112 X. and Y. v. Federal Republic of Germany, EComHR 13 May 1976 (dec.), appl. no. 7407/76,
D.R. 5, p. 161.
113 López Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 16798/90.
114 Ibid., para. 51.
115 Article 10 ECHR (the freedom of expression) was invoked as well. With regard to this article,
the ECtHR held that it does not impose upon states a duty to collect and disseminate
information – in this case regarding environmental dangers and the accompanying health
risks – on its own motion. Article 10 was for that reason not applicable. See Guerra a. O.
v. Italy, ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 116/1996/735/932, para. 53. See however the con-
curring opinions of Judge Palm, joined by Judges Bernhardt, Russo, Macdonald, Mararczyk
and Van Dijk, and of Judge Jambrek. Judge Thór Vilhjálmsson (partly concurring and partly
dissenting opinion) would have even preferred the case to be dealt with under Art. 10.
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sium carbonate and bicarbonate solution, containing arsenic trioxide, 150
people were hospitalised. It was also clear that the emissions into the atmo-
sphere coming from the factory were often channelled towards the place where
the applicants lived. In Guerra the Court held that ‘[t]he direct effect of the
toxic emissions on the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family
life means that Article 8 is applicable’.116 Although just like in López Ostra
the situation was ‘clearly’ serious enough for being dealt with under the ECHR,
the question still remained whether the Court’s reasoning was meant to imply
that any direct effect of pollution on private life, could trigger the applicability
of Article 8 of the Convention.
The case of Kyrtatos v. Greece, which concerned urban development on the
Greek island of Tiros, more particularly required the Court to offer clarity in
this regard. Complaining under Article 8, the applicants held that the develop-
ment ‘had led to the destruction of their physical environment and had affected
their life’.117 ‘Regardless of the danger for one’s health’, they stated, ‘the de-
terioration of the environment fell to be examined under Article 8 of the
Convention where it adversely affected one’s life’.118 Concerning the issue
that the area where their home was located had ‘lost all of its scenic beauty’,
the Court underlined that an adverse effect on the rights safeguarded by Article
8 requires ‘a harmful effect on a person’s private or family sphere and not
simply the general deterioration of the environment’.119 More importantly,
however, as regards the second limb of the applicants’ argument that dealt
with the light and noise pollution that had resulted from the urban develop-
ment, the Court concluded that the disturbances had ‘not reached a sufficient
degree of seriousness to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 8’.120
Thus, next to the fact that ‘there is no right to environmental protection unless
the environmental issues can be discussed within the context of private life
and family life’,121 pollution negatively affecting private and/or family life
must be of a certain severity for Article 8 to become relevant.
In the 2005 Fadeyeva v. Russia judgment it was confirmed that these ‘thres-
hold requirements’ are indeed a matter of scope, and hence determine whether
an environmental issue deserves review under the Convention in the first
place.122 Ms Fadeyeva was living in close proximity to a severely polluting
116 Ibid., para. 57.
117 Kyrtatos v. Greece, ECtHR 22 May 2003, appl. no. 41666/98, para. 44.
118 Ibid., para. 45.
119 Ibid., para. 52. It said that the articles laid down in the Convention are not specifically
designed for providing general environmental protection – ‘to that effect, other international
instruments and domestic legislation are more pertinent in dealing with this particular
aspect’.
120 Ibid., para. 54.
121 Koch 2009, p. 71.
122 Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00.
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plant that was operating in breach of domestic environmental standards and
endangering her health. The Court made crystal clear that
‘the adverse effects of environmental pollution must attain a certain minimum level
if they are to fall within the scope of Article 8 … The assessment of that minimum
is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity
and duration of the nuisance, and its physical or mental effects. The general context
of the environment should also be taken into account. There would be no arguable
claim under Article 8 if the detriment complained of was negligible in comparison
to the environmental hazards inherent to life in every modern city.’123
In concreto, for the applicability of Article 8 this means that ‘complaints relating
to environmental nuisances have to show, firstly, that there was an actual
interference with the applicant’s private sphere, and secondly, that a level of
severity was attained’.124 The Court also explained why in Fadeyeva these
requirements had been met. It referred to a ‘very strong combination of indirect
evidence and presumptions’ that made it likely the applicant’s health de-
teriorated as a result of the industrial emissions. ‘Even assuming that the
pollution did not cause any quantifiable harm to her health’, it stressed that
‘the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being reached a level
sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention’.125
Thus, it has become clear that not every environmental impact on an
individual’s well-being can be reviewed by the Strasbourg Court. Nevertheless,
the case law has created room for ‘indivisible’ review of fundamental interests,
not in the least because the criterion of a ‘minimum level of severity’ explicitly
demands taking into account the issue of health.126 Even though – partly
for evidentiary reasons – they do not seem to be an absolute prerequisite,127
‘physical and mental effects’ increase the likelihood that an issue is prima facie
protected under the Convention. Without becoming all-encompassing, the
Court’s interpretation in this regard does not seem biased against more social
protection. To the contrary, when health effects are clearly present, this makes
123 Ibid., para. 69.
124 Ibid., para. 70.
125 Ibid., para. 88. Cf. also Ledyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva and Romashina v. Russia, ECtHR
26 October 2006, appl. nos. 53157/99; 53247/99; 56850/00; and 53695/00.
126 As well as the duration of the nuisances, see, e.g., Dubetska a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 10
February 2011, appl. no. 30499/03, para. 118.
127 According to Brems (2007, p. 148), ‘the Court has explicitly adopted a higher standard in
the context of environmental pollution’ in the sense that – although limits exist – the
applicability (or violation) of Article 8 is not made contingent upon (a causal relation with)
health damage in particular. Indeed, as it is often hard to prove whether health effect exist
that actually are the result from the pollution concerned, the Court in this regard will
‘primarily give regard to the findings of the domestic courts and other competent authorities
in establishing the factual circumstances of the case’ (Dzemyuk v. Ukraine, ECtHR 4 Septem-
ber 2014, appl. no. 42488/02).
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it likely that review is granted,128 whereas when there are no health issues
involved at all this may be (part of the) reason a holding the case inadmiss-
ible.129
However, regardless of the clarity brought by the thresholds the Court has
set in the context of protection against environmental pollution, it does not
always apply the criteria identified in a consistent manner. In Zammit Maempel
v. Malta, for example, a family complained about fireworks that are let of on
the occasion of certain village feasts, twice a year for a few hours, at about
150 meters from their home. The Court here explicitly referred to the minimum
level of severity nuisances must have attained for a case to be admissible, but
as there was ‘at least a temporary effect on both the physical and … the
psychological state of those exposed to [the fireworks]’, and because ‘the
applicants’ family may be exposed to some physical and personal risk’,130
the complaint was nevertheless reviewed. The lack of concrete, severe risks
or any health effects further on in the judgment played an important role in
concluding that there had not been a violation.131 However, it can be asked
whether this was an issue in which it was for the Court to decide whether
the authorities had struck a fair balance in the first place. Also in Martínez
Martínez and Pino Manzano v. Spain the thresholds set did not play any concrete
role.132 Again, the noise levels and the negligible (possible) effects thereof
were explicitly taken into account at the balancing stage and for concluding
that the Convention had not been breached, yet were not considered to be
relevant for determining whether the issue was actually covered by Article 8.133
128 See, e.g., Bâcilâ v. Romania, ECtHR 30 March 2010, appl. no. 19234/04, paras. 63-64. In this
case the health effects of the hazardous chemicals released into the atmosphere as well
as the concrete health problems of the applicant were clearly established. This fact weighed
heavily in reaching the conclusion that Article 8 applied. Cf. also Brânduse v. Romania, ECtHR
7 April 2009, appl. no. 7586/03, paras. 66-67; Marchis a. O. v. Romania, ECtHR 28 June 2011
(dec.), appl. no. 38197/03, para. 38; Orlikowsci v. Poland, ECtHR 4 October 2011, appl. no.
7153/07, para. 98; Darkowska and Darkowski v. Poland, ECtHR 15 November 2011 (dec.), appl.
no. 31339/04, para. 69.
129 Cf., e.g., Walkuska v. Poland, ECtHR 29 April 2008 (dec.), appl. no. 6817/04: ‘In particular,
it has not been shown that the pollution complained of was of such a degree or character
as to cause any noxious effect on the applicant’s health or that of her family’; Fägerskiöld
v. Sweden, ECtHR 26 February 2008 (dec.), appl. no. 37604/04; Furlepa v. Poland, ECtHR
18 March 2008 (dec.), appl. no. 62101/00.
130 Zammit Maempel v. Malta, ECtHR 22 November 2011, appl. no. 24202/10, para. 38.
131 Ibid., para. 67.
132 Martínez Martínez and Pino Manzano v. Spain, ECtHR 3 July 2012, appl. no. 61654/08.
133 Cf., for a recent case that concerned noise that made the applicant’s home ‘virtually unin-
habitable’, Bor v. Hungary, ECtHR 7 October 2013, appl. no. 50474/08. In this case the Court
did not pay explicit attention to the minimum level of severity requirement. Instead, it
immediately moved to reviewing the issue, thereby having regard to the fact that the noise
levels significantly exceeded statutory levels. See, for the importance of ‘national irregular-
ities’ in reviewing whether there is a breach of the Convention, infra, S. 9.4.2.
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Another interesting example in this regard is the 2012 case of Di Sarno and
Others v. Italy.134 The issue at hand concerned the waste crisis in Italy, where
garbage had been piling up in the streets for months without the government
being able to take any effective measures. In Di Sarno the Court seemed to
place particular emphasis on these general circumstances, without thereby
focusing too much on the individual effects at stake. Some of the applicants
in Di Sarno only worked in the polluted area, which means that it could be
doubted whether there was any interference with their ‘private and family
life’ at all. The Court did speak of a direct effect of the waste on the applicants
‘propre bien-être’ (well-being),135 and moreover held that it could foresee
that the situation could lead to a ‘deterioration of their life quality’.136 How-
ever, also because of the lack of any health effects, it does not seem certain
that the criteria set in Fadeyeva were actually applied.
It may be concluded that the Fadeyeva criteria are sometimes disregarded
or used in a confusing manner. However, this is no reason for discrediting
the thresholds set as such. In fact, the different criteria seem to allow for
providing clear guidance concerning the scope of prima facie environmental
health protection under Article 8, by distinguishing fundamental, health-related
cases from those that merely concern annoyances. It seems that regardless of
whether an issue concerns a negative interference or positive demands, by
focusing on what the effects are for the individual concerned, the thresholds
allow for taking a bifurcated approach and create a clear starting point, at least,
that is, when being applied in a consistent manner.
9.4.2 National Irregularities, Procedural Demands, and the Search for A Fair
Balance
In deciding on the question of whether environmental issues amount to a
violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the crucial question is generally
whether the state has struck a fair balance between the individual and general
interests concerned. This is everything but easy to determine, not least because
of the multiplicity of interests involved. As was seen in the previous subsection,
on the side of the individual, health issues may only be one of the concerns
involved, while also on the part of the state different (political, budgetary,
environmental) interests may play a role. In cases characterised by such com-
plexity, it is difficult for the Strasbourg Court to engage in a balancing exercise
without thereby giving the impression of supplanting the national decision-
maker’s view by its own. The likely result is thus that the Court leaves con-
siderable leeway to the national authorities. However, in the cases it has dealt
134 Di Sarno a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 10 January 2012, appl. no. 30765/08.
135 Ibid., para. 81.
136 Ibid., para. 108.
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with over the past years, the Court has nevertheless been able to rely on a
number of criteria for deciding on environmental health issues in a convincing
manner. These have not merely been developed by the Court itself, but rather
seem to have been presented to it through the facts of the different cases.
Mention can be made, first, of the importance of national irregularities for
finding a breach of Article 8. Further, the Court has relied in particular on
procedural requirements that have helped it to decide on the ‘fair balance’
question. In the following, its approach will be illustrated by a number of cases,
while the question will be answered whether on this basis the Court indeed
seems to succeed in providing effective and indivisible environmental health
protection.
A first case that shows the importance of national irregularities for the Court’s
balancing review is the case of López Ostra v. Spain. Although the Court in
this case held that there might be a link with Article 8 even when no serious
health dangers exist,137 it took the severe health condition of the applicant’s
daughter into account in its assessment of the fair balance struck by the
national authorities. However, even more weight was granted to the fact that
the factory was operating without the necessary municipal licence, and that
its closure had therefore been ordered. Thus, regarding the question of whether
the necessary measures had been taken, ‘[i]t has to be noted that the municipal-
ity not only failed to take steps … but also resisted judicial decisions to that
effect’.138 A fair balance between the economic well-being of the town and
the applicant’s fundamental right had therefore not been struck.
In Guerra and Others v. Italy the Court recognised the importance of obtain-
ing the necessary information on (the seriousness of) the health risks present.
Ascertaining ‘whether the national authorities took the necessary steps to
ensure effective protection of the applicants’ right to respect for their private
and family life as guaranteed by Article 8’,139 particular emphasis was placed
on the fact that the authorities had known about specific dangers but had not
provided information to the persons concerned in order to enable them to
assess the risks inherent in staying in the vicinity of the plant. The fact that
in this case there had been a violation, however, was again premised on the
fact that there was a national law, concerning the dissemination of information,
with which the state had failed to comply.
In Fadeyeva v. Russia, next to clearly pinpointing the thresholds that have
to be met for having one’s environmental complaint reviewed under the
Convention, the Court also confirmed the importance of ‘national irregularities’
for concluding whether or not there had been a violation. It mentioned that
137 López Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 16798/90, para. 51 (see, supra, S.
9.5.1).
138 Ibid., para. 56
139 Guerra a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 116/1996/735/932, para. 58.
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‘in all previous cases in which environmental questions gave rise to violations
of the Convention, the violation was predicated on a failure by the national
authorities to comply with some aspect of the domestic legal regime’.140 How-
ever, different from in cases concerning negative obligations,141 it considered
that when positive claims are concerned, such irregularities do not necessarily
suffice for concluding on a violation:
‘[I]n cases where an applicant complains about the State’s failure to protect his
or her Convention rights, domestic legality should be approached not as a separate
and conclusive test, but rather as one of many aspects which should be taken into
account in assessing whether the State has struck a ‘fair balance’ in accordance
with Article 8 § 2.’142
Moreover, the Court stated that even though ‘in today’s society the protection
of the environment is an increasingly important consideration’, because of the
complexity of the issues involved the Court’s task remains a primarily sub-
sidiary one.143
Although in Fadeyeva the combination of relevant circumstances eventually
tipped the scale towards finding a violation,144 the approach the Court in
this case outlined thus seems to be a quite hesitant one. In this regard one
may also have a look at the well-known case of Hatton and Others v. the United
Kingdom, which involved sleep deprivation caused by a new night flight
scheme at Heathrow airport.145 After the Chamber had concluded on a viola-
tion because it did not find the decisions made at the national level convinc-
ing,146 the review by the Grand Chamber took a more cautious stance. Im-
portant in reaching the eventual conclusion that Article 8 had not been
140 Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para. 97. Cf. also, e.g., Deés v.
Hungary, ECtHR 9 November 2010, appl. no. 2345/06 (regarding noise pollution due to
heavy traffic) where statutory limits had been crossed and the authorities had failed to
take effective measures.
141 With regard to active interferences the Court notes that ‘[t]he breach of domestic law in
these cases would necessarily lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention’. See
Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para. 95.
142 Ibid., para. 98. Cf. also Dubetska a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 10 February 2011, appl. no. 30499/03,
para. 141.
143 Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para. 103, with a reference to
Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), ECtHR 18 February 1991, appl. no. 12033/86, para. 48.
144 Ibid. The Court eventually found that the fact that the steel plant did not comply with the
domestic environmental standards with regard to the necessary sanitary zone, in combination
with the fact that the state had failed to regulate the industry and provide the applicant
with a solution, was reason for finding a violation.
145 Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 2 October 2001, appl. no. 36022/97; Hatton a. O. v. the UK,
ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97.
146 It had held that ‘mere reference to the economic well-being of the country is not sufficient
to outweigh the rights of others’ (Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 2 October 2001, appl. no.
36022/97, para. 97).
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breached was the subsidiary position of the Strasbourg Court and the state’s
wide margin of appreciation, as well as, indeed, the fact that the ‘element of
domestic irregularity is wholly absent in the present case’.147 What Hatton
thereby seems to confirm is that especially in the absence of such an irregular-
ity, the leeway the Court grants seems a strong indication that it will not find
a violation.
However, it must be noted that apart from the element of whether national
rules were complied with, the Grand Chamber in Hatton also stated that in
cases ‘involving State decisions affecting environmental issues’, besides an
assessment of the substantive merits of the case, ‘it may scrutinise the decision-
making process to ensure that due weight has been accorded to the interests
of the individual’.148 And although in Hatton the applicants were not much
aided by this ‘procedural test’, in later cases it has been shown to form a
workable starting point for investigating environmental health complaints in
a meaningful manner, without thereby interfering with the decisions made
at the national level in a too far-reaching manner. Just like in the context of
housing,149 procedural review that moreover looks at whether the socio-eco-
nomic needs of the individuals involved were duly considered, allows the
Court to give attention to serious health concerns even if the authorities did
not act contrary to domestic legislation.
A good example is the case of Taskin and Others v. Turkey, which concerned
a complaint about the issuing of permit to use a cyanidation operation process
that posed a risk for human health and safety and where the Court recalled
the possibility of ‘procedural review’.150 In Taskin, the Court only briefly
reflected on the substantial aspect and referred to the wide margin of appreci-
ation granted in this regard. Procedurally, however, it held that in complex
issues of environmental and economic policy,
‘the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and
such as to afford due respect for the interests of the individual as safeguarded by
Article 8 … It is therefore necessary to consider all the procedural aspects, including
the type of policy or decision involved, the extent to which the views of individuals
were taken into account throughout the decision-making process, and the pro-
cedural safeguards available.’151
147 Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97, para. 120.
148 Ibid., para. 99.
149 See, especially, the Roma housing case law that was presented in the previous chapter (supra,
Ch. 8, S. 8.3). See also the way the Court deals with issues concerning the respect for the
home more generally (supra, Ch. 8, S. 8.2.1.1).
150 Taskin a. O. v. Turkey, ECtHR 10 November 2004, appl. no. 46117/99, para. 115.
151 Ibid., para. 118. Cf. also Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97,
para. 104; Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00, para. 82; Hardy
and Maile v. the UK, ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 31965/07, para. 219.
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More concretely,
‘the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate investigations and
studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of
those activities which might damage the environment and infringe individuals’
rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting
interests at stake … The importance of public access to the conclusions of such
studies and to information which would enable members of the public to assess
the danger to which they are exposed is beyond question … [They must] be able
to appeal to the courts against any decision, act or omission where they consider
that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in the
decision-making process.’152
Because in Taskin the authorities had ‘deprived the procedural guarantees
available to the applicants of any useful effect’, the Court concluded that
Article 8 had been breached.
Another example of the Court’s emphasis on ‘procedural review’ is the
case of Giacomelli v. Italy, which concerned an applicant who lived 30 metres
away from a plant for the storage and treatment of ‘special waste’.153 An
environmental impact assessment had only been initiated years after the
‘detoxification’ of the hazardous waste had begun to take place. The Court
in this regard
‘considers that the procedural machinery provided for in domestic law for the
protection of individual rights, in particular the obligation to conduct an environ-
mental-impact assessment prior to any project with potentially harmful environ-
mental consequences and the possibility for any citizens concerned to participate
in the licensing procedure and to submit their own observations to the judicial
authorities and, where appropriate, obtain an order for the suspension of a danger-
ous activity, were deprived of useful effect in the instant case for a very long
period.’154
152 Taskin a. O. v. Turkey, ECtHR 10 November 2004, appl. no. 46117/99, para. 119. See also,
e.g., Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00, para. 83; Grimkovskaya
v. Ukraine, ECtHR 28 June 2011, appl. no. 38182/03, para. 67, Hardy and Maile v. the UK,
ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 31965/07, paras. 220/221.
153 Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00.
154 Ibid., para. 94.
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There had hence been a violation of the Convention.155
In a later case the Court has found a violation on the basis of the fact that
that the state had failed to provide the information known in order for those
involved to take the necessary steps, thereby referring to the importance of
the precautionary principle.156 Elsewhere, it held that the fact that it had
taken ten years before an issue was settled before the domestic authorities
made that the state had failed to show due diligence and give proper consider-
ation to all competing interests.157 In other instances the Court has concluded
that the procedural safeguards were sufficient, and combined with a deferential
stance on the substantive issue, this then often led to the conclusion that Article
8 had not been breached.158 In any case, it seems that by now, the Court has
moved from a rather narrow focus on national irregularities, to a test that
encompasses review of the substantive issue and an explicit focus on the
(decision-making) procedures concerned and whether these have shown due
account to the (health, housing, and other) needs of the individuals involved.
Thereby, it seems to have found an approach that has at least has the potential
of providing effective and indivisible socio-economic protection, while prevent-
ing the Court from overstepping the boundaries of its delicate task. In fact,
when combined with a clear determination of the scope of the Convention
on the basis of the (essential) importance of the (health) interests concerned,
this approach could come close to what feasible minimum core protection in
a complex field like environmental policy may entail.159
9.4.3 An ‘Environmental Policy’ Margin
The (wide) margin of appreciation the Court grants the national authorities
in cases concerning environmental pollution already has been briefly touched
upon. To conclude this chapter, however, a few more remarks may be made
on how the Court uses the margin of appreciation doctrine in this part of its
155 See for a comparable, ‘purely’ procedural violation of Article 8 due to a failure to (timely)
conduct the necessary studies Lemke v. Turkey, ECtHR 5 June 2007, appl. no. 17381/02. Also
in the case of Mileva a. O. v. Bulgaria (ECtHR 25 November 2010, appl. nos. 43449/02 and
21475/04), a procedural violation was found in respect to complaints about noise resulting
from a computer club. The Court held that ‘the respondent State failed to approach the
matter with due diligence or to give proper consideration to all competing interests, and
thus to discharge its positive obligation to ensure the applicants’ right to respect for their
private and family lives’.
156 Tâtar v. Romenia, ECtHR 27 Januray 2009, appl. no. 67021/01.
157 Udovicic v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 April 2014, appl. no. 27310/09.
158 Hardy and Maile v. the UK, ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 31965/07. See also Luginbühl
v. Switzerland, ECtHR 17 January 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 42756/02; Gaida v. Germany, ECtHR
3 July 2007 (dec.), appl. no. 32015/02.
159 See, supra, Ch. 7, S. 7.4, and for some more concrete conclusions in this regard, infra, Ch.
11, S. 11.1.
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case law, and whether this allies with the aims of providing effective and
indivisible protection.
In regard to its review of environmental issues the Court has often held
that
‘[w]hether the question is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State – to
take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under
paragraph 1 of Article 8 –, or in terms of an ‘interference by a public authority’
to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles are broadly
similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole,
and in any case the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.’160
These general considerations bring up at least two questions. First, they do
not make clear what ‘a certain’ margin is, or how the margin that applies in
a particular case needs to be determined. Moreover, the quotation does not
say anything on how the requirement of a fair balance and the margin that
is granted relate to each other.
In regard to the first question, it may be noted that Court has often re-
peated that the scope of the margin is dependent on the context of the case.
More precisely, the relevant factors that determine the scope of the margin
include ‘the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the
individual and the nature of the activities concerned’.161 However, as already
became clear in the previous subsection, the applicable margin in environ-
mental health issues is generally a ‘wide’ one,162 and it may hence be asked
whether the Court truly takes the individual interests concerned into account.
160 López Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 16798/90, para. 51. See also, e.g.,
Powell and Rayner v. the UK, ECtHR 21 February 1990, appl. no. 9310/81, para. 41; Hatton
a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97, para. 98; Giacomelli v. Italy,
ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00, para. 78.
161 See, for the first time, Buckley v. the UK, ECtHR 25 September 1996, appl. no. 20348/92,
para. 74.
162 See, e.g., Taskin a. O. v. Turkey, ECtHR 10 November 2004, appl. no. 46117/99, paras. 116-117;
Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para. 104 ; Ledyayeva, Dobrokhoto-
va, Zolotareva and Romashina v. Russia, ECtHR 26 October 2006, appl. nos. 53157/99; 53247/99;
56850/00 and 53695/00, para. 110; Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no.
59909/00, para. 80; Fägerskiöld v. Sweden, ECtHR 26 February 2008 (dec.), appl. no. 37604/04;
Walkuska v. Poland, ECtHR 29 April 2008 (dec.), appl. no. 6817/04; Allen a.O. v. the UK,
ECtHR 6 October 2009, appl no. 5591/07, para. 60; Dubetska a. O. v. Ukraine, ECtHR 10
February 2011, appl. no. 30499/03, para. 141; Zammit Maempel v. Malta, ECtHR 22 November
2011, appl. no. 24202/10, para. 66; Hardy and Maile v. the UK, ECtHR 14 February 2012,
appl. no. 31965/07, para. 218. On the other hand, no expressly ‘wide’ margin is given in
for example López Ostra v. Spain, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 16798/90, para. 58;
Deés v. Hungary, ECtHR 9 November 2010, appl. no. 2345/06, para. 23; Mileva a. O. v.
Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 November 2010, appl. nos. 43449/02 and 21475/04, para. 98. A ‘consider-
able’ margin was applied in Grimkovskaya v. Ukraine, ECtHR 28 June 2011, appl. no. 38182/
03, par. 65.
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The case of Hatton and Others provides an interesting example in this regard.
In this case the Grand Chamber held that it was ‘faced with conflicting views
as to the margin of appreciation to be applied’.163 Discussing the issue of
whether the state’s regulations on limitations for night flights had struck a
fair balance between the individual and the general interests involved, it
considered that
‘on the one hand, the Government claim a wide margin on the ground that the
case concerns matters of general policy, and, on the other hand, the applicants’
claim that where the ability to sleep is affected, the margin is narrow because of
the “intimate” nature of the right protected. This conflict of views on the margin
of appreciation can be resolved only by reference to the context of a particular
case.’164
In this particular context, it found that the issue of sleep deprivation was not
‘intimate enough’ for concluding that the margin of appreciation had to be
a narrow one,165 and it instead opted for the wide ‘environmental
margin’.166 This turned out to be one of the most important reasons for why
the Grand Chamber judgment in Hatton has been criticised.167 Indeed, in
Hatton the fact that the severity of the individual interests at stake could also
mitigate the margin – rather than only turn it into a very narrow one – is not
even considered, which means that it hardly seems possible to overcome the
wide margin the Court ‘generally’ grants in the field of environmental policy.
Especially when the Court would apply the various thresholds for applying
the Convention that were discussed in Section 9.4.1 in a consistent manner,
this approach is questionable. After all, the environmental cases it would then
review are those that explicitly concern ‘direct effects’ on individuals that
moreover have reached a ‘minimum level of severity’.168 Given that some-
thing serious is going on for the applicants concerned, thus, this would seem
reason to at least consider the possibility of (somewhat) narrowing down the
margin of appreciation.
163 Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97, para. 103.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., para. 123: ‘However, the sleep disturbances relied on by the applicants did not intrude
into an aspect of private life in a manner comparable to that of the criminal measures
considered in Dudgeon to call for an especially narrow scope for the State’s margin of
appreciation … Rather, the normal rule applicable to general policy decisions … would
seem to be pertinent here.’
166 In any case, moreover, it stated that ‘[e]nvironmental protection should be taken into
consideration by States in acting within their margin of appreciation and by the Court in
its review of that margin, but it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a special
approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human rights’
(Hatton a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 8 July 2003, appl. no. 36022/97, para. 122).
167 See the dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupancic, and Steiner, under
III. Cf. Koch 2009, p. 69ff.
168 See Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para. 88.
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As regards the second question, which concerns the relation between the
requirement of a fair balance and the applicable margin, it may be considered
that the Court uses different approaches dependent on whether the substantive
or rather the procedural aspect of the Court’s review is concerned. In Taskin
and Others v. Turkey, for example, it clearly distinguished between these two
and when discussing the former, the ECtHR noted that interests had been
balanced by the national court and held that ‘no other examination of the
material aspect of the case with regard to the margin of appreciation generally
allowed to the national authorities in this area is necessary’.169 It then pro-
ceeded with a stricter review of the procedural aspect, yet without noting what
margin is to be granted in this regard.170 The judgment in Giacomelli v. Italy
is equally obscure as to the exact function of the doctrine. There, it was stated
that ‘[i]n determining the scope of the margin of appreciation allowed to the re-
spondent State, the Court must … examine whether due weight was given
to the applicant’s interests and whether sufficient procedural safeguards were
available to her’.171 It appears from this that rather than something that deter-
mines the strictness of the Court’s review, the margin is instead what follows
from a procedural test.172 However, the quotation could also be read as mere-
ly implying that the procedural aspects of a case can generally be scrutinised
more closely. The latter would be in keeping with Taskin as well as with what
the Court said in Fadeyeva v. Russia, namely that
‘it is certainly within the Court’s jurisdiction to assess whether the Government
approached the problem with due diligence and gave consideration to all the
competing interests. In this respect the Court reiterates that the onus is on the State
to justify, using detailed and rigorous data, a situation in which certain individuals
bear a heavy burden on behalf of the rest of the community.’173
Indeed, thus, it seems that, where the procedural safeguards are concerned,
the margin left to the authorities is more or less insignificant. One could also
say that a certain substantive margin of discretion is then ‘built into’ the test
itself, as the requirement of procedural safeguards does not ask what the right
169 Taskin a. O. v. Turkey, ECtHR 10 November 2004, appl. no. 46117/99, para. 117.
170 Cf. also Udovicic v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 April 2014, appl. no. 27310/09, where the Court also
conducted a ‘procedural’ test and did not refer to the margin once.
171 Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00, para. 80 [emphasis added].
172 The outcome of this case is however confusing in this regard, because after having discussed
the procedural safeguards and whether the applicants’ interests had been sufficiently taken
into account, the Court concludes that ‘notwithstanding the margin of appreciation left
to the respondent State, the Court considers that the State did not succeed in striking a
fair balance’ (Giacomelli v. Italy, ECtHR 2 November 2006, appl. no. 59909/00, para. 97).
This again seems to imply that the margin was given, before the Court conducted its
procedural test.
173 Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECtHR 9 June 2005, appl. no. 55723/00, para 128.
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answer (or rights means for protecting the right at stake174) would have been,
but rather whether the individual needs of the individual were given serious
attention. Emphasising the ‘non-negotiability’ of this requirement may increase
the effectiveness of the Court’s approach to environmental issues, and signal
that it is willing to provide truly indivisible protection in this regard.
9.5 CONCLUSION
It has been shown in this chapter that the Court has over the years dealt with
a great variety of (social) health issues. Some of these directly concern claims
for care or medicine, while others – like the cases concerning environmental
pollution – concern the issue of health in a more indirect manner. The relevant
cases are numerous and the Court often deals with them in a very case-specific
fashion, taking into account the particular (health-related) circumstances
concerned. This chapter aimed to illuminate some general lines and develop-
ments in the Court’s case law on health and health care, in order to answer
the question of whether its approach can provide for effective, indivisible
protection that nevertheless fits the (limited) role of the Court in the sensitive
context of health. Some of the important points that were discussed are worth
summarising here.
First of all, Section 9.2 discussed the protection of claims for care and
medication under Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Convention. It was seen that the
guarantees that can be distilled from the Convention in this regard are, at most,
‘minimum guarantees’. That is, the Court often holds that individuals should
not be denied care that has been made available to the public generally, yet
when it comes to exceptional or expensive medicine or care, the Court gen-
erally refrains from interfering with the decisions made at the national level.
Even though the cases concerned may involve issues of life and death, the
Court’s restraint seems understandable given the limited resources of the states
and the likewise limited role of the ECtHR in determining what would be the
proper choice regarding the distribution thereof. Nevertheless, although the
level of care that is provided to the public generally seems something the state
can freely decide upon, the case law suggests that it should nevertheless attain
a certain minimum level. This would mean that in exceptional circumstances,
applicants may rely on the Convention, although the Court has failed to further
elaborate on this.
Besides the Court’s hesitant approach to positive claims for care, however,
in Section 9.3 it was shown that in some contexts it provides more concrete
duties for the state. This is the case when for example detainees are concerned,
or other vulnerable individuals who are placed under the control of the state.
174 Ibid., para 124.
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In this regard the state has the responsibility to provide ‘adequate care’ suited
to the needs of the individual concerned.
Finally, a look was had at the Court’s reasoning in ‘environmental health’
cases (Section 9.4). Although these cases do not exclusively concern the issue
of the health of the applicants, they form an important illustration of how the
ECtHR has made an effort at providing effective protection in this field that
also ensures that the issue of health is given serious attention. It is natural
that environmental pollution may affect a person’s private life, yet the Court
has clarified that in order to raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention,
there must be a ‘direct effect’ that moreover reaches a ‘minimum level of
severity’. It was argued that with the help of these thresholds, the Court seems
able to distinguish between more and less serious (or fundamental) issues,
i.e., between those environmental cases that do and that do not deserve review
under the Convention. However, it was also argued that the thresholds could
be applied in a more consistent manner. The issue of whether a fair balance
has been struck between the competing interests concerned, then, is answered
by the Court by foremost having regard to whether the authorities have acted
in conformity with national legislation. Besides that, it looks at whether suffi-
cient procedural safeguards have been provided. This has enabled the Court,
without having to embark on the substantive outcomes concerned, to provide
meaningful review. By requiring that the individual interests are duly taken
into account at the national level, moreover, the procedural requirements it
has formulated do not remain substantively empty but instead can protect
the socio-economic needs of the individuals involved in complex decision-
making on environmental issues. Indeed, although its use of the margin in
socio-economic cases does not seem to bear witness to this, the Court generally





The Convention does not contain a provision guaranteeing (or even containing
the words) social security. As will be illustrated in this chapter, however, the
ECtHR is clearly engaged with this topic. An explanation for this may be that
social security has become an inherent aspect of the welfare-oriented state that
developed after the Second World War, which has brought along questions
and conflicts concerning procedural protection, equal treatment, etc. Moreover,
(the lack of) social security measures can seriously affect an individual’s private
life and proprietary interests – issues that have an obvious relation to the
Convention. In fact, over the past years the Court’s engagement in the area
of social security has expanded significantly and by now its case law on this
topic forms a substantial part of the Strasbourg fundamental rights acquis.
Nevertheless, the fact that social security clearly is an ECHR issue does not
yet answer the question whether one can also distil an individual right to social
security from the Convention. On the one hand, the fact that the ECtHR receives
many social security complaints might suggest that it is generally thought that
such a right can be claimed. On the other hand, since the Convention does
not contain any norm explicitly dealing with this topic, it could be expected
that a right to social security is unlikely to be ‘read into’ the Convention. In
reality, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The Convention does not
unequivocally guarantee a subjective right to be provided with social security
benefits, yet a close look at the case law prevents the conclusion that a social
security benefit not awarded to an individual at the national level can never
be successfully claimed by means of the Convention.
The overview presented in this chapter is intended to illuminate what the
effects are of the Court’s ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’ approaches to ECHR
protection in cases dealing with the topic of social security.1 It is explained
to what extent the Court’s interpretation enables review of social security
issues, and explored what it has said about often complex and politically
sensitive, national social security arrangements. This discussion must be seen
1 Part of the material presented in this chapter previously appeared, in a different form, in
‘From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights’, 13 Human Rights Law Review 2013, pp. 309-349 (Leijten
2013a) (see also Leijten 2013b).
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in the general context discussed in Chapter 2 of this book, in particular against
the backdrop of the criticism that has been directed at the ECtHR’s case law
dealing with economic and social interests.2 It was mentioned there that the
main criticism is that in socio-economic cases the Court proceeds in an alto-
gether too incremental and casuistic manner, relying on ad hoc reasoning while
not providing for principled guidance. Moreover, it has been said that although
the Court’s interpretation of the Convention rights may promise a lot, the
actual protection it offers is often very limited. Just like in the chapters on
housing and health care, in this chapter it is asked if the Court’s reasoning
is transparent and provides the certainty that is needed to develop a case law
that furthers the aims of effective and indivisible protection as well as fits in
well with the particular role of the Court. It is seen whether it is really clear
when exactly a social security benefit amounts to a possession for purposes
of review under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, and whether
the Court’s proportionality analysis provides sufficiently clear reasons for why
a certain conclusion is reached.
These various issues will be dealt with in this chapter as follows. In Section
10.2 some further introductory remarks will be made with regard to the
relation between the Convention and social security protection. It is explained
how this issue is linked to the Court’s understanding of the right to respect
for private and family life and the protection of property, as well as may
trigger review under Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention. Thereafter, the chapter
will provide a more in-depth analysis of the cases that concern property
protection,3 addressing the issues and questions formulated above. Section
10.3 deals with cases concerning alleged discrimination and property rights.
It shows that non-discrimination review has in fact been the driving force
behind the development of the Strasbourg social security case law, although
the eventual protection provided is arguably limited. The extent to which the
Court deals with social security complaints that do not involve alleged dis-
crimination is the subject of Section 10.4. This section illuminates a range of
cases concerning in particular revocations and reductions of benefits and
pensions, and shows the way in which the Court is dealing with issues of this
kind as well as the room there might be for more core rights-oriented pro-
tection. Section 10.6 summarises the chapter’s findings.
2 Supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.6.2.
3 This because in cases concerning social security (welfare benefits, pensions, etc.) Art. 1 P1
has proven to be by far the most relevant Convention article. Moreover, the limited attention
in this chapter for the other articles relevant in the context of social security can be explained
by the fact that issues that could be considered to be ‘social security cases’ under for
example Art. 3 or 8 frequently concern housing or health care assistance, and have for that
reason been discussed in, supra, Ch. 8 and 9, respectively.
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10.2 SOCIAL SECURITY AS AN ECHR ISSUE
To enable a more thorough discussion of the ECtHR’s social security case law,
its potential and pitfalls, it is useful first to explore the link between the
Convention and social security in more general terms. Contrary to various
other (socio-economic) fundamental rights documents,4 the ECHR does not
contain any reference to (a right to) social security.5 Besides, social security
regulation is generally perceived as a national prerogative. Nonetheless, there
are several connections between this topic and the norms enumerated in the
Convention that ensure that social security interests can be considered to be
protected by it. It has turned out to be impossible – as well as undesirable –
to maintain a ‘water-tight division’ between the sphere of the Convention and
social security issues.6 To explain this, this section first looks at the relation
between the right to respect for private life and family life and to protection
of property and social security complaints (10.2.1). Thereafter, the (indirect)
protection of social security claims on the basis of Article 3 ECHR and Article 6
ECHR is briefly discussed (10.2.2).
10.2.1 A Strained Relationship with Article 8 and Article 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR
Be it in the form of health care allowances, a state pension or another form
of assistance, the modern welfare state organises a certain level of redistribu-
tion, the fruits of which are enjoyed by a significant percentage of individuals.
Yet this does not automatically make social security a fundamental rights issue.
Indeed, it is still often considered that the provision of social assistance – at
least when not based on prior contributions – has nothing to do with the idea
of ‘rights’, properly understood. Rather, receiving ‘solidarity benefits’ is fre-
quently perceived as a privilege that in the light of changing political prefer-
ences or budgetary considerations can be revoked almost as easily as it was
created. At a closer look, however, this understanding seems oversimplified.
Not only do many individuals receive some kind of social assistance, a signi-
ficant number of them today is dependent on the provision of state-organised
support. When private social networks fail to provide the necessary safety
nets and this task is largely left to fine-grained social security schemes, the
relation between individuals and the ‘social state’ becomes a prominent one.
Indeed, this relation is an asymmetrical one, characterised by the power of
4 See, e.g., Art. 22 UDHR; Art. 9 ICESCR; Art. 12 (R)ESC; as well as the materials of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). See also Art. 34 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (CFR).
5 Indeed, it can be said that the (textual) link between the Convention and housing and health
issues is less controversial than the ECHR’s connection with social security. See, supra, Ch.
8 and 9.
6 Cf. Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR 9 October 1979, appl. no. 6289/73, para. 26.
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the state and the vulnerability of the individual concerned, thus creating a
situation in which fundamental individual interests can be harmed.7
The inherent relation between social security and fundamental individual
interests provides an answer to the question why this topic is relevant under
the Convention, next to in the context of economic and social fundamental
rights. Still, and this may be unsurprising given the lack of a textual reference
in the Convention, the obvious effects of (the revocation of) social security
measures for an individual’s private and/or family life have not automatically
led to the applicability of Article 8 and the prohibition of disproportional
interferences or omissions on the basis of this norm.8 In a similar vein, the
importance of pecuniary support has not compelled the straightforward
recognition of all social security benefits as ‘possessions’ deserving protection
under the right to protection of property.
What has always proven relevant in the context of social security and the
Convention is the prohibition of discrimination. Via this provision the rights
under Article 8 and Article 1 P1 have increasingly come to be applied to
matters of social security.9 Important in this regard is that although the prohi-
bition of discrimination (Article 14) is not a self-standing requirement, its scope
of application is relatively broad as it covers the ‘ambit’ of the substantive
right invoked together with Article 14, rather than the more narrow ‘scope’
of this right that is decisive when there is no unequal treatment involved.10
An example of how this can lead to social security protection is the case of
Petrovic v. Austria.11 In this case the applicant father was refused a parental
leave allowance because only mothers could claim this allowance. Discussing
the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court in this case held
that ‘the refusal to grant Mr Petrovic a parental leave allowance cannot amount
to a failure to respect family life, since Article 8 does not impose any positive
obligation on states to provide the financial assistance in question’.12 Yet since
the applicant had invoked Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 (the prohi-
bition of discrimination), the Court continued as follows:
7 According to Kenny 2010, p. 502, certain themes recur in the Court’s social security case
law: ‘[C]ertain members of society are dependent on the state’s provision of social welfare;
those members deserve certainty and security; social welfare is an expression of society’s
solidarity with its more vulnerable members’.
8 This is different in cases concerning evictions and other housing matters, that have ‘auto-
matically’ been considered to fall within the scope of Art. 8. However, this primarily has
to do with the fact that Art. 8 contains a ‘right to respect for the home’, although positive
obligations under Art. 8 more generally have been recognised as well. See, supra, Ch. 8.
9 Bossuyt 2007, p. 321. See also Koch 2003, p. 19.
10 For the point that the ‘ambit’ is generally perceived as something that is more inclusive
than the narrow ‘scope’ of the right that is invoked together with Art. 14, see, supra, Ch.
2, S. 2.4.2.2 and, e.g., Wintemute 2004; Wintemute 2004a; Arnardóttir 2014.
11 Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, appl. no. 20458/92.
12 Ibid., para. 26.
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‘Nonetheless, this allowance paid by the State is intended to promote family life
and necessarily affects the way in which the latter is organised as, in conjunction
with parental leave, it enables one of the parents to stay at home to look after the
children. The Court has said on many occasions that Article 14 comes in play
whenever “the subject-matter of the disadvantage … constitutes one of the
modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed” … or the measures complained
of are “linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed” … By granting parental leave
allowance States are able to demonstrate their respect for family life within the
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention; the allowance therefore comes within the
scope of that provision. It follows that Article 14 – taken together with Article 8 –
is applicable.’13
Petrovic thus shows that whereas the Court quite resolutely rejected the possi-
bility of recognising positive claims to parental leave allowances under the
Convention directly,14 it was willing to review the case in the light of the
prohibition of discrimination.15 Because the allowance paid was intended
at promoting and affects family life, there was a sufficient relation with Article
8 for holding that Article 14 applied.
This may raise the question of how direct the connection of social benefits
with private and family life needs to be to enable the Court to deal with a
complaint via the non-discrimination clause. The Court’s judgment can be read
as implying that only because parental leave allowances directly relate to the
organisation of family life, the connection with Article 8 is a sufficient one.16
Other arrangements then, that only have a more indirect impact on family
and/or private life or have not been expressly created by the state to demon-
strate respect for these rights, might not open up the possibility of non-dis-
crimination review. At the same time, given the broadness of especially the
notion of ‘private life’, and the fact that the Court has often underlined that
‘Article 14 comes into play whenever “the subject-matter of the disadvantage
13 Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, appl. no. 20458/92, paras. 27-29.
14 Regardless of the Court’s strictness in Petrovic, however, it has become clear that when
there is a ‘direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an applicant and
the latter’s private life’, Article 8 taken alone can apply to social assistance issues as well.
See, e.g., Marzari v. Italy, ECtHR 4 May 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 36448/97, which concerned
housing assistance and was discussed in, supra, Ch. 8, S. 8.2.1.2.
15 It however did not find a violation, because Austria could not be blamed for the fact that
it had only gradually introduced legislation extending parental leave allowance to fathers
(Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, appl. no. 20458/92, para. 41). Cf. Koch 2003,
p. 23; Kapuy 2007, p. 231; Koch 2009, pp. 188-198.
16 Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, appl. no. 20458/92, para. 29. Cf. also Okpisz v.
Germany, ECtHR 25 October 2005, appl. no. 59140/00, para. 32; Niedzwiecki v. Germany,
ECtHR 25 October 2005, appl. no. 58453/00, para. 31; Konstantin Markin v. Russia, ECtHR
7 October 2010, appl. no. 30078/06, para. 45; Konstantin Markin v. Russia, ECtHR (GC) 22
March 2012, appl. no. 30078/06, para. 130.
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... constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed”’,17
the variety of social security arrangements that can be reviewed does not
appear to be very limited.18 Indeed, when either the benefit (e.g., a survivors’
benefit) or the relation concerned (e.g., a homosexual relation) falls within the
‘wider ambit’ of private or family life, Article 14 will apply.19
Also in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the prohibition of discrimina-
tion provides an important route towards protection.20 The applicability of
Article 1 P1 normally depends on the economic value the interest complained
about has or does not have.21 Moreover, for a property right to be recognised
as justiciable it should generally be an existing right.22 Alternatively, there
should be a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining effective enjoyment of such
right.23 A right to acquire property is not recognised,24 and it is thus not
surprising that the Court has held that Article 1 P1 does not oblige a state to
provide individuals with certain benefits. Nevertheless, over time it has
allowed for the adjudication of a great number of benefits-related cases,25
again foremost through the prohibition of discrimination.26 When a benefit
not necessarily amounts to a ‘possession’, but nevertheless falls ‘within the
ambit’ of the protection of property, and is not awarded because of a failure
17 E.g., Petrovic v. Austria, ECtHR 27 March 1998, appl. no. 20458/92, para. 29; Konstantin
Markin v. Russia, ECtHR (GC) 22 March 2012, appl. no. 30078/06, para. 129.
18 Cf., e.g., Karner v. Austria, ECtHR 24 July 2003, appl. no. 40016/98, discussed in, supra, Ch.
8, S. 8.2.3, which concerned the succession of a tenancy which was allowed to ‘life-com-
panions’ but refused to homosexuals.
19 Cf. Arnardóttir 2014. Also important in this regard is the development of Art. 1 of Protocol
No. 12, which provides for a ‘self-standing’ non-discrimination provision and is hence
applicable regardless of whether another Convention right is involved. See, supra, Ch. 2,
S. 2.6.1. However, the practical added value of this article has thus far turned out limited.
See, e.g., the case of Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 23 October 2012 (dec.),
appl. no. 34880/12, that is discussed in, infra, S. 10.3.
20 Koch and Vedsted-Hansen 2006, p. 20, in this regard hold that although the prohibition
of discrimination is often regarded as a negative right, it ‘may have positive implications
if the differential treatment concerns distribution of certain benefits’.
21 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 866, point out that it is difficult to deduce precise criteria from the
Court’s case law, but that ‘[t]he basic point of departure seems to be the economic value
of the right or interest: whenever State measures do not affect this economic value, no
responsibility under Article 1 is engaged’.
22 See Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 869. In the case of Stran Greek Refinieries and Stratis Andeadis
v. Greece, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no. 13427/87, the Court noted that an existing
right should be ‘sufficiently established to be enforceable’ (para. 59).
23 Mere ‘hope’ is not enough. See Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, ECtHR (GC)
12 July 2001, appl. no. 42527/98, where it concerned the expropriation of a painting of the
father of the applicant, in 1946. The right had become non-exercisable and did hence not
amount ot a ‘legitimate expectation’ (para. 85). See also Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 869.
24 E.g., Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR 23 November 1983, appl. no. 8919/80, para. 48;
Pistorova v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 26 October 2004, appl. no. 73578/01, para. 38.
25 See, especially, infra, S. 10.4.
26 Cf. also Cousins 2009.
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to fulfil an allegedly discriminatory criterion, an obligation to be provided
with this benefit could follow from the Convention.
A classic illustration of how Article 14 can protect social security interests
is the case of Koua Poirrez v. France, which concerned unequal treatment on
the basis of nationality.27 The applicant had been registered as 80% disabled
and had been issued with an invalids’ card, but because he did not have the
French nationality he was refused a disability allowance. The Court held that
the right concerned ‘is a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 P1’.28
In this regard, it considered that
‘the refusal to award the allowance to the applicant prior to June 1998 was based
on criteria – possession of French nationality or the nationality of a country having
signed a reciprocity agreement with France in respect of the AAH [allowance for
disabled adults] – which amount to a distinction for the purposes of Article 14 of
the Convention.’29
The Court reviewed the case under Article 1 P1 in conjunction with the non-
discrimination principle, and given the suspect character30 of a distinction
made on the ground of nationality and the fact that the government had not
adduced an ‘objective and reasonable justification’, it found a breach of the
Convention.31 Although the case of Koua Poirrez arguably could have also
been reviewed under Article 1 P1 taken alone,32 it was dealt with as a matter
of unequal treatment, which eventually led to protection of the social security
interest in question.
Thus, it can be said that both in relation to Article 8 and Article 1 P1,
Article 14 plays an important role in the review of social security issues. It
allows for meaningful review, even when there is no substantive right to the
benefit concerned under the Convention. The exact implications of the Court’s
non-discrimination review in relation to property rights issues will be further
elaborated in Section 10.3. Moreover, in Section 10.4 it is discussed that –
arguably also as a corollary of the broad understanding of the ‘ambit’ of the
right to protection of property – the Court by now reviews a great variety of
social security issues under Article 1 P1 taken alone as well. Most of these
issues, it will be shown, are of a particularly complex kind, concerning for
example sensitive dilemmas related to gender-based distinctions, systems in
27 Koua Poirrez v. France, ECtHR 30 September 2002, appl. no.40892/98.
28 Ibid., para. 37.
29 Ibid., para. 41.
30 Generally, ‘supsect classifications’ require ‘very weighty reasons’ to be justified. See, e.g.,
Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 1046-1049. Cf. Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR 16 September 1996, appl.
no. 17371/90, para. 42, were the Court held that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be
put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on
the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention’.
31 Koua Poirrez v. France, ECtHR 30 September 2002, appl. no.40892/98, paras. 46-50.
32 Ibid., para. 37.
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transition, or austerity measures taken in response to severe economic circum-
stances. Before further expounding upon social security issues qua property
rights matters, however, some remarks can be made about the role of Article 3
and Article 6 of the Convention.
10.2.2 The Relevance of Article 3 and Article 6 ECHR
Perhaps somewhat less obviously, next to Articles 14, 8, and 1 P1 ECHR there
are more Convention provisions relevant to the protection of social security
interests. First, Article 3, containing a right to freedom from torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, in a few cases has been
linked to social security issues.33 Needless to say, the absolute protection of
this article can only be triggered in very severe circumstances, or, in the
terminology of the Court, when these circumstances ‘attain a minimum level
of severity’.34 It has held that ‘[t]he assessment of this minimum is, in the
nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such
as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some
cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.’.35
In fact it is because of this ‘relative’ understanding that also issues related
to the provision of benefits cannot be excluded from the protection of Article 3.
In Larioshina v. Russia the applicant complained about the insufficient amount
of pension and other benefits she received for maintaining a proper standard
of living.36 In deciding on the admissibility of her complaint, the Court con-
sidered that
‘a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of pension and the other social
benefits may, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention which
prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. However, on the basis of the material
in its possession, the Court finds no indication that the amount of the applicant’s
pension and the additional social benefits has caused such damage to her physical
or mental health capable of attaining the minimum level of severity falling within
the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.’37
In the case of Budina v. Russia the Court confirmed that it is very difficult to
satisfy the (high) threshold of ‘a minimum level of severity’, especially when
33 See, on the applicability of this provision to socio-economic issues more generally, Cassese
1991. Needless to say, since this article was published, plenty of developments in the Court’s
case law have taken place.
34 Ireland v. the UK, ECtHR 18 January 1978, appl. no. 5310/71, para. 162.
35 Ibid. See also, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.3.2; Ch. 8, S. 8.2.4, Ch. 9, S. 9.2.2.
36 Larioshina v. Russia, ECtHR 23 April 2002 (dec.), appl. no. 56869/00.
37 Ibid.
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someone is not left bereft of ‘essential medical treatment’.38 Yet there is one
example of where the Court has found a violation of Article 3 in the context
of a social security-related matter. This is the case of M.S.S. v. Greece and
Belgium, which has been brought up already a few times.39 The case concerned
a situation in which an asylum seeker lacked minimum means of subsistence,
and although the Court held that Article 3 does not entail ‘any general obliga-
tion to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain
standard of living’,40 it did find a violation of this provision.41 Indeed, es-
pecially when a person is considered ‘vulnerable’42 and ‘dependent’43 on
the state, Article 3 may imply an obligation for the authorities to ensure a basic
level of socio-economic protection, yet is seems for them to decide on how
exactly this is arranged for.
Also in the Court’s case law on Article 6 (the right to fair trial) social security
cases can be found. In fact, compared to Article 3 it seems relatively easy to
attract the protection of this article since social security disputes generally are
considered to fall within the provision’s reach.44 However, if protection is
granted under this article, it is not of a substantive kind, as Article 6 only
ensures a procedure that meets the different fairness requirements.45
38 Budina v. Russia, ECtHR 18 June 2009 (dec.), appl. no. 45603/05. There, the Court reiterated
that the Convention may be relevant, but considered that ‘the applicant has failed to
substantiate her allegation that the lack of funds translated itself into concrete suffering’.
She had explained that her pension allowed her to pay her flat and sufficed for food and
hygiene items, ‘but was not enough for clothes, non-food goods, sanitary and cultural
services, health and sanatorium treatment’. In this regard the Court considered that she
was not left bereft of essential medical treatment and that her pension was hence not
insufficient to protect her from damage to her physical or mental health or from ‘a situation
of degradation incompatible for human dignity’. Cf. also Brems 2007, pp. 156-157. See also
Koch 2009, pp. 181-182.
39 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 253.
See, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.3.2 and Ch. 8, S. 8.2.4.
40 Ibid., para. 249, referring to Müslim v. Turkey, ECtHR 26 April 2005, appl. no. 53566/99,
para. 85.
41 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, paras. 263-264.
42 Ibid., para. 251.
43 Ibid., para. 253.
44 This because the notion of ‘civil rights and obligations’ in this provision has been interpreted
in an autonomous manner. Although in earlier cases the Court ‘balanced’ the private and
public aspects of a social security cases for finding out whether Art. 6 applied, since the
judgment in Salesi v. Italy, ECtHR 26 February 1993, appl. no. 13023/87, it is considered
that all social security disputes fall within the article’s reach. See also, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.2.1;
Kapuy 2007, pp. 223-225; Koch 2009, pp. 183-187.
45 It is not the Court’s function ‘to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by
a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms
protected by the Convention’ (Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, ECtHR (GC) 21 January 1999, appl. no.
30544/96, para. 28).
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This notwithstanding, it is worth providing an example of the protection
of Article 6 in social security cases in order to illustrate what this can imply.
The 2006 case of Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom concerned the applicant’s applica-
tion for housing and council tax benefits.46 Since she had failed to timely
apply for these benefits, Tsfayo also had requested backdated payment, yet
this was refused. Tsfayo appealed against this refusal before the Council
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Review Board (HBRB), but her appeal
was rejected. According to the Court, the HBRB only had to answer a simple
question of fact, namely whether there was ‘good cause’. The applicant had
provided evidence that she had not been notified that anything was amiss
with her claim for housing benefit until she received a notice from her landlord
because her rent was in arrears. This the HBRB had found unconvincing. The
Court, however, considered that ‘the HBRB was not merely lacking in inde-
pendence from the executive, but was directly connected to one of the parties
to the dispute, since it included five councillors from the local authority which
would be required to pay the benefit if awarded’, which ‘might infect the
independence of judgment in relation to the finding of primary fact in a
manner which could not be adequately scrutinised or rectified by judicial
review’.47 It concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) of the
Convention.48
Hence, next to Article 3, also Article 6 ECHR can be considered a relevant
additional guarantee when it comes to social security issues. Although it cannot
directly ensure a beneficial outcome, the example mentioned shows that it
can lead to meaningful protection in the sense of ensuring that social interests
are dealt with in a procedurally fair manner.49 This does not mean, however,
that next to relying on Article 6 applicants do not at the same time also try
46 Tsfayo v. UK, ECtHR 14 November 2006, appl. no. 60860/00. See on this case further Palmer
2009, pp. 420-421.
47 Tsfayo v. UK, ECtHR 14 November 2006, appl. no. 60860/00, para. 47.
48 Another interesting example concerns the cases of Maggio and Sterfanetti that will be
discussed more extensively with regard to the Article 1 P1 complaints below (Maggio a.
O. v. Italy, ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and
56001/08; Stefanetti a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 15 April 2014, appl. nos. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/
10, 21855/10, 21860/10, 21863/10, 21869/10 and 21870/10). See, infra, S. 10.4. The cases
concerned the entry into force of a new law that altered the method of calculation of
pensions of those who had spent part of their working lives in Switzerland. The Court
noted that this law settled retrospectively the terms of disputes on pension claims pending
before the ordinary courts. It considered that financial considerations could not alone be
reason for doing so, and that by interfering in a decisive manner in proceedings to which
it had been a party to ensure a favourable outcome the state had breached Article 6(1).
49 For a critical outlook on the far-reaching outcome in Tsfayo however, see Palmer 2009, pp.
420-421.
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to obtain substantive protection under the Convention, for example by invoking
Article 1 P1.50
10.3 ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AND PROPRIETARY INTERESTS
In Section 10.2.1, some introductory remarks were made about the role of the
non-discrimination provision taken together with Article 1 P1 in social security
cases, yet it is useful to provide some further (recent) examples of what this
role implies. It is the aim of this chapter to see whether the Court’s protection
of social security interests – besides being in line with the ideas effective and
indivisible protection – complies with the demands of transparency and
consistency. In this respect it is worth highlighting that, although it has always
been clear that Article 14 applies in some social security cases, there has been
and in fact remains some controversy on how far this application exactly
reaches. Moreover, holding that a case falls within the ambit of the right to
protection of property and can therefore be reviewed under Article 14 is only
the first step. It will be shown how the Court has reviewed a great variety
of mostly very complicated social security-related discrimination issues, and
whether this has led to effective as well as principled protection under the
Convention. To that end, after a more thorough analysis of the factual situ-
ations to which Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 P1 applies (10.3.1),
the Court’s review of the possible justifications for unequal treatment (10.3.2)
and the role of the margin of appreciation therein (10.3.3.) will be discussed.
10.3.1 The ‘Ambit’ of the Protection of Property
It was demonstrated in Section 10.2.1 that the requirement of non-discrimina-
tion in combination with Article 1 P1 is of great relevance in social security
cases. However, it has not always been crystal-clear how much exactly is
covered by the ‘ambit’ of this article. In most social security schemes the
connection between benefits and the contributions that have been paid is a
very loose one. Frequently, collective security systems are not linked to con-
tributions that can be individualised in any way. Moreover, many schemes
are based on the ‘principle of solidarity’, which implies that no contributions
have been paid at all. This has raised the question of whether also non-con-
tributory benefits actually can be considered to fall within the ambit of the
protection of property, and therefore trigger the applicability of Article 14 of
the Convention.
50 Cf. Maggio and Stefanetti (ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08,
54486/08 and 56001/08; ECtHR 15 April 2014, appl. nos. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/10,
21855/10, 21860/10, 21863/10, 21869/10 and 21870/10), discussed in, infra, S. 10.4.
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In Gaygusuz v. Austria, the ECtHR held the Convention applicable to a
complaint of a Turkish citizen living in Austria who claimed that he was
entitled to an advance on his pension in the form of emergency assistance.51
Just like Austrian nationals, Mr Gaygusuz had paid unemployment insurance
contributions. And even though emergency payments were granted by the
state to persons in need, and not directly funded by insurance contributions,
the Court found that the emergency benefit was available only to persons who
had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits. Accordingly,
Gaygusuz would have received emergency assistance but for his failure to
meet the condition that required beneficiaries of this benefit to be Austrian
nationals, and this was reason to render Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1
applicable.52 The controversy that emerged after the Court’s judgment was
whether the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme
was crucial for holding that the emergency benefit fell within the ambit of
Article 1 P1.53 Or was it rather the emergency character of the benefit that
made the Court hold that Article 14 was applicable?54
The Grand Chamber of the Court clarified this issue in its 2005 admissibility
decision in the case of Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom.55 The Stec case
has been of great importance for the development of the Court’s social security
case law and is therefore worth discussing in some detail. After Mrs Stec had
severely injured her back at work, she was unable to continue working and
was awarded a reduced earnings allowance (REA). This income-related addi-
tional benefit was a non-contributory one, i.e., it was not conditional on any
direct contributions to an insurer. As a result of the gradual termination of
the benefit, legislative measures were adopted to remove or reduce the com-
pensation for claimants no longer of working age. For Mrs Stec this meant
that when she reached the age of 60, her award was replaced by a less valuable
retirement allowance (RA). Due to the fact that at that time the pensionable
age in the UK was not the same for men and women, however, Mrs Stec would
51 Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR 16 September 1996, appl. no. 17371/90.
52 Ibid., para. 41.
53 See, e.g., Willis v. the UK, ECtHR 11 June 2002, appl. no. 36042/97, para 32, where the Court
states that ‘in Gaygusuz … it considered that the right to emergency assistance, entitlement
to which was linked to the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance fund,
constituted a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’. See also Kapuy
2007, p. 227.
54 This second rationale was illustrated in Koua Poirrez v. France, ECtHR 30 September 2003,
appl. no. 40892/98, para. 37: ‘The Court also points out that it has already held that the
right to emergency assistance – in so far as provided for in the applicable legislation – is
a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. That provision is therefore
applicable without it being necessary to rely solely on the link between entitlement to
emergency assistance and the obligation to pay “taxes or contributions”.’ See also Bossuyt
2007, pp. 321-322.
55 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR(GC) 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01. This
case was already briefly introduced in, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.4.2.2, 2.4.3.4, and 2.5.2.1.
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have received the more valuable REA until the age of 65 if she had been a man.
Before the Strasbourg Court she argued that the measures taken breached the
non-discrimination principle in conjunction with the right to property of Article
1 P1.56 Thus, the Court had to answer the question whether in this case the
non-contributory benefits came ‘within the ambit’ of the ‘possessions’ protected
by the ECHR.57
REA and RA were funded by general taxation rather than by the National
Insurance Scheme, which made it difficult for the Court to squarely hold that
the issue involved ‘possessions’. The UK government referred to Gaygusuz and
argued that it had relied on the rule laid out in that case that ‘there is no
entitlement … where … contributions have not been made’.58 The Court
however noted that ‘precedents’ had also pointed in a different direction.59
To end the confusion as to the applicability of Article 1 P1 to cases on social
security issues, the Grand Chamber now expressly decided to ‘examine afresh
the question whether a claim to a non-contributory welfare benefit should
attract the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.60 It first of all considered
that ‘since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection
of human rights’, changing conditions had to be taken into account to render
its rights ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory’.61 The Court
emphasised that the ECHR must be read as a whole to promote harmony and
internal consistency between the various provisions. In Salesi v. Italy it had
held that Article 6(1) ECHR (right to a fair trial) was applicable to a dispute
over entitlement to non-contributory welfare benefits.62 This was reason to
interpret the autonomous concept of ‘possessions’ accordingly.63 Also, the
56 Ibid., para. 33.
57 Ibid., para. 41.
58 Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR 16 September 1996, appl. no. 17371/90, para. 39.
59 I.e., that even a non-contributory benefit had incidentally constituted a possession. See,
e.g., Koua Poirrez v. France, ECtHR 30 September 2003, appl. no. 40892/98 (in this case Judge
Mularoni dissented from the majority because in her view the allowance could simply not
constitute a ‘possession’. Given the severity of the case however, she found that it could
have been reviewed under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR). The Court also
refers to Buchen v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 26 November 2002, appl. no. 36541/97, para.
46; Wessels-Bergervoet v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 4 June 2002, appl. no. 34462/97; Van den
Bouwhuijsen and Schuring v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 16 December 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 44658/
98.
60 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para.
47ff. Cf. also, supra, Ch. 2, S. 2.5.2.1.
61 Ibid., para. 47.
62 Salesi v. Italy, ECtHR 26 February 1993, appl. no. 13023/87. See also, Schuler-Zgraggen v.
Switzerland, ECtHR 24 June 1993, appl. no. 14518/89, para. 46: ‘[T]he development in the
law … and the principle of equality of treatment warrant taking the view that today the
general rule is that Article 6(1) does apply in the field of social insurance, including even
welfare assistance.’
63 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para.
49.
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variety of funding methods in the Member States made it ‘appear increasingly
artificial’ to include only contributory benefits. Doing so would moreover
disregard the fact that in a non-contributory benefit system, the payment of
taxes can also be regarded as a financial contribution.64 In the words of the
Court:
‘In the modern, democratic State, many individuals are, for all or part of their lives,
completely dependent for survival on social security and welfare benefits. Many
domestic legal systems recognize that such individuals require a degree of certainty
and security, and provide for benefits to be paid – subject to the fulfilment of the
conditions of eligibility – as of right.’65
The part of the decision headed ‘the approach to be applied henceforth’ ends
with the holding that since Article 1 P1 does not create a right to acquire
property, the freedom of the state to decide on whether and what kind of social
security system it creates is not in any way restricted. But if a state creates
a benefits scheme, and regardless of whether this scheme is a contributory
or a non-contributory one, ‘it must do so in a manner which is compatible
with Article 14’.66 Thus, Mrs Stec’s REA benefits came within the ambit of
Article 1 P1 and the Court held that Article 14 was applicable.
With the admissibility decision in Stec and Others the issue of social security
in relation to non-discrimination and the protection of property had been
clarified:67 whenever a state provides for benefits, of whatever kind, it must
do so in a non-discriminatory manner. Unsurprisingly, this rule has invited
many new social security-related applications – ever since the Stec-decision
applicants invoke this case as the main argument for why their complaints
deserve to be reviewed under the Convention. This has led to the admissibility
of highly complex issues concerning for example the cessation of the USSR and
the transition from a centralised socialist to a market economy, involving
questions concerning the payment pensions or the timing of social security
reforms.68 Several cases moreover not only confirm the straightforward
approach that was outlined in Stec, but also show that starting from the Stec-
64 Ibid., para. 50.
65 Ibid., para. 51.
66 Ibid., paras. 54-55.
67 An example of the effect of this clarity also in a national legal context is the statement by
Lord Neuberger in the House of Lords, who pointed out that Stec, ‘was a carefully con-
sidered decision, in which the relevant authorities and principles were fully canvassed,
and where the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR came to a clear conclusion, which was
expressly intended to be generally applied by national courts’. See R. (on the application
of RJM) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (RJM), UKHL 2008, 63, 3 W.L.R. 123, para.
31. See Cousins 2009, p. 122.
68 See, e.g., Andrejeva v. Latvia, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 2009, appl. no. 55707/00, and Andrle
v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 17 February 2011, appl. no. 6268/08, respectively.
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decision, the Court arguably took the applicability of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 1 P1 even further. It has become clear, for example, that when
instead of a particular benefit, access to a social security system and hence the
future possibility to obtain a benefit, is concerned, there is sufficient reason
for applying Article 14 as well.69 The unequal treatment an applicant com-
plains about hence does not need to be directly related to the granting of a
benefit as such.70 Moreover, whereas the Court has repeatedly held that
Article 1 P1 does not guarantee a right to a pension of any particular amount,
when a non-discrimination complaint concerns the level of a pension, this is
no reason to hold the case inadmissible.71
Thus, while de-emphasising the question of whether or not the interest at stake
in some way equals a possession, the Court has come to apply the Convention
to complaints that before 2005 did not even come close to attracting funda-
mental rights protection. Yet before discussing how the Court reviewed and
answered the difficult social security questions it thereby got itself involved
in, a few cases must be mentioned in which the Court (recently) has shown
a more hesitant approach. Thereby it is shown that in struggling to provide
effective protection by means of a broad interpretation while also leaving room
for the state when it comes to social security issues, the picture that emerges
is not always a very lucid one. Indeed, although the line set out in and after
Stec at first glance may appear to be clear, some decisions and judgments
suggest that the Court is not entirely certain about its approach to non-dis-
crimination issues in the social security sphere.
First, in the case of Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria, the Court was asked to
review the applications lodged by nine Bulgarian nationals who claimed that
the statutory cap on their pensions breached their rights under the Conven-
tion.72 They invoked the right to property taken alone, as well as in con-
junction with the prohibition of discrimination. The applicants considered that
they had been discriminated against compared to those individuals who fell
below the cap, as well as compared to those whose pensions were exempted
from it.73 Although in the light of what was said in Stec this non-discrimina-
tion complaint could be expected to automatically fall within the ambit of the
69 Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 November 2007, appl. no. 77782/01. See also Stummer v. Austria,
ECtHR (GC) 7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02.
70 E.g., B. v. the UK, ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 36571/06 (concerning the applicant’s
failure to report a material fact; she complained about the fact that persons unable to report
facts because they were unaware of them were treated differently from those who were
unable to report facts for some other reason).
71 Cf. Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 4 November 2008, appl. no. 42184/05 (concerning the
complaint of pensioners who had moved abroad that their pensions were not up-rated
in line with inflation).
72 Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04,
19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05.
73 Ibid., para. 102.
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protection of property, the Court in this case opted for a different approach.
It underlined the broad ambit of the Convention rights for the purposes of
non-discrimination review, yet concluded its discussion of the applicability
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 P1 by stating that it ‘does not
consider it necessary to determine whether the facts of the case fall within
the ambit of that provision’.74 This because, ‘[e]ven assuming that they do,
and that Article 14 is thus applicable, the Court finds that there has been no
violation of that provision for the reasons that follow’.75 Apparently it was
clear from the start that the issue at stake would not amount to a breach of
the Convention. However, the ECtHR’s failure to address the interpretation
question does lead to confusion as regards the possible limits to what is and
what is not prima facie covered by the Convention.
A second example of such confusion is the Court’s inadmissibility decision
in the case of Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands.76 This case dealt with
the effects of the new Dutch health care system for pensioners living abroad.
The applicants complained under the right to protection of property about
the fact that with the new system, they had lost their former health care
contracts and thereby their premiums based entitlements. Moreover, they
invoked the prohibition of discrimination, arguing that the health care insur-
ance they could obtain under the new system was not equivalent to that
available to Netherlands residents. In its admissibility decision the Court first
of all held that Article 1 P1 taken alone did not apply. The expectations the
applicants had were ‘based on the hope to see their insurance contracts con-
tinued, or renewed, on terms no less favourable for them than those which
they enjoyed previously’, and this was not enough for concluding that there
had been a ‘possession’.77 In relation to the non-discrimination complaint
the Court then held that it
‘has already found that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is inapplicable in the absence
of a proprietary right that can properly be equated to a ‘possession’. It follows that
Article 14 cannot apply in combination with that Article. This complaint too is
therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.’78
The interests the applicants complained about were indeed far removed from
being ‘possessions’ and there was hence reason to conclude that Article 14
did not apply. However, although the Court referred to the broader ambit
74 Ibid., para. 113.
75 Ibid. The Court concluded in a similar way on the complaint under Art. 1 P1 taken alone,
see, infra, S. 10.4.1.
76 Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 23 October 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 34880/12.
See on this case Leijten 2013b.
77 Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 23 October 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 34880/12,
paras. 81-82.
78 Ibid., para. 87.
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of Article 1 P1 in non-discrimination cases, it is surprising that it straight-
forwardly held that because Article 1 P1 taken alone did not apply, it also could
not form the basis for an admissible non-discrimination complaint. It must
be noted that the Court did review the case under the self-standing non-dis-
crimination provision enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Conven-
tion,79 and perhaps that was the reason why it did not go into the Article
14 complaint. Regardless of this possible explanation, however, the Court’s
approach does create doubt as to the meaning of Article 1 P1 in conjunction
with Article 14. Although later cases do not confirm this, it could be inferred
from the decision in Ramaer and Van Willigen that now that it can rely on
Article 1 P12, the Court no longer sees the use of concluding on a (very) broad
‘general scope’ of the various Convention rights in order to provide for the
necessary non-discrimination protection.80
In conclusion, it can be said that at the interpretation stage the Court seems
unwilling to make a distinction between cases concerning contributory social
security benefits and those concerning non-contributory ones or dealing with
other aspects of social security schemes. In case of alleged discrimination
virtually all social-security related complaints seem to allow for review under
the Convention. This definitely signals an ‘indivisible’ approach, that does
not discriminate between different categories of rights and can ensure practical
and effective protection against discrimination irrespective of how a particular
benefit is funded or what exact matter is concerned. However, it was shown
that the Court sometimes places some doubt upon the broad applicability of
Article 14 in the field of social security. This can be said to undermine the
clarity of its interpretation and to result in insecurity for (prospective) applic-
ants as to whether their complaint will be reviewed under the Convention.
As will become clear in the remainder of this chapter, next to the cases
mentioned here there are more examples of where the ECtHR seemingly aims
at restricting to some extent its broad interpretation of the Convention rights
in social security cases.81 A reason for this may be found in the inherent
complexity of the eventual application of these rights, showing the limited
possibilities of the Court in this field.
79 Ibid., para. 88ff. However, the conclusion was that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
80 Important in this regard, however, could also be the fact that since Stec, also the ‘scope’
of Article 1 P1 has broadened significantly, and that therefore there hardly seems reason
anymore for distinguishing between the ‘ambit’ and the ‘scope’. See, infra, S. 10.4.1.
81 See, in particular, infra, S. 10.4.1.
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10.3.2 (Non-)Similar Situations and Objective and Reasonable Justifications
With the admissibility decision in Stec and Others the Court opted for a broad
interpretation of the reach of Article 1 P1 and the possessions it protects in the
context of alleged discrimination. It is interesting to see whether at the applica-
tion stage this has led to principled and effective protection of individual social
security rights. When the Court reviews a non-discrimination complaint, it
first asks whether the differential treatment was made on a ground covered
by Article 14 and whether the applicant found himself in a ‘relevantly similar
situation’.82 In the end, only when no ‘objective and reasonable justification’
has been given for the differentiation made, it will be held to violate Article
14. This will be the case when the distinction does not pursue a legitimate
aim, or lacks a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised’.83 The question to be addressed
in this section is whether the Court has approached these tests in a transparent
and consistent manner, thereby offering at least some added value for the
applicants who decided to bring their social security cases to Strasbourg.
First of all, compared to the struggle the Court went through to hold the case
applicable, its eventual review in Stec was rather limited. The Court’s Grand
Chamber concluded that the situation that Mrs Stec saw herself confronted
with did not amount to a violation of the Convention.84 The disadvantage
she and the other applicants had faced resulted from the then legitimate policy
of the United Kingdom to correct the disadvantaged position of women by
differentiating in pensionable age.85 The Court agreed that the reform towards
equality had indeed taken quite a long time.86 However, because of the re-
form’s ‘extremely far-reaching and serious implications, for women and for
82 E.g., Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), ECtHR 18 February 1991, appl. no. 12033/86, para. 60; Willis
v. the UK, ECtHR 11 June 2002, appl.no. 36042/97, para. 48.
83 See, e.g., Chassagnou a. O. v. France, ECtHR (GC) 29 April 1999, appl. nos. 25088/94, 28331/95
and 28443/95, para. 91; Serife Yigit v. Turkey, ECtHR 2 November 2010, appl. no. 3967/05,
para. 67.
84 Interesting is the concurring opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego added to the Grand Chamber
judgment, who returned to the question of interpretation and held that he had voted with
the majority, ‘based on the belief that the applicants could not be considered to have
“possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which guarantees the
protection of property’.
85 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 12 April 2006, appl. nos. 65731/01 65900/01, para. 59.
86 Ibid., para. 63. The Court notes that many other countries still maintain differences between
men and women when it comes to the age at which they become eligible for a state pension.
And: ‘In the light of the original justification for the measure as correcting financial inequal-
ity between the sexes, the slowly evolving nature of the change in women’s working lives,
and in the absence of a common standard amongst the Contracting States … the Court
finds that the United Kingdom cannot be criticised for not having started earlier on the
road towards a single pensionable age’ (para. 64).
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the economy in general’87 and the wide margin of appreciation granted in
the light of the social and economic character of the complaint at issue,88 Mrs
Stec and her co-applicants left Strasbourg empty-handed.89
A similarly deferential approach is visible in the judgment in Andrle v. the
Czech Republic.90 Andrle had been taking care of his children for a number
of years and applied for a retirement pension at the age of 57. His application
was dismissed since he had not reached the age required by the Pension
Insurance Act, which for a man in his situation was 61 years and ten
months.91 Also here the issue concerned a problematic distinction on the sus-
pect ground of sex,92 yet the Court held that the slow reform of the legislation
that enabled women who had raised children to retire at an earlier age did
not amount to a breach of the Convention. In this regard, it reflected in quite
general terms on why it was important to grant much leeway to the state. It
considered that pension payments are of a distinct kind since ‘[t]hey are
founded on the principle of long-term contributions’ and because ‘the inherent
features of the [pension] system allow for lifelong family and career plan-
ning’.93 It thus accepted that adjustments of pension schemes must be carried
out gradually and should not be forced on the state by a supranational
87 Ibid., para. 65.
88 Ibid., para. 63.
89 Also without luck were the applicants in Walker v. the UK, Barrow v. the UK, and Pearson
v. the UK (ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no. 37212/02; ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no.
42735/02; ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no. 8374/03). These cases concerned problems that
were similar the issue in Stec. Again, the Court had to deal with the United Kingdom’s
difference in pensionable age between men and women, this time in relation to the payment
of National Insurance contributions. All three claimants received judgments that almost
literally reiterated the Court’s argumentation in Stec: The difference in treatment had to
have an objective and reasonable justification, and it had to pursue a legitimate aim. A
difference in treatment based exclusively on the grounds of sex, moreover, required very
weighty reasons as justification. But, ‘against this must be balanced the countervailing
proposition that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing
social and economic policies should be a wide one’ (e.g., Pearson, para. 24). This meant that
in all cases the differentiation did not amount to a violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
90 Andrle v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 17 February 2011, appl. no. 6268/08.
91 Differentiated age limits for men and women in the Czech Republic had existed from 1957
onwards, with lower limits for women that further decreased according to the number
of children they had raised. The reason for this was that women in the former Czechoslova-
kia were expected to fully participate in the labour process and were at the same time
responsible for raising children. Since 2003, the system was in the process of being reformed,
but the reform was not yet completed due to political struggles.
92 Generally, a distinction made on this ground requires ‘very weighty reasons’. See, e.g., Van
Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 1046-1049; Gaygusuz v. Austria, ECtHR 16 September 1996, appl. no.
17371/90, para. 42.
93 Andrle v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 17 February 2011, appl. no. 6268/08, para. 51.
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Court,94 which was reason to conclude that the differential treatment in Andrle
was reasonably and objectively justified.95
Also in the case of Stummer the Court’s review was of a deferential kind. In
this case the applicant complained about the fact that he could not be affiliated
to an old-age pension system during the 28 years he was imprisoned and had
worked in the prison bakery and kitchen. As a result he was not entitled to
an early retirement pension. The Court held that working prisoners are in a
comparable situation to ordinary workers,96 yet the wide margin and the lack
of consensus amongst the Member States of the Council of Europe regarding
pension scheme affiliation for prisoners led to the conclusion that Austria could
not be said to have violated the Convention.97
However, regardless of the leeway the Court generally grants the state,
not all social security complaints are easily dismissed on the merits. The case
of Luczak v. Poland shows that in some instances the socio-economic interest
of the applicant obtains actual protection.98 In Luczak the applicant had been
barred from joining the Polish Farmers’ Social Security Fund solely on the
basis of his nationality, and the Court unanimously concluded that Article
14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated. The Court
stressed that very weighty reasons were required to justify a difference in
treatment based on the ground of nationality.99 Moreover, it held that even
when very weighty reasons were advanced, ‘to leave an employed or self-
employed person bereft of any social security would be incompatible with
current trends in social security legislation in Europe’.100 According to the
Court, Luczak found himself in a comparable position to Polish nationals.
When he was employed he even supported the farmers’ scheme by paying
taxes.101 Moreover, since the law excluding Luczak had eventually been
changed in 2004 the Court could not but find that the original scheme could
not be justified.102 ‘[I]n the instant case’, according to the Court, ‘the Govern-
ment have not provided any convincing explanation of how the general interest
was served by refusing the applicant’s admission to the farmers’ scheme during
the period in question’.103
94 Cf. also Runkee and White v. the UK, ECtHR 10 May 2007, appl. nos. 42949/98 and 53134/99.
95 Andrle v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 17 February 2011, appl. no. 6268/08, para. 60.
96 Stummer v. Austria, ECtHR (GC) 7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02, para. 93.
97 Ibid., paras. 104-111.
98 Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 November 2007, appl. no. 77782/01.
99 Ibid., para. 48.
100 Ibid., para. 52.
101 Ibid., para. 55.
102 Also: ‘[T]he Court does not find it established that the continuation of the distinction at
issue in the present case was justified because of the allegedly far-reaching and serious
implications for the State’s economy if that distinction were to be continued’ (ibid., para.
58).
103 Ibid., para. 59.
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Another example of where the individual social security interest obtained
eventual protection is the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia.104 In this case the Court’s
Grand Chamber had to deal with the complaint of a former USSR citizen who
had worked in Latvia since 1973. When the Soviet Union ceased to exist
Andrejeva became stateless and in 1995 she was granted the status of ‘per-
manently resident non-citizen’. For her pension this meant that only periods
of work in Latvia could be taken into account, but because Andrejeva had
been working for a Moscow-based employer, her working years in Latvia were
treated as an ‘extended business trip’ and therefore could not add to any
pension.105 Like in Luczak, the differential treatment complained about con-
cerned the suspect ground of nationality, and the Court stressed that ‘very
weighty reasons’ were necessary for justifying the distinction made between
Ms Andrejeva and others who did have the Latvian nationality and whose
periods of work outside Latvia had been taken into account when their
pensions were calculated.106 Since the Court was not convinced of a ‘reason-
able relationship of proportionality’, it concluded that the Convention had
been violated.
What can be inferred from the cases of Stummer, Luczak, and Andrejeva,
is that it seems to make a difference when a distinction is made on the suspect
ground of nationality,107 rather than on the ground of, for example, ‘being
a prisoner’.108 Moreover, a violation seems less likely to be found when the
effects of an exclusion are arguably of a less far-reaching kind, whereas when
someone is left bereft of any social security cover this may very well be in
breach of the Convention. However, regardless of the outcomes of the different
cases, the way in which the Court approached the various complex issues can
be criticised. With regard to Stummer, first, it can be argued that by merely
focussing on consensus as regards pension schemes for prisoners, the Court
paid too little attention to the fact that affiliation to such schemes cannot be
viewed in isolation but instead forms only a part of a complex web of arrange-
ments states might have in place for detainees. Yet would the Court have tried
to make sense of all the relevant information from the different states, it
arguably would have even been more complicated to solve the case in a
reasoned manner. Also in Luczak, moreover, the Court’s approach lacked
transparency in the sense that although its review was clearly strict enough
for the case to come out in favour of the applicant, it remained unclear how
104 Andrejeva v. Latvia, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 2009, appl. no. 55707/00. See for some critical
remarks the lengthy partly dissenting opinion of Judge Ziemele attached to the judgment.
105 Ibid., para. 18.
106 Ibid., paras. 81-88.
107 However, according to Bossuyt 2007, p. 325, the question is: ‘Is nationality a ground that
should be subject to the highest level of scrutiny, and this regardless of the right in which
the difference of treatment is practiced?’ He argues that this might be less convincing in
the context of socio-economic rights.
108 Stummer v. Austria, ECtHR (GC) 7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02, para. 90.
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the requirement of a convincing explanation related to the margin of appreci-
ation that was granted.109
Finally, the judgment in Andrejeva has been criticised for not taking due
account of all relevant matters. For example, the Grand Chamber did not pay
any express attention to the fact that Latvia relied on bilateral agreements to
arrange matters like this.110 It also did not want to accept the argument that
naturalisation would have saved Andrejeva’s interest.111 In Andrejeva, the
Court had to answer the question of who was responsible for the payment
of pensions to persons in Andrejeva’s situation. It had to assess and evaluate
extraordinarily complex economic constellations that were undoubtedly hard
to determine from a supranational point of view and that could have just as
well led to a different outcome. Strasbourg review in this case led to indivisible
protection of the social security interest put forward. At the same time, given
also that the case did not even concern the basic, minimum pension but
additional entitlements,112 it can be said that by reviewing it the Court
reflected upon politics and policies it generally does not consider itself capable
of touching upon.113
Frequently, also, the Court does not take a stance on whether or not differential
treatment was ‘objectively justified’. Its conclusion with regard to complex
social security-related discrimination issues is not seldom that the applicants
simply were not in a relevantly similar situation to those who received the
treatment they too desired. This can be illustrated by the case of B. v. the United
Kingdom, in which the applicant had for some time received too high an
amount of income support because she had failed to notify the relevant author-
109 In line with the ‘very weighty reasons-requirement’ that comes with a classification on
a suspect ground, it speaks of the ‘convincing explanation’ that was not provided, whereas
it also tends to favour deferential review, by concluding that ‘even having regard to their
margin of appreciation in the area of social security’, there was no reasonable and objective
justification (Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 November 2007, appl. no. 77782/01, para. 59). It
can hence be a point of discussion whether the Court actually applied a ‘very weighty
reasons-test’ here. See further, infra, S. 10.3.3.
110 Andrejeva v. Latvia, ECtHR (GC) 18 February 2009, appl. no. 55707/00, para. 90.
111 Ibid., para. 91.
112 According to the dissent of Judge Ziemele, ‘Latvia decided to guarantee a minimum pension
to everyone living in the country [including Andrejeva], citizens and non-citizens alike,
and additionally to compensate for losses incurred as a result of the demise of the USSR
on the basis of the criteria of citizenship and territory’ (para. 6, but see also para. 1 and
para. 7).
113 See again the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Ziemele attached to the judgment in
Andrejeva, who held for example that ‘[t]he Republic of Latvia, as an independent subject
of international law, was under no obligation either to extend its social protection to, or
repair the loss of Soviet social protection in respect of, persons who had worked in the
Soviet Union, another subject of international law to which Latvia was not a successor State’
(para. 6).
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ities of the fact that her children had been taken into care.114 B. complained
about a difference in treatment between persons who could not reasonably
be expected to report a material fact to the social security authorities because
they were unaware of the fact, and persons who, like herself, could not reason-
ably be expected to report a fact because they were not aware of its materiality.
The ECtHR held that ‘although neither could be said to be “to blame” for the
failure to report, the Court considers the situation of persons who are not
aware of a fact to be qualitatively of a different nature to that of persons who
are aware of a fact but who are not aware of its materiality’.115
The ‘not in a relevantly similar situation’ reasoning has also appeared in
a number of judgments concerning social security claims of individuals who
had moved abroad. In Ramaer and Van Willigen the Court held that Article
14 did not apply, but as was mentioned above, it did consider the case in the
light of the non-discrimination provision of Article 1 P12. The applicant pen-
sioners claimed that they were in a relevantly similar position to Netherlands
residents because they had paid the same health care insurance premiums.
However, their private insurance contracts were terminated with the entry
into force of the new Health Care Insurance Act and were therefore held
‘irrelevant to the present situation’.116 The new Act provided for an essentially
territorial system, and the applicants were now ‘treaty beneficiaries’ who were
entitled in accordance with Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC to basic health
care in their respective countries of residence. ‘[A]ccordingly’, the ECtHR held,
‘the applicants are not in a relevantly similar situation to Netherlands residents,
or to each other’.117 The upshot of this was that the complaint was declared
manifestly ill-founded.
The approach of the Court in Ramaer and Van Willigen can be traced back
to the Grand Chamber’s ‘landmark’ judgment in Carson and Others v. the United
114 B. v. the UK, ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 36571/06.
115 Ibid., para. 57. It continued by saying that ‘[a]s the Court of Appeal found, the proposition
that you cannot report something that you do not know is a simple proposition of logic,
whereas the proposition that you cannot report something you do not appreciate you have
to report depends on difficult questions of cognitive capacity and moral sensitivity which
vary from person to person’. The Court found the applicant’s alternative formulation,
namely that persons who did not have the capacity to understand their obligation to report
should be treated differently from persons who did, ‘somewhat more persuasive’. However,
the decision not to treat the applicant in a different way pursued the legitimate aim of
‘ensuring the smooth operation of the welfare system and the facilitation of the recovery
of overpaid benefits’. Moreover, since a number of steps had been taken to ensure that
the burden the applicant had to bear was not excessive, the state’s failure to treat the
applicant differently was ‘proportional’ and objectively and reasonably justified (paras.
58-61).
116 Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 23 October 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 34880/12,
para. 97.
117 Ibid., para. 101.
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Kingdom.118 The Chamber had held in its judgment in this case that the
pensioners who had emigrated to countries in which their pensions were not
up-rated in line with inflation were not in a relevantly analogous situation
to those residing inside the UK ‘insofar as concerns the operation of pension
or social security systems’.119 Neither could they be compared to pensioners
resident in other countries where up-rating was available.120 In 2010, the
Grand Chamber confirmed this conclusion, albeit on the basis of somewhat
different reasoning.121 It explicated that the applicants had misconceived the
relationship between National Insurance contributions and the state pension:
according to the Grand Chamber these were not exclusively linked. Rather,
the complex and interlocking system made it ‘impossible to isolate the payment
of National Insurance contributions as a sufficient ground for equating the
position of pensioners who receive up-rating and those … who do not’.122
Further, the Grand Chamber emphasised the ‘essentially national character
of the social security system’,123 and expressed that it is generally hard to
draw comparisons, because of the great variety of applicable social and eco-
nomic variables.124 It thus had regard to the web of relations between various
benefits and contributions, holding that ‘random effects’ are in any case in-
escapable.125 Like in the context of pension scheme reforms, in this case the
118 Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2010, appl. no. 42184/05. This also goes for
the cases of Raviv v. Austria, ECtHR 13 March 2012, appl. no. 26266/05, and Efe v. Austria,
ECtHR 8 January 2013, appl. no. 9134/06. Raviv concerned a special insurance regime in
Austria, under which victims of Nazi prosecution have the possibility of paying retroactive
contributions on a voluntary basis in order to be entitled to an old age pension. Mrs Raviv
held that she was discriminated against since under this special system periods of child
raising spent abroad were not counted for the purpose of calculating her pension. The Court
however held that she was not in a relevantly similar position to those who were not
covered by the special system but instead had made regular contributions to the old-age
system. Efe v. Austria concerned an applicant who had worked in Austria while his children
had stayed in Turkey, and who complained about the fact that he had not received a family
allowance after in 1996 a Social Security Agreement between Turkey and Austria had been
terminated. In this case the ECtHR concluded ‘that the social security system in Austria
was … primarily designed to cater for the needs of the resident population and that it was
therefore hard to draw any genuine comparison with the position of those who based their
claim on persons resident elsewhere’ (para. 52).
119 Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR 4 November 2008, appl. no. 42184/05, para. 78.
120 Ibid., para.79. According to Cousins 2009, p. 134, however, this conclusions was somewhat
less convincing: ‘From the point of view of the individual pensioner it must appear ano-
malous that payment of an increase should depend on whether she lives in a country which
does or does not have a reciprocal agreement with the United Kingdom’.
121 Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2010, appl. no. 42184/05.
122 Ibid.para. 84. Cf. also Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04,
19125/04, 19475/04, 19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05, para.
95.
123 Carson a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2010, appl. no. 42184/05, para. 85.
124 Ibid., para. 86.
125 Ibid.
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Court thereby underlined the complexity of social security issues, and the
limited role of the Strasbourg Court therein.
Altogether, what can be concluded from the Court’s review of the various
social security cases under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 P1 is, first,
that the Court is generally showing a relatively large degree of deference when
it comes to (the reform of) social security systems. How exactly it thereby uses
the concept of the margin of appreciation is further elaborated in Section 10.3.3,
but it can be noted here that, for the Court, the fact that it is literally far
removed from these systems can be reason not to engage with the issue in
a thorough manner. Secondly, that another reason for why the Court often
does not have to answer the question of whether a distinction in the field of
social security was proportional, is because it concludes that the applicant does
not find himself in a ‘relevantly similar situation’. What exactly this criterion
entails remains hard to say, yet it can be seen that in the context of complex,
interlocking social security systems there often will be a reason for holding
that situations were not sufficiently similar for providing eventual pro-
tection.126 Also in this regard, thus, the broad applicability of the Convention
does not always add much. Finally, there are several cases where the Court
does thoroughly engage with the merits of the discrimination complaint. Even
in these cases, however, it remains unclear what exact difference the ground
of differentiation makes, or why – in view of all the circumstance – a case is
determined in one way or another. Surely, the issues the Court is required
to ‘resolve’ are often extremely difficult to get a good overview of and judge
upon. Distinctions in the field of social security are omnipresent as well as
necessary,127 and even a distinction based on the suspect ground of national-
ity in this context cannot always be considered to constitute discrimination.128
However, the point is that although there may be clear cases in which the state
for example altered its regime, ‘admitting’ that a distinction made in the past
126 Ibid. For determining the similarity of situations, it is important what level of abstraction
is chosen. Pensioners receiving Dutch pensions can be considered to be in a similar situation
merely due to this fact, yet their situation can also be considered non-similar if the focus
shifts to the country they live in (cf. Ramaer and Van Willigen v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 23
October 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 34880/12).
127 As the Court has noted in this regard: ‘[A]ny welfare system, to be workable, may have
to use broad categorisations to distinguish between different groups in need’. See, e.g.,
Runkee and White v. the UK, ECtHR 10 May 2007, appl. nos. 42949/98 and 53134/99, para.
39. See also Kenny 2010, p. 498.
128 Cf. Bossuyt 2007, p. 325. See for the difficulties in judging upon alleged discrimination in
social security in relation to EU law (and the nationality issues featuring therein) moreover
Burri 2013; Pennings 2013.
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was wrong,129 in other cases the Court seems unable to take stock of all the
relevant information in a transparent and convincing manner.
Thus, the Court’s interpretation creates room for indivisible and effective
protection against discrimination, and in some cases it actually grants such
protection. This notwithstanding, in many instances its review does not get
to the heart of the matter concerned or creates a confused image of interests
and considerations that omits to provide for any clear standards.
10.3.3 The Role of the Margin
Before discussing the cases in which Article 1 P1 was invoked on its own, it
is worth to zoom in on the role of the margin of appreciation in the Court’s
reasoning in non-discrimination cases. Does it use this doctrine in a consistent
way that adds clarity to the Court’s review and is moreover in line with the
aim of providing effective and indivisible rights protection? Or is it in fact
also due to the way the Court utilises the margin that Court’s case law can
be criticised?
In the landmark case of Stec and Others, the Grand Chamber made the
following remarks with regard to the margin of appreciation:
‘The Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and
to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment
… The scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject
matter and the background … As a general rule, very weighty reasons would have
to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based
exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention … On the
other hand, a wide margin is usually allowed to the State under the Convention
when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy … Because of
their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are
in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is in the
public interest on social or economic grounds, and the Court will generally respect
the legislature’s policy choice unless it is “manifestly without reasonable founda-
tion”.’130
129 Cf. Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 November 2007, appl. no. 77782/01, where the Court
moreover held that it cannot be accepted that someone is left bereft of any social security
cover.
130 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 12 April 2006, appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, paras.
51-52. See also Cousins 2009, p. 128. According to Cousins ‘we have a somewhat variable
list of statuses which require “very weighty reasons” to justify differential treatment. Those
mentioned by the Court of Human Rights – in Carson and in previous judgments – include
gender, nationality, sexual orientation, and racial or ethnic origin. Outside that sphere a
(very wide) margin of appreciation is to be allowed’ (p. 132).
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In the case on hand, the state had opted for using the state pension age as
the cut-off point for REA because this made the scheme easy to understand
and administer. The Court held that ‘such questions of administrative economy
and coherence are generally matters falling within the margin of appreci-
ation’.131 Moreover, the fact that the reform was introduced slowly and in
stages could, ‘given the extremely far-reaching and serious implications, for
women and for the economy in general’, also be considered to ‘clearly’ fall
within the state’s margin.132
It already became clear in the previous section that especially when it
concerns the timing of pension reforms, the Court’s review is of a very de-
ferential kind. Also in Andrle the Court, unsurprisingly, held that it
‘cannot but reiterate that the national authorities are better placed than an inter-
national judge to determine such a complex issue relating to economic and social
policies, which depends on manifold domestic variables and direct knowledge of
the society concerned, and that they have to enjoy a wide margin of appreciation
in this sphere.’133
However, also in the cases that did not concern the timing of a (pension)
reform the Court has made similar remarks as to the width of the margin,
even when the issue at stake was held to be in breach of the Convention. This
can be illustrated by the judgment in Andrejeva, where the Court recalled that
‘a wide margin of appreciation is usually allowed to the state under the
Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social
strategy’.134 Nonetheless, although ‘being mindful of the broad margin of
appreciation enjoyed by the state in the field of social security’, it did hold
that the arguments presented by the state were not sufficiently convincing
for concluding that the distinction made was justified. Indeed, what played
an important role in this case was that the applicant was discriminated against
on the basis of her nationality. Apparently, however, this did not influence
the ‘wide’ or ‘broad’ margin of appreciation, but rather seemed to ‘outbalance’
the great measure of leeway that was automatically granted.135
Indeed, the fact that the Court in social security cases almost without
exception speaks of a wide margin of appreciation does not help in making
131 Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 12 April 2006, appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, para.
57.
132 Ibid., para. 65.
133 Andrle v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 17 February 2011, appl. no. 6268/08, para. 56
134 Ibid., para. 83 (see also para. 89)
135 This also explicitly follows from the Court’s remark that, although sometimes very weighty
reasons are required, ‘against this must be balanced the countervailing proposition that
the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one’ (Walker v. the UK, ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no. 37212/02,
para. 33; Barrow v. the UK, ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no. 42735/02, para. 35; Pearson
v. the UK, ECtHR 22 August 2006, appl. no. 8374/03, para. 24).
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its review and the different outcomes reached more insightful. More concretely,
it makes one wonder what exactly is the relation between this margin and
the ground of discrimination or the other specific circumstances at hand. On
the one hand the Court generally holds that very weighty reasons are required
to justify a difference in treatment based on the suspect grounds of sex or
nationality. However, it then may continue by stating that ‘on the other hand’,
measures of economic and social strategy require a wide margin of ap-
preciation, thereby seeming to maintain that these are two separate things and
that the former does not influence the latter. Indeed, in many cases, after
stating some general remarks on the margin the Court does not conclude on
how in the specific case at hand, and given the ‘circumstances, subject matter
and background’, the margin should or should not be adjusted. Interesting
in this regard is the case of Luczak, where, as was already mentioned, the Court
unanimously concluded that the exclusion of Luczak from the farmers’ social
security scheme on the ground of his nationality had violated Article 14
together with Article 1 P1. What it did not do to reach this conclusion, how-
ever, was explicitly narrowing the margin of appreciation. The Court’s final
remarks in Luczak were that
‘while the Court accepts that a measure which has the effect of treating differently
persons in a relevantly similar situation may be justified on public-interest grounds,
it considers that in the instant case the Government have not provided any convinc-
ing explanation of how the general interest was served by refusing the applicant’s
admission to the farmers’ scheme during the period in question … In conclusion,
the Court finds that the Government have not adduced any reasonable and objective
justification for the distinction such as to meet the requirements of Article 14 of
the Convention, even having regard to their margin of appreciation in the area
of social security.’
This may confirm that in the area of social security, the margin is merely
perceived as a given, rather than as something that is actually dependent on
various factors and, importantly, on what exactly was at stake for the applicant.
In Luczak the Court underlined that the exclusion of a person from a social
security scheme ‘must not leave him in a situation in which he is denied any
social insurance cover, whether under a general or a specific scheme, thus
posing a threat to his livelihood’. Moreover, ‘to leave an employed or self-
employed person bereft of any social security cover would be incompatible
with current trends in social security legislation in Europe’.136 Albeit these
considerations seemingly led to some stricter form of review, when essential
needs are at stake this does not seem reason for the Court to narrow the
margin of appreciation in a more transparent manner.
136 Luczak v. Poland, ECtHR 27 November 2007, appl. no. 77782/01, para. 52.
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Thus, the Court’s references to the margin of appreciation are consistent, yet
perhaps also a bit too consistent. The Court may always mention the doctrine,
yet this often does not truly add something to its review and can even be said
to be part of the reason why its reasoning is perceived as problematic.137
Arguably, the differences that characterise the cases that come before it could
in fact be reason for a more tailor-made (indivisible) approach, but the Court
fails to recognise that for example when certain very important (‘core’) social
security benefits are concerned, that have a direct impact on the applicant’s
livelihood, even an issue concerning a ‘general measure of social security’ may
perhaps demand a narrow(er) margin of appreciation. Instead, the wide margin
merely seems to be one amongst many relevant factors the Court considers
in the context of an opaque balancing test. In doing so, it is not using the
doctrine as an instrument for recognising different levels of interference and
adjusting the review of a case accordingly.
10.4 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Next to under Article 14, complaints regarding social security benefits are also
often made under Article 1 P1 taken alone. Generally, a successful property
claim should be ‘sufficiently established’138 as well as ‘adequately defin-
able’,139 and a right to acquire property is not recognised.140 According
to the Court’s earlier case law, systems that create definable individual shares
in specific funds by payment of directly related contributions are property-
creating systems. Accordingly, claims to benefits derived from these schemes
can be seen as ‘possessions’ for the purposes of the Convention.141 At the
same time, in the case of systems ‘based on the principle of solidarity’ a
definable proprietary interest has proven harder to find. In G. v. Austria, for
example, the former European Commission of Human Rights held that ‘[a]
claim of entitlement to a survivor’s pension for civil servants does not con-
stitute a possession attracting the protection of this provision where, as in
137 Although there may be some exceptions. Sometimes, the Court for example holds that the
margin in dependent on the existing consensus, see, e.g., Stummer v. Austria, ECtHR (GC)
7 July 2011, appl. no. 37452/02, para. 104. See also Efe v. Austria, ECtHR 8 January 2013,
appl. no. 9134/06, para. 44. Also in these cases, however, it did not actually ‘change’ the
margin according to its findings on this matter.
138 Stran Greek Refinieries and Stratis Andeadis v. Greece, ECtHR 9 December 1994, appl. no.
13427/87, para. 59. See also Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 869.
139 See Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 867.
140 E.g., Van der Mussele v. Belgium, ECtHR 23 November 1983, appl. no. 8919/80, para. 48;
Pistorova v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 26 October 2004, appl. no. 73578/01, para. 38.
141 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 867.
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Austria, these pensions are based on the principle of maintenance and are not
entirely founded by prior contributions’.142
It was demonstrated that with its admissibility decision in Stec, the Court
has clarified that in the context of discrimination cases it should not be material
whether a benefit is or is not based on prior contributions. In this section it
will be discussed whether this broad understanding of the ‘ambit’ of the right
to protection of property has also influenced the way the more narrow ‘scope’
of this right is understood. How, in other words, does the Court today interpret
Article 1 P1 of the Convention in social security-related issues, and does this
allow for effective, indivisible protection while providing general insights on
what is and what is not covered by this article? After discussing the prima
facie scope of this provision (10.4.1), the discussion will continue with several
examples of the review of the Court in Article 1 P1 cases (10.4.2). In that
context, it will be investigated whether the Court’s proportionality review
allows for applying the right to protection of property in a principled manner,
and what use is thereby made of the margin of appreciation (10.4.3).
10.4.1 Wide Scope or Vague Scope?
It was explained in Section 10.2.1 that because of the apparent ‘ambit’/‘scope’
distinction it seems easier to obtain ECHR protection when a Convention
provision is invoked together with Article 14. The Court used to be quite strict
on what could amount to a ‘possession’ for the purposes of Article 1 P1,143
although it allowed for some exceptions in the special context of alleged
discrimination.144 Against this background, it can be asked whether next to
the widening of the ambit of Article 1 P1 in discrimination cases, the Stec
decision has in fact had the parallel effect of also broadening the scope of the
protection of property in the context of social security complaints that do not
invoke Article 14.
Many cases indicate that the understanding of Article 1 P1 that followed
from Stec is indeed not restricted to cases concerning Article 14. Already
shortly after the 2005 decision, Stec was considered a relevant precedent at
the admissibility stage in a case claiming ‘pure’ property protection. In Gouds-
142 G. v. Austria, EComHR 14 May 1984, appl. no. 10094/82. See also X. v. the Netherlands,
EComHR 20 July 1971 (dec.), appl. no. 4130/69; Mrs. X. v. the Netherlands, EComHR 18
December 1973 (dec.), appl. no. 5763/72.
143 G. v. Austria, EComHR 14 May 1984, appl. no. 10094/82; X. v. the Netherlands, EComHR
20 July 1971 (dec.), appl. no. 4130/69; Mrs. X. v. the Netherlands, EComHR 18 December
1973 (dec.), appl. no. 5763/72.
144 E.g., Buchen v. the Czech Republic, ECtHR 26 November 2002, appl. no. 36541/97, para. 46;
Wessels-Bergervoet v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 4 June 2002, appl. no. 34462/97; Koua Poirrez
v. France, ECtHR 30 September 2003, appl. no. 40892/98; Van den Bouwhuijsen and Schuring
v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 16 December 2003 (dec.), appl. no. 44658/98.
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waard-Van der Lans v. the Netherlands – dealing with a complaint under Article
1 P1 concerning an allegedly disproportionate and unjustified reduction of
a widow’s pension – the Court needed but a single reference to Stec to find
that the Convention applied.145 The case did not in any way concern discrim-
ination, and it can be doubted whether the applicability of Article 1 P1 alone
could be readily inferred from what was held in Stec.146 Yet Goudswaard-Van
der Lans turned out to be no exception. Also in other cases in relation to
Article 1 P1 taken alone the Court has underlined that although this article
does not guarantee a right to acquire property, or to a pension of a particular
amount,
‘where a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as
of right of a pension – whether or not conditional on the prior payment of contribu-
tions – that legislation has to be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling
within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its require-
ments … The reduction or the discontinuance of a pension may therefore constitute
interference with possessions that needs to be justified.’147
One example that illustrates the potentially very far-reaching role the Court
hereby creates for itself in national social security issues is Moskal v. Poland.148
This 2009 case concerned Ms Moskal’s early retirement pension that was
revoked after it had become clear that she did not satisfy the relevant con-
ditions. Moskal complained that the reconsideration ex officio of her claim to
the pension, followed by the negative decision and a period of three years
in which no replacing benefit was granted, amounted to a violation of Article
1 P1. The government submitted that this provision did not extend to pensions
and welfare benefits that were erroneously acquired.149 The Court referred
to Stec, and held that ‘[w]here an individual has an assertable right under
domestic law to a welfare benefit, the importance of that interest should also
be reflected by holding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be applicable’.150 The
145 Goudswaard-Van der Lans v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 22 September 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 75255/
01. What could have played a role here as well is, however, the fact that the applicant, the
government, and the third parties agreed on the applicability of Article 1 P1.
146 After all, the bottom-line of Stec seems to be that whenever a state creates social security
benefits, and regardless of whether these are of a contributory or of a non-contributory
kind, it must do so in a manner compatible with Art. 14.
147 Lakicevic and Others v. Montenegro and Serbia, ECtHR 13 December 2011, appl. nos. 27458/06,
33604/07, 37205/06 and 37207/06, para. 59, with plenty of references to earlier cases (see
also para. 34, where the Court held that the applicants’ pensions complaints ‘naturally fall
to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only’. See also, e.g., Grudic v. Serbia, ECtHR
17 April 2012, appl. no. 31925/08, para. 72.
148 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05. See more recently also
Czaja v. Poland, ECtHR 2 October 2012, appl. no. 5744/05.
149 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05, para. 36.
150 Ibid. See also Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 6 July 2005 (dec.), appl. nos. 65731/01 and
65900/01, para. 51.
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fact that the benefit was subject to lawful revocation, and was indeed revoked
because one of the three criteria for receiving it had not been met, was no
reason for the Court to judge differently. According to the Court, a property
right had been generated the moment the applicant’s dossier was evaluated
in a favourable way.151
What can be inferred from this is that whenever a state discontinues or
reduces the provision of a social security award – and regardless of whether
this was lawful and moreover resulted from the fact that it had been erroneous-
ly granted – it has to justify this in terms of the Convention.152 Indeed, es-
pecially also in times of austerity this means that many of the legislative
measures and individual decisions taken in the area of social security could
end up being reviewed in Strasbourg.153
Although the acceptance of a link between non-contributory social security
awards and the ‘possessions’ protected by Article 1 P1 still raises some eye-
brows,154 it appears that the Court has consciously opted for offering pro-
tection in this field. The application of the Stec reasoning to cases concerning
Article 1 P1 taken alone has led to a far-reaching, yet at first glance transparent
and comprehensible approach to social security complaints that allows indi-
viduals and states to know what their prima facie rights and duties are.155
151 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05, para. 45.
152 Cf. Iwaszkiewicz v. Poland, ECtHR 26 July 2011, appl. no. 30614/06. In this case, concerning
the withdrawal of a veteran’s disability pension after a fresh medical examination that
replaced an earlier and allegedly inaccurate test, the Court did not even question the
applicability of Article 1P1 found that the reach of Article 1 P1 was not even an issue worth
discussing. The matter of applicability was a mere formality, and review was more or less
granted automatically.
153 See, for some austerity related cases, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.),
appl. nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12; Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal, ECtHR
8 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 62235/12 57725/12, and Savickas a. O. v. Lithuania, ECtHR
15 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 66365/09, 12845/10, 28367/11, 29809/10, 29813/10 and
30623/10. These cases concerned salary cuts and reductions and revocations of Christmas
and holiday subsidies that resulted from austerity measures and the EU’s Economic and
Financial Assistance Programme. The Court however took a deferential stance in these
cases and considered them to be manifestly ill-founded. See further, infra, S. 10.4.2.
154 Cf. for a generally critical outlook on the Court’s approach to social security case law,
Bossuyt 2007, who especially with regard to the possessions question refers to the concurring
opinion attached to the eventual judgment in Stec of Judge Borrego Borrego, who noted
not without irony that the Court’s new interpretation ‘has an undeniable attraction! Without
any need for a revolution, all Europe’s citizens have become property owners, protected
by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Everyone, from a billionaire right down to the poorest person
subsisting on social security, has become a property owner’ (Stec a. O. v. the UK, ECtHR
(GC) 12 April 2006, appl. nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01).
155 I.e., it has been considered that virtually all social security complaints can be reviewed under
the Convention. Cf. Cousins 2008, p. 22; Cousins 2009, p. 118; Kapuy 2007, p. 221, who
‘concludes that the right to protection of property … [is], as a general rule, applicable in
the field of social security’.
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However, like in the case of the protection against discrimination, also in the
context of social security and property rights there are some (recent) cases
that create doubt as to whether the Court’s approach is actually as un-
ambiguous as it seems.
An example can be found in the case of Sali v. Sweden, which concerned
the domestic authorities’ refusal to grant an unemployment benefit on the
ground that the applicant did not fulfil the requirement of being unemployed
in terms of the relevant law. In this admissibility decision a crucial role was
given to the point made in Stec that there was no longer any justification for
distinguishing between contributory and non-contributory benefits. Seemingly,
however, the Court was not sure whether this sufficed for considering Article 1
P1 applicable. Rather than holding that Article 1 P1 applied (or not), it decided
to avoid the issue and to ‘proceed on the assumption that the refusal to grant
the applicant [an] unemployment benefit constituted an interference with her
peaceful enjoyment of possessions’.156
The Court did something similar in the case of Maggio and Others v. Italy.
There, one of the applicants complained that the fact that his pension turned
out lower than he had expected, due to a legislative change providing for a
new method of calculation, resulted in an interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. In this case the Court jumped to an assessment
of the merits of the case stating that it ‘does not consider it necessary … to
determine whether the first applicant in the present case had a possession
within the meaning of the Protocol No. 1, as in any event it considers that
there has been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.157
Perhaps one must not think too much of the Court’s reluctance to clearly
interpret the scope of Article 1 P1 in these cases. ‘Assuming’ that the different
benefits fell within this provision’s reach may seem to confirm that it is likely
that they do, and the reason for the Court not to explain this in detail might
simply be that in the end what mattered was that no violation could be found.
Against this argument, however, one may hold that it is strange that the Court
proceeded to the review of the case without identifying whether there was
a Convention right applicable in the first place. In any case, although the
156 Sali v. Sweden, ECtHR 10 January 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 67070/01 [emphasis added]. Cf. also
Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04,
19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05. In this case the Court not
only refrained from answering the interpretation question with regard to the Article 14
complaint, it also did not find it necessary to take a firm stance on whether the cap on the
applicants’ pensions amounted to an interference with their ‘possessions’, ‘because it
considers that there has been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for the reasons that
follow’. Again, it proceeded ‘on the assumption that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable
and that the pensions cap, in all its forms, can be regarded as an interference with the
applicants’ rights under that provision’ (para. 87).
157 Maggio a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09 52851/08 53727/08 54486/08
56001/08, para. 59.
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approach illustrated by Sali and Maggio may still be squared with a broad
understanding of the scope of Article 1 P1, there is a recent judgment that
more concretely questions the assumption that in ‘virtually all’ social security
issues, Article 1 P1 applies.
In the 2013 case of Damjanac v. Croatia the applicant complained about the
stopping of his military pension for thirteen months after he had changed his
place of residence to Serbia.158 In regard to the question whether his pension
could be considered a possession for the purposes of Article 1 P1, the Court
repeated that pension legislation in principle can be considered as creating
proprietary interests, and that ‘where the amount of a benefit or pension is
reduced or eliminated, this may constitute an interference with possessions
which requires to be justified in the general interest’.159 However, it did not
stop there, but continued by stating the following:
‘Where, however, the person concerned does not satisfy, or ceases to satisfy, the
legal conditions laid down in domestic law for the grant of any particular form
of benefits or pension, there is no interference with the rights under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 … Finally, the Court observes that the fact that a person has entered
into and forms part of a State social security system does not necessarily mean
that that system cannot be changed either as to the conditions of eligibility of
payment or as to the quantum of the benefit or pension.’160
Read together, these considerations seem to imply – or at least allow for the
conclusion – that Article 1 P1 is not concerned when due to changes in the
system, i.e., because of alterations regarding the relevant conditions or the
quantum of the benefit at stake, someone does no longer satisfy the legal
conditions for being granted any particular benefit or pension. And although
this may seem a sensible interpretation, arguably the Court hereby opted for
a stricter understanding of the right to protection of property than it normally
does. The Court’s interpretation of Article 1 P1 has become known for its
inclusiveness, i.e., for including virtually all social security cases, at least when
at some point the relevant conditions were met.161 From the remarks in
Damjanac, however, it may be inferred that no complaint under Article 1 P1
can be made if the reason for a reduction or elimination of a benefit or pension
lies in the fact that someone no longer meets the applicable conditions, or when
it relates to more a more general change in the system – which is indeed often
the reason for no longer obtaining a benefit or a benefit of a certain amount.
The reasoning in Damjanac, in other words, would enable the Court to exclude
a large category of cases from review under the Convention, although it does
158 Damjanac v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 October 2010, appl. no. 52943/10.
159 Ibid., para. 85.
160 Ibid., para. 86.
161 Cf. Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05
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not clarify if this is actually what it wants to do and why such an approach
should be preferred.
The straightforwardness of the approach the Court here outlined is con-
firmed by its application of the principles stated to the case on hand. It held
that since ‘there is no right under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to receive a social
security benefit or pension payment of any kind or amount, unless national
law provides for such entitlement’, the task that remained for the Court was
to determine whether all the relevant requirements had been satisfied so that
a property right had been established.162 In this regard,
‘[a] negative answer to this question will consequently lead the Court to a finding
that the stopping of the payment of the applicant’s pension, as a result of conditions
which he had created himself, did not amount to an interference with his property
rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 given that the applicant would not have
a proprietary interest falling within Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 … However, by
contrast, if the Court finds that the applicant satisfied the requirements as set out
by the relevant Croatian pension legislation, then the stopping of the payment of
the applicant’s pension by the domestic authorities will be regarded as an inter-
ference with the applicant’s property interests which was not in accordance with
the law as required under the Convention. Such a conclusion will make it un-
necessary for the Court to ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck between
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights in finding a violation of Article 1
of Protocol No.1.’163
Indeed, what the Court is saying here is that not (or no longer) fulfilling the
conditions means that there is no issue that falls within the scope of the right
to protection of property, whereas if the conditions are met, a failure to provide
the applicant with the relevant benefit will automatically result in a violation
of the Convention. This binary approach seems much more categorical than
what is common in the Court’s case law and in fact it renders the balancing
of the various interests at stake redundant. Moreover, the Court’s stricter
interpretation seems hard to square with the ‘rule’ that followed from Moskal,
namely that as soon as a benefit has been granted, the reduction or elimination
thereof can be reviewed under the Convention. Ms Moskal turned out not
to meet one of the criteria for being granted an early retirement pension, while
in many other cases the issue will be that after conditions have been changed
– due to austerity or other measures – someone will no longer comply with
the requirements and lose the rights he once had.164
162 Damjanac v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 October 2010, appl. no. 52943/10, para. 87.
163 Ibid., paras. 88-89.
164 Cf. also Richardson v. the UK, ECtHR 10 April 2012 (dec.), appl. no. 26252/08, where the
Court reasoned in a similar manner on a complaint about the raising of the pensionable
age for women and alleged discrimination on the grounds of age and sex. It stated that
social security systems can change as to the conditions or quantum of the benefit and
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Altogether, whereas the Court’s socio-economic case law can generally be seen
to suggest that virtually all social security complaints were covered by Article 1
P1 of the Convention,165 recent case law shows that this is not entirely certain.
The question is whether this should be considered problematic, since perhaps
a more constrained approach to social security claims under the right to
protection of property is defensible (also) because of the complex position of
the Court and its limited capacities to say something on national social security
matters. However, it seems in any case important that a bright line is provided
in order to ensure transparency and legal certainty also at the national level.
The more recent case law makes one wonder if a case like Moskal would still
be held admissible, and if one can always rely on Convention protection when
a benefit (or an expectation thereof) is eliminated in accordance with the law
yet without ensuring an alternative safety net or a transitory period. When
it comes to crucial issues like this it seems important that clear guidance is
provided.166
10.4.2 Applying the Right to Protection of Property to Social Security Issues
Even though the exact scope of Article 1 P1 does not seem entirely clear, it
is obvious that, over the past years, the Court has reviewed many instances
of pension reductions, benefit eliminations, etc. Like in the non-discrimination
context, this brings up the question whether the promise of review under the
Convention has also resulted in meaningful protection. How does the Court
deal with individual social security interests qua property rights, while having
regard to the sensitive policies and (budgetary) decisions at stake? Does it have
the capacity to reason in a consistent and persuasive manner why a given
interference is proportional or not? In order to answer these questions and
show the potential but also the weaknesses of the Court’s approach, the
concluded that the applicant ‘has no right under domestic law to receive pension payments
between the ages of 60 and 65. It follows that she has no proprietary interest in such
payments for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The complaint under that provision
must, therefore, be declared incompatible ratione materiae’ (para. 18).
165 Cf., e.g., Cousins 2008, p. 22; Cousins 2009, p. 118; Kapuy 2007, p. 221, who ‘concludes that
the right to protection of property … [is], as a general rule, applicable in the field of social
security’.
166 It can be noted here that the recent case of Bélané Nagy v. Hungary, ECtHR 10 February
2015, appl. no. 53080/13, makes things even more confusing. In this case the Court used
the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ to hold that the applicant had a claim under Art.
1 P1 to a disability benefit, thereby seemingly taking a step towards recognising a ‘right
to a social security benefit’ under the Convention. The three dissenters however argued
that the complaint did not involve a ‘possession’, and the case has been referred to the
Grand Chamber. For that reason, as well as because the judgment was only rendered after
this research was concluded, the case is not discussed here – it may however be hoped
that the Grand Chamber takes the opportunity to provide a clear interpretation of the scope
of the protection of property in social security cases.
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examples below are presented under three different headers. First, brief men-
tion is made of some cases in which the Court could conclude its review by
holding that a social security measure was not in accordance with the law.
Secondly, the Court’s proportionality review is discussed, and besides the fact
that many cases are easily dismissed on the merits it is shown that when the
Court resorts to ad hoc balancing its reasoning is not always very convincing.
Finally, it will be shown that the Court from time to time refers to criteria that
potentially could help in making its reasoning more principled and insightful,
yet that would need further elaboration for actually having this effect.
10.4.2.1 Unlawful Measures
It is generally not easy for the Court to judge upon the proportionality of
interferences with individual social security rights. Frequently, on the other
side of the scale there are considerations related to ideological preferences,
budgetary considerations and/or austerity concerns, and balancing these
against individual interests is a delicate task, especially for a (supranational)
court. However, in some cases the Court does not need to go into the difficult
question of what is and what is not allowed at the national level in terms of
interferences with social benefits. This is the case, for example, when it con-
cludes that a measure or decision taken by the state was unforeseeable and
hence does not meet the lawfulness test.
As was highlighted in the previous section, in Damjanac the Court placed
a lot of emphasis on the fact that for complaining under Article 1 P1, it is
required that all the requirements for obtaining a benefit or pension are met.
In turn, when this is the case, the non-granting of the benefit automatically
results in a violation. In line with this the Court concluded that the fact that
Mr Damjanac’s military pension was discontinued when he moved to Serbia
had not been foreseeable, i.e., according to the applicable law it could be said
that he actually met the relevant requirements and there was hence no ground
for stopping his pension.167 This meant that no proportionality test was
required, and that the Court had a straightforward reason for concluding on
a violation of the Convention.168
Also in the case of Grudic v. Serbia the Court concluded that there had been
a violation of Article 1 P1 because the interference had not been in compliance
with the national law. In this case, Mr and Mrs Grudic complained about the
suspension of their disability pensions and the Court held that because the
167 The Court found that military pensions had been integrated in the general pension scheme,
and Damjanac could therefore rely on the Social Insurance Treaty that guaranteed that
pensions could not be ‘reduced, stopped, seized or confiscated on the ground of residence
on the territory of the contracting States’(Damjanac v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 October 2010, appl.
no. 52943/10, para. 102).
168 Ibid.
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suspension was based on Opinions of the Ministry for Social Affairs and the
Ministry for Labour, Employment and Social Policy, which do not amount
to legislation, the lawfulness requirement had not been met. Like in Damjanac,
this made it
‘unnecessary for it to ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck between the
demands of the general interest of the community on the one hand, and the require-
ments of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights on the other … ,
the seriousness of the alleged financial implications for the respondent State not-
withstanding.’169
However, it appears from the Court’s case law that most of the social security
measures that are reviewed by the Court are based on national law, as well
as accessible and foreseeable. When this is the case, the Court has to dive more
deeply into the issue at stake and decide whether a ‘fair balance’ has been
found.
10.4.2.2 Balancing Social Security Rights and the General Interest
Most of the social security complaints that were held admissible under the
Convention have turned on the requirement of proportionality and more in
particular on the Court’s ‘balancing’ of the different interests. Frequently, the
result of this test is that cases are dismissed on the merits, although there are
also examples of where the Court actually found a violation. In the first
category, the case of Goudswaard-van der Lans v. the Netherlands can be men-
tioned.170 The issue at stake concerned the reduction of a widow’s pension,
and the Court concluded that the complaint under Article 1 P1 was manifestly
ill-founded. It straightforwardly held that the Convention ‘does not place
Contracting Parties under a positive obligation to support a given individual’s
chosen lifestyle out of funds which are entrusted to them as agents of the
public weal’. In this way it substantiated the conclusion that the legislative
change had not resulted in an ‘individual and excessive burden’.171
Logically, the Court also did not rule in favour of the individuals concerned
in the cases where it already at the outset held that it was not necessary to
take a firm stance on the applicability of Article 1 P1 since the Convention
had not been violated.172 In Sali, the Court proceeded on the assumption
that the issue concerned an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment
of possessions. It granted the state much leeway in respect to its restrictive
legislation on unemployment benefits that was meant to protect the general
169 Grudic v. Serbia, ECtHR 17 April 2012, appl. no. 31925/08, para. 81.
170 Goudswaard-Van der Lans v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 22 September 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 75255/
01.
171 Ibid.
172 Supra, S. 10.4.1.
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interests of the Swedish society and the case was held manifestly ill-
founded.173 In Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria, moreover, the Court explicitly
confirmed that its role in the field of social security measures is a very limited
one.174 In this case, it explained it statement at the outset that the Convention
had not been breached on the basis of various references to the margin of
appreciation,175 as well as discussions on national prerogatives and the
undesirability of second-guessing determinations of the domestic policy-
maker.176 Several comparative studies that proved the specificity of, and
variance among national pension schemes,177 helped the Court affirm that
the matter at issue – a statutory cap on the first-tier pension – was to be
decided primarily by the national authorities.178 It may be remarked here
that such a deferential stance is difficult to square with the expectations the
Court has created by holding that social security issues generally come within
the scope of the Convention.179
The question of the added value of Strasbourg review in social security cases
may also come up when looking at the reasoning of the Court in the case of
Maggio. In this case the Court had stated that ‘in any event’ there had not been
a violation,180 and while discussing whether the applicant had been con-
fronted with an individual and excessive burden due to the legislative change
that made him obtain a lower pension than he had expected, the Court had
regard ‘to the particular context in which the issue arises in the present case,
namely that of a social security scheme’.181 It considered that ‘[s]uch schemes
173 Sali v. Sweden, ECtHR 10 January 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 67070/01.
174 Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04,
19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05.
175 Ibid. As to the question of what is in the public interest (para. 91), but also with regard
to passing laws in the context of a change of political and economic regime (para. 96), the
Court awards the state a (wide) margin of appreciation.
176 Ibid., para. 92.
177 Ibid., paras. 66-68.
178 Ibid., para. 92. See however the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Panova, who holds that
the pension cuts were disproportional, also because the transitional process from a central-
ised socialist to a market economy that had been ongoing in Bulgaria ‘cannot be endless
and unlimited in time – twenty-two years have now elapsed since 1989 – and cannot
perpetually serve to justify limitations on citizens’ social rights’.
179 See in this regard also the various austerity-related cases the Court has been confronted
with over the past years, e.g., Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), appl.
nos. 57665/12 and 57657/12, Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal, ECtHR
8 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 62235/12 57725/12, and Savickas a. O. v. Lithuania, ECtHR
15 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 66365/09, 12845/10, 28367/11, 29809/10, 29813/10 and
30623/10. Although it can be said that especially in the crisis context a judicial safety net
for the individuals concerned is very important, these three cases were all held manifestly
ill-founded.
180 Maggio a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08
and 56001/08, para. 59.
181 Ibid., para. 61.
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are an expression of a society’s solidarity with its vulnerable members’,182
and since the applicant lost ‘considerably less than half’ of his pension, he
had to endure ‘a reasonable and commensurate reduction, rather than the total
deprivation of his entitlements’.183 It was considered that the new method
of calculating the pensions of those who had worked in Switzerland – where
they had paid lower contributions – yet decided to retire in Italy in fact
equalised a state of affairs thereby avoiding unjustified advantages. According-
ly, there had not been a violation of the Convention.
Given the circumstances of the case, the Court’s conclusion in Maggio does
not seem unreasonable.184 Interesting is, however, that the Court’s proportion-
ality analysis in the similar case of Stefanetti and Others v. Italy resulted in the
opposite conclusion.185 This case concerned the situation of eight Italian
pensioners who were confronted with the same legislative change that altered
the method of calculation of the pensions of those who had been spending
(part of) their working lives in Switzerland. The ECtHR noted that unlike in
Maggio, the applicants in Stefanetti had lost more than half of what they would
have received in pension had the calculation not been altered.186 At the same
time, the Court stated that account must be had to more than just the amount
or percentage of the reduction, as well as that it is material whether the benefit
concerned was based on actual contributions rather than being ‘gratuitous
welfare aid solely funded by the tax-payer in general’.187 Eventually, the
Court held that the reductions had ‘undoubtedly affected the applicants’ way
of life and hindered its enjoyment substantially’.188 Given also their legitimate
expectation of receiving higher pensions, the lack of a compelling general
interest and the unforeseeability of Law no. 296/2006 that laid down the new
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid., para. 62. See also, e.g., Valkov a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/
04, 19125/04, 19475/04, 19490/04, 19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05, para.
97.
184 Apart from the fact, that is, that it can be asked how the Court can judge on the proportion-
ality of an interference with a property right, without deciding whether in the case at hand
such a right is present.
185 Stefanetti a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 15 April 2014, appl. nos. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/10, 21855/
10, 21860/10, 21863/10, 21869/10 and 21870/10. Different from in Maggio, moreover, in
Stefanetti the Court held that ‘[i]n the light of its case-law the Court is ready to accept that
for the purposes of this case the applicants’ pension entitlements constituted a possession
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention’ (para. 53).
186 This was reason to ‘reassess the matter and scrutinise the reduction more closely’ (ibid.,
para. 58). The Court firmly states that ‘the deprivation of the entirety of a pension is likely
to breach the said provision’, whereas ‘minimal reductions to a pension or related benefits
are likely not to do so’ (para. 59).
187 Ibid., para. 60. This may seem somewhat unsurprising, because the Court’s express inclusion
of both into the scope of the Convention arguably was meant to assure that the variety
of ways in which benefits are funded should not affect citizens’ fundamental rights pro-
tection.
188 Ibid., para. 64.
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method of calculation, it concluded that ‘the applicants had not suffered
commensurate reductions but were in fact made to bear an excessive
burden’.189
Since the Court must provide for individual protection, it on the one hand
seems unproblematic that whereas the legislative change had proportional
effects in one case, it led to a violation in another. On the other hand, the Court
explicitly did not base its conclusion in Stefanetti solely on the percentage of
the reduction, and since many of the other relevant circumstances were
identical in the two cases, it remains unclear when and why exactly the
measure became disproportional.190 Indeed, the point that can be made about
the cases of Maggio and Stefanetti is that analysing the proportionality stricto
sensu of an interference with social security rights is an inherently complicated
task. The similarity of the facts that form the background to these makes
painfully clear that it is difficult, if not impossible to draw the line. Conse-
quently, it can be asked to what extent the Court is capable of reaching con-
vincing conclusions on social security matters, and should indeed always
engage in this type of review in the first place. In this regard it is interesting
to read the partly dissention opinion that was attached to the judgment in
Stefanetti.191 The dissenters emphasised the wide margin of appreciation of
the state and they underlined the ‘huge and unjustified disparity there would
have been, to the advantage of the applicants, had the system not been
amended’. Moreover, they held that none of the applicants fell into the lowest
pension bracket, and that ‘still less the old-age pensions actually received by
the applicants … are at such a level as to deprive the applicants of the basic
means of subsistence’. Thereby they seem to suggest that only when this would
have been the case, the Court could have justifiably interfered with the
measures taken by the Member State. This is an interesting point, as it may
suggest that only when ‘minimum essential levels’ of socio-economic rights
are concerned, the Court can legitimately step in. This would be in keeping
with the core rights perspective elaborated in Chapter 7 and could arguably
have prevented the confusion that now emerged.192
In the same vein, finally, it is worth mentioning the case of N.K.M. v.
Hungary.193 The applicant in this case complained that the levying of tax at
189 Ibid., para. 66.
190 Moreover, the issue in Stefanetti concerned eight applicants, yet the Court does not dis-
tinguish amongst these, although it can be asked whether the reduction was as dispro-
portional for Mr Andreola – who still received EUR 1,820 – as for Mr Rodelli – who now
only got EUR 714. While looking not only at the percentage but also at the effects of the
reduction, one could argue that the Court should have given an explanation for why the
individuals involved (different from Mr Maggio) had all been confronted with a dispro-
portionate interference.
191 Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Raimondi joined by Judge Lorenzen.
192 See, on the way the Court sometimes refers to the importance of whether or not ‘essential’
social security rights were at stake, infra, S. 10.4.2.3.
193 N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May 2013, appl. no. 66529/11.
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a rate of 98% on part of her severance pay had amounted to a breach of
Article 1 P1. Although the Court’s approach to tax issues is normally a very
hesitant one,194 in N.K.M., it held that ‘considered as a whole, the circumstances
conferred on the applicant title to a substantive interest protected by Article 1
of Protocol No. 1’.195 The same ‘mixture’ of circumstances, moreover, was
also reason for concluding on a violation of this article. In the applicant’s case,
the tax measure had led to an overall tax burden of about 52% on the entirety
of her severance pay, yet ‘given the margin of appreciation the applicable tax
rate cannot be decisive in itself’.196 The Court noted that the applicant ‘had
to suffer a substantial deprivation of income in a period of considerable
personal difficulty, namely that of unemployment’.197 Referring to Article
34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the
importance of providing protection in the case of loss of employment the Court
considered it ‘quite likely’ that the applicant had been exposed to ‘substantial
personal hardships’.198 Since other civil servants had not been required to
contribute to a comparable extent to the public burden and since the relevant
tax statute entered into force only weeks before the termination of the civil
service relationship and no transitional period had been granted, it concluded
that there had been a violation.199 Unsurprisingly, in a similar case where
the applicant was notified of her dismissal only six weeks after the law was
enacted, and was confronted with an overall tax burden of 60%, the Court’s
concluded in a like manner.200 However, it must be noted that this ‘ex-
ceptional’ review of a tax issue made the Court enter a discussion of
proportionality stricto sensu in this field, and also here the question is whether
it is capable of drawing a clear line. After all, even though the cases mentioned
arguably were ‘clearly’ disproportional, what if the Court would be confronted
with a case in which the overall tax burden would be significantly lower?
Would the fact that part of the severance pay was taxed at a rate of 98%, then
still amount to a violation?201 While hardly paying attention to the lawfulness,
194 Which also has to do with what is stated in Art. 1 P1, namely that this right shall not ‘impair
the right of a State to … secure the payment of taxes’. Cf. Harris et al. 2014, pp. 901-903.
195 N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May 2013, appl. no. 66529/11, para. 33 [emphasis added].
196 Ibid., paras. 66-67.
197 Ibid., para. 70.
198 Ibid., para. 70.
199 Ibid., paras. 71-76.
200 Gáll v. Hungary, ECtHR 25 June 2013, appl. no. 49570/11.
201 A third related case suggests that this might be the case. In R.Sz. v. Hungary a violation
was found as well, albeit the Court there, different from in the other two cases, specifically
had regard to comparative law, i.e., to tax rates that in other European countries and in
the US, according to the highest courts of these countries, have been considered unconstitu-
tional. See R.Sz. v. Hungary, ECtHR 2 July 2013, appl. no. 41838/11, paras. 19-22, 54.
Social Security 433
suitability or necessity tests202 and balancing ‘all the circumstances of the
case’ in an unordered way, the judgment brings up more questions than it
answers.
Altogether, the Court’s efforts in some cases may be said to ensure eventual,
indivisible protection. Proportionality analysis creates the flexibility to do so:
by resorting to an overall balancing of all relevant factors even similar cases
can lead to different outcomes and ‘occasional’ protection can be provided.
However, this flexibility comes at the expense of the clarity and predictability
of the Court’s case law, and of a more principled approach to socio-economic
rights, and social security interests in particular.
10.4.2.3 ‘Proportionality Criteria’: Good Governance, Non-Discrimination, and the
Essence of Rights
Framed as a human rights concern, it can be argued that property review needs
to take into account all relevant circumstances of the case in order to provide,
where necessary, individual relief. When social benefits or pensions are con-
cerned, however, it has been shown throughout this chapter that this easily
triggers the Court to decide on social circumstances and the appropriateness
of welfare policies. The cases discussed reveal that when the Court engages
with the merits of a case, it generally resorts to balancing the various interests
at stake, yet hardly makes clear how this leads to a particular outcome. Where-
as this may be unproblematic for a democratic legislator, for a supranational
court that has to set clear standards, it is less so.
By contrast, it is more promising from this perspective that, in some cases,
the Court places particular emphasis on a specific aspect for determining
whether something was proportional or not. Arguably, paying particular
attention to ‘good governance’, non-discrimination, or to whether or not an
interference concerned the essence of the applicant’s social security rights, can
serve the aim of granting effective and indivisible protection, while also
providing more clarity on when and why an interference exactly amounts to
a breach of the Convention. However, in order for these ‘proportionality
criteria’ to actually make the Court’s reasoning more transparent, it can be
202 The fact that the Modified Tax Act laying down the 98% tax rate on severance payments
exceeding a particular amount had been adopted only weeks before the applicant had been
dismissed, for example, did not lead to the conclusion that there was no proper legal basis,
but played a role in the eventual proportionality test. The Court held that even though
‘serious doubts remain’ regarding the relevance of the considerations given by the govern-
ment regarding the aim of the tax measure, it was ‘not necessary for the Court to decide
… on the adequacy of a measure that formally serves a social goal, since this measure is
in any event subject to the proportionality test’ (N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May 2013,
appl. no. 66529/11, para. 59).
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said that they would need to be applied in a more explicit and consistent
manner.
First of all, in Moskal, the case concerning the revocation of an erroneously
granted early retirement pension, the Court relied on the principle of ‘good
governance’ for concluding that no fair balance had been struck between the
demands of the general interest and the protection of the individual’s funda-
mental rights.203 According to the Court this principle ‘requires that where
an issue in the general interest is at stake it is incumbent on the public author-
ities to act in good time, in an appropriate manner and with utmost consist-
ency’.204 The test it applied was a rather stringent one: even though the
interference was provided for by law and pursued a legitimate aim,205 the
effects of the relatively late withdrawal and the fact that it took three years
before she received another benefit, made the case turn out in Moskal’s
favour.206 The judgment thereby can be seen as suggesting that every lawful
revocation requires the national authorities to scrutinise the individual hardship
that might thereby be caused and act accordingly.207 Nonetheless, according
to the dissenters in the case, the ‘good governance test’ of the majority was
not entirely convincing. They argued that the Court, in judging the pro-
portionality of the interference, lost sight of the fact that the right to the benefit
could not be relied on indefinitely.208 Moreover, the dissenters emphasised
that the revocation of the benefit had been subjected to careful examination
at three levels of jurisdiction at the national level. Finally, the applicant never
had to pay back the sums that had mistakenly been paid to her. It had taken
a while for her to obtain an alternative and less valuable pension, but the
award of these benefits was backdated to the year she had lost her pension.209
It may be inferred from the dissenters’ criticism that instead of emphasising
the principle of good governance the Court could have better relied on an
overall balancing test focussing on all the different circumstances of the case.
It is unlikely, however, that this would have resulted in more transparent
reasoning, or in a more objective conclusion, let alone that it would have
increased the predictability of the Court’s case law. Alternatively, it can be
203 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05, paras. 68–76.
204 Ibid., para. 51, referring to Beyeler v. Italy, ECtHR 5 January 2000, appl. no. 33202/96, para.
120; Megadat.com S.r.l. v. Moldova, ECtHR 8 April 2008, appl. no. 21151/04, para. 72.
205 Moskal v. Poland, ECtHR 15 September 2009, appl. no. 10373/05, paras. 54-63.
206 The government’s error in granting the pension in the first place seems to have been
important here, too. The Court emphasised that ‘if a mistake has been caused by the
authorities themselves … a different proportionality approach must be taken’. Ibid., para.73.
207 Cf. Kenny 2010, p. 500. If, in contrast to the situation in Moskal, someone’s means of subsist-
ence are not at stake, and the authorities have acted in an appropriate manner by for
example immediately granting a replacing pension, a violation is unlikely to be found. Cf.
Iwaszkiewicz v. Poland, ECtHR 26 July 2011, appl. no. 30614/06.
208 Partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Hirvelä, and Bianku, para. 7.
209 Ibid.
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said, the Court should have been more clear on what is so crucial about the
requirement of good governance, and importantly, on what it exactly implies.
Even if one would not agree with the outcome of the case, it would have then
at least been clear what the conclusion was based on and the court would have
provided a clear standard also for future cases.210
Next to ‘good governance’, the Court in its review of social security issues
also has paid particular attention to the notion of ‘equality’. Normally, cases
concerning allegedly discriminatory treatment are dealt with under Article
14 (or Article 1 of Protocol No. 12) of the Convention. When the Court opts
for taking another substantive article as the starting point for its review,
however, it apparently seems willing to ‘weigh in’ the unequal treatment issue.
In N.K.M. this arguably played a significant role. In reviewing whether the
98% tax the applicant was confronted with amounted to a violation, the Court
gave particular attention to the ‘unequal treatment aspect’, i.e., to the fact that
compared to the applicants, other civil servants had not been confronted with
a similar (tax) burden.211 In regard to the applicant’s Article 14 complaint
the Court then held ‘that the inequality of treatment of which the applicant
claimed to be a victim has been sufficiently taken into account in the above
assessment that has led to the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 taken separately’.212 It could be a point of discussion whether this is
a desirable approach: on the one hand it can be argued that by focusing on
the discrimination complaint under Article 14 the Court could have avoided
the inherently difficult balancing test. On the other hand the ‘non-discrimina-
tion criterion’, as it was now taken on board in the review under the protection
of property, may also form an interesting focal point for further concretising
the seriousness of the interference and developing a more insightful test.
Finally, and this is important in the light of the topic of this research, the Court
also regularly refers to the ‘essence’ of the social security right concerned. That
210 It is true that after Moskal, the Court relied on similar ‘good governance’ reasoning in a
line of other cases. See, e.g., Czaja v. Poland, ECtHR 2 October 2012, appl. no. 5744/05. These
cases concerned more or less the same situation, and hence do not show how the criterion
of good governance would work out in other circumstances.
211 N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May 2013, appl. no. 66529/11, para. 71. The Court held that
‘the applicant, together with a group of dismissed civil servants … , was made to bear an
excessive and disproportionate burden, while other civil servants with comparable statutory
and other benefits were apparently not required to contribute to a comparable extent to
the public burden, even if they were in the position of leadership that enabled them to
define certain contractual benefits potentially disapproved by the public. Moreover, the
Court observes that the legislature did not afford the applicant a transitional period within
which to adjust herself to the new scheme’.
212 N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May 2013, appl. no. 66529/11, para. 84; Gáll v. Hungary,
ECtHR 25 June 2013, appl. no. 49570/11, para. 79; R.Sz. v. Hungary, ECtHR 2 July 2013,
appl. no. 41838/11, para. 70.
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is, it does not explicate what exactly this essence is and what consequences
this has for its review, but it does hold that ‘an important consideration’ in
reviewing a case under Article 1 P1 is whether the essence of the applicant’s
right to social security is impaired.213 An example of where this criterion
seemingly played an important role is the case of Lakicevic and Others v. Monte-
negro and Servia, where the applicants complained about the suspension of
their pensions because they had reopened their legal practices on a part-time
basis. The Court held that
‘[w]hile it must not be overlooked that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not restrict
a State’s freedom to choose the type or amount of benefits that it provides under
a social security scheme … it is also important to verify whether an applicant’s
right to derive benefits from the social security scheme in question has been
infringed in a manner resulting in the impairment of the essence of his pension
rights.’214
It considered that the applicants had been granted an entitlement to a pension
at a time when receiving a full pension was not incompatible with gainful
employment on a part-time basis, which had been reason for the applicants
to reopen their legal practices. The subsequent suspension of their pensions
had not been due to any changes in their own circumstances, but solely
resulted from changes in the law. No regard was thereby had to the amount
of revenue generated by their part-time work, and the Court considered that
the pension must still have constituted a considerable part of the applicants’
gross monthly income.215 The Court held that the applicants were made to
bear an individual and excessive burden, and that this
‘could have been otherwise had the applicants been obliged to endure a reasonable
and commensurate reduction rather than the total suspension of their entitlements
… or if the legislature had afforded them a transitional period within which to
adjust themselves to the new scheme. Furthermore, they were required to pay back
the pensions they had received as of 1 January 2004 onwards, which must also
be considered a relevant factor to be weighed in the balance’.216
Thus, it seems that when a pension or other benefit, which moreover forms
a substantial part of someone’s monthly income, is suspended or discontinued
entirely and cannot easily be substituted by another benefit, this is likely to
213 For some of the first examples, see, Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, ECtHR 12 October 2004,
appl. no. 60669/00, para. 39; Wieczorek v. Poland, ECtHR 8 December 2009, appl. no. 18176/
05, para. 57.
214 Lakicevic a. O. v. Montenegro and Serbia, ECtHR 13 December 2011, appl. nos. 27458/06,
33604/07, 37205/06 and 37207/06, para. 63.
215 Ibid., para. 70.
216 Ibid., para. 72.
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be in breach of the Convention.217 Unfortunately, it remains unclear what
role the ‘essence criterion’ exactly played in reaching the conclusion that there
had been a violation. Did the mere revocation of their entire pensions constitute
an interference with the essence of the applicant’s rights, which was then seen
as one amongst multiple factors that had to be considered for determining
the justifiability of the interference?218 Or was the impairment of their
essential rights instead the result of all the circumstances taken together, and
moreover the reason to conclude that there had been a violation? In terms of
the distinctions made in Chapter 7, the Court’s reference to the essence (or
‘core’) does not clarify at all whether the content of this essence is something
that is ‘relative’ (dependent on all the circumstances of the case), or rather
of a more general (‘absolute’) kind; neither does it make clear whether the
protection of this essence is absolute in the sense of prohibiting any inter-
ference, or ‘relative’ in that it is just one amongst many factors and hence not
decisive.219
The Court may also use the ‘essence criterion’ for substantiating that an
interference with social security rights is not in breach of the Convention. In
Maggio, for example, it held that ‘the applicant’s right to derive benefits from
the social insurance scheme in question has not been infringed in a manner
217 Cf. also Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, ECtHR 12 October 2004, appl. no. 60669/00, where
the applicant’s disability pension had been stopped entirely after a new assessment of his
disability based upon his work capacity in general and not on his capacity to perform the
same work. The Court concluded that he was made to bear an individual and excessive
burden. See also Brems 2007, p. 155. In cases where there are alternative benefits, indeed,
this can be reason for holding that a complaint is manifestly ill-founded, even if because
of someone’s savings or capital he is not eligible for these benefits (Hoogendijk v. the Nether-
lands, ECtHR 6 January 2005 (dec.), appl. no. 58641/00).
218 A hint that according to the Court the mere loss of an entire pension – or means of subsist-
ence – may constitute an interference with the essence of ones right, was given in Valkov
a. O. v. Bulgaria, ECtHR 25 October 2011, appl. nos. 2033/04, 19125/04, 19475/04, 19490/04,
19495/04, 19497/04, 24729/04, 171/05 and 2041/05, para. 97, where it held that the cap
on the applicants’ pensions ‘did not totally divest the applicants of their only means of
subsistence. The applicants are, in the nature of things, the top earners among the more
than two million persons in Bulgaria who are currently in receipt of a retirement pension.
They can therefore hardly be regarded as being made to bear an excessive and dispropor-
tionate burden, or as having suffered an impairment of the essence of their pension rights’.
See also Markovics a. O. v. Hungary, ECtHR 24 April 2014 (dec.), appl. nos. 77575/11, 19828/
13 and 19829/13, para. 42: ‘Although there has been an actual decrease in the nominal
amount of the monthly disbursements, the measure did not totally divest the applicants
of their only means of subsistence nor did it place them at risk of having insufficient means
to live on. They cannot therefore be regarded as being made to bear an excessive and
disproportionate burden, or as having suffered an impairment of the essence of their social
security benefits.’
219 See, for the different core rights approaches identified on the basis of the comparative
studies, supra, Ch. 7, S. 7.2.1.
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resulting in the impairment of the essence of his pension rights’.220 Another
example would be the case of Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v.
Portugal,221 which concerned austerity-related pension cuts in the form of
(temporary) revocations of holiday and Christmas allowances. In this case,
as well as in several other austerity cases,222 the Court decided that the
applicants’ complaints were manifestly ill-founded. Thereby it also relied on
‘the important consideration’ of whether the applicants’ rights had been
infringed in a manner resulting in the impairment of the essence thereof.223
This may seem to suggest that in the sensitive austerity context, the Court will
nevertheless step in whenever the essence of a right is concerned. At the same
time, the reference is again a superficial one as it is not clarified why in the
case at hand the essence of the applicants’ rights had not been touched upon,
let alone what this essence is and what an impairment thereof would mean
for the Court’s review. Thus, although it seems important to emphasise that
the Court’s limited role does include the protection of the essence of rights,
to truly add to the clarity and principledness of the Court’s review the ‘essence
criterion’ needs to be used in a more sophisticated manner. Just like in the
case of good governance, indeed, the potential of this ‘standard’ seems not
yet fully realised.
10.4.3 The Margin and Measures of Economic and Social Strategy
Finally, it can be asked whether – if not the criteria just outlined – at least the
Court’s use of the margin of appreciation in cases concerning Article 1 P1 taken
alone has the effect of structuring the Court’s review. Unfortunately, on the
basis of its reasoning in the cases discussed above it must be concluded that
the Court’s references to the margin are quite minimal. Just like in the non-
discrimination cases, it mostly remains unclear what exact margin applies and
the Court thereby seems to miss an opportunity to clarify why it reaches a
certain conclusion. Indeed, it can be doubted whether the margin as it is
currently used actually adds something to the Court’s review in social security
220 Maggio a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08
and 56001/08, para. 63. See also, e.g., Panfile v. Romania, ECtHR 20 March 2012 (dec.), appl.
no. 13902/11, para. 24; Khoniakina v. Georgia, ECtHR 19 July 2012, appl. no. 17767/08, para.
77; Torri a.O. v. Italy, ECtHR 24 January 2012 (dec.), appl. nos. 11838/07 and 12302/07, para.
45; Arras a.O. v. Italy, ECtHR 14 February 2012, appl. no. 17972/07, para. 83; Cichopek a.O.
v. Poland, ECtHR 14 May 2013 (dec.), appl. no. 15189/10 (and 1,627 others), para. 153.
221 Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal, ECtHR 8 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos.
62235/12 and 57725/12.
222 E.g., Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 57665/12 and 57657/
12; Savickas a. O. v. Lithuania, ECtHR 15 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos. 66365/09, 12845/10,
28367/11, 29809/10, 29813/10 and 30623/10.
223 Da Conceição Mateus and Santos Januário v. Portugal, ECtHR 8 October 2013 (dec.), appl. nos.
62235/12 and 57725/12, para. 24.
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cases, apart from serving as a reminder that the states’ leeway in this field
generally can – but does not always – prevent a finding of a violation.
First of all, in some cases the Court only at the very end refers to the
margin of appreciation. In Sali, for example, the Court concluded that
‘having regard to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the area
of social legislation, the Court finds that the present case does not disclose any
indication of a failure on the part of the respondent State to strike a fair balance
between the individual interests of the applicant and the general interests of
Swedish society.’224
Also in Maggio, the Court’s review of the issue was concluded with the remark
that ‘bearing in mind the State’s wide margin of appreciation in regulating
the pension system … the Court considers that the applicant was not made
to bear an individual and excessive burden’.225 It may be inferred from this
that the margin in these judgments merely seems to have the function of
underlining once more that the issues concerned could not be considered to
be in breach of the Convention, rather than doing anything more than that.226
In most cases, however, as in the cases discussed in Section 10.3, the Court
did start its review of the issue at hand with some remarks on the margin.
Generally, it is held that that in the context of ‘general measures of economic
or social strategy’ the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation and also
regarding the question whether a measure was ‘in the public interest’ states
are granted a lot of leeway. General statements on the margin are usually
followed by the remark that ‘however’, there should be a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality. The judgment in Grudic provides for a clear example.
In this case the Court considered that
‘in the area of social legislation including in the area of pensions States enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation, which in the interests of social justice and economic
well-being may legitimately lead them to adjust, cap or even reduce the amount
of pensions normally payable to the qualifying population. However, any such
measures must be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and comply with
the requirements of proportionality. Therefore, the margin of appreciation available
to the legislature in the choice of policies should be a wide one, and its judgment
224 Sali v. Sweden, ECtHR 10 January 2006 (dec.), appl. no. 67070/01.
225 Maggio a. O. v. Italy, ECtHR 31 May 2011, appl. nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08
and 56001/08, para. 63.
226 Alternatively, it could be argued that since the Court in both cases had refrained from
holding whether or not the case was actually covered by Article 1 P1, it in fact was lacking
a starting point on the basis of which the applicable margin could be outlined in a more
concrete manner. In any case, the way the margin is used in these cases, adds even less
to the Court’s review than its references to the margin discussed in, supra, S. 10.3.3.
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as to what is “in the public interest” should be respected unless that judgment is
manifestly without reasonable foundation.’227
When, like in Grudic or Damjanac, it is concluded that the interference resulted
in a violation of the Convention for failing to comply with the lawfulness
requirement, this might explain why the Court leaves it at that and does not
concretise the applicable margin any further. Noticeably, however, also when
a case turns upon the issue of proportionality, the Court often does not say
more of the margin than that it is ‘generally wide’.228
Indeed, what can be noticed with regard to the Court’s references to the
margin of appreciation in property rights cases concerning social security
issues, is that it in fact does not really use the margin in the sense of adjusting
it according to the ‘circumstances, subject matter and background’ of the case
concerned, but merely mentions it as a kind of general predisposition. In the
cases in which it eventually concludes that the Convention had been violated,
the Court sometimes refrains from using the word ‘wide’. However, what it
does not do in these cases is explicitly narrowing the margin and explaining
why this is appropriate given the circumstances of the case, although this
would have arguably made its conclusion more insightful. Indeed, also in cases
where the individual interest concerned was arguably of a very serious kind
and concerned the applicant’s minimum means of subsistence, this did not
have any clearly traceable effect on the applicable margin.229 Of course, as
became clear above, it makes a difference for the outcome of the case whether
the applicant is or is not dependent on the benefit concerned, and whether
or not this benefit is taken away entirely or merely reduced. This seemingly
is important for ‘giving weight’ to the individual interest as opposed to the
general one in the eventual balancing test. It is not, however, used to develop
a more multi-layered standard of review, i.e., a not just ‘wide’ but differentiated
margin suited to the specific kind of social security issue (or interest) con-
cerned. This bars the Court from developing a truly indivisible approach, yet
also fails to clarify the actual strictness of its test.
10.5 CONCLUSION
It was considered in this chapter that over the past decades the Court has dealt
increasingly with social security-related complaints, and that its case law on
this topic by now forms a substantial part of the Strasbourg fundamental rights
227 Grudic v. Serbia, ECtHR 17 April 2012, appl. no. 31925/08, para. 75.
228 See also the discussion of the margin in non-discrimination cases in, supra, S. 10.3.3.
229 Cf. Lakicevic and Others v. Montenegro and Serbia, ECtHR 13 December 2011, appl. nos. 27458/
06, 33604/07, 37205/06 and 37207/06, where the Court no less than three times mentioned
the ‘wide’ margin of appreciation (paras 61 and 63); N.K.M. v. Hungary, ECtHR 14 May
2013, appl. no. 66529/11, paras. 37, 49, 57, 61, 65, and 67.
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acquis. It was investigated whether in this case law, the Court provides for
effective and indivisible protection, while at the same time ensuring an insight-
ful interpretation and application of the rights concerned.
In Section 10.2 the relation between the topic of social security and the
rights enshrined in the Convention was further introduced. It was held that
there is an apparent connection between social security and private and family
life (Article 8) and property protection (Article 1 P1), although this connection
remains a controversial one. Also Article 3 and Article 6 can be relevant when
it comes to social security complaints. However, whereas because of the high
threshold for applying the former the cases in which Article 3 is engaged have
proven to be rare, the latter can only provide ‘non-substantive’, procedural
protection.
In the end, as the lion’s share of this chapter has illustrated, what has
proven most relevant in the context of social security is the protection provided
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Taken alone or in conjunction with the non-
discrimination principle laid down in Article 14 of the Convention, Article 1
P1 has been the starting point for numerous complaints about pensions, allow-
ances and benefits, and more particularly about the reduction or elimination
thereof. The way in which the Court has dealt with these complaints, however,
at various points has shown to be inconsistent or lacking in transparency.
First, in Section 10.3 it was illustrated that in dealing with complaints of
alleged discrimination in the field of social security, the Court has generally
interpreted the ‘ambit’ of Article 1 P1 in a generous manner. This creates room
for truly indivisible protection of social security interests, although it must
be admitted that the cases the Court has been confronted with have proven
everything but easy to judge upon. Its review does not always appear very
effective, and it does not always seem to add much for the applicants con-
cerned. Often the Court takes a very deferential stance, or concludes that the
applicant did not find himself in a ‘relevantly similar situation’. In the cases
in which it did get to the heart of the matter, it has been criticised for insuffi-
ciently taking all the relevant factors into account. The margin of appreciation,
rather than forming a useful starting point for tackling this inherently com-
plicated task, seems to constitute yet another factor that somehow has to be
considered in balancing the various interests. It does not seem to help in
distinguishing between different socio-economic cases, as it is generally wide,
regardless of the circumstances at hand.
Section 10.4, concerning complaints under the protection of property taken
alone, showed that although the Court on the basis of the case of Stec has held
that both contributory and non-contributory benefits can be considered
‘possessions’ under the Convention, its interpretation remains somewhat
ambiguous. Regardless of the proprietary character of the interests concerned,
more recently the Court has suggested that it will only review cases when
all conditions have been met, while emphasising that ‘the fact that a person
has entered into and forms part of a state social security system does not
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necessarily mean that that system cannot be changed either as to the conditions
of eligibility of payment or as to the quantum of the benefit or pension’.230
It was held that uncertainty as to whether this must be understood as a re-
striction of Article 1 P1’s scope is undesirable. Moreover, with regard to the
Court’s analysis of the proportionality of interferences with social security
rights, it was shown that it often remains unclear why exactly the circum-
stances of a particular case do or do not result in a breach of the Convention.
Generally, the Court resorts to ‘balancing’ while having regard to multiple
relevant considerations, yet this not always allows for drawing a line in a
transparent manner. In its case law, the Court from time to time refers to
criteria that could be helpful in this regard, namely the importance of good
governance and non-dsicrimination, or the protection of the essence of social
security rights. However, what these criteria exactly imply and what role they
(could) play in the Court’s review, remains unclear. To make the Court’s
review more principled, thus, the criteria identified would have to be utilised
in a more sophisticated manner. The same goes for the Court’s references to
the margin of appreciation, which also in cases concerning Article 1 P1 taken
alone fail to structure its test by adapting to what actually is at stake for the
individual concerned.
In conclusion, it can be said that it is understandable that the Court is
cognisable of its supranational position when dealing with complex and
politically sensitive social security complaints. However, when it opts for a
broad interpretation of Article 1 P1 in this field, thereby explicitly allowing
for indivisible rights review, it should also deal with the various cases in an
effective as well as consistent and transparent manner. In the final chapter
of this book, some further remarks will be made as to how a ‘core rights
perspective’ could be helpful in this regard.
230 Damjanac v. Croatia, ECtHR 24 October 2010, appl. no. 52943/10, para. 86.
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11.1 THE ADDED VALUE OF A CORE RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
The topic of core rights deserves particular care. The notion of core rights can
easily be misunderstood, and its (potential) technical finesses are not always
appreciated. What is more, the idea of core rights protection may be perceived
as going against what a belief in fundamental rights today seems to be about:
a broad coverage of rights, balancing of interests, etc. In this study an effort
was made to develop the idea of core rights in such a way that it could lead
to workable suggestions for a particular legal context, namely that of the
protection of socio-economic interests by the European Court of Human Rights
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The protection of economic
and social interests is a particularly delicate aspect of the practice of the ECtHR,
because it highlights the difficulties inherent in providing effective protection
while showing the necessary deference, as well as providing the guidance
Member States need to protect ECHR rights. In this final chapter some conclud-
ing remarks are made as to how core rights can be used in the socio-economic
fields discussed in the previous three chapters. In addition, the potential,
broader implications of this study are addressed in relation to the current
trends in judicial fundamental rights protection.
Chapter 7 of this book has offered some conclusions on the possible use and
added value of the notion of core rights and on the preferred use of this notion
for the Strasbourg socio-economic rights context. Although it is not the aim
of this final chapter to repeat or summarise what was outlined there, it is
important to briefly recall some of these conclusions before linking the ‘theory’
of the core rights perspective that was developed in Parts I-III of this book
to the ‘practice’ of the Strasbourg reasoning. The first two parts of this book
introduced the tasks of the Court and the socio-economic dimension of the
Convention, the different possibilities of fundamental rights reasoning, and
various core rights doctrines. This led, first, to a critical appraisal of several
persistent ideas on core rights, on the basis of which a broader and more
workable image of this notion was created, and, secondly, to the development
of a ‘core rights perspective’ that would potentially fit the Strasbourg socio-
economic practice. What was outlined in Chapter 7 was hence not so much
a theoretical, philosophical conclusion on the idea of core rights. Rather, the
findings presented were drawn from concrete (practical and constitutional)
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examples from Germany, South Africa, and the field of international economic
and social fundamental rights, albeit the theoretical underpinnings of these
examples thereby played a prominent role. Moreover, in outlining a core rights
perspective for the ECtHR, more was done than merely extracting the most
interesting ideas from the different doctrines to then combine them into an
‘ideal’ perspective. Instead, the more normative account of the role and tasks
of the Court that was presented in Chapter 2, in combination with the import-
ance of a bifurcated approach to fundamental rights reasoning, formed the
starting point for what was presented as a promising way to deal with core
rights in particular at the Strasbourg level.
Adding the notion of core rights to the ideas of ‘effective’ and ‘indivisible’
fundamental rights protection that were introduced in Chapter 2, the perspect-
ive presented first of all placed significant emphasis on the determination of
the scope of rights, i.e., on the interpretation of the ECHR in order to decide
whether an individual socio-economic interest does or does not fall within
the scope of the Convention. For a great many interests that could (also) be
called ‘economic’ or ‘social’, this may automatically be the case. One can think
of complaints concerning the issue of fair trial or of interferences with an
individual’s respect for his home. Beyond this, however, it was noted that the
question of scope is less straightforward, and it was held that with the help
of the idea of core rights it could be approached in a more principled manner.
More precisely, it was suggested that when ‘minimum essential levels’ of socio-
economic rights are concerned, an issue can be considered to fall within the
ECHR’s scope. When it involves interferences with, or rather a state’s failure
to provide such a minimum, this is reason for review under the ‘civil and
political’ Convention. In fact, the aim of effective and indivisible fundamental
rights protection calls for prima facie protection of such issues, and supra-
national review is justified by their importance. However, a socio-economic
scope that exclusively covers minimum socio-economic rights fails to do justice
to the promise of the Convention. Besides this, therefore, additional ‘core
indicators’ were identified that concern the protection against discrimination
as well as the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups. When these issues
are at stake, it was argued, there is likewise reason for review under the ECHR.
However, the ‘core rights perspective’ that was outlined does not merely
serve to demarcate the ‘socio-economic scope’ of vague Convention norms
that potentially cover a very wide range of interests. The recognition that a
minimum core right is concerned also may be considered relevant at the stage
of application, i.e., at the stage of review of the justifiability of a certain re-
striction or omission to act. According to the preferred ‘absolute-relative’
understanding of core rights, the fact that an interference or omission involves
a core socio-economic right need not automatically lead to the conclusion that
the rights norm that was invoked has been violated. Yet it does place particular
weight on the individual interest at stake, meaning that there is a ‘thumb on
the scale’ when it is ‘balanced’ against other interests. Phrased differently, core
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socio-economic rights protection does not bar a proportionality analysis – it
should however guide the Court’s review in a given case. This entails that
when what is provided or what is ‘left over’ is evidently insufficient in terms
of minimum socio-economic levels, a violation of the Convention will be found.
Additionally, it was held that in order to make the ‘core’ requirement to ensure
minimum levels more tangible, procedural requirements could play an im-
portant role. Such requirements allow for concretising what is, as a matter
of priority, demanded, without the Court having to ‘quantify’ the required
minimum levels. In this regard, it must be noted that when the Court’s review
is limited to core socio-economic rights cases, the role of the margin of appre-
ciation is a particularly small one. When an issue concerns unequal treatment,
or the needs of vulnerable individuals, but not minimum essential levels, there
is some room for the state to decide an issue in one way or another. When
minimum essential levels are concerned, however, the state is granted leeway
only as regards the way in which it ensures this minimum, but not regarding
whether a minimum level is guaranteed in the first place.
Altogether, the approach that was outlined serves two goals in particular. First,
with the help of a core rights perspective the ECtHR could work towards a
principled approach to the adjudication of (positive) economic and social rights
claims, characterised by a clear interpretation of rights and hence a de-
marcation of its jurisdiction in this field. Secondly, the perspective outlined
serves the aim of providing meaningful, robust protection of important socio-
economic interests. Rather than inviting a wide margin and instead of being
easily ‘outbalanced’ by state interests, a core rights perspective can ensure
indivisible protection of socio-economic needs by stating them in a clear
fashion that can guide the Court’s (proportionality) review. In the specific
context concerned here, core rights protection may hence well be described
by the catchphrase ‘less is more’.
A promise was made, however, to use this final chapter to also embark on
some more concrete suggestions as to what core rights can do for the reasoning
of the ECtHR in socio-economic cases. The case law studies presented in Chap-
ters 8 to 10 have not presented an exhaustive overview of the Court’s decisions
and judgments on the topics of housing, health and health care, and social
security. Rather, they aimed to present the most prominent lines of reasoning,
developments, and shortcomings. It can be derived from the case law studies,
first, that the core rights perspective outlined in Chapter 7 actually can be made
to ‘fit’ the current Strasbourg practice. It is in line with the apparent aim of
the Court to provide effective, yet not unlimited socio-economic rights pro-
tection. This objective is illustrated by the fact that it regularly holds that ‘the
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Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political
rights’,1 and ‘does not guarantee, as such, socio-economic rights’,2 while, at
the same time, reviewing a great variety of socio-economic issues. Also, a core
rights approach seems a fitting tool for the Court’s apparent struggle to dis-
tinguish between the interpretation and application of Convention rights, and
to answer the question of proportionality in a (more) convincing manner. What
is more, the idea of core rights protection in fact uncovers what is already
happening to some extent in the Strasbourg practice. In its dealing with socio-
economic interests, the ECtHR’s protection can sometimes be seen to entail a
kind of ‘minimum’ socio-economic guarantees. Moreover, in its case law
generally, the Court also places emphasis on the protection of vulnerable
individuals and groups, like children, disabled persons, or asylum seekers,
while the working of Article 14 creates a significant role for non-discrimination
protection. Important is also that the Court has started to experiment increas-
ingly with the idea of ‘procedural’ protection: especially in sensitive fields –
like socio-economic rights – it frequently asks whether the procedural guar-
antees provided to the applicant were sufficient. Although certain parts of
the case law are farther removed from this ‘blueprint’, the idea of a core rights
perspective could thus be seen to ‘connect the dots’ – starting form what is
already there it may lead to a more principled, coherent and transparent
approach to socio-economic rights.
Some concrete examples can be given of how this could work. First, when
it comes to the protection under Article 8, and this goes especially for cases
concerning housing and health care, it has become clear that the Court often
fails to define the (positive) scope of the Convention. When complaints concern
claims for housing assistance or for example medication or treatment, no clear
statement is given on the interpretation and applicability of the Convention.
The Court may underline that Article 8 entails positive obligations, yet at the
same time it often holds that the Convention does not guarantee a right to
housing, health care, etc. Rather than clarifying the obligations that nevertheless
exist in this field, what results is an overall (balancing) test lacking information
on what kind of prima facie Convention right is concerned or whether there
is such a right in the first place. The core rights perspective that was outlined
can be helpful in this regard. It would provide a principled starting point for
determining when a (positive) socio-economic claim falls within the scope of
the Convention. This would be the case when an issue concerns ‘minimum
essential levels’ of the rights to housing, or health care, or social assistance,
because such issues should be prima facie protected by the Convention. Accord-
ing to the ‘perspective’ outlined in Chapter 7, it would not be necessary for
the Court to expressly concretise what such minimum levels should amount
1 N. v. the UK, ECtHR (GC) 27 May 2008, appl. no. 26565/05, para. 44.
2 Cf. Pancenko v. Latvia, ECtHR 28 October 1999 (dec.), appl. no. 40772/98. Cf. also, e.g., Kyrtatos
v. Greece, ECtHR 22 May 2003, appl. no. 41666/98, para. 52.
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to. Rather, when a housing or health care issue can be seen to involve mini-
mum social entitlements, the Court can explain that this is why it deserves
to be reviewed, thereby providing more clarity on the scope of the Convention
is socio-economic cases. Also when a case for example concerns the housing
situation of vulnerable individuals like severely ill or handicapped persons
Article 8 may be considered applicable. Again, the Court can then hold that
it is not merely for the fact that there is ‘a link’ with someone’s private life,
but because essential socio-economic guarantees in the form of protection of
vulnerable individuals are concerned, that Convention review is granted. In
turn, such a clear statement as regards the interpretation of the Convention
could then form an important benchmark for judging whether an interference
or omission was justified. Rather than being ‘outbalanced’ by a wide margin
of appreciation merely because of the social policy character of the issue
involved, the core interest concerned would bring about more robust pro-
tection. This implies that when the level of care – the contours of which are
to be determined at the national level – in the view of the Court is ‘evidently
insufficient’, a violation will be found. This could for example be the case when
no efforts were made at all to provide a severely handicapped person with
adequate accommodation. Moreover, the Court may also rely on ‘procedural’
requirements, and demand that even when something was not ‘evidently
insufficient’ the interests of the individuals concerned were actually and
sufficiently taken into account. It was seen in Chapters 8 and 9 that the Court
under Article 8 indeed has started to develop a ‘procedurally-oriented’ test
for dealing with housing and health-related complaints, for example in the
case of Roma housing issues or environmental health cases. This is a positive
development, especially when the Court explicitly demands that the socio-
economic needs of the individuals concerned are taken into account in the
national (decision-making or judicial) process. In fact, when this approach
would be combined with the clear and transparent interpretation of the ‘socio-
economic scope’ the Convention outlined here, it may lead to principled,
effective and indivisible ‘core’ socio-economic rights protection. Thus, in the
Roma cases for example, the Court should state that it is because a vulnerable
group is concerned – as well as, often, minimum housing needs – that there
is a prima facie (positive) right under the Convention not to be evicted or to
be provided with suitable, alternative housing. When the protection granted
is obviously insufficient, or when there are procedural shortcomings, any
margin that would be granted – and this cannot always be a wide one – can
be overcome and a violation can be found.
Secondly, under Article 3 ECHR, the Court on the one hand seems hesitant
to explicitly include socio-economic protection. This especially holds true in
cases in which it is hard to say that a severe socio-economic situation was the
result of actual ‘treatment’, like when its severity primarily emanates from
the illness a person suffers from. Nevertheless, the Court has generally been
willing to review issues that merely concern someone’s living conditions, or
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housing or health in particular, to see whether the specific circumstances of
the case attained the ‘minimum level of severity’ needed for triggering the
protection of Article 3. What is more, on the basis of the cases in which is has
found a violation of this norm, it can be argued that the ECtHR guarantees some
kind of minimum level of socio-economic protection, especially when vulner-
able individuals are involved. A core rights perspective would suggest that
this be done in a more open and explicit manner. Indeed, the Court should
clarify that an obvious lack of minimum socio-economic guarantees related to
health care or housing, can very well amount to ‘inhuman’ or ‘degrading’
treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Because of the ‘absolute’
protection prescribed by the wording of this provision, the threshold set should
however be a high one. After all, including core socio-economic protection
in the context of Article 3 leaves no room for justified limitations. Thus, for
example, in the case of expulsion of a sick person who has no chance to
actually survive (at least for a while), the socio-economic dimension of Article
3 may be triggered. In such a case the Court should make clear that it is only
because a core socio-economic guarantee is concerned, that protection is pro-
vided, thereby also informing potential applicants that they need not bring
all of their ‘social’ complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.
Also Article 14 plays an important role in the Court’s socio-economic
protection. It is said to have a ‘socialising’ effect, in the sense that the socio-
economic entitlements a state decides to create need to be distributed in a non-
discriminatory manner. To this extent, the Court’s approach already is in line
with the core rights perspective presented in Chapter 7, which holds that the
importance of non-discrimination, also in the sphere of social policy, calls for
review of alleged discrimination under the Convention. However, in the
various case law chapters it has also become clear that complaints of discrim-
ination are not always dealt with in a straightforward manner. First, when
it comes to social security benefits or housing assistance, there generally is
a good reason as well as a budgetary need for distinguishing between different
groups of persons, and frequently unequal treatment in these fields does not
amount to discrimination prohibited under the ECHR. Secondly, other cases
of alleged discrimination, like those occurring in the context of Roma housing,
have been shown to be very sensitive and for that reason very difficult to judge
upon in a convincing manner. In this context the core rights perspective first
of all suggests that it be recognised that protection against discrimination is
nevertheless of crucial importance in the socio-economic sphere. For that
reason, complaints concerning unequal treatment should not be marginalised
from the outset. At the same time, it must also be clear that not all ‘differential
treatment’ in the socio-economic sphere amounts to discrimination. What the
notion of core rights in this regard could add is that besides for example a
distinction between different (suspect and non-suspect) grounds of discrimina-
tion, a distinction between core and non-core socio-economic entitlements can
inform the proportionality analysis that is conducted in order to see whether
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Article 14 has been violated. More concretely: when someone is treated differ-
ently in regard to the provision of minimum social benefits, like a basic pension
or standard health care, regardless of the exact ground that is concerned, this
would be reason to opt for a stricter form of review. Currently, when the Court
reviews cases of alleged discrimination, it does not make a distinction between
core and non-core entitlements. A core rights perspective does include this focus,
thereby allowing for more insightful reason-giving as to why a distinction
is easily justified, or rather should be approached with more suspicion.
Article 14 not least played a role in the social security case law of the Court,
and it indeed seems defensible that the Court opts for a wide interpretation
of the ‘ambit’ of the protection of property (Article 1 P1) in order to allow for
non-discrimination review under the Convention. A different issue, however,
is whether also on the basis of this Convention provision ‘taken alone’, so when
there is no differential treatment, every instance of an interference with social
security benefits should obtain prima facie property rights protection. As the
relation between ‘possessions’ and especially non-contributory social benefits
is a strained one, this is certainly not self-evident. And although the Court
no longer distinguishes between contributory and non-contributory benefits,
more recently it sometimes seems unwilling to straightforwardly apply Article
1 P1 in social security cases. On the basis of the core rights perspective devel-
oped in this study, two important submissions can be made here. First, it can
be argued that because of the lack of a clear link, not every social benefit,
pension, etc. should obtain prima facie protection qua property right under the
Convention. When interferences with social security arrangements concern
alleged discrimination and/or ‘minimum essential levels’, yet not ‘property’,
they may then nevertheless be reviewed under Article 14 or Article 8 (or even
Article 3) ECHR, respectively. In other words, also here the ‘core criteria’ could
form an (additional) aid for demarcating the scope of the Convention. When
benefits are concerned that do not guarantee a subsistence minimum, for
example, the fact that no contributions were paid may form a reason to exclude
the issue from review under the ECHR. Secondly, however, when if it is pre-
ferred to hold on to a (very) broad interpretation of the ‘possessions’ protected
by Article 1 P1 – also because what is considered a ‘possession’ generally does
not depend on how much one needs it – core rights protection may still
improve the Court’s reasoning. If only at the application stage, it would enable
the Court to underline the core or non-core character of the individual interest
concerned. Rather than being overshadowed by a ‘generally wide’ margin,
in case minimum benefits are concerned that can be considered to form some-
one’s minimum means of subsistence, this would then be reason for a stricter
test. Thus, even when the scope of property protection does not seem de-
pendent on how essential the social issue at stake is, a core rights perspective
can aid in deciding the issue of proportionality in a more transparent and
convincing manner. It allows the Court to argue that because an essential
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guarantee was at stake, the margin is narrow and it is hence more likely that
there will be a violation of the Convention.
Thus, in various respects a core rights approach can contribute to the clarity
and transparency of the Court’s case law. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised
that a core rights approach does not solve all possible issues related to the
protection of socio-economic interests under the Convention. The ‘absolute-
relative’ understanding of core rights that was propagated in Chapter 7 does
not provide an answer to every socio-economic complaint, but leaves room
for or even requires taking into account other considerations. Core rights
reasoning may need to be corroborated by other tests or instruments in order
to reach a conclusion on whether or not the Convention was violated. Indeed,
rather than forming the relevant test, an absolute-relative core rights approach
informs the Court’s review. Yet it does allow for a more principled, rule-based
approach to socio-economic complaints under the Convention. Once their core
character allows for review of socio-economic issues, the evidently insufficient
provision of minimum levels is very likely to amount to a violation. Besides
this, for example with the help of procedural requirements, core rights allow
for clearer standards to be set that may enable the Court to deal with complex
issues in a more transparent manner. Hence, although a core rights perspective
cannot work miracles, it clearly can have added value. It may add to the
notions of effective and indivisible rights protection, and to what is already
visible in the Court’s case law, in a way to help the Court making its approach
future-proof.
11.2 IMPLICATIONS IN REGARD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL FUNDA-
MENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
It was mentioned in the introductory chapter that the scope of the research
presented in this book is limited.3 The outcomes exclusively concern the
practice of the ECtHR, and more particularly the Strasbourg Court’s protection
of socio-economic interests. The various findings are relevant, in other words,
for the supranational protection of socio-economic interests under civil and
political rights norms. Regardless of these limitations, however, in the intro-
duction to this book the practice and especially the reasoning of the ECtHR were
linked to broader developments in the field of fundamental rights adjudica-
tion.4 It was considered that in dealing with conflicts between individual and
general interests courts around the world frequently make use of
proportionality review and ‘balancing’. An important trend is moreover the
recognition of positive obligations – also when the norms concerned are
3 Supra, Ch. 1, S. 1.3.
4 Supra, Ch. 1, S. 1.1.
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phrased in ‘negative’ terms –, as well as the movement towards a more con-
structive approach to economic and social fundamental rights protection. It
was explained that the case law of the ECtHR could be seen as exemplary of
these different trends. The Court has contributed to a great extent to the
consolidation of proportionality analysis as the approach to fundamental rights
adjudication, as well as to the acceptance of positive obligations. Moreover,
as has been amply shown in this thesis, the ECtHR’s case law also signals the
possibility of (supranational) judicial socio-economic rights protection. Thereby
it confirms the emerging perception that next to civil and political rights also
economic and social guarantees should be taken seriously as legal constructs
by means of which individual claims can be protected. Having introduced
the practice of the ECtHR in connection with these topics, it may be asked what
implications the findings of this study may have for the direction in which
these various developments are or should be going.
Although the ECtHR was labelled a ‘forerunner’, and its practice ‘avant-
garde’, arguably it is particularly this court that should remain cautious in
its approach to fundamental rights protection. Its position is a sensitive one
as the acceptance and implementation of its judgments is dependent on the
willingness of the Member States. The Court is far removed not only from
the actual effects of its decisions and judgments, but also from what occurred
and was decided at the national level in the first place. Although its ‘human
rights mandate’ may provide the ECtHR with some leeway in applying the
Convention in an ‘evolutive’ way in order to ensure effective protection, its
role can neither be described as particularly ‘transformative’, nor is it expected
that the Court supports certain (social) political goals.5 In the light of this,
as well as in the context of the criticism that has been voiced regarding the
Court’s practice, it was asked in the introduction whether a combination of
the various trends just mentioned could in fact also hamper the success of
the Court. Its reliance on proportionality analysis or ad hoc balancing, in
combination with the room for positive and, moreover, economic and social
rights protection, may have the effect (or at least give the impression) that
the Court is doing more than its competences allow for, thereby fuelling and
exacerbating current criticism. Even when relying on a wide margin and not
often concluding on a violation of the Convention in the socio-economic sphere,
it may still be considered that it is not for the Strasbourg Court to determine
whether a fair balance has been struck between competing interests in a
particular field in the first place.
In this regard, the ‘core rights perspective’ developed in this book was
said to have the potential of improving the Court’s reasoning in socio-economic
5 That is, in this regard the Court’s role may be different from that of national constitutional
courts, like the South African Constitutional Court (that is said to interpret and apply a
‘transformative’ constitution), or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (protecting the ‘social
state principle’ of Art. 20(1) GG). See, supra, Ch. 4, S. 4.4.2, and Ch. 6, S. 6.2, respectively.
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rights cases, by leading to a more principled and transparent approach. It could
ensure effective and indivisible, i.e., meaningful protection of important socio-
economic interests, while also doing justice the sensitive role and position of
the Court. The proposed approach neither suggests that proportionality review
needs to be avoided, nor was it argued that positive obligations or the explicit
protection of socio-economic rights claims cannot have a place in the Court’s
case law. Rather, first and foremost, for a combination of these tests and
doctrines to work in a way that leaves enough room for national decisions
and policies and renders essential guidance to the domestic authorities, the
core rights approach that was outlined suggests that a clear interpretation be
provided. Where Möller speaks of the ‘global model of constitutional rights’,6
he rejects the (traditional) dominant narrative7 and presents a modern account
of judicial fundamental rights protection at both the constitutional and the
ECHR level. This account is characterised by positive and socio-economic rights,
horizontal protection, proportionality analysis, and by ‘rights inflation’, i.e.,
by a very broad understanding of the scope of rights that allows practically
all (autonomy-related8) individual interests to automatically pass the inter-
pretation stage. This conception is visible – in one way or another – in many
important academic works on fundamental rights adjudication,9 and implies
that clear statements on the interpretation and scope of rights become super-
fluous, while balancing – especially in the context of positive obligations –
gets all the attention. Yet what the gist of the argument presented here in fact
indicates is that ‘the global model’ may fare better, at least in some judicial
contexts, when there is less room for ‘inflation’ and attention is instead had
to a clearer demarcation of rights. For the protection by the ECtHR of (positive)
socio-economic interests under civil and political rights norms – but perhaps
also in other complex (supranational) judicial contexts, or in other cases where
specific norms are concerned – a principled starting point seems desirable.
The Court should not ‘from scratch’ start balancing the various interests at
stake in a given case, regardless of their importance and character, as it is often
simply for the national legislator, aided by executive and national judiciary,
to conduct this important task. Proportionality review by a court like the ECtHR
may work, but only if there is a fundamental right to balance the general
interest against. In other words, the necessary (prima facie) standards need to
be set, especially in the case of socio-economic, positive claims, for the Court
to be able to conduct its proportionality review or balancing test in a trans-
6 Möller 2012.
7 Which holds ‘(1) that rights cover only a limited domain by protecting only certain especially
important interests of individuals; (2) that rights impose exclusively or primarily negative
obligations on the state; (3) that rights operate only between a citizen and his government, not
between private citizens; and (4) that rights enjoy a special normative force, which means
that they can be outweighed, if at all, only under exceptional circumstances’ (ibid., p. 2).
8 Ibid., Part I.
9 E.g., Alexy 2002; Kumm 2010; Barak 2012; Klatt and Meister 2012.
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parent fashion. A core rights perspective allows for making clear interpretive
statements on the sensitive, socio-economic dimension of the Convention,
which in turn create a starting point for what was in Chapter 3 termed ‘the
second stage’ of fundamental rights adjudication, namely that of reviewing
the justification. Moreover, even when core rights are not used to explicitly
restrict the prima facie scope of socio-economic protection, distinguishing
between core and non-core socio-economic interests may lead to more insight-
ful reasoning as well as provide a solid ground for leaving more or less leeway
to the Member States.
In the end, thus, there are some implications of this research for theorising
judicial rights reasoning. Contrary to what current trends prescribe, on the
basis of this study the argument may be made that not in every legal context
the demarcation of the scope of rights is of inferior importance. Even when
the recognition of positive obligations, indivisible protection, and the import-
ance of proportionality are applauded, there may still – or even especially –
be reason to critically look at the interpretation stage and at what we define
as rights in the first place. Defining what ‘fundamental rights’ are about should
not be given up easily, as this not only allows for deliberation on judicial
versus other powers, but also serves as a reminder of the importance of funda-
mental rights protection. The arguments presented in this study neither provide
a complete, nor a definite answer to issues concerning the development of
judicial fundamental rights protection. It is hoped that they nevertheless
provide a contribution to the continuation of a long-standing, crucially im-
portant debate that should always remain alive.

Summary
CORE RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERESTS BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
This thesis deals with the protection of socio-economic interests under the
classic fundamental rights norms enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR; Convention). Over the years the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR; Court) has come to cover an increasing number
of individual interests. Regularly, the cases it adjudicates concern socio-
economic issues like housing, health care, and social security. The question
that is addressed in the thesis is how the ECtHR can deal with such issues in
a principled way that ensures effective rights protection while at the same
time giving the necessary leeway to Member States’ social policies. In
particular, it is assessed what use or added value the notion of core rights
could have in this regard.
Part I – Setting the Stage
Chapter 2 starts out with an introduction to the ‘civil and political’ ECHR. It
traces back the history of this treaty and the reasons why it contains foremost
‘classic’ rights norms, such as the prohibition of torture and the freedom of
expression. At the time the Convention came into being there was broad
agreement on these ‘negative’ rights, whereas the meaning and the (positive)
implications of socio-economic rights were much more controversial. One of
the reasons why so much emphasis was placed on the question of which rights
should be taken up in the Convention, was that it – and this was unique at
the time – was backed up by a supranational court that obtained the power
to render binding judgments on the basis of these rights. Meanwhile, the ECtHR
has created an immense and rich body of case law, which has provided content
to the Convention rights, but also has influenced the understanding and the
protection of fundamental rights at the national level. This does not mean,
however, that the smooth functioning of the Convention system is a given.
The Court has been confronted with a steadily growing number of applications,
and recently serious measures had to be taken to prevent the system from
collapsing. Besides that, especially in recent years serious criticism has been
voiced concerning the practice of the ECtHR, by lawyers as well as by
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politicians. That the ‘successful’ ECtHR is not immune to criticism is
unsurprising given the fact that it needs to meet several demands that do not
always appear compatible: First, the Court is required to provide effective
individual rights protection, which may require far-reaching interpretations
of Convention rights and a close focus on the particularities of a case. However,
it also has a ‘constitutional’ task, in the sense that it should set clear standards
and provide guidelines with the help of which Member States can comply
with the Convention on their own. Finally, the Court must show deference
to the (democratic) decisions made by national authorities, which are generally
‘better placed’ than the Court to strike a right balance between competing
interests.
Chapter 2 also presents a preliminary overview of the socio-economic case
law of the Court. It shows that the Court has recognised that there is no ‘water-
tight division’ separating the socio-economic sphere from the sphere covered
by the Convention. The ECtHR regularly provides for ‘indirect’ socio-economic
guarantees by means of procedural review or protection against discrimination.
Furthermore, several Convention articles allow for substantive protection in
the field of socio-economic rights. For example, through the recognition of
positive obligations under Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition of torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment) it has become clear that this provision may
require states to provide the necessary (health) care – whereas the same
development under Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for private and family
life) may entail that adequate housing be provided. Also the protection of social
security benefits under the right to protection of property (Article 1 Protocol 1
to the ECHR) forms a telling example of the socio-economic dimension of the
Convention. Two explanations are then given for this phenomenon: The first
is the ‘effectiveness thesis’, which holds that it is in order to effectuate the
rights norms enshrined in the ECHR that the ECtHR protects interests that cannot
always be labelled ‘civil or political’. The Court often underlines the importance
of effective protection, and together with its teleological, autonomous, and
‘living instrument’ interpretation, this idea has led to a broad understanding
of the scope of the Convention. The second is the ‘indivisibility thesis’, which
holds that it is not just for the mere effectuation of the ECHR, but also because
of the inherent worth of economic and social rights that socio-economic
protection is regularly granted. This thesis builds upon the idea that rights
are ‘indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’, and that they must be treated
as such. ‘Indivisibility’ is clearly visible in the case law of the Court when it
explicitly refers to socio-economic norms in order to justify a ‘social’
interpretation of an ECHR right. It is argued that both theses not only explain,
but also justify the socio-economic dimension of the Convention. However,
this does not mean that they form a sufficient starting point for dealing with
complex socio-economic issues. Potentially, the socio-economic protection
offered by the ECtHR can go much further, and the question is where potential
limits to the Court’s legitimate interference in this field may be found. In line
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with this, the Court has been criticised for lacking a principled starting point
for addressing socio-economic issues. Its case law is considered to be
‘incremental’, and whereas it creates plenty of room for review of socio-
economic issues, it remains unclear what eventual protection can be expected.
Because the idea of ‘core rights protection’ is often linked to the field of
economic and social rights, yet has not been explored in any depth in relation
to the socio-economic protection under the Convention, it is worth researching
what this notion has to add in this context.
Before embarking on an investigation of the idea of core rights, Chapter
3 first presents some insights in the practice of fundamental rights adjudication,
and rights reasoning in particular. An important distinction is made between
the stage of interpretation and the stage of application. Whereas the former
concerns the determination of the scope of a fundamental right, the latter
concerns the question whether a prima facie right also obtains eventual
protection. This distinction follows from the structure of fundamental rights
understood as norms, or principles, that are not absolute but can in certain
circumstances be limited. Applied in a consistent fashion, it allows for a clear
and independent interpretation of rights. Besides the two main stages, the
determination of the intensity of review is singled out as an important task.
Generally, courts – and in particular also supranational courts – should grant
a measure of deference to decisions made by the other (national) branches.
According to what is at stake this measure may vary.
With regard to the interpretation stage, it is further clarified that different
interpretive methods and principles can point to different interpretations. Also
important is whether a broad or rather a more narrow understanding of the
scope of rights is preferred. The former allies with the idea that the government
should provide reasons for interfering in the personal sphere of individuals,
and that prima facie rights cover more than only a limited category of very
important interests. A reason for a more narrow interpretation may however
be that a (particular) court should not be competent to judge on virtually all
conflicts between (individual and general) interests. It is argued, however,
that when positive rights are concerned the determination of the scope is less
straightforward, and that this may lead to avoiding the scope question
altogether. At the application stage, where a court reviews the justification
adduced for an interference with a prima facie right, it can likewise opt for a
broader or rather a more narrow approach. That is, in line with the level of
inclusiveness of a fundamental rights norm, the room for limitations can be
considered more or less significant. At the review stage state interests should
explicitly be taken into account. Often this is done by means of proportionality
review, whereby – in the light of the aim of a particular interference – it is
assessed whether a measure was suitable, necessary, and proportional stricto
sensu. The latter test generally boils down to a balancing exercise: this implies
that the various interests at stake are ‘balanced’ against each other in order
to establish whether the individual or rather the general interest prevails.
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Alternatively, a court could make use of more ‘categorical’ modes of review
that by means of different categories and accompanying rules allow for
generating answers to fundamental rights disputes in a less ad hoc manner.
Finally, in concluding on the strictness of the test, courts also opt for different
approaches. Some of these lead to much clarity with regard the applicable
standard of review, while others, instead, provide the necessary flexibility.
For all stages and tasks it can be said that a combination of approaches is often
possible, too. Important is that the different tasks and options are there – and
that they together provide the framework for courts like the ECtHR for
adjudicating rights cases.
Part II – Core Rights Doctrines
Part II turns to the notions of ‘core rights’ and ‘core rights protection’. By
means of a comparative study of three core rights ‘doctrines’, insights are
gained on the possibilities and pitfalls inherent in the idea of core rights that
could potentially be of relevance for the Strasbourg socio-economic rights
protection. Chapter 4 starts out with a discussion of the German Wesens-
gehaltsgarantie. This guarantee holds that ‘In no case may the core content of
a constitutional right be infringed’ (Article 19(2) of the German Grundgesetz).
It provides a classic example of core rights protection in the form of a ‘limit
to limitations’. The genesis of Article 19(2) GG shows that its aim was to
prevent the legislature, and to some extent also the other branches, from
limiting fundamental rights – including positive rights – to such extent that
nothing would remain. As straightforward as this may seem, however, there
has been quite some controversy – at least in legal academic debate – on what
exactly this provision entails. The most important point of discussion is
whether the Wesensgehaltsgarantie forms an absolute or rather a relative guar-
antee. The former understanding implies that core rights are protected that
are determined independent from case-based circumstances. The relative view,
on the other hand, holds that what belongs to a right’s core must always be
determined in the light of these circumstances. ‘Relativists’ then argue that
the Wesensgehaltsgarantie does not add anything to a proportionality test, in
the sense that such a test will automatically ensure that the core of a right is
left intact: when a measure is proportional, the essence of a right simply has
not been interfered with.
It is the predominance of the relative understanding that makes that the
Wesensgehaltsgarantie hardly plays any meaningful role in the practice of the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht. Another example of what could be perceived
as a kind of core rights protection, however, is this court’s recognition of a
right to an Existenzminimum (subsistence minimum). On the basis of the
guarantee of human dignity (Article 1 GG), in combination with the ‘social
state principle’ (Article 20(1) GG), it has determined that such a minimum right
can be inferred from the Grundgesetz. This is an interesting example, for it
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shows that focusing on core socio-economic guarantees may be a means of
providing effective protection while recognising the limits to what a court can
demand in this regard. In line with this, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has held
that it cannot provide a quantitative interpretation of what a subsistence
minimum entails. Instead it has elaborated certain ‘procedural’ requirements
the legislature has to comply with when determining the minimum subsistence
level to be provided.
Chapter 5 provides further insights on what core rights protection could
entail in the particular context of socio-economic rights protection. It does so
by means of a discussion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the ‘minimum cores’ or ‘minimum core
obligations’ that have been recognised on the basis thereof. It has proven
particularly difficult to effectively monitor state compliance with the rights
enshrined in the ICESCR. These rights need to be guaranteed to the maximum
of a state’s available resources and according to the standard of ‘progressive
realisation’. This means that they need not be fully complied with from the
start, which is in line with practical realities yet creates the risk that states
cannot be held accountable for they can always claim a lack of resources. In
order to overcome this risk the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) has concretised the meaning of the different rights by
pinpointing certain rights and obligations that need to be guaranteed first and
foremost. These are termed ‘minimum core obligations’, and can be said to
‘narrow’ the problematic scope of broad socio-economic rights that – for one
reason or another – cannot be complied with entirely. Examples are given of
the core obligations related to the rights to housing, health, and social security.
It is shown that what the different ‘cores’ have in common, is that they tend
to focus on non-discrimination, on the protection of disadvantaged and
marginalised individuals and groups, and on the provision of minimum
essential levels of the various economic and social rights. Additionally, it can
be inferred from the CESCR’s General Comments that the more precise content
of core obligations can be determined not just by looking at the rights norms
themselves. Additionally, information can be gathered from ‘external sources’,
such as state practices or consensus, or expert opinions on what minimum
socio-economic protection should embody.
Chapter 6 concerns the debate on the possible use of core rights in the
context of the protection of socio-economic rights under the South African
Constitution. In South Africa, economic and social rights, such as the right
to housing, health care, food, water, and social security, have been made
explicitly justiciable. It is interesting to see how the Constitutional Court has
gone about in taking up the important, but inherently difficult task of
adjudicating these rights. Some landmark cases are presented, that signal the
Constitutional Court’s willingness to grant protection to individual socio-
economic needs, yet also show that in doing so it takes a relatively deferential
stance. It has rejected an explicit core rights approach and instead opts for
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reasonableness review. The reason for this is that it does not consider itself
capable of determining the core of the different rights, and that it cannot be
expected that even core requirements would be complied with entirely. The
debate continues, however, and the Constitutional Court’s case law is criticised
for not providing the necessary standards, lacking a bifurcated approach, and
failing to recognise that some interests are so urgent that they explicitly need
to be prioritised. Opponents of the minimum core at the same time argue that
defining core obligations gives the court a greater task than it can legitimately
claim, that this would bar further dialogue on the content of rights, and, more
generally, that there simply are no objectively determinable minimum cores.
However, different authors have suggested that it is possible to overcome the
core rights/reasonableness dichotomy. Whereas Liebenberg argues that the
reasonableness test could become more substantive (also) by looking at the
core of a right, Bilchitz develops a ‘less rigid’ minimum core approach.
According to this approach, core rights need not be absolutes in the sense that
they never allow for any limitations. Even if they do it is important to state
what socio-economic core rights must be protected as a matter of priority,
simply because these are so urgent that they cannot be ignored.
Part III – Core Rights and the ECtHR
Part III (Chapter 7) brings together parts I and II and develops a core rights
perspective tailored to the protection of socio-economic interests under the
ECHR. First, it outlines a more workable understanding of a notion that is often
perceived as redundant or impracticable. On the basis of the information
gathered through the different comparative studies, it can be said that core
rights need not necessarily be absolutes: neither in the sense that they are
determined once and for all, nor in the sense that they may never be justifiably
limited. Next to this ‘absolute-absolute’ understanding, in fact, core rights can
be relative in that they are determined in the context of a particular case while
still requiring absolute protection (‘relative-absolute’), outlined in a general
fashion while leaving some room for non-fulfilment (‘absolute-relative’), or
in the sense that both their determination and the protection offered is case-
dependent (‘relative-relative’). Moreover, core rights may be useful not only
at the review stage, but may also help determine a more workable scope of
broad (socio-economic) rights. They may be ‘indeterminable’ in some ways,
but practice has shown that they nevertheless can be workable, too. ‘Minimum’
core protection, moreover, has the potential of maximising efforts. It presents
a difficult task to the courts, but also demarcates their influential task by tying
specific consequences to the fact that a core right is concerned.
In fact, core rights protection may be seen as a notion inherent in
fundamental rights protection. To develop a particular mode of core rights
reasoning for the ECtHR, the specific role and tasks of this court must however
be kept in mind. It was argued that the ECtHR needs to provide effective rights
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protection while being mindful of its subsidiary position and providing the
necessary guidelines to enable Member States to protect the ECHR rights on
their own. In this regard it is contended that a model of absolute-relative core
rights protection would best fit the socio-economic protection of the Strasbourg
Court. This would allow for clear guidelines through the demarcation of the
scope of the Convention rights in this field. At the same time it would allow
for some flexibility in applying these core rights, which would be in line with
the fact that the ECtHR cannot always demand absolute protection, not even
when it comes to core socio-economic rights, and that in most instances it
should defer to legislative choices. In this way, a ‘core rights perspective’ could
add to the notions of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘indivisibility’ and thereby lead to
a more principled approach to economic and social rights protection under
the Convention. When it comes to the ‘content’ of the relevant cores, the
perspective that is outlined suggests that in interpreting the classic rights of
the Convention, the ECtHR could ask whether an issue concerns interference
with or the lack of minimum essential levels of socio-economic rights. If this
is the case, there is reason to link the issue at stake to the norms enshrined
in the Convention and proceed to the review stage. This should moreover be
done when a case involves the socio-economic needs of vulnerable individuals
or when alleged discrimination is concerned. At the review stage, the fact that
it is ‘core’ socio-economic matters that are being reviewed suggests that the
ECtHR should provide for meaningful, robust review. To avoid assuming policy-
making capacities in this regard, it could thereby resort to procedural forms
of review. In any case, to ensure effective, indivisible protection the ‘socio-
economic character’ of the issues involved should not automatically lead to
a wide margin of appreciation and hence to the possibility that essential social
needs are easily ‘balanced away’. Instead, due to their essential character –
albeit some room for limitations remains – the review should be strict enough
to ensure effective protection.
Part IV – The Socio-Economic Case Law of the ECtHR
This part delves more deeply into the ECtHR’s case law on particular socio-
economic issues, namely housing, health and health care, and social security.
The aim of this part is to see where there is room for improvement and
whether the perspective outlined in Part III could actually have added value
in this regard. Chapter 8 concerns the ECtHR’s case law on housing issues such
as requests for adequate accommodation meeting someone’s special needs or
protection of lessees. It shows that at the interpretation stage, the Court has
created a lot of room for (positive) housing claims, but that eventual protection
– due to a wide margin – is often not granted. A ‘case study’ on the issue of
Roma housing illuminates that there the Court’s case law comes close to
recognising a positive right to alternative housing. What it requires is that the
national authorities recognise the (special) interests of Roma people and
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explicitly ‘balance’ their interests against those of the general community by
means of a proportionality test. This forms a promising starting point for
incorporating a core rights perspective. Doing so would allow for explaining
why the essential needs of the vulnerable group of Roma must be protected
under the Convention, and how procedural review can aid in achieving this.
Chapter 9 continues with the topic of health and health care and discusses
those cases that concern ‘positive’ health issues related to the provision of care,
medication, etc. Sometimes the Court is willing (for example under Article
3 ECHR) to provide protection to individuals suffering from serious health
conditions, yet it does so in an ad hoc manner that fails to provide the necessary
clarity on what the Convention requires. Furthermore, even though complaints
concerning the provision of medication may be reviewed under (various
articles of) the Convention, due to a wide margin the added value of such
review is not always apparent. In the context of ‘environmental health’ issues
under Article 8, moreover, the Court does not always provide for a consistent
interpretation and application of the Convention. It has set certain ‘thresholds’
for holding the Convention applicable in environmental cases, but it is argued
that it should apply these in a more principled manner and that also here a
core rights perspective may prove helpful.
Finally, Chapter 10 discusses the sensitive issue of the protection of social
security under the Convention. Over the past years, the ECtHR’s case law on
this topic has expanded significantly. This has not been without problems:
after all, the link between the Convention and all kinds of social security claims
is not always a very solid one, and it may hence be asked how far the Court
can go in this regard. Also here, it has provided a lot of room for review of
social security cases, in the form of review of alleged discrimination under
Article 14 ECHR but foremost by means of a broad interpretation of the
‘possessions’ protected under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.
Often the Court even refrains from answering the difficult question why a
specific pension or other social security benefit can be considered to be a
‘possession’, to directly see whether the interference was proportional or not.
In the light of the important distinction between interpretation and review,
such an approach does not seem desirable. It is hence argued that the Court
should provide more clarity as regards the scope of Article 1 P1 in social
security issues, while also its proportionality analysis and balancing test could
be improved. It would potentially be helpful if the Court thereby would more
clearly distinguish between cases concerning essential social security claims,
the discriminatory provision of benefits and the protection of vulnerable groups
on the one hand, and more peripheral issues on the other. When the former
are concerned, regardless of the Court’s habit to ‘generally’ grant a (very) wide
margin when socio-economic policy is concerned, a core rights perspective
would allow for a stricter test as well as for clarifying why such a test is
justified.
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Chapter 11 provides the final conclusions. It draws together the different parts
of the study and concludes that the core rights perspective that was developed
in the thesis would actually fit the practice of the ECtHR. Already, the Court
sometimes emphasises that it aims at protecting the ‘essence’ of fundamental
rights, and pays (extra) attention to vulnerable individuals and protection
against discrimination. It is argued that a more explicit core rights perspective
would ‘connect the dots’ and could hence result in a more principled and less
incremental case law. More generally, what this study suggests is that in times
in which rights are generally interpreted in a broad, indivisible manner, and
reviewed by means of proportionality review, a clear demarcation of the scope




KERNRECHTEN EN DE BESCHERMING VAN SOCIAALECONOMISCHE BELANGEN DOOR
HET EUROPEES HOF VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS
Dit proefschrift gaat over de bescherming van sociaaleconomische belangen
onder de klassiek geformuleerde grondrechten die zijn neergelegd in het
Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM; Verdrag). Door de
jaren is de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens
(EHRM; Hof) een toenemend aantal individuele belangen gaan omvatten. Zo
behandelt het regelmatig zaken die gaan over sociaaleconomische belangen
verband houdende met huisvesting, gezondheidszorg, sociale zekerheid, etc.
De vraag die centraal staat in dit onderzoek is hoe het EHRM op een principiële
manier sociaaleconomische bescherming kan bieden en tegelijkertijd voldoende
ruimte kan laten voor de beleidskeuzes van de Lidstaten. Meer specifiek wordt
onderzocht wat de rol of meerwaarde van de notie van ‘kernrechten’ hierbij
zou kunnen zijn.
Deel I – ‘Setting the Stage’
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een introductie van het ‘burgerlijke en politieke’ EVRM.
Het bespreekt de historie van het Verdrag en de redenen waarom het in
beginsel ‘klassieke’ grondrechtsnormen bevat, zoals het verbod van foltering
en de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Ten tijde van de totstandkoming van het
EVRM bestond er consensus over het belang van deze ‘negatieve’ rechten, maar
waren de betekenis en (positieve) implicaties van sociaaleconomische rechten
veel meer omstreden. Een van de redenen waarom uitgebreid werd gediscus-
sieerd over welke rechten moesten worden opgenomen, was omdat het Ver-
drag – en dit was destijds uniek – de mogelijkheid creëerde voor een supra-
nationaal hof om bindende uitspraken te doen op basis van deze rechten.
Inmiddels heeft het EHRM een omvangrijke en gedetailleerde jurisprudentie
tot stand gebracht, waarmee het inhoud heeft gegeven aan de rechten die zijn
neergelegd in het EVRM, maar ook grote invloed heeft gehad op de opvattingen
over en bescherming van fundamentele rechten op nationaal niveau. Toch is
het soepel functioneren van het EVRM-systeem geen gegeven. Het Hof heeft
zich geconfronteerd gezien met een constant groeiende zaakslast, en recentelijk
waren serieuze maatregelen nodig om ervoor te zorgen dat het niet onder deze
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last zou bezwijken. Daarnaast is er in het bijzonder in de laatste jaren sprake
van serieuze kritiek op het functioneren van het Hof, afkomstig van juristen
maar ook van politici. Dat het ‘succesvolle’ EHRM niet immuun is voor kritiek
mag eigenlijk niet verbazen gezien het feit dat het wordt geacht aan verschil-
lende eisen te voldoen, die niet altijd even goed lijken samen te gaan: Ten
eerste wordt het EHRM geacht effectieve individuele rechtsbescherming te
bieden, wat kan leiden tot relatief verstrekkende interpretaties van het Verdrag
en een duidelijke focus op de omstandigheden van het geval. Tegelijkertijd
heeft het Hof ook een ‘constitutionele’ taak, wat wil zeggen dat het standaar-
den dient te creëren die duidelijkheid verschaffen aan de Lidstaten over wat
het EVRM precies vereist. Ten slotte dient het Hof ruimte te laten voor (demo-
cratische) besluiten genomen door de nationale autoriteiten, die in het alge-
meen immers als beter gesitueerd kunnen worden beschouwd dan het Hof
om een afweging te maken tussen conflicterende belangen.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft ook een eerste overzicht van de sociaaleconomische
jurisprudentie van het EHRM. Duidelijk wordt dat het Hof heeft erkend dat
er geen ‘waterdichte scheiding’ is tussen de sociaaleconomische sfeer en
datgene wat wordt beschermd onder het EVRM. Het EHRM oordeelt regelmatig
‘indirect’ over sociaaleconomische kwesties door middel van procedurele
toetsing of het bieden van bescherming tegen discriminatie. Bovendien bieden
verschillende EVRM-artikelen de mogelijkheid voor meer directe sociaaleconomi-
sche bescherming. Door middel van het erkennen van positieve verplichtingen
onder Artikel 3 EVRM (het verbod van foltering en van onmenselijke en ver-
nederende behandeling) is bijvoorbeeld duidelijk geworden dat dit artikel ook
van staten kan verlangen dat zij iemand de nodige (gezondheids)zorg verlenen
– dezelfde ontwikkeling onder Artikel 8 EVRM (recht op respect voor privé-
en familieleven) kan met zich brengen dat voor adequate huisvesting moet
worden gezorgd. Ook de bescherming van sociale zekerheidsuitkeringen onder
het eigendomsrecht (Artikel 1 Eerste Protocol EVRM) vormt een sprekend
voorbeeld van de sociaaleconomische dimensie van het Verdrag. Vervolgens
worden twee verklaringen gegeven voor dit fenomeen: de eerste is de ‘effective-
ness-thesis’, welke inhoudt dat het EHRM naast klassieke ook sociaaleconomische
belangen beschermt met als doel de EVRM-rechten te effectueren. Het Hof
benadrukt regelmatig het belang van effectieve bescherming, en in combinatie
met diens teleologische, autonome en ‘living instrument’-interpretatie heeft dit
geleid tot een ruime uitleg van het Verdrag. Ten tweede is er de ‘indivisibility-
thesis’, volgens welke de sociaaleconomische bescherming die wordt geboden
onder het Verdrag niet zozeer het gevolg is van de effectuering van EVRM-
rechten, maar (ook) van het expliciet erkennen van het inherente belang van
economische en sociale rechten. Deze uitleg steunt op de gedachte dat rechten
‘ondeelbaar, onderling afhankelijk en onlosmakelijk verbonden’ zijn, en als
zodanig moeten worden behandeld. Deze gedachte is duidelijk zichtbaar in
de rechtspraak van het Hof wanneer het expliciet verwijst naar sociaaleconomi-
sche normen om een ‘sociale’ interpretatie van een EVRM-recht te rechtvaar-
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digen. Beargumenteerd wordt dat beide thesen niet alleen de sociaaleconomi-
sche dimensie van het EVRM kunnen verklaren, maar haar ook kunnen recht-
vaardigen. Dit betekent echter niet dat ze ook een voldoende uitgangspunt
vormen voor het Hof om met complexe sociaaleconomische zaken om te gaan.
Er is ruimte voor verdere uitbreiding van de sociaaleconomische bescherming,
en de vraag is dan ook waar mogelijke grenzen aan de bevoegdheden van
het Hof op dit terrein kunnen worden gevonden. In lijn hiermee wordt het
Hof bekritiseerd vanwege het niet bieden van ‘principiële’ bescherming in
sociaaleconomische kwesties. De jurisprudentie van het Hof op dit terrein
wordt als ‘ad hoc’ en ‘incrementeel’ aangeduid, en waar het enerzijds veel
ruimte laat voor het toetsen van sociale kwesties, blijft tegelijkertijd onduidelijk
welke uiteindelijke bescherming mag worden verwacht. Omdat de notie van
‘kernrechten’ regelmatig in verband wordt gebracht met sociaaleconomische
rechtsbescherming, maar nog niet grondig is onderzocht in relatie tot het
bieden van sociaaleconomische bescherming onder het EVRM, is het interessant
te onderzoeken wat deze notie hier zou kunnen bijdragen.
Voordat wordt begonnen met een onderzoek naar de idee van kernrechten,
biedt hoofdstuk 3 eerst verschillende inzichten in de praktijk van rechterlijke
beoordeling, en rechterlijke argumentatie in het bijzonder. Een belangrijk
onderscheid wordt hierbij gemaakt tussen de interpretatiefase en de toetsings-
fase. Waar de eerste het afbakenen van de reikwijdte van een fundamenteel
recht betreft, gaat het bij de laatste om de vraag of een prima facie-recht ook
uiteindelijke bescherming verdient. Dit onderscheid volgt uit de structuur van
grondrechten opgevat als normen, of beginselen, die niet absoluut zijn maar
in sommige gevallen beperkt mogen worden. Wanneer dit onderscheid conse-
quent wordt toegepast, kan het zorgen voor een duidelijke en onafhankelijke
interpretatie van grondrechten. Naast de twee hoofdfasen wordt ook aandacht
besteed aan het bepalen van de intensiteit van de rechterlijke toetsing. In het
algemeen moeten rechters – en supranationale rechters in het bijzonder –
voldoende afstand bewaren tot de besluiten die zijn genomen door de andere
(nationale) machten. De precieze intensiteit van de toets kan vervolgens aange-
past worden aan de omstandigheden van een zaak.
Met betrekking tot de interpretatiefase wordt vervolgens duidelijk gemaakt
dat verschillende interpretatiemethoden en -beginselen in de richting van
verschillende interpretaties kunnen wijzen. Ook belangrijk is een eventuele
voorkeur voor een ruime of juist een beperkte opvatting van de reikwijdte
van grondrechten. Een ruime opvatting sluit aan bij de gedachte dat de over-
heid redenen dient te geven voor inmenging in de persoonlijke sfeer van
individuen, en dat prima facie-rechten meer dan een beperkt aantal zeer belang-
rijke belangen omvatten. Reden voor een meer beperkte opvatting zou echter
kunnen zijn dat het niet aan een (bepaalde) rechter is om uitspraak te doen
over praktisch alle conflicten waarbij verschillende (individuele en algemene)
belangen aan de orde zijn. Beargumenteerd wordt dat vooral bij positieve
rechten het echter niet zo eenvoudig is om voor een duidelijke afbakening
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te zorgen, en dat dit tot gevolg kan hebben dat de interpretatievraag in het
geheel niet wordt beantwoord. Ook in de toetsingsfase kan gekozen worden
voor een ruime of een engere aanpak. Dat wil zeggen, in lijn met een ruime
of juist beperkte interpretatie van grondrechten kan de ruimte voor beperkin-
gen van grondrechten als meer of minder omvattend worden opgevat. In de
toetsingsfase dienen de belangen van de staat expliciet te worden meegenomen.
Vaak gebeurt dit door middel van een proportionaliteitstoets, waarbij – in het
licht van het doel van de beperking – wordt gekeken of een maatregel geschikt,
noodzakelijk en proportioneel stricto sensu was. Deze laatste toets komt door-
gaans neer op een ‘afweging’ van de verschillende aan de orde zijnde belangen
om op die manier te kijken of het individuele of toch het algemene belang
aan het langste eind trekt. Als alternatief kan gebruik worden gemaakt van
meer ‘categorische’ toetsingsmethoden die met behulp van categorieën en
bijbehorende regels mogelijkheden bieden voor het beslechten van conflicten
op een manier die minder ad hoc van aard is. Tot slot, ook bij het bepalen van
de intensiteit van de toets kunnen rechters voor verschillende aanpakken
kiezen. Sommige daarvan geven veel duidelijkheid over (de striktheid van)
de toe te passen toets, terwijl andere, in plaats daarvan, voor de nodige flexibi-
liteit zorgen. Voor alle fasen en taken geldt dat een combinatie van aanpakken
eveneens tot de mogelijkheden behoort. Belangrijk is dat de verschillende
opties er zijn – en dat deze tezamen het raamwerk vormen voor het beslechten
van fundamentele rechten-kwesties door rechterlijke instanties zoals het EHRM.
Deel II – Kernrechtdoctrines
Deel II bespreekt de concepten ‘kernrechten’ en ‘kernrechtbescherming’. Door
middel van een vergelijkende studie van drie ‘kernrechtdoctrines’ worden
inzichten verkregen in de kansen en mogelijke problemen van kernrecht-
bescherming die relevant kunnen zijn voor de bescherming van sociaaleconomi-
sche rechten onder het EVRM. Hoofdstuk 4 begint met een bespreking van de
Duitse Wesensgehaltsgarantie. Deze garantie houdt in dat ‘in geen geval de kern
van een grondrecht mag worden beperkt’ (Arikel 19(2) Grundgesetz). Het betreft
een klassiek voorbeeld van kernrechtbescherming in de vorm van een ‘beper-
king aan beperkingen’ van grondrechten. De historische achtergrond van
Artikel 19(2) GG laat zien dat het doel van deze bepaling was om de wetgever,
en tot op zekere hoogte ook de uitvoerende en de rechterlijke macht, ervan
te weerhouden grondrechten – inclusief positieve rechten – zodanig te beperken
dat er praktisch niets overblijft. Door de jaren heen is er behoorlijk wat discus-
sie geweest – althans in de juridische literatuur en in de verschillende Grund-
gesetz-commentaren – over wat Artikel 19(2) precies inhoudt. Het belangrijkste
punt van debat is de vraag of de Wesensgehaltsgarantie als ‘absolute’ of eerder
als ‘relatieve’ garantie moet worden aangemerkt. Volgens de absolute opvatting
moeten kernrechten worden beschermd die onafhankelijk zijn van de specifieke
omstandigheden van het geval. De relatieve theorie, aan de andere kant, houdt
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in dat wat onder een kern van een recht moet worden verstaan enkel kan
worden bepaald in het licht van deze omstandigheden. ‘Relativisten’ beargu-
menteren dat de Wesensgehaltsgarantie niet daadwerkelijk iets toevoegt aan
de proportionaliteitstoets, omdat een dergelijke toets er automatisch voor zou
zorgen dat de kern van een recht wordt beschermd: als een maatregel propor-
tioneel is, is de kern daarvan simpelweg niet aangetast.
Dat de relatieve theorie de dominante is, uit zich ook in het feit dat de
Wesensgehaltsgarantie in de praktijk van het Duitse Constitutionele Hof, het
Bundeseverfassungsgericht, nauwelijks een rol speelt. Een ander voorbeeld van
wat als kernrechtbescherming kan worden bestempeld is echter de erkenning
van het Bundeseverfassungsgericht van een recht op een bestaansminimum
(Existenzminimum). Op basis van de garantie van de menselijke waardigheid
(Artikel 1 GG), in combinatie met het ‘Sozialstaatsprinzip’ (Artikel 20(1) GG),
is bepaald dat een recht op een dergelijk minimum afgeleid kan worden uit
de Grondwet. Dit is een interessant voorbeeld, omdat het laat zien dat een
focus op ‘kern’-sociaaleconomische rechten een manier kan zijn om effectieve
bescherming te bieden terwijl tegelijkertijd wordt erkend dat de mogelijkheden
van de rechter in deze context beperkt zijn. In lijn hiermee heeft het Bundesver-
fassungsgericht aangegeven dat het geen ‘kwantitatieve’ uitleg kan geven aan
wat een bestaansminimum precies inhoudt. In plaats daarvan heeft het verschil-
lende ‘procedurele’ vereisten geformuleerd waaraan de wetgever moet voldoen
bij het vaststellen van het precieze minimum waarin wordt voorzien.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat nader in op de (mogelijke) betekenis van kernrecht-
beschrming in het bijzonder in de context van sociaaleconomische rechten.
Dit gebeurt door middel van een bespreking van het Internationaal Verdrag
inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten (IVESCR) en de ‘minimum-
kernen’ (‘minimum cores’) of ‘minimum core’-verplichtingen die op basis daarvan
zijn vastgesteld. Het is bijzonder moeilijk om de naleving van de rechten die
zijn neergelegd in het IVESCR effectief te monitoren. De standaard voor imple-
mentatie van deze rechten is ‘progressieve realisatie’, in het licht van de aan
de staat ter beschikking staande middelen. Dit houdt in dat de rechten niet
vanaf het begin volledig gegarandeerd hoeven te worden, wat aansluit bij de
praktische realiteit dat dit simpelweg niet haalbaar zou zijn, maar tegelijkertijd
ook het risico in zich draagt dat staten niet verantwoordelijk kunnen worden
gehouden omdat zij zich altijd kunnen beroepen op een gebrek aan middelen.
Om dit risico te beperken heeft het Comité Economische, Sociale en Culturele
Rechten (CESCR) de inhoud van de verschillende rechten proberen te verduide-
lijken door het aanwijzen van verschillende rechten en plichten die in elk geval,
of althans met voorrang gegarandeerd dienen te worden. Het gaat hier om
‘minimum kernverplichtingen’ (‘minimum core obligations’) waarvan kan worden
gezegd dat ze de problematische reikwijdte van breed geformuleerde sociaal-
economische grondrechten – die om wat voor reden dan ook niet in hun geheel
kunnen worden gegarandeerd – beperken en verduidelijken. Voorbeelden
worden gegeven van de kernverplichtingen die behoren bij het recht op
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huisvesting, gezondheid en sociale zekerheid. Duidelijk wordt dat wat de
verschillende ‘kernen’ gemeen hebben is een focus op non-discriminatie, op
de bescherming van achtergestelde en gemarginaliseerde groepen, en op het
voorzien in een ‘minimumniveau’ van de verschillende rechten. Bovendien
kan uit de General Comments van de CESCR worden afgeleid dat de meer precie-
ze inhoud van sociaaleconomische kernrechten niet alleen bepaald kan worden
door te kijken naar het recht zelf, maar ook met behulp van ‘externe bronnen’,
zoals de praktijken van of consensus onder staten, of de opinies van experts
ten aanzien van wat minimum sociaaleconomische bescherming dient te
omvatten.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt het debat over het mogelijke nut van kernrechten
in de context van de bescherming van sociaaleconomische rechten onder de
Zuid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. In Zuid-Afrika kunnen economische en sociale
rechten worden ingeroepen voor de rechter, en het is interessant om te zien
hoe het Constitutionele Hof daar omgaat met de belangrijke maar ook zeer
moeilijke taak van het beschermen van deze rechten. Enkele landmark cases
worden besproken, waaruit kan worden opgemaakt dat het Constitutionele
Hof bereid is op te komen voor deze rechten, maar daarbij tegelijkertijd wel
vrij afstandelijk toetst. Het heeft een expliciete kernrechtaanpak verworpen
en toetst in plaats daarvan of dat wat de autoriteiten hebben gedaan of hebben
nagelaten, ‘redelijk’ was. De reden hiervoor is dat het Hof zich niet in staat
acht tot het bepalen van de kern van de verschillende rechten en bovendien
dat het een illusie is om te denken dat kernrechten onmiddellijk zouden
kunnen worden gegarandeerd. Desondanks gaat het debat verder, en wordt
de rechtspraak van het Constitutionele Hof bekritiseerd vanwege het feit dat
het geen duidelijke standaarden creëert, niet gekenmerkt wordt door een ‘twee-
fasen’-toets, en op die manier niet erkent dat er individuele sociaaleconomische
belangen zijn die zo urgent zijn dat ze expliciet prioriteit vereisen. Tegenstan-
ders van de minimum core beargumenteren dat het definiëren van kernverplich-
tingen niet behoort tot de taken van de rechter, dat dit een verdere dialoog
over de inhoud van sociaaleconomische rechten zou blokkeren, en dat er
simpelweg geen objectief bepaalbare kernen zijn. Niettemin laten verschillende
auteurs zien dat het mogelijk is om een brug te slaan tussen een aanpak
gebaseerd op kernrechten en redelijkheidstoetsing. Liebenberg beargumenteert
dat de redelijkheidstoets meer inhoudelijk kan worden als de rechter (ook)
in ogenschouw neemt of de kern van een recht aan de orde is of niet, terwijl
Bilchitz een ‘minder rigide’ kernrechtaanpak voorstelt. Deze aanpak houdt
in dat kernrechten niet per se altijd absolute bescherming genieten. Zelfs als
er enige ruimte voor gerechtvaardigde beperkingen bestaat is het volgens
Bilchitz echter van het grootste belang om duidelijkheid te verschaffen over
welke ‘kernaspecten’ prioriteit verdienen, simpelweg omdat de bescherming
ervan zo urgent is dat ze niet mogen worden genegeerd.
Deel III – Kernrechten en het EHRM
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In Deel III (Hoofdstuk 7) worden de delen I en II samengebracht en wordt
een ‘kernrechtperspectief’ ontwikkeld dat aansluit op de sociaaleconomische
bescherming onder het EVRM. Allereerst wordt een meer werkbare interpretatie
gepresenteerd van een notie die niet zelden als ‘overbodig’ of ‘onpraktisch’
wordt bestempeld. Op basis van de informatie die is verkregen door middel
van de vergelijkende kernrechtsudies kan worden gezegd dat kernrechten niet
per se ‘absoluut’ hoeven te zijn. Kernrechten hoeven niet voor eens en voor
altijd gedefinieerd te worden en het hoeft evenmin te gaan om aspecten van
rechten die nooit aan beperkingen onderhevig kunnen zijn. Naast een ‘absolute-
absolute’-opvatting van kernrechten – waarbij zowel de definitie als de bescher-
ming absoluut is – kan er ook gesproken worden van kernen die in een be-
paald opzicht relatief zijn. Bij ‘relative-absolute cores’ wordt de inhoud bepaald
in de context van een specifieke zaak, maar wordt wel ‘absolute’ bescherming
geboden, terwijl er ook kernen zijn die worden bepaald in een algemene,
zaaksonafhankelijke zin, maar die niettemin (enige) ruimte voor beperking
laten (‘absolute-relative’). Ten slotte kunnen zowel de definitie van kernrechten
als de bescherming die deze ‘essentiële’ rechten verdienen relatief worden
opgevat (‘relative-relative’). Bovendien kunnen kernrechten niet alleen relevant
zijn in de toetsingsfase, tijdens welke de gegeven rechtvaardiging voor een
inbreuk op een recht wordt getoetst, maar ook bij de bepaling van de reikwijd-
te van ruim geformuleerde, sociaaleconomische grondrechten (in de interpreta-
tiefase). Ze mogen dan misschien in een bepaald opzicht ‘onbepaalbaar’ zijn,
in de praktijk is duidelijk geworden dat kernrechten wel degelijk werkbaar
kunnen zijn. ‘Minimum’ kernrechtbescherming kan bovendien tot ‘maximale’
bescherming leiden. Het vormt een lastige opdracht voor de rechter, maar biedt
tevens houvast, zodat van rechterlijk activisme geen sprake hoeft te zijn.
In feite kan kernrechtbescherming worden gezien als iets wat inherent is
aan de bescherming van fundamentele rechten. Om een model van kernrecht-
argumentatie te ontwikkelen dat aansluit op de praktijk van het EHRM is het
echter wel noodzakelijk om de precieze rol en taken van dit Hof in het achter-
hoofd te houden. Duidelijk is geworden dat het EHRM moet zorgen voor
effectieve, individuele rechtsbescherming. Tegelijkertijd moet het zich bewust
zijn van zijn supranationale positie en de nodige richtlijnen verstrekken op
basis waarvan Lidstaten in staat worden gesteld om zelf de verschillende EVRM-
rechten te garanderen. In het licht hiervan wordt beargumenteerd dat ‘absolute-
relative’-kernrechtbescherming het beste zou passen bij de sociaaleconomische
bescherming van het Straatsburgse Hof. Dit biedt ruimte voor het creëren van
duidelijke richtlijnen door middel van het afbakenen van de reikwijdte van
de EVRM-rechten op dit terrein. Tegelijkertijd laat het bij het toetsen aan het
deze rechten enige ruimte voor gerechtvaardigde beperkingen, wat aansluit
bij het feit dat het supranationale EHRM niet altijd absolute bescherming kan
verlangen, zelfs niet wanneer het om kernaspecten van soicaaleconomische
rechten gaat. Op deze manier kan een ‘kernrechtperspectief’ iets toevoegen
aan de uitgangspunten van ‘effectieve’ en ‘ondeelbare’ bescherming, en leiden
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tot een meer principiële aanpak van sociaaleconomische bescherming onder
het Verdrag. Wat de inhoud van de verschillende ‘kernen’ betreft, suggereert
het ontwikkelde ‘perspectief’ dat bij het interpreteren van de klassieke EVRM-
rechten moet worden nagegaan of een klacht minimum essential levels van
sociaaleconomische rechten betreft. Als dit het geval is, is er reden om de
klacht onder de reikwijdte van het Verdrag te scharen en kan vervolgd worden
met toetsing. Dit dient eveneens te gebeuren wanneer een zaak de sociaaleco-
nomische belangen van kwetsbare individuen en groepen betreft of wanneer
er sprake is van vermeende discriminatie. Aangekomen bij de toetsingsfase
betekent het feit dat er ‘kern’-sociaaleconomische belangen in het geding zijn
dat er serieuze, robuuste bescherming moet worden geboden. Om te voor-
komen dat het Hof hierbij overgaat tot het maken van gevoelige beleidskeuzes,
kan het daarbij gebruikmaken van ‘procedurele’ eisen. In elk geval, om effectie-
ve, ondeelbare bescherming te garanderen, dient het sociaaleconomische
karakter van een kwestie niet automatisch een ruime margin of appreciation
tot gevolg te hebben. In plaats daarvan, en ook al is er enige ruimte voor
gerechtvaardigde beperkingen, moet de toets strikt genoeg zijn om daadwerke-
lijke bescherming van essentiële sociaaleconomische rechten te kunnen garande-
ren.
Deel IV – De Sociaaleconomische Jurisprudentie van het EHRM
Deel IV gaat dieper in op de jurisprudentie van het EHRM over kwesties
betreffende huisvesting, gezondheid en gezondheidszorg en sociale zekerheid.
Het doel van dit deel van het boek is na te gaan of het ontwikkelde kernrecht-
perspectief concrete meerwaarde zou kunnen hebben. Hoofdstuk 8 gaat over
de rechtspraak van het Hof over huisvestingskwesties zoals verzoeken om
een adequaat onderkomen of de bescherming van huurders. Duidelijk wordt
dat de interpretatie van het Hof veel ruimte heeft gecreëerd voor toetsing van
(positieve) claims betreffende huisvesting, maar dat uiteindelijke bescherming
– mede door de ruime margin of appreciation – niet vaak wordt geboden. Een
case study van zaken over huisvesting van Roma laat zien dat de jurisprudentie
van het Hof in de richting lijkt te gaan van het erkennen van een recht op
alternatieve huisvesting. Wat het EHRM verlangt is dat de nationale autoriteiten
de (bijzondere) belangen van Roma onderkennen en expliciet afwegen tegen
het algemene belang door middel van een proportionaliteitstoets. Dit vormt
een veelbelovend startpunt voor een op kernrechten gerichte aanpak. Een
dergelijke aanpak zou duidelijk maken waarom de essentiële belangen van
de kwetsbare Roma (prima facie) bescherming verdienen onder het Verdrag,
en hoe procedurele garanties hierbij behulpzaam kunnen zijn.
Hoofdstuk 9 bespreekt de rechtspraak over gezondheid en gezondheids-
zorg, en in het bijzonder die zaken die gaan over ‘positieve’ claims betreffende
de verkrijging van zorg, medicijnen, etc. In sommige gevallen, bijvoorbeeld
in de context van Artikel 3 EVRM, is het Hof bereid om bescherming te bieden
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aan individuen die ernstig ziek zijn. Het doet dit echter op een zeer ad hoc-
wijze, waardoor er onduidelijkheid blijft bestaan over wat het Verdrag op dit
terrein precies vereist. Bovendien, hoewel klachten over (een gebrek aan)
medicatie aan verschillende Verdragsartikelen kunnen worden getoetst, is de
meerwaarde van deze toetsing mede door het toekennen van een ruime margin
niet altijd duidelijk. Om die reden kan de vraag worden gesteld of het Hof
in sommige gevallen überhaupt wel tot toetsing moet overgaan. Tot slot
beoordeelt het Hof regelmatig zaken over milieubescherming in relatie tot
gezondheidskwesties onder Artikel 8 EVRM. De ‘drempelwaarden’ die het heeft
gecreëerd voor toepassing van het Verdrag in milieuzaken hanteert het echter
niet altijd op consistente wijze. Beargumenteerd wordt dat hier ruimte is voor
verbetering en dat met behulp van een kernrechtperspectief zowel de interpre-
tatie als de (procedurele) toetsing in mileukwesties op een meer transparante
manier kan plaatsvinden.
Tot slot gaat Hoofdstuk 10 in op de – gevoelige – bescherming van sociale
zekerheid onder het EVRM. Met name in de laatste jaren is het Hof zich steeds
meer in gaan laten met sociale zekerheidskwesties. Dit kan problemen opleve-
ren, niet in de laatste plaats omdat de relatie tussen sociale zekerheid en de
in het EVRM neergelegde normen niet heel solide is, en de vraag rijst dan ook
hoe ver het Hof in deze context kan gaan. Ook in zaken betreffende sociale
zekerheid heeft het Hof veel ruimte geboden voor toetsing, onder Artikel 14
EVRM (non-discriminatie) maar bovenal via een ruime interpretatie van de
‘eigendommen’ die worden beschermd onder het recht op bescherming van
eigendom (Artikel 1 van het Eerste Protocol bij het EVRM). Daarbij laat het EHRM
regelmatig in het midden of en waarom een bepaald belang precies als ‘eigen-
dom’ kan worden aangemerkt, om direct over te gaan tot de vraag of de
inbreuk proportioneel was of niet. In het licht van het belangrijke onderscheid
tussen interpretatie en toetsing is een dergelijke aanpak onwenselijk. Beargu-
menteerd wordt daarom dat het Hof meer duidelijkheid moet verschaffen
betreffende precieze reikwijdte van Artikel 1 EP in sociale zekerheidskwesties,
terwijl ook de proportionaliteitstoets transparanter zou moeten zijn. Het zou
zinvol kunnen zijn als het Hof daarbij een duidelijker onderscheid maakt
tussen kwesties die essentiële sociale zekerheidsaanspraken betreffen, dan wel
vermeende discriminatie of de bescherming van kwetsbare groepen, en zaken
die gaan over meer ‘perifere’ klachten. Ongeacht de gewoonte van het Hof
om in zaken over sociaaleconomisch beleid een ruime margin te laten, zou,
als kern-sociaalecoomische kwesties aan de orde zijn, een ‘kernrechtperspectief’
ervoor kunnen zorgen dat een striktere toets wordt aangelegd en duidelijk
maken waarom een dergelijke toets gerechtvaardigd is.
Hoofdstuk 11 presenteert de uiteindelijke conclusies. Het brengt de verschillen-
de onderdelen van het onderzoek samen en concludeert dat het ontwikkelde
kernrechtperspectief daadwerkelijk inpasbaar zou zijn in de rechtspraak van
het EHRM. Zo af en toe verwijst het Hof al naar het belang van het beschermen
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van de ‘essentie’ van fundamentele rechten, en biedt het (extra) bescherming
aan kwetsbare groepen en tegen discriminatie. Een meer expliciet kernrechtper-
spectief kan deze verschillende aspecten samenbrengen tot een coherente
aanpak en op die manier bijdragen aan een principiëlere sociaaleconomische
rechtspraak. Tot slot kan meer algemeen uit dit onderzoek worden opgemaakt
dat in tijden waarin rechten in het algemeen zeer ruim worden uitgelegd, en
rechterlijke beoordeling plaatsvindt door middel van proportionaliteitstoetsing,
een duidelijke afbakening van (sociaaleconomische) rechten en/of een focus
op de belangrijkste aspecten daarvan, nog steeds van belang kan zijn.
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